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ABSTRACT 
The modern corporation is the dominant institution of the Canadian political economy. 
Does this imply that ‘corporate power’ is a meaningful concept in the Canadian context? 
What role has globalization played in restructuring the corporate sector? Are large firms 
controlled by salary-oriented managers or profit-seeking proprietors? Do mergers and 
acquisitions fuel the expansion of large firms? Why has Canada experienced slower GDP 
growth in recent decades? And how can we account for the level and pattern of Canadian 
income inequality? These and other questions are probed in this dissertation using tools 
from a variety of heterodox political-economic perspectives, including Nitzan and 
Bichler’s ‘capital as power’ framework, Institutionalism and Post Keynesianism. The 
reader will be introduced to some of the assumptions, concepts and theoretical claims 
that steer the research. The history of Canadian business will be reinterpreted and 
scholarship on the modern corporation surveyed. This will set the stage for an 
examination of large firms, or ‘dominant capital’, in Canada over the postwar period. This 
study provides the first long-term estimates for aggregate concentration and for 
corporate amalgamation. It devises metrics to capture the distributive struggle between 
capital and labour and for the globalization of merger activity. The structure of corporate 
ownership is laid bare, linkages between amalgamation and concentration are 
established and the association between the growth of large firms and GDP stagnation is 
charted. The dissertation closes by establishing points of contact between the 
amassment of corporate power and income inequality.  
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PREFACE 
On the eleventh of September, 2001, the scales fell from my eyes and I awoke into 
political consciousness. As a North America born under the protective blanket of 
postwar security, the carnage of that historic day was emotionally and psychologically 
destabilizing like nothing I had ever experienced. In hindsight, it was not so much the 
fact that airplanes were deliberately steered into the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon that shook me; it was the meaning of the event that I could not comprehend. 
Why would human beings be motivated to undertake such a horrendous act? Nothing in 
my experience prepared me to assimilate that event into a broader map of meaning.  
The terror of that fateful day demonstrated to me more clearly than any scholastic 
lecture ever could how little I understood about the world around me. As a consequence I 
became determined to learn how the world works, but as a major in economics, 
accounting and finance my studies did not seem to adequately prepare me to understand 
human activity outside of business. I began to read the newspaper as a way of getting in 
touch with broader events, and this helped somewhat, but even the language used in 
ordinary news reporting was outside my grasp. People used terms like ‘globalization’ and 
‘solidarity’, spoke regularly of ‘liberalization’ and referred to institutions like the World 
Bank and IMF, but I had great difficulty navigating the torrent of information that was 
coming my way. I soon realized that if I was to understand something as straightforward 
as the daily news I needed a broader intellectual frame within which to view the micro 
activity of daily events.  
xvii 
 
I started expanding the scope of my readings to include scholarship in a broad 
array of fields, including philosophy, politics, history and psychology. After receiving my 
B.A., I took a job as a researcher at an economic policy think tank. Even though I felt 
fortunate to have secured such a stimulating job, the most exciting part of my day was 
the time spent outside the office, voraciously reading whatever I could get my hands on. 
One short year after completing my undergraduate studies I re-enrolled in a year’s worth 
of political science courses — a field I had managed to entirely avoid as an 
undergraduate. I was unsure of what I wanted to learn, but politics seemed to be a broad 
enough area to hold my interest. A course in the history of Western political thought 
seemed particularly promising. Reading Plato’s Republic had a profound effect on me. It 
was captivating and beautiful. It asked big questions about justice and the meaning of 
human life. It blended philosophy with politics by exploring the linkages between 
knowledge and power. It advertised a life of virtue and packaged its message in a 
compelling dialogue. I had found what I was looking for. Reading Plato’s dialogues made 
me want a future that included contact with big ideas.  
 The following year I enrolled in a Master’s program in political science, 
specializing in the history of political thought, with the objective of graduating to a 
doctoral program and then, more distantly, a career in academia. My early years in the 
doctoral program brought me to Professor Jonathan Nitzan’s graduate courses. Political 
economy was a subject that I found mildly interesting, but I could never get overly 
stimulated about trade agreements and industrial policy. Professor Nitzan’s teaching and 
his writings with Shimshon Bichler brought the subject to life for me.  
xviii 
 
Instead of inflation being a mysterious process pertaining to increases in the price 
level, Nitzan and Bichler argued that inflation could be a power process nourished on 
social conflict which systematically redistributes income between different groups. 
Instead of mergers and acquisitions being a dull activity pertaining to the combination of 
businesses, Nitzan and Bichler claimed that corporate amalgamation could play a key 
role in restructuring broader social institutions. Instead of warfare in the Middle East 
being a phenomenon outside the domain of ‘economics’, Nitzan and Bichler made the 
accumulation of capital and mechanized warfare aspects of a broader social process. In 
short, instead of political economy being a subject whose historical significance resided 
in the past, when the Cold War struggle between capitalism and socialism raged, 
Professor Nitzan made the subject deeply contemporary in its significance.  
 Despite the appeal of his approach, I was apprehensive of working with Professor 
Nitzan. His ideas seemed extreme and yet I could not deny their appeal, to say nothing of 
their explanatory power. As a way of resolving this intellectual tension I made an 
agreement with myself: I would utilize Nitzan and Bichler’s ideas (along with other 
Institutionalist and Post Keynesian thinkers) for my dissertation research without 
committing myself to them. The ideas would have to demonstrate their usefulness to me 
in practice. In a loose sense I would ‘test’ the validity of the ideas by putting them to 
work and seeing what they could help me uncover. I decided to probe the history of 
Canadian capitalism from the standpoint of ‘dominant capital’ — one of the core 
concepts in Nitzan and Bichler’s toolkit.  
xix 
 
 This study explores the postwar development of large Canadian-based firms from 
the standpoint of institutional power. Examining business behaviour and performance 
from a power perspective is unorthodox, but it is not without precedent. Thorstein 
Veblen, Gardiner Means, Adolf Berle, Michal Kalecki, J.K. Galbraith and other heterodox 
political economists in the twentieth century incorporated power into their explanatory 
picture. Nitzan and Bichler, of course, put power at the centre of their analysis. In what 
follows, I will utilize some of the ideas of the thinkers mentioned above, but I do not 
claim any allegiance to them. Nor do I endorse any normative vision or political program 
that may be associated with these ideas.  
Over the past decade, my academic life has been largely devoted to studying 
intellectual systems. As a consequence, I have grown cautious of commitment to any 
particular ideological belief. This is not to say that epistemological relativism, ethical 
relativism or nihilism is an endorsable position. Rather, ideological and utopian thinking 
itself can be a danger. This study is a dual exploration: the explicit object of inquiry is the 
development of large firms, but the implicit object of inquiry is the validity of the 
multiple heterodox political-economic perspectives that are employed. To my mind, 
there is explanatory utility in studying the development of large firms from the 
standpoint of institutional power, but this is a judgement best left to the reader. 
 
Jordan Brennan 
 
May, 2014 
York University, Toronto 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction:  
Problematizing Canada’s Fiscal Fiefdoms  
 
 
It isn’t merely the origin of a city that we’re considering, it seems, but the origin of a 
luxurious city… [So] let’s study a city with a fever, if that’s what you want.  
- Socrates in Plato (1992) 
 
 
 
 
In their joint investigation of the nature of justice, Socrates and his interlocutors agree 
that they should first look for it in an ideal city — a ‘city in speech’ or kallipolis — 
because, given its larger size, it will be easier to find there than in the human soul. The 
first step in this rather strange undertaking is to identify the founding principle of the 
kallipolis: lacking self-sufficiency, individuals are compelled to cooperate in order to 
survive. From there, Socrates claims that the city in speech will require agricultural 
surplus and a division of labour in order to meet the requirements of life (only later will 
they speak of the good life). After adding a few other categories of employment, namely 
tradesman and merchants, Socrates suggests the ideal city is complete. Each individual 
has an occupation which contributes to the harmonious working of the whole and the 
kallipolis is structured to meet its material needs.  
Content to begin searching for the feature of this city which makes it just, 
Socrates is interrupted by Glaucon, who objects to the Spartan structure of Socrates’ 
linguistic metropolis. Glaucon protests that, lacking delicacies, Socrates has created a 
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city ‘fit for pigs’, as it is almost entirely without culture and so unsuitable for civilized 
life. Socrates absorbs the criticism and proceeds to address Glaucon’s objection, but not 
before qualifying the nature of their undertaking: it isn’t the origin of a city they’re 
investigating, but the origin of a luxurious city, a city with a fever (Plato 1992: 47-48).   
 Modern people normally attribute the observation that material surplus and 
social conflict are necessary complements to that most famous of political pamphlets. 
When Marx and Engels claimed that ‘the history of all hitherto society is the history of 
class struggles’ (1848: 219), they were not making a novel claim, at least from an 
analytical point of view. Plato recognized that the ceaseless pursuit of material wealth 
begets social pathology (‘fever’). The brilliance of Marx and Engels’ claim was that it 
wasn’t just a heuristic starting point; it was a historical truth claim which is supported 
by contemporary anthropology (Diamond 1999) and interpretive history (Wright 2006).1 
Before a society can have a recorded history it requires a class of people who have been 
freed from direct food production and can devote their time to literary pursuits. Societies 
without material surplus cannot sustain a divided class structure and so have no ‘history’ 
in the literary sense of the term.  
Contemporary scholars are thinking and writing in the imposing shadow cast by 
Plato, not least because most researchers are stationed in his Academy. As the inventor of 
political philosophy, Plato was the first to write of the political world in a systematic 
way, fusing logos with mythos, a practice which has since been instituted in our 
                                                          
1 Historical sociologists like Mann (1986: 216) claim that economic power has existed in all known civilized 
societies. Domination of one group by another through control over the production, distribution or 
exchange of resources is a civilizational universal. However, it was only in Classical Greece that class 
struggle is first observed as a stable feature of political life. 
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civilization. Part of the task of political philosophy is to fashion intellectual kosmos out of 
political khaos. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the great works of political philosophy 
have come at a time of crisis and disintegration. As the established orders of meaning 
begin to whither and the major institutions of society rupture, a great thinker emerges to 
explain, critique and occasionally rebuild the political world.  
 If institutional decay and disintegration have tended to attract the attention of 
political thinkers, institutional growth and development requires explanation as well. 
This study will explore the evolution of the largest corporate units in Canada, treated as 
a bloc, over the postwar era. This is an unusual object of inquiry. As a discipline, political 
science tends to confine its attention to the state and government, political parties and 
elections, citizens, their rights and other unambiguously ‘political’ phenomena. 
Economics includes business performance and markets in its domain of inquiry, but it is 
very rare for economists to examine business development from the standpoint of 
institutional power. If power is probed by mainstream economists at all it is often treated 
as residing outside the ordinary functioning of markets and business. Even Canadian 
political economy, for its part, has tended to concentrate its efforts on the transformation 
of the Canadian State and public policy. Few Canadian political economists have 
examined corporate development, even fewer from the standpoint of institutional power.  
 This study will explore the growth of one of the most important institutions in 
contemporary Canada: the large corporation. It will chronicle its origins and chart its 
development. Given the centrality of the corporate form in shaping social and political 
life, other institutions and processes (aside from large firms) will also be examined. By 
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the end of the study it is hoped that the reader will have a clearer picture of the evolution 
of postwar Canadian capitalism.  
The present chapter has three parts. The first outlines some of the key questions to 
be addressed in this study, the second provides a condensed version of the argument and 
the third outlines the path that the argument will follow. 
 
1.1 The Questions 
The overarching question to be addressed in this study is whether corporate power is a 
meaningful category in the Canadian context.2 This question presupposes another: is 
corporate power a valid concept to begin with? Some would argue that putting the two 
words together — ‘corporate’ and ‘power’ — is nonsensical. After all, states generate laws 
and enforce compliance in a given territory. States have a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence. States project military power abroad. Corporate institutions do not have the 
authority to legislate, nor can they compel obedience through the use of force. Corporate 
units operate through voluntary contracts, not coercive laws. Given this consideration, it 
is not obvious that ‘corporate power’ is a valid concept, especially if power is understood 
to be bound up with rule-making, rule-enforcement and the lawful use of violence. 
Accordingly, before we explore the meaning of corporate power in Canada we will have 
to explore the meaning corporate power as such. Once corporate power has been defined 
                                                          
2 American-based multinational corporations played an important role in the development of Canadian 
capitalism. However, their inclusion in this study would significantly expand its scope, pushing it to 
unmanageable proportions. Accordingly, the focus will be on the universe of Canadian-based firms.  
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and analyzed, we will be prepared to explore the evolution of this form of power in 
Canada.   
 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (N&B hereafter) have forged new 
concepts and developed new measurements to better understand the power-rootedness 
of contemporary capitalism. ‘Dominant capital’ is a concept they have developed to 
capture an entity encompassing the largest firms and key government organs that stand 
at the centre of the political economy. In what follows, ‘dominant capital’ will denote the 
largest Canadian-based firms, thus retaining a more conventional notion of the state. 
Large firms developed in historical time, so can we put an approximate date on the 
emergence of ‘dominant capital’ in Canada? When examining the history of large firms in 
Canada, does it make sense to separate economics from politics? Can state power be 
easily distinguished from corporate power? Did the development of large firms bear any 
relationship to the development of the Canadian State? And what role did large firms 
play in shaping the development of Canadian society more generally?  
Liberals, Marxists, Institutionalists, Managerialists and scholars working in other 
schools of thought tried to make sense of the development of the modern corporation in 
the twentieth century. How have the various schools of thought defined corporate 
power? What measurements have been developed to quantify corporate power and what 
is their explanatory utility? The growth of large firms in Canada has attracted the 
attention of historians, journalists, sociologists and political economists. There is a 
sizeable literature in the economic sociology of Canadian corporate power, debating 
subjects as broad as the role of foreign-based firms (mainly American) in steering 
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Canadian industrial development to subjects as focused as the attributes of Canada’s 
business class. How have Canadian scholars understood the development of large firms? 
What remains to be understood? 
 If dominant capital is a meaningful category in Canada, how many units comprise 
this entity? If differential accumulation is the generative process of the modern political 
economy, as N&B maintain, how has it unfolded over the postwar era? Managerialists 
would have us believe that large firms are controlled by salary-oriented managers as 
opposed to profit-seeking proprietors. Is this true for Canada? Who owns and who 
controls the largest firms in Canada? And how globalized is Canadian corporate 
ownership?  
 At this point, an important caveat must be stated. Corporate power manifests 
itself in multiple domains. The power of large firms is (perhaps) most visible in the 
direction and pace of industrial development, but another forum in which corporate 
power is apparent is public policy. At various points in this study we will explore how 
large firms have shaped (and benefitted from) Canadian public policy, but this will not 
be the focus of the research. The impact of dominant corporations on the evolution of 
Canadian public policy resides in the background of the analysis; rarely will it occupy the 
foreground. The cohesiveness of dominant corporations as a public policy bloc is a 
subject sufficiently expansive to warrant its own study.   
 Large firms have multiple accumulation pathways open to them. N&B (2002; 
2009) specify four: green-field investment, mergers and acquisitions, cost-cutting and 
stagflation. Which accumulation pathways have large firms historically traversed in 
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Canada? More specifically, what does the history of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
tell us about the development of large firms? Intuitively, we would suppose there to be a 
linear relationship between firm size and market power. Is this true for Canada? 
Legislators, policy makers, economists and many other groups in Canada 
(including the citizenry at large) have expressed concern with the level and trend of GDP 
growth. Why did the Canadian political economy grow at a relatively rapid pace 
between 1940 and 1980 only to grow at a sluggish pace in subsequent decades?3 Does the 
slower growth of recent decades bear any relationship to the development of large firms?  
Relatedly, inflation has been relatively low and stable in Canada for two decades. 
However, previous decades witnessed relatively high levels of inflation. Does the history 
of Canadian inflation shed any light on the development of large firms? Numerous 
heterodox scholars would have us believe that inflation is generated through distributive 
conflict between competing income groups. Does Canadian inflation tend to appear 
alongside social conflict? If yes, does Canadian inflation produce distributive ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’? In short, can Canadian inflation be thought of as a power process that 
systematically redistributes income between different income groups?  
J.K. Galbraith (1952) would have us believe that labour unions act as a 
‘countervailing power’ to large firms, at least in the American context. Is this relationship 
true for Canada? Has the institutional strength of organized labour played a role in 
mitigating income inequality? Relatedly, can the evolution of Canadian corporate power 
                                                          
3 Canada’s growth path has not been unique. As we shall see, many OECD countries grew rapidly during 
the early postwar decades only to grow at a slower rate in recent decades. Despite this fact, we will 
concentrate on the Canadian growth experience and examine domestic causes, bearing in mind that there 
may be an international aspect to Canada’s growth rate. 
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help explain the distribution of factor and personal income? And finally, if corporate 
power has grown in recent times does this threaten Canadian democracy in any way? 
These and other questions are addressed in the chapters that follow. 
 
1.2 The Argument 
An attenuated version of the argument, schematically represented in Diagram 1.1, runs as 
follows. Using Veblen’s (1904; 1923) conceptual scheme, the modern corporation should 
be viewed as a business institution, not an industrial unit. ‘Business’ is distinguishable 
from ‘industry’ in the same way that the legal, organizational and institutional structure 
of the political economy is distinct from its material, productive and technological 
apparatus. Business centres on distribution and is institutionally embodied in the 
modern corporation. Industry centres on production and is most clearly manifest in the 
‘machine process’. Industry involves the utilization of socially generated and transmitted 
knowledge to control natural processes for the purpose of efficiently satisfying human 
needs. Business involves the utilization of social power to organize and control industrial 
activities for the purpose of private pecuniary gain. From this theoretical vantage point, 
the modern corporation is not a productive unit; it is a legal and organizational vehicle 
that enables proprietors to control production for the purposes of distribution.4 N&B build 
on Veblen to tell us that capital is finance and only finance. ‘Capital accumulation’, they say, 
does not entail the amassment of machinery, equipment or technological ‘know how’. 
Instead, it involves the growth of capitalization.  
                                                          
4 This conceptual scheme implies that the term ‘manufacturing capital’ is a contradiction in terms while 
‘financial capital’ is redundant. 
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Diagram 1.1 
A Schematic Representation of the Argument5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 At the centre of this study is differential accumulation — the drive by large firms to beat the average. The 
two main ‘regimes of differential accumulation’ — breadth and depth — form the twin tips of the study. 
Processes that grow out of differential accumulation are shaded in grey, processes that pertain to labour 
unions are shaded in red and processes which originate outside Canada are shaded in black (ignoring the 
fact that many of the processes that are ‘internal’ to Canada have international analogues as well). 
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‘Differential accumulation’, N&B continue, is the central process of the modern 
political economy and it involves large firms or ‘dominant capital’ striving to ‘beat the 
average’ and exceed some financial benchmark. This understanding of capital enables us 
to view the development of Canadian capitalism from an alternative perspective. 
Changes in technology, innovation, productivity and the like are important, but they are 
decidedly secondary to the way such changes are controlled and harnessed by major 
social organizations, including large firms, labour unions and the Canadian State. From 
this perspective, the development of Canadian capitalism is not primarily about the 
growth of the ‘capital stock’ (a fictitious entity) or the development of the ‘forces of 
production’ (which has little to do with ‘capital’), but about the way business 
institutions (and other competing or complementary organizations) strategically control 
shifts in production, technology and broader social processes.  
Viewing capital from the standpoint of institutional power alters the meaning of 
key junctures in Canadian history. Whether we examine the Act of Union in 1841, 
Confederation in 1867 or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 
we find that state power and governance institutions were often generated by and for 
dominant commercial interests. Take Confederation, for example. It is customary to view 
Canadian-based corporations as emerging out of Canadian ‘society’, but it is historically 
defensible to argue that the Canadian State itself was the offspring of Canadian business, 
with the British Crown and British capital markets playing a partnering role. 
Comparable turning points in Canada’s political-economic and governance structures 
were often initiated by, and served to bolster, dominant commercial interests.  
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Moving from the deep history of Canadian business to the postwar evolution of 
Canada’s largest firms, we find that, when properly defined, corporate power is not only 
a valid concept; it is an indispensable tool to help us understand contemporary 
capitalism. ‘Dominant capital’ is a meaningful concept in the Canadian context. Though 
numerically small, the top 60 firms dominate and drive the Canadian political economy. 
Using numerous metrics, including the profit share of national income, aggregate 
concentration and differential accumulation, the power of these firms was low and/or 
lessening in the Keynesian era (1945 to 1980, roughly) and soared in the neoliberal era 
(1980 to the present). To a remarkable extent, the largest Canadian-based firms have 
controlling owners, contrary to managerial suppositions. This means that what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘capitalist class’ (as opposed to a purely managerial class) is 
a coherent social entity in Canada. The relative growth of the largest corporate units in 
Canada implies that capitalist power has reached a historic extreme in recent times.  
The main pathway that large firms take in their quest for differential 
accumulation is mergers and acquisitions. Corporate amalgamation has been a key driver 
of both asset concentration and differential accumulation. The merger waves of recent 
decades appear to have played a role in globalizing Canadian corporate ownership to a 
historically unprecedented extent. Evidence also suggests that Canadian firms have been 
acquiring foreign firms faster than the Developed Country average, thus challenging 
Arthurs’ (2000) claim that corporate Canada is being ‘hollowed out’. The increased 
corporate concentration associated with mergers and acquisitions appears to have led to 
increased market power amongst large firms (as registered in the profit markup).   
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The four decades to 1980 witnessed rapid GDP growth and the three decades 
since 1980 brought comparatively slower growth for Canada. The shift from robust 
growth in the Keynesian era to the stagnant growth of the neoliberal era bears some 
proximity to the development of large firms. Both employment and business pending on 
fixed assets among the largest firms grew at a rapid pace between 1950 and 1980 and 
slowed considerably in the decades that followed. This may be part of the reason for 
sluggish growth after 1980. The income share and cash held by the largest firms remained 
relatively low in the Keynesian period and soared in the neoliberal period. Part of the 
slowdown in GDP growth may be due to the fact that large firms stockpiled cash on their 
balance sheet instead of investing it in growth-enhancing industrial projects. The 
motivation to ‘hoard’ cash includes the stabilization of earnings and dividend payments, 
which reduces risk and elevates equity market capitalization, and the enhanced ability to 
make strategic acquisitions.  
Evidence suggests that as firms grew in relative size, their earnings margins 
increased and their income share deepened (as a percent of GDP). With a greater share of 
national income, large firms increased the extent of their control over private investment 
decisions. And because growth is driven, in part, by green-field investment, and the latter 
drastically fell in the neoliberal era as a consequence of heightened merger activity, it is 
logical to suppose that an increase in the relative size of the largest firms is associated 
with the deceleration of GDP growth. In other words, sluggish GDP growth may be the 
‘flip side’ to greater aggregate concentration.  
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This dissertation offers an alternative understanding of Canadian inflation. Over 
the long-haul and in the aggregate, the rate of inflation tends to accelerate with global 
warfare-fuelled social crises. Inflationary episodes in Canada also tend to appear with 
social conflict of another kind, namely domestic worker revolts against proprietors. Long 
waves of labour disobedience appear to produce two outcomes: higher average wages and 
a higher rate of consumer price inflation. The institutional growth of labour 
organizations in tandem with the extent of workplace action appears to shape the 
average rate of worker compensation. Changes in the latter, in turn, help shape the 
overall price level. Canadian labour disobedience and worker wage gains are strongly 
inflationary.  
When we shift from absolute to differential terms (and in so doing, embrace 
N&B’s approach), we find that Canadian inflation has tended to redistribute income 
from large firms to small firms, from large firms to labour groups and from segments of 
capital to segments of labour. The 1970s may be an exception to this trend. In that 
decade, inflation tended to redistribute income from labour to capital and to dominant 
capital. Canadian inflation appears to be the product of a power struggle that is 
nourished on social conflict and which systematically redistributes income between 
different income groups such that we can meaningfully speak of distributive ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’.    
Base commodity and producer price inflation also tends to increase with 
outbreaks of internationally organized violence. This type of inflation has systematically 
redistributive consequences within the corporate sector: because the Canadian equity 
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market is over-represented by firms operating in the base material and energy sectors, 
inflation of this kind has tended to redistribute profit and equity value to energy and base 
materials firms. This type of inflation has also tended to redistribute equity value 
between national equity markets, such that the Canadian corporate universe 
outperformed global benchmarks during episodes of global violence and underperformed 
during outbreaks of peace.  
This interpretation of Canadian inflation has a number of public policy 
implications. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Canadian State and the Bank of Canada 
embraced an anti-inflationary monetary policy. If inflation is good for the working and 
middle classes and for smaller firms, and if inflation is harmful to large firms and the top 
income group, then one way of understanding the shift towards anti-inflationary 
monetary policy is to view it as the use of state power (presumably on behalf of large 
firms and the Canadian Establishment) to redistribute income from labour to capital, 
from small to large firms and from the lower to the upper echelons of the social hierarchy.  
 This dissertation measures factor income in a way that takes account of the class-
based distribution of personal income. Corporate profit is divided by an adjusted national 
wage bill. The latter is measured as national wages and salaries less the wages and 
salaries portion of the top percentile income share. Using this metric, and in the light of 
J.K. Galbraith’s ‘countervailing power’ argument, there is a tight and persistent 
relationship between the distributive struggle among capital and labour over profits and 
wages and personal income inequality. Corporate power and income inequality declined 
together from the 1940s through the 1980s. This was a period in which Canadian 
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unionization expanded rapidly. All three processes went into reverse after the 1980s: 
unionization declined, corporate power increased, and as a partial consequence, 
Canadian income inequality surged.  
Finally, the growth of large firms in recent decades in tandem with the decline of 
labour unions has not only led to an increase in income inequality, but there is evidence 
to suggest that the overall level of Canadian income inequality plays a role in shaping the 
extent of democratic participation, such that higher levels of inequality are associated 
with lower levels of political participation and vice versa. If this is correct, then the 
growth of corporate power in recent decades not only exacerbates income inequality; it 
depresses the quality of Canadian democracy by lessening political participation.  
These research results offer us an unconventional way of interpreting the broad 
political-economic meaning of neoliberal globalization in Canada. Rather than 
characterizing the neoliberal program as an ‘unleashing of market forces’ or as a ‘retreat 
of the state’, the evidence suggests that neoliberal globalization in Canada is primarily 
about the utilization of state power by dominant business groups to reconfigure the 
political economy. The alteration of corporate ownership and investment rules, the 
generation of anti-inflationary monetary policy and the reduction in personal and 
corporate income taxes, all amidst the institutional decline of labour unions and erosion 
of the fiscal and redistributive aspects of the Canadian State, have served to transfer 
national income from labour to capital and from the lower the upper echelons of the 
income hierarchy. Far from reducing the application of power, neoliberalism in Canada 
has involved a concurrent increase in corporate power alongside the instrumentalization 
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of state power for corporate ends. This shift in power is registered in greater income 
inequality and reduced democratic participation, or so it is argued.     
 
1.3 The Roadmap 
The argument is built up through ten chapters, delivered in three sections. Section I 
comprises Chapters 2 to 4 and it lays the theoretical, historical and literary foundations 
for the research-based chapters in Sections II and III. Chapter 2 reviews, analyzes and 
elaborates some of the guiding assumptions, concepts and theoretical claims that inform 
the research. Because this research draws extensively on the institutionalism of Thorstein 
Veblen and N&B’s approach to political economy, Chapter 2 sketches an outline of their 
respective thinking on capital. The chapter begins by presenting the reader with the 
neoclassical definition of capital. It then takes the reader through Veblen’s critique of the 
neoclassical definition, Veblen’s alternative vision of capital and some of the organizing 
concepts that Veblen deployed to make sense of the specifically American capitalism that 
was maturing in his lifetime. The latter half of the chapter introduces the reader to some 
aspects of N&B’s approach to political economy. Because N&B’s writings are relied upon 
extensively, subsequent chapters will review other aspects of their approach where they 
are relevant.  
 Chapter 3 reviews the development of Canadian business, examining how key 
transformations in Canadian society were driven by changes in the organization and 
behaviour of dominant commercial entities. The chapter explores the growth of 
Canadian business from Canada’s pre-colonial status, through its colonial incarnations 
17 
 
— including Canadian State formation — and finally the ascent of the modern 
corporation in the twentieth century. It argues that a sharp separation of economics from 
politics is an analytical hindrance if we are to understand key junctures in the 
development of Canadian capitalism. Crucially, it maintains that an entity that could be 
classified as ‘dominant capital’ emerged with the railroad corporations and financial 
institutions in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Relatedly, the chapter argues that 
the emergence of the Canadian State can be understood, in part, as the offspring of 
Canadian business, with the British Crown and British capital markets playing a 
partnering role.  
 In Chapter 4 we assess how various schools of thought have understood the 
evolution of the modern corporation. The chapter begins by introducing the reader to the 
various approaches to Canadian political economy. This acts as a prelude to a review of 
how corporate power has been defined, analyzed and measured by scholars working in 
competing theoretical traditions. The chapter closes by reviewing what questions 
Canadian scholars have asked about the evolution of corporate power, what is valid in 
their answers and what remains to be understood. 
 Section II comprises Chapters 5 through 7 and it maps the growth of large firms 
in Canada over the postwar period. Chapter 5 begins to add substance to the concept of 
‘dominant capital’ by chronicling the structure, numeric composition and the differential 
performance of the largest Canadian-based firms. The chapter provides the first 
continuous, long-term estimates for Canada’s aggregate concentration and it maps the 
aggregate and disaggregate history of corporate profitability in Canada and the United 
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States. Importantly, Chapter 5 addresses the managerial thesis by determining who owns 
and who controls the largest firms in Canada. The chapter closes by benchmarking the 
performance of Canadian equities globally and by determining the extent of Canadian 
corporate ownership abroad. 
 Chapter 6 explores one of the main accumulation pathways that large firms have 
historically navigated: mergers and acquisitions. This chapter provides the first 
continuous, long-term estimates for Canadian corporate mergers and acquisitions. It also 
explores the history of green-field investment. These processes are interesting in their 
own right, but the objective is to understand what role (if any) amalgamation has played 
in fuelling the growth of large firms. The chapter establishes linkages between 
amalgamation, concentration and market power. The history of Canadian cross-border 
amalgamation is explored and an alternative measure is developed — ‘differential cross-
border amalgamation’ — to help address the question of whether corporate Canada is 
being ‘hollowed out’. 
 The early decades of the postwar era in Canada exhibited rapid growth while the 
decades since 1980 exhibited comparatively sluggish growth (stagnation). Chapter 7 
maps the history of Canadian GDP growth and examines some of its determinants. Three 
variables are emphasized: the unemployment rate, green-field investment and 
government spending. The chapter questions whether rapid growth in the aggregate is 
something that large firm’s should, theoretically speaking, desire. Assembling claims 
made by Nitzan and Bichler, Veblen and Kalecki, an argument is developed as to why 
moderate stagnation is optimal for large firms. While Chapter 7 tries to understand some 
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of the long-term drivers of growth, the primary objective is to sort out what role large 
firms have played in propelling growth/stagnation in postwar Canada. Three aspects of 
large firms are highlighted: first, their size and income position; second, their decision to 
‘hoard’ cash; and third, what bearing changes in the corporate income tax regime may 
have had on the first two aspects. There is evidence to suggest that stagnation may be a 
partial consequence of increasing corporate concentration.  
 Chapters 8 through 10 make up Section III and they provide a conceptual and 
empirical investigation of income and asset inequality in Canada. Chapter 8 builds on the 
research of others, notably that of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), to argue that income 
inequality is of great importance in determining the overall well-being of a society. Using 
the data generated by Emmanuel Saez and Michael Veall (2005; 2007), Chapter 8 also 
maps the history of income inequality in Canada and tries to establish connections 
between inequality and democratic engagement. With the broad sweep of facts in the 
background, the chapter interrogates some of the main hypotheses advanced in recent 
times to account for the heightened inequality in some OECD countries. Using the ideas 
of Aristotle, Veblen, Kalecki, Galbraith, N&B and others, Chapter 8 also tries to 
conceptualize how an alternative explanation for the distribution of Canadian income 
might be generated. This alternative explanation emphasizes how shifts in the 
institutional environment — especially (but not only) the relative size of the largest 
firms, governmental organs and labour organizations — shape the conditions of 
exchange, and ultimately, the distribution of income and assets.  
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Chapter 9 probes some of the history of Canadian inflation and tries to determine 
what role increases in the price level may have had in redistributing income between 
different income groups. While the ultimate causes of inflation loom in the background, 
the focus of the chapter is on the intersection between social conflict, rising prices and 
the redistribution of income. This target is reached in a series of steps. The reader is given 
a tour of some of the thinking done on inflation by contrasting how some of the major 
schools of thought responded to the overt appearance of stagflation. Rather than power 
operating at a distance from market prices, the chapter argues that broad power 
processes have a bearing on price formation and on inflation. The chapter concretizes the 
relationship between power and prices by zeroing in on one commodity — labour power 
in Canada — to see if, or in what way, its price relates to power. The chapter also 
explores the points of contact between the internationally organized violence embodied 
in regional and global wars and various measures of inflation. Importantly, the chapter 
probes what role inflation has played in the development of large Canadian-based firms.  
Whereas Chapter 8 lays out the problems to be solved — the distribution of 
factor income and personal income inequality — and tries to forge an interpretive 
framework, Chapter 10 empirically demonstrates that increasing corporate power is 
associated with a redistribution of factor income from labour to capital and from the 
lower to the upper echelons of the personal income hierarchy. Conversely, the 
institutional growth of labour unions is historically associated with the redistribution of 
factor income from capital to labour and from the upper to the lower echelons of the 
personal income hierarchy. The chapter unpacks the relationship between 
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unemployment and income inequality by exploring the dramatic redistribution of 
personal income during the Second World War. Chapter 10 closes by honing in on the 
top income share to discern if there are any long-term patters which govern the 
distributive gains made by the superrich in Canada.  
 The objective of this dissertation is to empirically map and quantitatively 
document the postwar rise of large Canadian-based firms. A variety of theoretical tools 
are used in the service of this objective, most importantly the capital as power framework 
developed by N&B. It being a relatively new approach, we may wish to know how useful 
it is. N&B have used their theory to explore the power underpinnings of capital in Israel 
and the United States; does their theory hold in the Canadian setting? The eleventh and 
concluding chapter reflects on the aspects of N&B’s approach that are (dis)confirmed by 
the Canadian evidence. As we will see, the capital as power framework is useful in the 
study of corporate power, and while some crucial hypotheses survive refutation in the 
Canadian case, others do not.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Theory and Method:  
A Power Approach to Political Economy 
 
 
The modern corporation has wrought such a change in the free market system that new 
concepts must be forged and a new picture of economic relationships created.1  
- Gardiner C. Means (1983) 
 
 
 
 
In 1955 Adolf Berle posited that ‘no adequate study of twentieth-century capitalism 
exists’ for the singular reason that conventional economic thinking had failed to come to 
a satisfactory account of the modern corporation (1955: 1). Instead of economic activity 
being coordinated through the push and pull of market forces, and instead of business 
decisions unfolding under conditions of fundamental uncertainty, Berle claims that large 
firms plan supply and demand, shield themselves from market discipline through internal 
financing, make decisions under fairly predictable conditions and administer prices. The 
modern corporation, he concludes, should be treated as a ‘non-statist political institution’ 
(1955: 44).  
Berle goes on to issue a series of questions to political science, the discipline 
nominally concerned with power: first, what is the relationship between property and 
power; second, what are the main elements of power; and finally, which institutions 
organize power and how are they related to the state (1955: 11-12)?  Mainstream political 
                                                          
1 In this passage, Means is partially quoting the conclusion he and Adolf Berle reach in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (1932: 351). Quoted in Means (1983: 469). 
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science has not offered a response to the questions (the challenge) Berle posed. Half a 
century later, Chandler and Mazlish (2005: 11) echoed Berle when they claimed that the 
multinational corporation is the ‘new Leviathan of our time’ and yet political science has 
systematically managed to ‘ignore the subject’. This omission is all the more inexplicable, 
they say, when we consider that multinationals are beginning to personify core political 
ideas such as sovereignty and transparency. And while Chandler and Mazlish claim that 
multinationals do not pose a threat to the authority of states, they recognize that they are 
contesting state control over political-economic development (2005: 8-11).  
 The reason for the invisibility of ‘corporate power’ in mainstream social science is 
articulated by Robert Gilpin (1975: 5), who argues that economists are unwilling to 
concede the reality of power while political scientists tend to ignore markets. In other 
words, those who study the corporation do not believe that power is germane to their 
domain of inquiry, while those who study power think the corporation is outside the 
boundaries of ‘politics’. There exists an academic blind spot, then, insofar as the multi-
unit, vertically-integrated, globally-scaled corporation is simultaneously a power 
institution that often operates through markets. As a consequence of this blind spot, we 
understand very little of the ways in which large firms develop.   
It appears that we are in something akin to uncharted territory in the endeavour 
to study the corporate form of power. Accordingly, we will need to begin with some 
basic questions. What is corporate power? Can corporate power be measured? If it can, 
what do the various measures tell us about the development of this form of power in 
Canada?  
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This inquiry will direct itself to the evolution of large firms or ‘dominant capital’ 
in Canada. ‘Dominant capital’ is a concept developed by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler (2002; 2009). Although they are not the only scholars to have examined 
contemporary capitalism from the standpoint of power, Nitzan and Bichler (N&B) have 
done some of the clearest thinking on the subject. Through decades of joint research, they 
have developed a framework for understanding capitalist development that puts power 
at the centre of the analysis. Because this inquiry will draw on N&B’s power approach to 
political economy, the present chapter will sketch a broad outline of some of the main 
aspects of their thinking. The review will be neither comprehensive nor argumentative; 
instead, it will survey some of the elements of N&B’s approach that are utilized in this 
study. Subsequent chapters will unpack N&B’s ideas in greater detail.  
In building their approach, N&B draw on the ideas of other thinkers, including 
Michal Kalecki, Gardiner Means, and perhaps most importantly, Thorstein Veblen. Some 
of the assumption and concepts developed by Veblen, Kalecki and Means will also be 
used in this research, though not necessarily in the same way as they are used in N&B’s 
framework. Because his ideas will feature heavily in this study, the present chapter will 
also review and elaborate some of main assumptions and concepts developed by Veblen. 
Subsequent chapters will articulate and explore some of the ideas generated by Means, 
Kalecki and others.  
The chapter will begin by briefly summarizing the neoclassical definition of 
capital. This will act as a springboard to Veblen’s writings on capital and political 
economy. This, in turn, will set the stage for a review of the broad contours of N&B’s 
approach to political economy.  
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2.1 Capital as a Gateway to Political Economy 
The capital as power (CAP) framework grows out of a dual dissatisfaction, one 
theoretical (philosophical) the other practical (political).2 N&B would have us believe 
that mainstream and radical approaches to capital are deeply flawed. This is significant 
because without an adequate understanding of capital we are liable to fundamentally 
misconstrue contemporary capitalism. Capital is at the centre of capitalism and our 
in/ability to accurately define this single institution has a bearing on other important 
theoretical and practical matters such as the price system and the distribution of income, 
for example. This study will explore the development of the Canadian political economy 
through an investigation of the largest Canadian-based firms (‘dominant capital’). 
Accordingly, it will be impossible to understand the development of dominant capital in 
Canada if we do not have a clear idea of what capital is. So why not accept the 
mainstream conception of capital?  
The most common understanding of capital today is neoclassical in origins. 
Rooted in the ideas of John Bates Clark (1891; 1899) and Irving Fisher (1896; 1906; 1930), 
for three generations Paul Samuelson was among its most influential exponents. For 
Samuelson and the neoclassicists, capital is produced means of production, or artefacts 
(output) used in the production process (as inputs). This definition has been revised to 
include intangible assets such as software, patents and brand names, so the materiality of 
                                                          
2 N&B claim that the dominant approach — neoclassical economics — is inherently ideological. 
Neoclassical economics is ‘an ideology in the service of the powerful’ because the capitalist class uses it to 
‘conceal its own power’ from plain view. The supposed scientific status of neoclassical economics doubles 
as its social function, for it legitimizes the institutions underpinning capitalism. The essentially political 
function of Capital as Power is to tear down the veil, laying bare relations of power so that people may act to 
bring about ‘a new social reality’ (2009: 3). The normative and political undertones in Capital as Power will 
be dissociated from the socially scientific ideas utilized in this study. 
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capital has been broadened to include immaterial items as well (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2010: 352). When we push this idea to its end point we find that something is 
deemed ‘capital’ if it helps produce goods and services that generate ‘utils’ or units of 
pleasure (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 126-30).  
But this is only one ‘side’ of capital, according to neoclassical economics. The 
other side consists of financial assets, which represent monetary claims by one party 
against another. The former kind of capital stands in the ‘real’ economy, coming in the 
form of material-productive entities that have the capacity to augment output and satisfy 
human desire. The latter stands in the ‘nominal’ economy and comes in the form of pieces 
of paper or electronic records that facilitate exchange and act as legal claims on ‘real’ 
capital. In other words, financial assets are ‘backed up’ or ‘supported’ by ‘real’ assets. 
‘Capital goods’ as physical things are mirrored by ‘capital value’ or financial wealth, the 
latter conceived as a stream of future earnings discounted to present value. So what’s 
wrong with this understanding? 
 
2.2 Veblen on Neoclassical Capital 
Veblen is among the earliest political economists to generate both a rigorous criticism of 
the neoclassical definition of capital and a substitute definition. Veblen begins by 
indicting the neoclassical orthodoxy on methodological grounds. The objective of 
neoclassical thinkers, he says, is to arrive at a classificatory and taxonomic scheme of 
economic life through pure ratiocination or deduction of concepts from ‘primordial 
metaphysical postulates’ (1908d: 150). Veblen argues that this is a hopelessly unscientific 
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way of arriving at a definition of capital. Instead, he works towards a definition from 
observation of its usage by modern business people. At a minimum, this method has the 
chance of passing the test of usefulness because any definition of capital should be 
measured against how the term is actually used.  
This methodological difference leads Veblen to make an important observation 
about capital: when one looks at its usage in business practice, one finds that it is not a 
physical category and cannot be specified in material-productive terms. Instead, it is a 
pecuniary term pertaining to investment (1908d: 151). But his criticism goes deeper than 
this. Veblen makes two arguments which shake the neoclassical definition of capital to 
its core. First, the assertion that capital is a material-productive entity breaks down 
when we face the fact of ‘capital mobility’. Veblen’s acute vision noted that when capital 
‘moves’ from one location in the industrial geography to another, this does not entail the 
movement of physical objects. The continuity of capital is not predicated on a transfer of 
stuff, but is derived from the maintenance of ownership — something which is not a 
physical fact. The continuity is of an immaterial character, for it centres on legal rights and 
control (1908c: 196-7). The second argument centres on the recognition that ‘capital 
goods’, understood as physically abiding productive entities, cannot be aggregated 
because they lack a homogeneous quality. Capital as a monetary magnitude may be 
homogeneous, but physical equipment is heterogeneous. This fact makes the aggregation 
of capital impossible. This indictment is very serious, for if it is true it undermines much 
of the thinking of political economists since Adam Smith.  
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Political economists have conditioned themselves to think of capital as a stock of 
physical goods used in the production process. Neoclassical economics goes further 
when it posits that this stock of physical equipment is measurable in material-productive 
units. Veblen’s indictment of the neoclassical is this: the neoclassical definition of capital 
as tools, machines and factories — material-productive equipment — might have had 
some validity in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but by the early twentieth 
century capitalists no longer think or act as if capital has a material-productive basis. He 
estimates that the usage of the term had changed fifty years prior, a fact which his 
contemporaries failed to note and which made their notion of capital as material-
productive entities outdated (1908d: 161).  
Beyond Veblen’s damning criticism of the neoclassical definition of capital, N&B 
(2009: 77-83) argue that the Cambridge capital controversies made apparent the very 
serious technical difficulties associated with the neoclassical conception.3 What the 
controversies showed is that if ‘economic output’ relies on capital, classified as a factor of 
production and plugged into an aggregate production function, we need to be able to 
quantify and aggregate capital in material-productive terms. Without a material 
quantum of capital we have no production function, no convincing way of explaining 
(and for some, justifying)4 returns to capital and no marginal productivity theory of 
distribution. And because ‘distribution theory is a special case of the theory of prices’, as 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010: 288) say, we lose other concepts that are central to 
                                                          
3 Initiated by Robinson (1953-54) and named by Harcourt (1969), the Cambridge capital theory 
controversies unfolded from the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s and encompassed a theoretical debate 
between economists stationed in Cambridge England and their opponents in Cambridge Massachusetts. 
4 Moseley (2012a; 2012b) is an exponent of this position. 
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mainstream economics. A survey of the Cambridge capital controversies claims: ‘on a 
theoretical level, the “English” Cantabrigians won the round over aggregate production 
functions’ (Cohen and Harcourt 2003: 206). The impossibility of measuring and 
aggregating heterogeneous capital goods in physical units led economists since Wicksell 
to use capital valuation, an untenable move, the writers claim, because of its circularity.  
If the neoclassical definition of capital is invalid for the reasons that Veblen 
spelled out, and if its measurement poses insurmountable technical obstacles as the 
Cambridge Capital Controversies showed, is there an alternative conception of capital 
that does not exhibit these limitations? 
 
2.3 Veblen’s Conception of Capital 
Veblen not only dismembers the neoclassical definition of capital; he outlines an 
alternative conception in the form of a speculative history.5 The starting point for this 
story builds on the recognition that, from an economic standpoint, human beings have 
never led a solitary, self-sufficient existence. The phenomenon of human life always 
unfolds within communities. Veblen’s question is this: what makes the continuity, 
coherence and development of community life possible? His answer: the conditions of the 
possibility of group continuity, now or at any time in the past, rest on immaterial 
foundations. What does this mean?  
One interpretation runs as follows: Veblen would have us believe that the ‘life 
activity’ of a community is made up of relations between individuals and between 
                                                          
5 ‘Speculative’ because Veblen never documents his claims historically. His ideas are generated in the 
course of a thought experiment. The following account is extracted from Veblen (1908a; 1908b). 
30 
 
individuals and the world of objects. In order to satisfy the requirements of life, human 
beings must transform natural objects and processes to suit human needs. The taming of 
brute nature requires knowledge, mainly practical and habitual, but eventually 
theoretical and abstract. This knowledge or technology, which Veblen refers to as 
‘immaterial equipment’, is the cumulative knowledge of ‘ways and means’ and represents 
the accumulated wisdom of previous generations (1908a: 525).  
Part of this ‘immaterial equipment’ is the knowledge required to transform non-
human nature into socially useful objects, but another part is the making of social needs 
in the first place, something which varies over time. Mobile phones, for example, would 
be about as useful for securing group continuity in a hunting-and-gathering society as a 
spear would be for securing comforts in a modern city. Both objects are of human 
invention and both are technological achievements, but their usefulness comes in relation 
to what Veblen calls the ‘state of the industrial arts’, i.e., the socially accumulated 
wisdom of previous generations. From a Veblenian perspective, it is community life or 
‘culture’ which makes something an instrument of needs satisfaction to begin with.  
Veblen did not develop a theory of valuation even though he was deeply critical of 
neoclassical conceptions of value. But if we are to speak about ‘needs’ or ‘wants’ and their 
satisfaction we are effectively speaking about the domain of values. Peterson (1999: 33) 
would have us believe that the positive or negative valence associated with an object is 
generated through culture, not just nature. Modern people are accustomed to thinking of 
needs and their satisfaction in biophysical terms, i.e., as having a transcultural basis. 
Using the methods of science, Peterson tells us, we can gain an understanding of what an 
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object is, i.e., we can examine its sensory apprehensible qualities. But that does not 
address the question of value. From a phenomenological standpoint, Peterson continues, 
the motivational and emotional significance of an object is a consequence of cultural 
development. Different cultures can assign different values to the ‘same’ object (e.g., 
think of the cow in contemporary Canada — a farm animal, a mammal, a commodity, etc. 
— versus a cow in Hindu India). The cultural significance of an object cannot be reduced 
to its sensory apprehensible qualities, i.e., physical facts. Whereas Veblen roots 
knowledge in the ‘life history’ of the community, what his vision lacks, and what political 
economy still lacks, is a more encompassing understanding of human values, both how 
they are generated and why they evolve over time. What we need to understand, for now, 
is that appraisals of value are culturally mediated.  
Veblen tells us that all knowledge is created as a result of the life activity of the 
community and all invention and innovation add to the immaterial foundations which 
support the group. This knowledge is beyond the capacity of any one individual to 
master or acquire and the history of its growth is the history of the development of 
material civilization (1908a: 521).6 As the immaterial equipment grows in size and 
complexity — here comes the speculative part — a larger unit of material equipment is 
required to carry on productive activity. Private ownership of material equipment, 
Veblen says, effectively enables an individual member to ‘corner’ the accumulated 
knowledge of ‘ways and means’ that become embodied in physical objects.  
                                                          
6 When it comes to technological change, Diamond (1999: 245-6) argues that it develops cumulatively 
rather than in isolated ‘heroic acts’. What’s more, he claims that the adoption of new technologies is 
dependent upon many factors, including ‘compatibility with vested interests’, a most Veblenian assertion! 
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One of Veblen’s core contentions is that private ownership of industrial objects 
and land effectively enables a member of the group to control the community’s 
technological inheritance through the limitation of access. An institutional arrangement 
of this kind gives a small portion of the community effective control over the group’s 
industrial possibilities. In Veblen’s words:  
…any person who has a legal right to withhold any part of the necessary industrial 
apparatus or materials from current use will be in a position to impose terms and exact 
obedience, on pain of rendering the community’s joint stock of technology inoperative to 
that extent. Ownership of industrial equipment and natural resources confers such a right 
legally to enforce unemployment, and so to make the community’s workmanship useless to 
that extent. This is the Natural Right of Investment (1923: 65-66). 
 
In a similar vein:  
…under the regime of capital, the community is unable to turn its knowledge of ways and 
means to account for a livelihood except at such seasons and insofar as the course of prices 
affords a differential advantage to the owners of material equipment. The question of 
advantageous — which commonly means rising — prices for the owners (managers) of the 
capital goods is made to decide the question of livelihood for the rest of the community 
(1908b: 108). 
 
Veblen supplies the example of rent to clarify the meaning of his contention before 
dealing with capital proper.  
Rent, he says, is a pecuniary concept based on ‘differential gain’ and relying upon 
‘differential advantage’ (1908a: 529). The ultimate grounding of rent is conditioned by the 
productive efficiency of the land. We should understand his use of the term ‘productive 
efficiency’ as being synonymous with the ‘state of the industrial arts’ — the accumulated 
wisdom allowing individuals to convert natural objects and processes to human need. 
The landlord’s sociological position as a claimant on the net product of the land is 
conditioned by his legal right to decide if, to what extent and on what terms other people 
will employ the community’s immaterial equipment to extract something of use from the 
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land. It would be a near impossibility, Veblen says, to assert that the landlord’s privileged 
position rests upon expert knowledge or productive activity. Instead, the landlord’s 
elevated social position relies upon his relation to the property regime. The latter is 
rooted in the coercive apparatus of society.  
If we transpose this argument onto what neoclassical economists call ‘capital 
goods’, Veblen continues, we arrive at similar conclusions. Each piece of industrial 
equipment is the product of individual labourers. But the productivity of any individual 
labourer is conditioned by the immaterial technological equipment, which is 
accumulated over the community’s life experience and initiative (1980a: 531).7 Veblen 
notes that when Adam Smith was writing it could safely be assumed that the person who 
owns the physical equipment (‘capital goods’) had a hand in directly producing it. In 
Veblen’s time this assumption no longer held. Capital goods are controlled by the 
‘capitalist-employer’, who no longer plays an industrially productive role in economic life, 
but who shapes the industrial process through the ownership and control flowing from 
business enterprise. With business consolidation, more and more of the community’s 
technological knowledge is effectively controlled by fewer people. Capitalist-employers 
become de facto owners of the community’s aggregate store of technological knowledge. 
Control over access to this knowledge is secured through business institutions and 
practice, which puts the business owner in a position of power in relation to the 
industrial community. 
                                                          
7 One reason Veblen rejects Marx’s notion that labour is the ultimate source of value, and so the basis of 
business profitability, is that the ‘productivity’ of any given labourer is a function of the state of the 
industrial arts, which belongs to the community as a whole. Just as a piece of industrial equipment is 
‘productive’ in relation to the community’s immaterial equipment, so too the work of any given labourer is 
‘productive’ in relation to that same immaterial equipment.  
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 If this is true then the ‘returns on investment’ that the capitalist collects is 
withdrawn from the aggregate material productivity of the industrial community’s 
workmanship. Veblen argues that we cannot assume proportionality between ‘returns on 
investment’ and the industrial productivity of ‘capital goods’, as the neoclassicists are in 
the habit of doing (1908b: 106). The use of physical equipment contributes to the creation 
of goods and services, but the extent of this contribution cannot be determined. In short, 
the outcome of the industrial process is not a direct consequence of the owner. Instead, it 
is a product of the workmanship of the industrial community. The latter, however, grows 
out of the immaterial-technological situation, i.e., the accumulated practical and 
theoretical wisdom of previous generations.  
 This assertion is in stark contrast to the neoclassical doctrine espoused by one of 
Veblen’s teachers, J.B. Clark. Clark’s theory set out to show how, under certain 
conditions, the distribution of income between the various ‘factors of production’ and the 
income of any agent of any factor is in proportion to the marginal productivity of that 
factor or agent. In Clark’s words: 
…the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, 
if it work[s] without friction, [will] give to every agent of production the amount of wealth 
which that agent creates (1899: 1).  
 
The marginal productivity theory of distribution, as it came to be known, contends that 
capital goods are productive and that a portion of earnings are therefore attributable to 
the capitalist. This theory offers both a positive explanation for distributional reality and 
a normative theory of distributive justice. Clark’s theory is still cited by the neoclassical 
thinkers as key in the development of the neoclassical theory of income distribution 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 2010: 302, for example).  
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But if Veblen’s claims have validity then the neoclassical theory crumbles because 
ownership of physical equipment is not an industrially productive activity. Indeed, 
inhibition and withdrawal of access to physical instruments may generate an income 
which can be capitalized. Veblen’s seemingly bizarre claim is that the inhibition of 
industrial efficiency — the withdrawal of access or restriction of output — may alter the 
flow of income to the owners of physical equipment in a way that can be capitalized, and 
indeed, elevate capitalization. But Veblen warns that the curtailment of industry would 
only be expedient on pecuniary grounds, never on industrial grounds. The retardation of 
industry might confer a differential business advantage to the owner of physical 
equipment, but this comes at the expense of the industrial serviceability and efficiency of 
the community’s workmanship (Veblen 1908b: 107).  
A simple example drawn from an ordinary reporting of business affairs will 
illustrate. The headline reads ‘Potash producers slash output to protect prices’. Fearful 
that potash prices could collapse, major potash firms like Russia’s OAO Uralkali and 
Canada’s Potash Corporation are cutting output ‘amid record volumes and an investor 
view that more fertilizer will be needed over the long term to feed the world’s growing 
population’. An executive from Uralkali notes: ‘our strategy is that price is much more 
important than volumes’ (read: industrial considerations [volume] are subordinate to 
business considerations [price]), adding ‘it’s a strategy for most of the big players in the 
market’. Saskatchewan-based Potash Corporation is the world’s largest potash producer 
(read: controller of potash production). It announced that, despite doubling its dividend 
and maintaining its earnings power, the company was temporarily shutting down some 
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of its Canadian mines, the total of which represent approximately 10 percent of its 
operating capacity. For reasons like this Potash Corporation is taken to be an ‘industry 
disciplinarian’ since ‘it will bear much of the burden of cutting production to balance 
industry fundamentals and mitigate the scale of inventory gains which could otherwise 
occur’ (Bouw 2012).  
In this example we get a taste of what Veblen had in mind. Production is 
becoming too efficient and must be curtailed in order to defend the profit-pricing 
structure that serves the differential business goals of the owners. Industry is restricted 
by management (in the name of owners) not because farmers do not need the product — 
projections are that farmers will need even more potash in the future; rather, Potash 
Corporation wants to discharge the product at higher, more profitable prices. Too much 
industrial efficiency leads to larger inventory, which puts downward pressure on prices. 
From the farmer’s point of view and from that of the rest of society the latter is desirable.8 
But from the owner’s point of view, too much efficiency is a threat to their differential 
pecuniary goals. Through management, owners curtail industrial efficiency with a view 
to price inflation and enlarged profits (read: redistribution).  
According to Veblen, the capitalist-employers’ quest for ‘differential advantage’ 
wins out over the ‘economic advantage’ of the industrial community (1908b: 107). In 
sharp contrast to J.B. Clark and the entire neoclassical edifice of capital and distribution 
theory, Veblen contends that: 
…the substantial core of all capital is immaterial wealth… if such a view were accepted…the 
‘natural’ distribution of incomes between capital and labour would ‘go up in the air’… The 
returns actually accruing to [the capitalist]… would be a measure of the differential 
                                                          
8 On this point we ignore the potentially negative environmental impact of increased potash production. 
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advantage held by him by virtue of his having become legally seized of the material 
contrivances by which the technological achievements of the community are put into effect 
(Veblen 1908c: 200). 
 
If this is true then we do not have reason for assuming some proportionality between 
gains from investment and the industrial serviceability flowing from physical equipment. 
The link between production and distribution is tenuous at best and non-existent at 
worst. Instead, the distribution of income is shaped by (and so partially manifests) socio-
institutional power.  
N&B agree with Veblen when they argue that capital is finance (immaterial wealth), 
but before we review their approach we need to review two more aspects of Veblen’s 
approach to political economy because they will play an important role in the 
organization and interpretation of this research. 
 
2.4 The Business Regime and Modern Political Economy  
The study that brought Veblen scholarly repute and popular fame was his Theory of the 
Leisure Class (1899). In it, Veblen not only set out to establish the manners and motives of 
the leisure class in America; he also explored the broader conditions which make a leisure 
class possible as well as the general interplay between the class structure and material 
civilization. In the course of his inquiry he generated potent analytical categories that 
were developed in subsequent studies, notably The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) and 
Absentee Ownership (1923). Veblen’s unorthodox notions of capital are closely related to 
two analytical distinctions: first, workmanlike and predatory motivations; and second, 
industrial and business institutions. We will deal with each in turn.  
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 Neoclassical orthodoxy begins its inquiry with the ‘economic problem’: 
individuals are thought to face a perpetual deficit between unlimited desire and the 
limited capacity to satisfy desire. The legitimate purpose and driving motivation behind 
work and acquisition is presumed to be consumption of the goods produced or acquired. 
Desires may be physiological, psychological or aesthetic, but the ultimate end of 
economic activity is understood to be desire-satiating consumption. As Veblen saw it, 
the pleasure pursuit/pain avoidance vision of human motivation was incomplete. Besides 
being narrow, it misses the effect that a stratified, hierarchical society has on human 
motivation. People are moved to acquire and consume not only for the sake of hedonistic 
gratification, but for the sociological sake of status differentiation.  
Veblen contrasts the motivational energy on the upper and lower ends of the 
social hierarchy to demonstrate the mixed motives at work. Work and acquisition by 
those on the upper end cannot meaningfully be reduced to the need to ‘put food on the 
table’. The motivational energy, beyond a certain point, has more to do with emulation, 
status, envy, honour — and we may add, power — than it does with bodily need.9 
Pecuniary wealth confers these social affects (1899: 25-26). People look above themselves 
in the social hierarchy to see how the stratum directly above themselves conducts itself 
and they try to mimic the behaviour they see. But they also look down the social 
hierarchy and try to put as much distance between themselves and the social ‘average’. 
This is the broader meaning of Veblen’s terms, ‘pecuniary emulation’ and ‘conspicuous 
consumption’.  
                                                          
9 On the latter point, recall what Thomas Hobbes — one of the founders of modern political thought — 
says about human motivation: ‘I put for a generall inclination of all mankind a perpetuall and restlesse 
desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death’ (1651: 161). 
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What motivates those on the low end of the social hierarchy? Veblen tells us that, 
at a minimum, sustenance and physical comfort compel people to work. However, those 
lower down the social hierarchy operate on the basis mixed motivations because they 
will not entirely sacrifice conspicuous consumption. Veblen observed that people will 
undergo material discomfort and deprivation before they sacrifice the modes of 
consumption that confer status (1899: 84-85). In other words, people are thrown into 
‘economic’ action on the basis of sociological needs as much as physiological needs:  
…the end sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the 
community in point of pecuniary strength. So long as the comparison is distinctly 
unfavourable to himself, the normal, average individual will live in chronic dissatisfaction 
with his present lot; and when he has reached what may be called the normal pecuniary 
standard of the community, or of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction 
will give place to a restless straining to place a wide and ever-widening pecuniary interval 
between himself and his average standard. The invidious comparison can never become so 
favourable to the individual making it that he would not gladly rate himself still higher 
relatively to his competitors in the struggle for pecuniary reputability (1899: 31-32). 
 
Different motivational energies manifest themselves across the social hierarchy. The 
invidious comparisons attached to wealth predominant on the upper end are 
distinguishable from the physical comforts attached to things on the lower end. When it 
comes to accumulation and acquisition, differential status appears to be the main driver, 
at least from a Veblenian point of view.  
  These counteracting motivations are loosely mirrored by Veblen’s distinction of 
‘business’ from ‘industry’, terms which most people think of as synonyms but to Veblen 
were becoming closer to antonyms. Industry is the domain upon which the economic 
welfare of the community rests. This material-productive domain contains the inherited 
knowledge of previous generations and is calibrated through heterogeneous material 
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units. For Veblen, an activity is industrial insofar as the end sought is the expansion of 
human comfort and the means utilized are non-human things. Control over nature, not 
over other human beings, characterizes industry (1899: 10). Insofar as industry is directed 
at the efficient and innovative servicing of the community’s needs, cooperation and 
synchronization are the requirements of success. Business, by contrast, centres on 
investment for profit. The language used is that of accounting and the units of measure 
are universal pecuniary values. The immaterial-financial business system is driven by 
capitalists competing for ‘differential advantage’ (Veblen 1904: 18), something which 
unfolds through acquisition, ownership and the extension of control. This, in turn, 
presupposes conflict amongst owners and between owners and non-owners.  
If these two domains are inherently distinct, how are they related? In a word: 
hierarchically. Veblen argues that the ‘industrial system is organized on business 
principles and for pecuniary ends [with the] business man [at] the center…’ (1904: 27). In 
modern times, ‘the large business man controls the exigencies of life under which the 
community lives’ (1904: 8). Conceptually speaking, business overlaps with industry but 
is not coterminous with it. What’s more, Veblen would have us believe that business 
activity cannot legitimately be placed under the heading ‘production’, as is commonly 
done. Instead, he postulates that it belongs under the theoretical auspices of 
‘distribution’ (1919b: 296).  
If Veblen gives us good reason to doubt the neoclassical theory of capital and 
distribution, and if he provides some of the building blocks to understand contemporary 
capitalism, N&B supply an overarching framework within which to conduct research.  
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2.5 The Conceptual Infrastructure of Capital as Power 
N&B begin their construction of the CAP framework by tearing down two of the major 
dichotomies of political economy: the separation of the ‘real’ world of production and 
consumption from the ‘nominal’ world of prices and finance and the broader severance of 
the polity from the economy. They argue that these dualisms are hindrances to our 
understanding of capital.10 They propose that the accumulation of capital is the 
‘generative’ process of contemporary capitalism and because neoclassical and Marxian 
conceptions of accumulation rest on these problem-ridden dichotomies, both approaches 
to accumulation are unworkable (2009: 153).  
The major problem comes with the basic units of analysis or ‘elementary 
particles’, as they put it (Bichler and Nitzan 2006). To understand capital and the price 
system we require a theory of value.11 A theory of value rests on a set of metaphysical 
assumptions about how market prices are formed. Neoclassical economics relies upon 
the ‘util’ and Marxism on ‘socially necessary abstract labour’ to explain relative prices. 
Here is where the dualisms come in: N&B tell us that both approaches conceive of the 
‘real’ processes of production, distribution and exchange — denominated in quantitative 
terms of utils or abstract labour — to be mirrored by a ‘nominal’ world of prices. 
Furthermore, these ‘real’ quantitative processes are thought to unfold in the material 
sphere of the economy, at a distance from the power processes of the polity. N&B’s 
criticism is that utils and abstract labour have never been scientifically demonstrated to 
be workable or even logically consistent units. And the dualisms that they rest upon are 
                                                          
10 See Bichler and Nitzan (2006; 2012) and Nitzan and Bichler (2000; 2002; 2009) for a discussion of these 
dualities. 
11 Robinson (1962) elaborates on the place of metaphysics and value theory in political economy. 
42 
 
difficult to sustain. The result: neither approach arrives at a satisfactory account of 
accumulation.  
At this point it should be noted that the validity of N&B’s criticism of 
neoclassical and Marxian approaches is not the main issue. There has been plenty of 
criticism levelled at both frameworks, including questions of logical consistency and 
empirical validity. In short, we need not rely on N&B’s criticism to reject neoclassical 
and Marxian approaches. The purpose of recounting N&B’s critique is to trace how they 
reason away from these established frameworks and how they reason towards an 
alternative framework. Much of the scholarship that is reviewed and contested in the 
chapters to follow is rooted in neoclassical and Marxian traditions, which implies that 
these approaches must be taken seriously. And while this research is guided by numerous 
heterodox thinkers, at this point in the dissertation it is necessary to remain agnostic 
about which framework is the most useful in the study of large firms. By the end of the 
dissertation we will be prepared to comment on the usefulness of the CAP framework. 
Consider the polity/economy duality. Modern people, insofar as they embrace 
liberal presuppositions, tend to approach the political in terms spelled out by John 
Locke. For Locke, political power centres on ‘the making of laws with penalties of death’ 
(1690: 8). Politics is institutionally defined through the state and government, governors 
and governed, coercive laws and obedient citizens, political parties and voters, rights and 
entitlements, etc. This conceptual arrangement of human association means that 
economics is functionally and institutionally separated from politics. Economics deals 
with the aspects of associational reality that are defined through markets and business, 
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employers and employees, voluntary exchange, the price mechanism and a host of other 
categories such as production, consumption, trade and investment. And capital, of 
course, is habitually placed in the latter domain. In the two domains agents pursue 
different goals, utilize different means, face differing incentives, manifest differing 
motivational energies and are embedded in different institutional environments.  
The parcellization of associational reality into multiple domains might be 
theoretically tidy, but N&B claim (2009: 10) that it is an obstacle to understanding 
contemporary capitalism. In claiming that capital is a power institution, N&B seem to 
posit an unconventional understanding of ‘the political’. Contemporary linguistic usage 
conceives of the ‘political’ as something that is nested in and subsumed by in the ‘social’, 
but this is a wholly modern innovation. It appears that N&B’Ss conception of the 
political has more in common with the ancient Greek politiké, which may be thought of as 
the collectively intended institution of society, or the totality of collective life. This 
broader definition of the political encompasses laws, institutions, conventions, customs 
and ideology. Under this latter conception, capital is a creature of a broader human 
culture and thus is a political institution.12 Contemporary academic usage has the 
political scientists concerned with power and economists with wealth. Drawing 
inspiration from N&B, this research will supplant the separation of ‘politics’ and 
                                                          
12 The modern habit of thinking of politics as just one aspect of a broader entity called ‘society’ might be 
traceable to Hegel’s distinction between the state and civil society. Then again, the notion of ‘civil society’ 
is a Latin notion. For the Ancient Greeks there was no distinction between the political and the social. See 
Sartori (1973) for a discussion. The word ‘society’ derives from the Latin societas and socius, meaning non-
Roman ally (Mann 1986: 14). This term had no meaning in Ancient Greek parlance and would have been 
redundant anyway.  
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‘economics’ with the much older term, ‘political economy’, and use it to denote an 
integrated system of wealth and power.13  
Another duality which N&B challenge is the separation of the ‘real’ world of 
production and consumption from the ‘nominal’ world of prices and finance. They claim 
that the architecture of prices (an inherently quantitative system) and the broader socio-
legal-historical institutions of society (which are inherently qualitative) are part of the 
same power processes (2009: 149). Instead of prices (‘economics’) being at a distance 
from power (‘politics’), it appears that in their framework prices can manifest power. 
They further posit that all historical societies involve a mixture of social struggle and 
cooperation, and that, in capitalism, the pattern of (qualitative) conflict shapes exchange 
and the quantitative world of relative prices.  
So the quantitative world of relative prices does not reflect another quantitative 
world of production or consumption, as mainstream economics supposes. Instead, it can 
partially reflect the qualitative world of socio-institutional power. Methodologically 
speaking, this means that analysis should unfold on two parallel levels: the quantitative 
world of business performance should be investigated side-by-side the qualitative world 
of power processes, thus making the fusion of quantity and quality an important method 
in this research. 
 Rejecting these dualities enables N&B to approach capital in a new way. As they 
see it, the organizing ritual of contemporary capitalism is capitalization and the 
                                                          
13 Many of the canonical thinkers of classical political economy from Smith to Marx did not draw a clear 
line of demarcation separating the ‘economic system’ from the ‘political system’. Many, including Smith, 
incorporated power into their analyses of things that would now be called ‘economic’. Aristotle’s (2004) 
positing of the embeddedness of the oikos in the broader institutions of the polis seems an apt metaphor for 
the relationship between wealth (‘economics’) and power (‘politics’). See Polanyi (1957) for a discussion.  
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accumulation of capital entails the growth of capitalization. To study capitalization is to 
study ‘the algorithm that generates and organizes prices’ (2009: 153). The power-
rootedness of accumulation, they tell us, is apparent when we consider the centrality of 
private ownership in the definition of capital. The word ‘private’ is derived from the Latin 
privare which means ‘to deprive’ (privation, deprivation) and privatus which means 
‘restricted’ (2009: 228). To ‘deprive’ or dispossess has meaning when contrasted with its 
opposite, namely access, openness and that which is common. To ‘own’, from late Middle 
English ownen, is to have ‘power’, ‘authority’, ‘dominion’ or ‘be master of’. The popular 
understanding conceives of private ownership as an institution which is useful because it 
enables those who own. But as N&B see it, the overriding purpose of private ownership 
is to disable those who do not own. And institutionalized exclusion, they assert, is 
always a matter of organized power (2009: 228).  
 Rooting accumulation and relative prices in power has a number of theoretical 
consequences. Power is an inherently relational category and thus has no meaning apart 
from its relativity. This feature entails a significant shift in our thinking. Instead of 
examining the ‘corporate sector’ as a whole or a ‘representative firm’, N&B (2009: 319) 
urge us, as a first step, to disaggregate and focus on the largest firms at the centre of the 
political economy or what they call dominant capital. They do not confine the category 
‘dominant capital’ to large firms alone, but instead use it to encompass the ‘leading 
corporate-government coalitions’ (2009: 315). For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
conventional notion of the state will be retained and the concept ‘dominant capital’ will 
be used to denote the largest publically traded firms.  
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In terms of business behaviour, N&B claim that ‘profit maximization’ only holds in 
the ‘fairy tale of perfectly competitive equilibrium’ (2009: 233). Large firms are not driven 
to accumulate in absolute terms; instead, they strive to exceed the ‘normal’ rate of return 
by beating some benchmark, which means that differential accumulation should be 
understood as the driving force behind contemporary capitalism. Dominant capital and 
differential accumulation are the twin operational concepts which make up the core of 
N&B’s framework. These concepts will be put to work in the Canadian context. 
 
2.6  Capital and Institutional Power 
If power is the theoretical centre around which other concepts orbit, we should be clear 
about what N&B mean by the term. As they see it, capital is the symbolic representation 
of power that appears as finance, the equity and debt of a corporation, or its 
capitalization (2009: 7). The relative value of capitalization, computed as the expected 
future profit and interest payments adjusted for risk and discounted to present value, 
represents the power of the corporation’s owners to restructure society against 
opposition. This means that the distribution of capitalized values doubles as the 
distribution of capitalist power amongst owners (2009: 17-18).  
Capital is a vendible or commodified form of power insofar as it is available for 
purchase and sale on the stock and bond markets. Its meaning, when understood as a 
singular owned entity, is a pecuniary capitalization of the capacity to generate earnings 
and limit risk (2009: 8, 231). In the broader philosophical sense what gets ‘accumulated’, 
they say, is the capacity to tame, harness and subjugate creativity (2009: 218, 231). Insofar 
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as ‘industry’ is subordinate to ‘business’, then, the accumulation of capital can be 
understood an amassment of the capacity to incapacitate.  
Power is a metaphysical category in the Aristotelian sense that it is not directly 
accessible to sensory perception, which means that it is difficult for any definition to 
satisfy all our intuitions about it. If human knowledge is dependent upon the 
identification of limits or boundaries (such that concepts like infinity or God, because 
they are boundless, lie outside human understanding) then the demarcation of 
boundaries through definitions is of great importance. So how can the distribution of 
income or the distribution of corporate ownership or the relative price of oil, for example, 
be a manifestation of power? One way of dealing with metaphysical categories, like 
power, is as they manifest themselves or through their effects.14  
According to Karl Popper (1963: 119), the notion that the visible is explainable 
with reference the invisible stretches back to the Ancient world. Modern people 
regularly speak of ‘forces’ that are not visible and yet these forces are thought to govern 
the behaviour of physical objects. Pop physics posits the existence of gravitation, for 
example, but no one has ever seen, smelt or heard gravitation. What we experience are 
the effects or manifestations of gravitation. Gravitation exists and we can know it, but 
not because it is directly accessible to our sensory apparatus — only its effects are 
disclosed to our senses. Thus, differential accumulation, an increase in the relative price 
of oil or an increase in the income share of the ‘one percent’ — the measurable behaviour 
                                                          
14 This insight is traceable to Benedict Spinoza, who claims that ‘the power of an effect is defined by the 
power of its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause’ (1677: 163). 
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of prices — are manifestations of underlying, metaphysical, non-measurable political-
economic processes, and power may be understood as part of those processes.15  
 Now that we have reviewed how Veblen and N&B approach capital, some 
clarification should be added as to how, and to what extent, these ideas will be utilized. 
Following Veblen, capital will be used to denote financial wealth, which means it is 
primarily a ‘business’ category that belongs in the pecuniary domain of distribution. And 
following N&B, this starting point means that capital will be understood as 
capitalization. Insofar as we can validly speak of corporate power, N&B have developed 
some of the most innovative ways of measuring it. However, even though capital should 
be thought of as financial wealth and although there is a power aspect to capital, 
business activities are not reducible to power alone, nor can power be validly posited as 
the sole purpose or primary motivator of business behaviour. This dissertation 
intentionally shies away from notions of ‘personal power’, opting instead to view power 
through the lens of the institutional and organizational structure of the political 
economy. 
Business institutions play an organizing and regulating role in the political 
economy that may not be ‘productive’ in the strict (industrial) sense. Nevertheless, 
business shapes the processes of production and coordinates political-economic 
behaviour. The richness and importance of N&B’s writings on ‘capital as power’ is their 
clarity, empirical grounding and analytical rigour. Insofar as business behaviour, relative 
                                                          
15 Even though N&B point to Hegel (through Marcuse) for this conception — force being nothing apart 
from its effects — it stretches (farther) back to Spinoza. It is possible that this conception predates 
Spinoza by many centuries. Scruton (2002) suggests that much of Spinoza’s thinking about God and his 
imminence may have been derived from the Kabbalah (Jewish mysticism).  
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prices, investment, trade, accumulation and similar political-economic phenomena can be 
spoken of in power terms, N&B offer the most convincing contemporary account. But no 
socially scientific theory is (or can ever be) complete. No theory can fully encompass the 
entirety of individual or collective (political-economic) experience. This means that the 
assumptions, concepts and measurements of a given framework should be utilized with a 
degree of caution.    
 
2.7 Regimes of Differential Accumulation 
If differential accumulation by dominant capital is the generative process of the 
contemporary capitalism, how does it unfold? N&B answer this question theoretically 
and historically by decomposing the capitalization formula. Capitalization consists of 
four ‘elementary particles’: future earnings, hype, a risk coefficient and the ‘normal’ rate of 
return.16 Quantitatively speaking, dominant capital can differentially accumulate by (1) 
raising differential earnings, (2) raising differential hype or (3) lowering differential risk. 
They suggest that raising differential earnings is the most potent pathway and has 
primacy over the long-haul. We can further subdivide earnings into its constituent parts, 
namely (1) the number of employees multiplied by (2) earnings per employee. The former 
designates the formal size of the organization and the latter the ‘elemental power per unit 
of organization’ (N&B 2009: 328).  
On the basis of this decomposition, differential earnings can increase (and by 
extension, differential accumulation can unfold) through a combination of the following: 
                                                          
16 The following synopsis is derived from Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 327-33). 
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expanding employment faster than the average, which N&B label ‘breadth’, and/or by 
raising earnings per employee faster than the average, which they label ‘depth’. Sub-
diving breadth and depth into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions leads to the taxonomy 
presented in Table 2.1. At the level of an individual firm, the four pathways towards 
differential accumulation include: the creation of new industrial capacity through green-
field investment (external breadth); the purchase of existing capacity through merger 
and acquisition (internal breadth); cost-cutting (internal depth); and raising prices 
amidst stagnation or stagflation (external depth). At the aggregate level, these pathways 
become broad regimes of differential accumulation. N&B’s research shows that, in the 
cases they studied, breadth and depth have tended to move inversely to each other over 
the past century and that the most potent pathway towards differential accumulation is 
through mergers and acquisitions.17 Dominant capital and differential accumulation are 
the twin operational concepts which make up the core of N&B’s research program, and 
they will be put to work in this study. 
Table 2.1 
Nitzan and Bichler’s ‘Regimes of Differential Accumulation’ 
 External Internal 
Breadth Green-Field Investment Mergers and Acquisitions 
Depth Stagflation Cost-Cutting 
Source: Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 329), Table 14.2.. 
 
This brief summary was meant to introduce to the reader some of the 
assumptions, concepts and measurements that will be utilized in subsequent chapters. 
                                                          
17 The implications of this taxonomy are spelled out in greater detail in Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 331-3) 
and Nitzan (1998; 2001). 
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The explication was brief, but core assumptions and concepts will be revisited as we 
proceed through the dissertation. Now that some of the theoretical tools have been 
specified, the next thing to sort out is some of the relevant historical background. Does 
the term ‘dominant capital’ have any historical meaning in the Canadian context? Have 
large firms played an important role in the political-economic development of Canada 
and, if so, can the utilization of ‘power’ as a central category help us make sense of 
Canada’s unique development? We will now put some of these concepts to work in order 
to uncover an aspect of Canadian history that, until now, has remained undisclosed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
From Contact through Confederation to Continental Integration:  
A Brief History of Canadian Business 
   
 
The actual, functioning nationalism… that emerged out of Confederation was based on a 
triple alliance of federal government, Conservative party, and big-business interests: 
government of the people, by lawyers, for big business. 
- Frank Underhill (1963)   
 
      
 
 
Our investigation into dominant capital in Canada is focused on the present and how it 
grew out of the recent past, namely the quarter century since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement was signed in 1988.  However, dominant capital at the time of the CUFTA 
grew out of events that stretch back to the Second World War, the First World War, 
and indeed, to Confederation. As we trace the history of large firms in Canada we find 
that they have colonial origins. Extending the historical picture back even farther, we 
find that Canadian business predates Canada’s colonial status. To understand the 
present, then, we need to have some understanding of how it grew out of the deep past. 
To that end, this chapter will provide a brief history of Canadian business from the very 
beginning to the 1990s. Covering 500 years of history is a daunting task and we will have 
to be content if, by the end, the image we have is little more than an outline, clear enough 
to perceive the overall shape, but missing in all the details that make for a rich canvas. 
In surveying the historical development of Canadian business, a number of 
themes continually arise. First, a sharp division of economics from politics is an analytical 
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hindrance, especially if we are to understand important historical junctures. The line 
separating business from government — corporate power from (imperial) state power — 
cannot be drawn with great precision.1 Second, the toleration, if not outright 
encouragement of oligopoly and monopoly are consistent features of the Canadian 
political economy from the very beginning. And third, the development of Canadian 
capitalism is nested within, and dependent upon, international commodity markets, 
international financial markets and global empire, whether French, British or American.  
So while Nitzan and Bichler (2002: 96) see the relationship between the Israeli 
State and dominant capital as one of a ‘cocoon’, with differential accumulation emerging 
out of the Israeli State, in Canada it makes more sense to invert this metaphor: rather 
than dominant capital emerging out of the state cocoon, the Canadian State can be 
understood, in part, as the offspring of Canadian business, with the British Crown and 
British capital markets playing a partnering role. Whether we examine the Act of Union 
in 1841, Confederation in 1867 or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, state power and governance institutions were generated by and for commercial 
interests.  
Even though N&B’s approach to political economy is unorthodox, the history of 
Canadian business as captured in the Canadian political economy and business history 
literatures is broadly supportive of many of their arguments. In order to understand 
particularities of Canadian development, capital must be viewed as a source of social 
power. Furthermore, many scholars argue that separating economics from politics — 
                                                          
1 Naylor (1987) argues that the state in all its forms played a leading role in shaping commercial life, which 
means that it does not make sense for us look at ‘economic history’ in isolation from ‘political history’.  
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divorcing business activity from state power — obscures rather than clarifies many of the 
key events in Canadian history, which is also in line with N&B’s approach.  
The chapter is organized into six sections and it will explore the development of 
Canadian business in chronological fashion. The first section sets the stage by recounting 
some of the early facts about European exploration of the New World. The second 
explores the roots of Canadian business and teases out some of the connections between 
business activity and state power. The deep historical facts suggest that the size, shape 
and political-economic structure of modern Canada grew out of the centralized power of 
the Hudson’s Bay Company. This review of pre-modern Canada will then serve as a 
backdrop to the third section, which will unpack the complicated relationship between 
the political unification of the Canadas and business crises.  
The fourth section will argue that the origins of ‘dominant capital’ are bound up 
with the formation of the Canadian State and the associated creation of a national 
political economy. More specifically, the major railway corporations of the mid to late 
nineteenth century in Canada exhibited the requisite size, structure and political-
economic power to justify use of the label ‘dominant capital’. Sections five and six focus 
on the growth of dominant capital in the twentieth century by exploring, first, the major 
international crises of the first half of the century, namely the two World Wars and the 
Great Depression, and second, by outlining the passage from a Keynesian welfare regime 
to that of neoliberal globalization.  
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3.1 Worlds Collide 
The historical development of Canada is marked at every significant point by the imprint 
of commerce. Few contemporary societies have a history so bound up with the norms, 
needs and activities of business enterprise. Business institutions and practice were slow 
to develop in Canada, but the seeds were planted by the first Europeans in the late 
fifteenth century. We are accustomed to think of European explorers like John Cabot, 
Jacques Cartier and Samuel de Champlain as founding Canada on behalf of European 
monarchs, but as Bliss (1987: 17) points out, the first people to sail westward across the 
Atlantic were not explorers, but ‘practical men seeking profit’. It was merchants 
operating out of Bristol, England who first sent mariners across the Atlantic in search of 
fish from the 1490s onward, perhaps earlier.  
Henry VII of England only sent the Italian explorer, John Cabot, across the 
Atlantic in 1496. In 1534 the French mariner, Jacques Cartier, sailed to the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence and claimed Canada for Francis I, but he was already following the well-
established routes laid out by Norman, Breton and Basque fishermen (Bliss 1987: 19). 
Seafaring men headed for the ‘new founde launde’ would establish cod fishing as the first 
business in Canada. The fur trade — Canada’s iconic business — only developed a 
century and a half later, after Europeans established relations with Aboriginal peoples. 
 Cartier’s proprietary claim to Canada on behalf of ‘His Most Christian Majesty’, 
Francis I, betrayed the fact that Aboriginal and Inuit peoples had inhabited Canada for 
thousands of years.2 It took Europeans several centuries to make contact with all the 
                                                          
2 The name ‘Canada’ is derived from the Mohawk word ‘Kanata’, meaning ‘village’. Cartier relayed the name 
to European mapmakers (Ray 2002: 62). 
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peoples of Canada. It wasn’t until the early decades of the seventeenth century that 
mariners made contact with the peoples of Hudson and James Bay and it took until the 
latter half of the eighteenth century for the Spaniard, Juan Perez, to make contact with 
the people of Haida Gwaii off the west coast of British Columbia (Ray 2002: 55). The 
three hundred thousand or so individuals who inhabited present day Canada spoke 
twelve major languages, were geographically dispersed and culturally unique.  
The Algonquin-speaking hunters of the Boreal forest led a highly mobile life while 
the Iroquoian-speaking people of the St. Lawrence had developed farming methods that 
enabled complex political formations encompassing thousands of people. The Cree, 
Ojibwa and Assiniboine of the Plains exhibited deeply patriarchal customs while the 
Huron of Southern Ontario traced descent on the female side and organized family life 
out of the mother’s home. The fishermen of the West Coast organized life in a highly 
stratified way, with a system of inherited rank dividing nobility from commoner and 
slave (Ray 2002: 12-45).  
 For all the cultural complexity of Aboriginal peoples, there are two major features 
amongst the disparate societies that are relevant to this study. First, trade was an 
established feature of human life on the North American continent prior to European 
arrival. Even though Europeans were looking for water passage to Asia, they found in 
Aboriginal peoples new trading partners. Canada is, and always has been, a trading 
nation. That said, the institutions and practices associated with capitalism — private 
ownership, private enterprise, the price system, investment for a profit, wage labour and 
an international commodity market — were unknown. And while capitalist institutions 
57 
 
were only in a gestational stage in Europe at the time of Contact, they would be brought 
with the Europeans and firmly planted in Canadian soil.3  
 
3.2 Corporate Activity and the Birth of a Colony 
For nearly two centuries Canada was a colony dedicated to the extraction of resources, 
not the settlement of a European population. The English victory over Spain in 1588 
combined with the decline of Portugal as a maritime power meant that the 
Newfoundland fishery and the continental fur trade would be contested by the French 
and English. Samuel de Champlain, the French explorer and diplomat, founded New 
France in 1608. His political program blended business with colonization and conversion 
(Morton 1997: 25-26). The way Bliss recounts it, the major problem facing European fur 
traders was how to reduce competitive pressures. The French Government had 
complementary objectives: it wanted some traders to prosper in the hope that settlers 
would be lured to New France (1987: 40).  
Champlain facilitated both objectives by overseeing the first merger in the history 
of Canadian business. In 1612-1614, he consolidated the activities of the merchant traders 
of the St. Lawrence into the royally chartered Company of Canada. A short time later, 
Cardinal Richelieu, the chief advisor to Louis XIII, used his Compagnie des Cent-
Associés (a successor to the Company of Canada) to govern New France and settle 
hundreds of feudal peasants each year in exchange for a permanent fur monopoly and 
limited monopolistic privileges in other Atlantic trades (Morck et. al. 2005: 73). By 1663, 
                                                          
3 See Beaud (2001) for a concise history of capitalism. 
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after a succession of companies failed to enlarge the settler population, the Crown 
converted New France into a royal colony. Although the earliest monopolies were a 
product of royal power, two things should be noted: first, the limitation of competition 
through the entrenchment of monopoly was an established part of Canadian business; 
and second, corporations played a leading role not only in controlling the trade, but in 
advancing settlement and governing New France. 
The development of British North America was influenced to an even greater 
extent by corporate activity. In 1610 Henry Hudson claimed the land around Hudson’s 
Bay for Britain, and in 1670 Prince Rupert of the Rhine drew up the royal charter 
establishing the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). It is hard to overstate the power this 
organization had on the evolution of (political-economic) life on the North American 
continent. In terms of duration, the HBC is the longest running multinational 
corporation in existence (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005: 17). In terms of spatial 
expanse, the tract of land the HBC acquired from the King was the largest real estate 
grant in human history. Rupert’s land was equivalent to 40 percent of modern Canada as 
well as northern parts of the United States, which meant that one-twelfth of the planet’s 
land surface was under HBC control (Newman 2005: xii).4  
The HBC was a centralized, hierarchical organization with the directors in 
London demanding unquestioning obedience from their employees (Taylor 2009: 6). It 
administered much of North America in between the Atlantic and the Pacific, but trading 
                                                          
4 It was in honour of Prince Rupert of the Rhine that this portion of North America was named Rupert’s 
Land. The HBC’s second governor, the Duke of York, abdicated his position with the company to become 
the King of England as James II. Other notable chieftains of the HBC include Sir Winston Churchill, who 
accepted the position of grand seigneur after retiring from politics in 1955 — the only corporate appointment 
he ever accepted (Newman 2005: xiii). 
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posts were as far afield as Hawaii and the Arctic Ocean. It isn’t a historical accident, Innis 
(1930: 392) tells us, that the geographical borders of modern Canada are very close to the 
fur trading areas of the northern part of North America. The presence and settlement 
activities of the HBC are what kept Western Canada in Canadian hands instead of falling 
under the control of Americans, who were trying to push their settlements northward. In 
1870 the sale of HBC territory to the nascent Canadian State greatly expanded the 
geographical space of Canada, filling in western and northern portions, with three 
provincial capitals — Winnipeg, Edmonton and Victoria — growing out of old HBC 
trading posts.  
The geographical and political borders of modern Canada grew out of this 
singular corporate entity, and when we consider the fact that the HBC minted its own 
coins, had its own army and navy, conducted its operations according to a calendar 
dating from its inception, drafted its own laws and ruled the territories, we realize that 
the tidy analytical distinction of ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ — corporate power and state 
power — cannot be easily imposed on the historical facts (Newman 2005).  
Shortly after the HBC was incorporated, all joint-stock companies were banned 
by the British Parliament on account of the speculative manias associated with the ‘South 
Sea Bubble’ and ‘Mississippi Bubble’. The HBC lost its exclusive trading privileges in 
1858 and a short time later ceased to operate as a quasi-government. Besides bequeathing 
to Canada its geo-political shape, the profits of the fur trade amassed by the HBC would 
make Montreal the business capital of Canada, until Toronto inherited the mantle in the 
mid-twentieth century (Taylor 2009: 5-7).     
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 For the first few centuries of its existence, Canada remained a sparsely populated 
colonial outpost. In 1663 the population of New France totalled three thousand people 
(Bliss 1987: 43) and as late as 1791 Upper Canada (now Ontario) only had fourteen 
thousand inhabitants (Morton 1997: 41). And while business enterprise continued to 
develop from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, from fish through fur to 
timber, wheat and minerals, a thinly populated territory combined with harsh climactic 
conditions made the pace of development modest.5 What’s more, imperial rivalry and 
colonial resentment led to constant warfare on the North American continent. In the 
Seven Years War, Britain dispossessed France of much of her holdings and became, in 
effect, sole proprietor of North America.6 But the Treaty of Paris in 1763 didn’t lead to a 
lasting peace. Britain lost much of her holdings in North America shortly thereafter when 
a tax revolt snowballed into a revolutionary War of Independence, with the Thirteen 
Colonies of British America aligning themselves against the British Crown. 
 For the century after the American Revolution, the development of the Canadian 
political economy unfolded in the shadow of the American goliath to the south, with 
threat of voluntary annexation or forced absorption remaining latent possibilities. The 
initial British response to the loss of the Thirteen Colonies was the Constitution Act of 
1791, which reconfigured governance in British North America. The two Canadas would 
be ruled by a governor, executive council and elected assembly. And because taxation had 
                                                          
5 We should remember that industrial capitalism only emerged in Canada in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. In 1867, at the time of Confederation, the Dominion’s population only numbered 3.7 
million, 80 percent of whom were engaged in agriculture (Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 384). Canada 
remained predominantly rural and agricultural in many parts well into the twentieth century. 
6 Elite consensus in France at the loss of her holdings to the British was succinctly captured by Voltaire, 
who dismissed Canada as ‘several acres of snow’ (Morton 1997: 31) 
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led to the American Revolution, government in the Canadas would be financed by 
reserving one-seventh of all land for the Crown.7  
Some did not see absorption into the American Republic as entirely negative. 
Upper Canada’s ruling elite realized that the large swathes of land they controlled would 
be worthless unless it was flanked by prosperous farms. However, attracting pioneers to 
Upper Canada was difficult given the fertility of the soil to the south of the Great Lakes 
and the thriving cities and industries that were forming in the northern United States. 
The American attack on British North America in response to the British blockade and 
seizure of American ships during the Napoleonic Wars eliminated the last remnants of 
the idea of peaceful incorporation into the American polity (for the time being). The War 
of 1812 and the ensuring victories racked up by Tecumseh and Brock gave the colonists a 
sense of national identity and united English and French Canadians, if only momentarily 
(Morton 1997: 41-45).    
 The warfare that plagued the North American continent between 1775 and 1815 
generated a steady stream of war contracts and war profits. The merchant aristocracy of 
Central and Eastern Canada that was fed by these lucrative contracts needed a new 
vision once Perpetual Peace replaced Napoleonic War. In The Commercial Empire of the St. 
Lawrence, a book that shook the orthodox vision of Canadian history, Creighton (1937) 
argues that it was the merchant elite of Montreal that sketched a new picture of 
Canadian commerce and nationhood. This sketch centred on the St. Lawrence River and 
                                                          
7 Another seventh would form the fiscal base of the Protestant Clergy, and though the Crown flirted with 
the idea of establishing a titled aristocracy, it was eventually decided that legislative councillors would 
hold a maximum of six thousand acres of land, thus entrenching a landed gentry (Morton 1997: 40). 
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Great Lakes as major transport links connecting the interior of the North American 
continent to markets in Europe. The task was to create a canal system that would 
simultaneously enable the Montreal merchants to dominate commercial life in Upper 
Canada by controlling the distribution of staples to European markets, while beating out 
rivals in New York City who were also vying to mediate the trade between the American 
interior and overseas markets. The actions undertaken to execute this vision would lead 
to the Act of Union in 1841 and then, in 1867, to Confederation.8 
 
3.3 From Agricultural Colony to Commercial State 
In 1824 construction of the Welland Canal began, but large overhead costs combined 
with lengthy delays led to the amassment of huge debts for the investors controlling the 
process. Upper Canada lacked the revenues to assume responsibility for the waterway 
improvements, so in 1841 the Province of Canada was formed through a merger of Upper 
and Lower Canada. This new, larger entity had the fiscal capacity to sell its bonds to 
investors in England and the new government promptly seized control of the canal 
building program. By 1848, with the St. Lawrence canal finished, the waterway system 
was completed (Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 351). Historians (Morton 1997: 51-52, for 
example) will normally cite the Rebellions of 1837 as leading to the Act of Union in 1841, 
and though this insurrection culminated in the winning of Responsible Government in 
the late 1840s, it is noteworthy that constitutional adaptation and political unification 
                                                          
8 Innis (1930) was the first to make the argument that it was capital expenditures on canals that led to the 
Act of Union in 1841 and capital expenditures on railways that led to Confederation in 1867 (1930: 396-7). 
In 1937, Creighton would develop a similar argument when he claimed that it was the St. Lawrence 
merchants who established the Canadian commercial state. 
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was preceded by a business crisis.9 The canal system was Montreal’s major link, through 
the Great Lakes, to staples production in the interior. For Upper Canada, the canal 
system was the bridge connecting its staples products, through the St. Lawrence, to 
markets in Europe. One way of understanding the political unification of the Canadas in 
1841, then, is to see it as a constitutional response to a business crisis.   
 The political-economic vision of the Montreal merchant aristocracy might have 
been realized had the British not radically reversed their policies in 1846. Canadian 
wheat, flour and other staples were granted preferential access to British markets from 
1815 onwards. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 vaporized this arrangement and 
changed Canada’s position in the British imperial system. British capitalists wanted to 
export their industrial goods abroad (duty free, of course) which meant that duties on 
imported inputs would have to be lowered. Canadian business had already managed to 
avoid those duties and would now have to compete with others in something akin to a 
free market.  
Easterbrook and Aitken (1956: 354) tell us that the commercial system of Canada 
was predicated on preferential access to British markets and with this policy change the 
ruling elite in Canada went into ‘full shock’ between 1847 and 1849. The St. Lawrence 
system had absorbed much of the capital in Canada for an entire generation and much 
government revenue too. Would Canadian business be able to locate other markets for 
their goods? Some doubted it. Caught between a British imperial system that was 
reconstituting itself and an emerging American power to the south, a manifesto 
                                                          
9 Responsible government was culturally and politically significant for Canadians, but it also had great 
financial significance. It meant that Canadians would control their tariff policy, thus making it possible for 
colonial governments to finance and oversee development (Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 350).  
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circulated calling for the annexation of Canada to the United States, with some 
prominent Montreal merchants adding their signature (Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 
351-4). 
 The alternative to outright annexation was a free trade agreement with the 
Americans. And by adding railway transport to the canal system and by modifying the 
tariff system, the pathway to an independent Canadian nationhood could remain open. 
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 secured less onerous access to the American market for a 
time, but a variety of factors led to its cancellation by the victorious Northern States in 
1866, who were industrialist and protectionist in orientation and who were hostile to the 
British for their perceived support of the Southern States during the American Civil War. 
Besides facing higher barriers to the American market, the conclusion of the American 
Civil War posed a serious military threat to Canada. The War of 1812 was still in living 
memory (American bitterness at the failure to conquer Canada surely endured) and the 
Northern States toyed with the idea of seizing Canada as compensation for the loss of the 
Southern States (Morton 1997: 61). Besides, the Northern armies were armed, battle 
tested and could be sent northward to overwhelm the modest Canadian defences should 
the command have been issued. What’s more, the Canadian West was under perpetual 
threat by American settlers. Confederation in 1867 was the institutional response to these 
commercial, political and military pressures. 
 The creation of a railway running on an east-west axis would enable the young 
Dominion to transcend the climactic and geographical barriers that had done so much to 
regionalize British North America. The beginnings of a national political economy would 
65 
 
be established in the linkage of staple producing areas in the West and East to the 
manufacturing and financial areas of Central Canada. Agricultural immigrants would be 
shuttled along the railway to help populate Western Canada and a tariff would be used 
to encourage lateral, as opposed to horizontal, commerce. The formula for Canadian 
nationhood and independence, enshrined in the National Policy of 1879, was this: 
transcontinental railway, protective tariffs, land settlement and immigration 
(Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 383).10  
 Historians have long argued that mainstream economic assumptions about 
unhindered enterprise and government docility do not hold in the context of early 
Canadian capitalism. Aitken (1964: 110) sees political power and national economic 
development as complementary activities. In the late nineteenth century the Canadian 
State actively used its power to steer industrial development. In this period especially, he 
argues, it is questionable whether we can disentangle ‘the state’ from ‘private enterprise’ 
(Aitken 1967: 209). The financial resources of the state were even delegated to 
corporations to further national economic policies. In this way, Aitken claims, private 
enterprise was the ‘chosen instrument’ of public policy. What’s more, Canadian political 
and economic elites were so closely associated that it is a ‘positive distortion to speak of 
them separately’ (Aitken 1964: 110).  
Naylor (1993: 129) echoes these sentiments when he posits that ‘in the very early 
years business and government were identical’. Fowke (1952: 239) says as much when he 
claims that ‘the national policy predated the creation of a national government in Canada 
                                                          
10 Some historians see the in the National Policy not just a set of policy decisions but a broader ‘declaration 
of economic independence’ (Underhill 1963: 23). 
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and envisaged the establishment of such a government as one of its indispensable 
instruments’. McCalla (1992: 209), too, sees a distinctive historical relationship between 
state and capital in Canada and argues that the Grand Trunk Railway was a ‘vehicle’ for 
public policy. However, we could invert this entire line of causality and say that the 
Canadian State was the chosen ‘vehicle’ for dominant business interests. Instead of 
thinking of 1867 as a constitutional adaptation leading to state formation with the 
National Policy of 1879 as the destination, we could see the national policy as creating the 
Federal Government through the BNA Act of 1867, with dominant business interests 
working in tandem with the British Crown to forge a new nation. Is there any reason to 
believe that dominant commercial interests created the Canadian State, not vice versa, in 
order to accomplish things it could not manage on its own, namely tariffs, railroad 
financing, immigration and land settlement?   
 Let’s consider this question in the light of the development of the railroad 
corporations. Railways were the first large scale businesses in Canada and their activities 
were crucial to the formation of the Canadian State. In 1849 the Government of the 
United Canadas began promoting railway construction by introducing the Guarantee 
Act. The interest on railway bonds would be paid by the government, if necessary, as a 
way of inducing investors to overlook the riskiness of such large scale, long-term 
projects. The costs of financing railway construction proved onerous. By the mid-1860s, 
45 municipalities in the Canadas effectively defaulted on debts acquired in the service of 
railway construction. The province absorbed these debt obligations and doubled its debt 
load in the process. By 1864 half of all provincial revenues were earmarked for the 
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servicing of corporate railroad debt and by 1885 the Canadian Government had provided 
$25 million in cash grants, 25 million acres in land grants and $27.5 million in emergency 
loans, all to railroad corporations (Taylor 2009: 2, 15-16).  
One interpretation of the relationship between capital and the state would 
suggest that governance institutions at all levels supported business in the service of ‘the 
national interest’. But these facts also fit a rival interpretation: dominant business 
interests created and then instrumentally utilized the state to further their differential 
business goals.  
 
3.4 The Emergence of Dominant Capital 
Whatever interpretation one may prefer, the period between 1850 and 1900 not only 
witnessed the creation of the Canadian State and a national political economy; it also 
brought with it the beginnings of firms that could reasonably be classified as ‘dominant 
capital’. The industrial scale of the projects controlled by railway corporations was 
enormous, but these firms managed to offload the financial risk onto governments, pre- 
and post-Confederation. Governments were regularly asked to service corporate debt 
and the magnitude of the profit or loss associated with the railways was directly tied to 
the level of the state tariff: an increase in the tariff increased the commercial traffic east-
west and led to higher profits; a decrease in the tariff led to increased commercial traffic 
north-south, thereby reducing profits (Easterbrook and Aitken 1956: 376).  
And given that some of the key personnel in Canadian governments were also 
investors or managers with the railways and other large firms such as the Bank of 
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Montreal and the HBC, the picture that emerges is a close penetration of dominant 
business interests and the Canadian State.11 Key aspects of modern Canada, then, from its 
geopolitical shape to its public finances, its constitutional evolution through to its 
governance structures, were created in response to and on behalf of dominant business 
interests. And while Canadian business was often dependent upon financing from 
London, Glasgow and New York, at the turn of the twentieth century a sophisticated 
network of financial institutions made the business class a cohesive social entity.    
 The national political economy that began to take root in the 1850s would begin 
to blossom by 1885 with the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The state-
corporate arrangements created during this period would remain fairly stable until the 
1930s. The financial architecture of the country, for example, was entrenched in the Bank 
Act of 1871. This legislation authorized the banks to establish branches throughout the 
country and restrained competition through high capital reserve requirements. At the 
time of Confederation, 35 banks were in existence (Newman 1975: 140). Between 1890 
and 1920 the number of chartered banks fell from 41 to 18 and by the mid-1950s, after a 
few high profile mergers, the ‘Big Five’ dominated Canadian banking.12 Between 
Confederation and the turn of the century, the major insurance firms would also 
establish themselves. And because the Canadian financial market was quickly saturated 
                                                          
11 The railway corporations contributed to the development of Canadian capitalism in other notable ways 
too: they were among the earliest businesses requiring a permanent and substantial waged labour force 
(Greer and Radforth 1992: 5). 
12 The ‘Big Five’ chartered banks include the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto-Dominion Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia. They were created 
between 1817 (BMO) and 1867 (CIBC). Newman (1975: 135) claims that the executive board of the Big Five 
represent the greatest source of non-governmental power in Canada. 
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by a few large players, many expanded their activities abroad, making the banks and 
insurance firms among the earliest Canadian multinationals (Taylor 2009: 22-25). 
 According to Taylor (2009), by the first decade of the twentieth century a cluster 
of forty or fifty men in Montreal and Toronto — the early ‘corporate raiders’ — 
dominated Canadian finance. And while foreign ownership and foreign credit played a 
large role in the development of modern Canadian capitalism, it was these corporate 
raiders who consolidated Canadian business in the greater merger movements of the 
early 1890s, 1909-1912 and 1925-1929, by which time most of the major industries were 
dominated by a small number of large firms.13 In terms of foreign ownership, by the First 
World War a distinctive pattern had emerged: financial institutions and utilities were 
under Canadian control while mining and industrial firms, which were more heavily 
reliant upon foreign direct investment, had higher levels of foreign ownership (Taylor 
2009: 28-29, 33). 
 It was also around this time that large integrated firms were beginning to 
restructure the Canadian political economy. Amalgamation in tandem with heavy foreign 
direct investment from the United States led to the creation of new corporate forms to 
manage both scale and scope. Labour unrest and outright political conflict followed as 
the struggle to control the workplace and whole communities unfolded. Skilled 
craftsmen resisted the new ‘scientific management’ techniques being imposed on the 
workplace, while the small and medium-sized firms began to organize into trade 
                                                          
13 It is noteworthy that two of these merger waves were followed by legislative acts that inquired into, and 
recommended restraints on, corporate power. The merger wave that peaked in 1910 led to the Combines 
Investigation Act and the merger wave that peaked in 1929 was followed by the Royal Commission on Price 
Spreads (1935).   
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associations to defend their interests. A newly created stratum of ‘white collar’ workers 
was being subjected to the discipline of corporate rules and procedures. Farmers, too, 
formed cooperatives and market ‘pools’ to enhance their bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
giant firms controlling the trade. Gender roles were shaken up as women entered the 
paid workforce in large numbers. In the late nineteenth century women only made up 10 
percent of the labour market; by 1930 they held nearly half of all clerical positions (Taylor 
2009: 90-92).    
 The emerging conflict required new social responses and new institutions. For 
the labour movement, the period between 1890 and 1920 was of great import, with 
struggle boiling over into outright conflict.14 The business response to unionization and 
worker control was best captured by the American industrialist, Samuel Insull, who 
believed the most sensible labour relations arrangement was ‘a long line of men waiting 
at the gate’ (quoted in Taylor 2009: 96). It took until the Second World War for 
collective bargaining to be formally accepted by the Canadian State: worker participation 
in the direction and pace of industry and in remuneration was soundly rejected by small 
and large firms alike prior to 1945. And while W.L. Mackenzie King would become 
Canada’s first Minister of Labour, introducing the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act in 
1907, the Canadian State was on board with business in its hostility to labour. At the 
close of the First World War, the RCMP devoted an entire unit to the surveillance of the 
Canadian labour movement (Taylor 2009: 95-97). 
                                                          
14 The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 was a bloody affair, with all three layers of government combining 
with the city’s business elite to crush the revolt. That year the Borden Government hosted a conference to 
discuss the findings of the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations (1919) (Heron 1996: 54). 
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 The question of foreign ownership also grew up around Confederation. The tariff 
system instituted in the National Policy appears to have encouraged foreign ownership of 
Canadian industry in the service of increased growth and new technologies. The tariff 
shielded Canadian business from foreign competition and simultaneously encouraged 
American firms to hop over the tariff wall and establish operations in Canada. The Patent 
Act of 1872 contained a ‘working clause’, which Laxer (1989: 232) calls ‘neo-mercantilist’, 
requiring foreign firms to establish operations in Canada within two years, thus inviting 
new technology into the Canadian political economy. Between 1879 and 1887, 37 
American branch plants set up shop in Canada, increasing to 66 by 1900 (Taylor: 2009: 
84-85). On the eve of the First World War there were 450 American branch plants in 
Canada and at the onset of the Great Depression the value of American direct investment 
was one and a half times that of Europe (Laxer 1989: 13).15  
 The Great Crash of 1929 devastated the corporate sector. The dollar value of total 
corporate profit fell 94 percent from its 1929 high to its 1932 low (calculations from the 
author’s data archive). Morck et. al. (2005: 112) tell us that the top 50 stocks lost 85 
percent of their value between their October 1929 highs and their May 1932 lows. Despite 
this drop, there was not to a single bank failure in Canada — a stark contrast from the 
experience in the United States, which saw more than five thousand banks disappear 
between 1930 and 1933 (Newman 1975: 140). Unemployment climbed from 2.5 percent in 
1928 to more than 20 percent by 1933.  
                                                          
15 By 1921 American inflows of capital into Canada had eclipsed those of Britain with the activity 
concentrated in automotive, energy and pulpwood (Taylor 2009: 84-85, 182). 
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The Bennett Conservatives responded by steering a course between policies that 
would counteract the depression and those that would conserve the free enterprise 
system. And while many of Bennett’s New Deal-style proposals were struck down as 
unconstitutional by the JCPC in Britain, one important measure stuck: the creation of the 
Bank of Canada (Taylor 2009: 120-5).16 The Bennett Conservatives were swiftly removed 
from office in 1935 and were replaced by the W.L. Mackenzie King Liberals.  
 
3.5 The Experiment with a Welfare State 
The Second World War transformed the Canadian political economy in five significant 
ways: government control of industrial processes, the closer integration of corporate and 
state elites, the deeper integration of Canadian and American political economies, the 
creation of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF — precursor to the NDP) 
and the reconstitution of capital-labour relations. Each transformation will be discussed 
in turn. First, governments at all levels influenced or commanded the industrial process 
to a historically unprecedented degree, largely through the use of crown corporations. 
However, state direction of industry, price and currency controls, the resort to crown 
corporations and the levying of corporate and personal income taxes were all remnants of 
the First World War.17 The difference between the two Wars was this: in 1919 the federal 
government reverted to its pre-war stance, whereas after 1945 some of the changes 
enacted to prosecute the war were entrenched.  
                                                          
16 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was Canada’s highest court of appeal until 1949 when the 
Supreme Court of Canada was created.  
17 The Canadian State experimented with crown corporations in a major way for the first time in 1919-1923 
when it merged the Canadian Northern, Grand Trunk and other railways to form the Canadian National 
Railway (privatized in 1995). 
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Clarence Decatur Howe, the savvy and sometimes authoritarian MIT graduate 
was made Minister of Munitions and Supply (though he was known as the ‘minister of 
everything’) and was granted enormous power to put the Canadian political economy on 
a war-time footing. Hiring what were known as ‘dollar-a-year men’, Howe summoned 
many of the Canadian business elite to Ottawa to help command the Canadian political 
economy. Wage ceilings for labour, price freezes for consumers, government loans and 
subsidies for favoured contractors (and seized factories for others), tax credits, 
accelerated depreciation and administered profits (at a handsome 5 percent) for business, 
exchange rate controls for importers and exporters and a roster of twenty eight new 
crown corporations were part of his political program (Taylor 1939: 137-9).  
Approximately $28 billion was spent on the Second World War, during which 
time the unemployment rate shrank from 12 percent (in 1939) to 2 percent (by 1945) and 
GDP surged from $5 to $12 billion. In 1945 Howe proceeded to discharge war plants to 
capitalists for 35 cents (or less) on the dollar in the first major privatization effort of the 
twentieth century (Newman 1975: 472). The intellectual capstone to the war effort 
activity was the White Paper on Employment and Income (1945), which codified the idea that 
government should play a key role in wealth creation and distribution through the 
maintenance of high levels of employment. Newman (1975: 446-7) tells us that this 
document represented the first overt signal from a government of acceptance of 
Keynesian principles.18  
                                                          
18 Campbell (1991: 4) contests the view that the 1945 White Paper signalled a more active role for 
government. Instead, he sees it as signalling a government commitment to ‘revitalize capitalism’.   
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Second, state and corporate elites (who were never at a great distance from each 
other in Canada) became even more tightly intertwined during the war. The way 
Newman describes it, the network of individuals comprising the highest echelons of 
business and government that were organized by Howe during the Second World War 
would emerge at its conclusion as the Canadian Establishment. After 1945 this group of 
men would determine the country’s destiny for the next three decades. ‘They had come to 
Ottawa as individuals’, he says, and ‘left as an elite’ (Newman 1975: 447).  
Third, the Canadian and American political economies became even more tightly 
integrated. Closer trade relations and a return to foreign investment by Americans 
interested in Canadian resources signalled the beginning of a continental, as opposed to 
national, political economy. 
Fourth, the Great Depression led to a new political party, the Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF), which held great sway over legislatures across the 
country during and after the War.19 And while this party never held the reins of 
government at the federal level, the pressure it put on the governing Liberals was 
significant. In the postwar period, the Mackenzie King Liberals would institute a 
number of social welfare policies, including family allowances, old age pensions and a 
more activist stance, largely to pre-empt the CCF’s popularity (Taylor 2009: 144-5).  
Fifth and finally, capital-labour relations were reconstituted during the War. 
Federal legislation in 1940 appeared to accept collective bargaining and the right of 
workers to form unions. By 1944, with the CCFs popularity surging, the King Liberals 
                                                          
19 In 1943 the Canadian Labour Congress endorsed the CCF as the political party of organized labour. That 
year a Gallup poll indicated the CCF was the most popular political party. Its agrarian populist roots 
helped it come to power in Saskatchewan in 1944 and remain there for twenty years (Campbell 1991: 1). 
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drafted legislation, sometimes referred to as the ‘Magna Carta for Labour’, that mirrored 
the Wagner Act of 1936 in the United States. It created the framework within which 
unions rights to collective bargaining were entrenched (Taylor 2009: 142). 
 The decades following the Second World War brought peace and historically 
unprecedented prosperity to Canadians. Large firms flourished during this period. The 
chartered Canadian banks had specialized in international exchanges early on and were 
well positioned to continue expanding their operations across the entire non-communist 
world. Dominant Canadian mining and resource firms like Inco, Falconbridge, Alcan, 
Cominco, Abitibi-Price, MacMillan-Bloedel, Hollinger and Noranda rode a wave of high 
prices and growth (Bliss 1987: 484-5). A merger wave in the late 1960s further 
consolidated many businesses and elevated a new corporate form, the conglomerate, to 
the apex of the Canadian political economy.20  
A series of global changes in the early 1970s led to a reconfiguration of corporate-
state relations in Canada. By 1971 the United States faced deficits in both its trade and 
payments balances, inducing President Nixon to take a series of steps to devalue the 
currency. The United States was Canada’s largest trading partner and it pleaded to be 
exempted from the protectionist measures.21 The lesson for the Trudeau Government was 
that Canada’s trade and investment dependence on the United States left it in a 
                                                          
20 In March of 1975, Paul Desmarais Sr., then chairman of Power Corporation, sought a controlling interest 
in Argus Corporation, two of the dominant conglomerates in Canada at the time. This jostling for position 
in the corporate power game quickly caught the attention of Ottawa. Pierre Trudeau responded by 
establishing the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (1978) to study the effects of increasing 
concentration on the Canadian political economy.  
21 Devaluation can be thought of as ‘protectionist’ insofar as it is a governmental measure meant to make 
foreign imports more expensive relative to domestic producers, which would have the effect, in principle if 
not practice, of reducing the current account deficit. 
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precarious position. Accordingly, it announced that it would seek trade and investment 
partnerships outside the United States to shelter Canada from American protectionism 
(Taylor 2009: 185).  
The vulnerability of Canada to forces outside its borders was amplified when the 
1973 Israel-Arab War coincided with a global energy crisis and a (seemingly) new 
phenomenon: stagflation. According to official accounts, OPEC flexed its oligopolistic 
muscle and the price of oil rose nearly 300 percent in a few short months. The Trudeau 
Government, again on the defensive, took steps to generate increased energy 
independence and to capture some of the energy dollars flowing into the coffers of OPEC 
governments, multinational energy firms and the Alberta treasury. Price controls would 
shield Canadians from the higher global price of energy, export controls would keep 
more energy in Canada, export taxes would augment the flow of funds to the national 
treasury and ownership restrictions would encourage Canadianization of energy 
resources (Bliss 1987: 533-4).  
These nationalist manoeuvres had been in the making for more than a decade. 
Chaired by Walter Gordon, the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects (1957) had 
warned of the threat of excessive foreign direct investment from the United States. The 
result of too much foreign investment, the Report warned, would be continental 
integration and an accompanying loss of political-economic independence for Canada. 
Gordon would later incite Prime Minister Pearson to commission a series of studies on 
the role of multinational corporations in Canada to assess the opportunities and threats 
posed by foreign ownership. The Watkins Report (1968) advocated greater domestic 
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ownership in key sectors and The Gray Report (1972) called for a screening agency to assess 
to benefit of new foreign direct investment.  
The outcome of these studies (and the nationalist sentiment that fuelled them) 
was the Canada Development Corporation in 1971 and the Foreign Investment Review 
Agency in 1973-74. These and other measures, including the creation of a new crown 
corporation in 1975, Petro-Canada, outraged some of most powerful people in Western 
Canada. The way Bliss (1987: 540-2) recounts the events of the late 1970s, the Joe Clark 
Tories deposed the Liberals in May of 1979 and some observers took this to signal a shift 
away from energy nationalism and state activism. However, geopolitical turmoil in the 
Middle East, including the Iranian Revolution in 1979, coincided with sharp increases in 
the price of oil (in the spring of 1979 the price of oil went from $14 to $28 USD).  
Clark’s minority government was toppled the next year by the Trudeau Liberals, 
who sold the electorate on lower energy costs and greater energy nationalism. The 
National Energy Program (NEP) was launched later that year. Bliss (1987: 540-2) tells us 
that the NEP was a complicated political package that included prices, taxes, grants, 
charges and domestic ownership. Some of the objectives included reduced energy costs 
for Canadian consumers and attaining 50 percent Canadian ownership of oil and gas 
assets within a decade. Despite these measures, the political-economic winds were 
blowing rightward. 
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3.6 Neoliberal Globalization: Restoring the Corporate State 
One week after the Trudeau Liberals introduced the NEP, Ronald Reagan was elected 
President of the United States on a program of laissez faire liberalism. The Reagan 
administration strenuously objected to the NEP, especially the provisions which sought 
to restrict exports to the United States and which discriminated against American-based 
energy firms (Taylor 2009: 188). By the mid-1980s the geopolitical developments that had 
generated fear of foreign ownership and energy nationalism began to subside. OPEC’s 
iron tight grip on the price of oil appeared to loosen as prices tumbled. American direct 
investment in Canada, which began to fall in the 1970s, continued to fall throughout the 
1980s (relative to GDP). So when the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives came to power 
in 1984, energy nationalism did not seem a pressing matter.  
The recession of 1981-82 had been the most severe since the Great Depression and 
Trudeau responded by forming The Macdonald Commission (1985) to consider Canada’s 
economic future. The final report was released shortly after the Mulroney Tories came to 
power.22 Seizing on the changing political climate, they embraced its central 
recommendation: greater reliance on ‘market forces’ and the pursuit of closer economic 
ties with the United States through a free trade agreement. From the 1970s onward the 
Business Council on National Issues had been pressing the Canadian and American 
governments for a trade and investment liberalization (TAIL) regime.23 The opponents of 
                                                          
22 The NEP was scrapped by the Mulroney Tories, as promised, and the Foreign Investment Review Agency 
was re-christened ‘Investment Canada’, signalling that Canada was ‘open for business’. 
23 Since 1976 the BCNI (since rebranded the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE)) has been the 
policy arm of the CEOs of the largest corporations operating in Canada. They spent $20 million lobbying 
for a TAIL agreement, which made it the largest lobbying effort in Canadian history (Newman: 1998: 156). 
See McBride (2001: 58-63) for some relevant historical background.  
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TAIL secured a majority of the popular vote in 1988 free trade election (52 percent) but 
split them between the Liberals and New Democrats, which meant that the pro-TAIL 
Progressive Conservatives, although in a popular minority, had a mandate to implement 
the agreement (Laxer 1989: 3).  
For Canadian firms, the FTA represented protection from American 
protectionism. For American investors it spelled the restraint of Canadian restrictions on 
foreign investment in energy and financial areas (Taylor 2009: 237). The agreement was 
legally expanded to include an investor ‘bill of rights’ and spatially expanded to include 
Mexico in 1994 with the North American Free Trade Agreement. At its inception in 1994 
the NAFTA was the largest trading bloc in the world. The TAIL regime took the better 
part of a decade to secure and represented the biggest shift in Canada’s political-
economic direction since Macdonald’s National Policy, Taylor argues (2009: 238).  
Even though a North America-wide TAIL regime was the crowning feature of the 
neoliberal program, the shift away from Keynesianism had begun much earlier. The 
conventional story about the shift from Keynesianism towards neoliberalism (or in 
monetary matters, monetarism) is as follows.24 Rising inflation in the late 1960s had 
transformed into severe stagflation by the early 1970s. Tighter monetary policy in the late 
1960s in response to rising inflation led to the suspension of the fixed exchange rate 
regime in 1970. The stated intention of the Bank of Canada was to have the Canadian 
                                                          
24 Whether this story is analytically or theoretically sound is not the primary concern. There are probably 
many historians who would contest the narrative constructed in this chapter. The intention is to begin 
with what is generally accepted as true about Canadian history, and then in the following research-based 
chapters, tell a slightly different story about Canadian political-economic development. 
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dollar float temporarily while the Canadian State got inflation under control, but by 1973 
the Bretton Woods system of pegged currencies had unravelled.  
As early as 1975 the Bank of Canada embraced monetarism and that same year the 
Trudeau liberals imposed wage and price controls in an effort to slow the growth of 
prices.25 Despite the more restrictive monetary policy, high levels of inflation did not 
subside. By the end of 1979, the Bank Rate had reached 14 percent and by 1981 it would 
crest 21 percent (Powell 2005: 71-75). Inflation remained high throughout the 1980s and 
in 1991 the Bank of Canada embraced inflation targeting (Laidler and Robson 2004). The 
1990s saw a lasting reduction in inflation, which led some (Ragan 2005, for example) to 
believe that the targeting worked.  
By the mid-1990s, inflation in Canada (and in many other OECD countries) was 
much lower. The attention of the Government of Canada at that time appeared fixated on 
budget deficits and the national debt. The (infamous) budget tabled by then Finance 
Minister Paul Martin in 1995 aggressively cut social spending as the Canadian State 
began to reverse a six decade-long trend by shrinking its share of GDP. The way the 
official story is told (see Tindal 2005, for example) is that, once high inflation was slain, 
deficits eliminated and the national debt reduced, the question became how to spend the 
budget surpluses. The Canadian State proceeded to cut taxes on corporations and the 
wealthy and to shift part of the tax burden from business to consumers. For example, in 
                                                          
25 The author’s understanding is that, after 1975, officials in the Bank of Canada no longer saw 
unemployment and inflation as policy trade-offs. Under Keynesian suppositions, inflation and 
unemployment could be counteracted using a mixture of monetary and fiscal tools. After 1975, officials 
understood inflation reduction to be their core policy challenge and monetary policy their main tool.  
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1991 the Mulroney Tories converted the business targeted Manufacturers Sales Tax into 
the consumer targeted Goods and Services Tax. 
 Accompanying monetarism, ‘sound’ fiscal policy, tax cuts and investment 
liberalization was a massive privatization drive. In 1986, 22 percent of the largest 500 
firms (ranked by revenue) were government owned. This meant that equity ownership in 
Canada was divided into three groupings: (1) a small clique of powerful families and 
conglomerates, (2) subsidiaries of foreign multinationals and (3) state enterprises. By 
2007, only 8.5 percent were state controlled (Francis 2008: 4, 16). Canadian National 
Railway, Potash Corporation, Air Canada and other prominent Canadian enterprises 
were put on the neoliberal chopping block. C.D. Howe had sold off many state assets 
after the Second World War in the first major privatization drive. Mulroney initiated the 
second privatization drive, which has not yet subsided. 
On the matter of competition, the Trudeau Liberals set out to strengthen 
Canada’s anti-monopoly laws, which dated back to Combines Investigation Act of 1910.26 By 
1981 Ottawa had drafted a new competition bill to ‘keep the business establishment’s 
piratical instincts in check’ (Newman 1998: 155), but over the course of the next three 
years the BNCI spent $1 million, hired a team of 25 lawyers and produced a 236 page 
document that would eventually become Canada’s new competition law. This was the 
only time in the history of capitalism, Newman (1998: 156) tells us, that ‘a country 
allowed its anti-monopoly legislation to be written by the very people it was meant to 
police’.  
                                                          
26 The Act prohibited monopolies, price-fixing, bid-rigging, misleading advertising and other anti-
competitive behaviour. 
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Reflecting on Canada’s 15 year attempt to strengthen competition laws, one 
scholar concluded: ‘corporate interests can virtually hold the government hostage’. The 
pressure put by the BCNI on the government in Canada changed the legislative process 
by ‘virtually transform[ing] consultative power into veto power’ (Vogt 1985: 556-7). 
Newman summarizes the relationship between the corporate elites and competition:  
Despite their unqualified allegiance to free enterprise, most Canadian businessmen don’t, 
in fact, like to compete. When they extol the virtues of capitalism, they are really 
describing and oligarchic economy with little scope or need for competition (1975: 218-9). 
 
The 1967 Bank Act prohibited the Chartered banks from owning more than a 10 percent 
stake of other firms, but in 1987 the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives liberalized 
financial markets and the Big Five banks quickly absorbed all the major investment 
banks and mutual fund companies (Houten 1991: 96).  
Despite the liberalization of financial markets and the successful attempt by 
business interests to block competition promoting legislation, the 1990s saw the 
displacement of some of the most dominant corporations and established families in 
Canada. Canada’s richest family at the time, the Reichmann’s, and their Olympia & York 
were hammered in the global property recession of 1989-90. Even though the Big Five 
banks have (so far) been shielded from foreign competition, Francis argues (2008: 9) that 
they might have failed in that recession had special write-off privileges not been 
orchestrated by the federal government. The 1990s saw one business dynasty after 
another succumb to the pressures of the new global environment: the Eaton’s, the 
Molson’s, the Bronfman’s and the Southam’s were all dislodged after occupying positions 
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of dominance for generations.27 A stake was driven through the heart of Canada’s WASP 
Establishment in February of 1997, Newman (1998: 75) tells us, when the Eaton clan were 
deemed commercially ‘insolvent’. Their decline marked the eclipse of the WASP 
establishment that had dominated Canadian life for 130 years.  
  Data on the processes described here are presented in Table 3.1. Decade averages 
for Canada, the United States and the G-7 are included so that we may contextualize the 
changes in Canada. Inflation in Canada increased markedly in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
was significantly lower by the 1990s. The inflationary experience in Canada does not 
appear to deviate from that in the United States and the G-7 (Central Bank interest rates 
also took a similar course in Canada and the United States). On the matter of total 
government spending there are some notable differences. Total governmental outlays in 
Canada rose from the 1950s through the 1990s before declining dramatically in the 2000s. 
The shift to neoliberal governance in Canada has, in fact, meant shrinking government. 
This is not true of the United States or the G-7 as a whole, where total government 
outlays (relative to GDP) either continuously rose throughout the neoliberal period or 
remained constant.   
The ‘official’ purpose of the neoliberal program of deregulation, privatization, tax 
cuts and trade and investment liberalization was the enhancement of prosperity. We 
might wish to know if this political program delivered on its promise. When we contrast 
GDP growth, unemployment and hourly earnings in the three decades spanning 1950 
                                                          
27 The term ‘dislodged’ can be easily misunderstood. We must distinguish the fact of corporate hierarchy 
(‘structure’) from the individuals and families who occupy the top positions. In this instance, ‘dislodged’ 
means that some of the oldest and most established families fell down the corporate dominance hierarchy, 
not that the hierarchy itself was challenged or reduced.    
84 
 
through 1980 — the Keynesian welfare era — with the last three decades of neoliberal 
globalization, we can safely conclude that neoliberalism has not, in fact, meant more 
rapid growth or the creation of shared prosperity. GDP growth was robust in Canada for 
the first three decades of the postwar era and this was matched by the growth in hourly 
earnings. And while unemployment climbed throughout the first three decades of the 
postwar era, it remained relatively low.  
Table 3.1 
Performance Indicators for Canada, the United States and the G-7 (Decade averages) 
Measure  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Canada 
GDP Growth Rate† 4.8 5.1 4.1 3.0 2.4 2.1 
Unemployment Rate 4.2 5.1 6.8 9.4 9.6 7.0 (10)* 
Growth Rate of Hourly Earnings† 3.30 2.35 2.78 -0.02 0.63 -0.49 
Consumer Price Index 
Annual percent change 2.4 2.5 7.4 6.5 2.2 2.1 
Central Bank Interest Rate 3.0 5.0 8.1 11.3 6.2 3.2 
Total government spending  
Percent of GDP 23 26 37 44 47 40 
United States 
GDP Growth Rate† 4.2 4.4 3.3 3.1 3.2 1.7 
Unemployment Rate 4.5 4.8 6.2 7.3 5.8 5.5 
Growth Rate of Hourly Earnings† 3.07 1.55 0.64 -0.66 0.08 0.18 
Consumer Price Index 2.2 2.5 7.4 5.1 2.9 2.5 
Central Bank Interest Rate 2.4 4.1 6.9 8.8 4.9 2.7 
Total government spending  -- -- 33 36 36 37 
G-7 
GDP Growth Rate† -- -- 3.6 2.9 2.5 1.4 
Unemployment Rate -- -- -- 6.5 6.5 6.3 
Growth Rate of Hourly Earnings† -- -- 2.53 0.38 0.52 0.24 
Consumer Price Index -- -- 8.3 5.5 2.7 2.0 
Total government spending  -- -- 34 39 41 41 
† Adjusted for inflation * Includes discouraged and involuntary part-time workers 
Sources for Canada: GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F1-13 and Cansim Table 380-0016; unemployment rate from the 
OECD (discouraged and involuntary part-time workers from Cansim Table 282-0086); hourly earnings from the IMF through Global 
Insight; Consumer Price Index from Global Insight; Bank of Canada Interest Rate from the Bank of Canada Review and Weekly 
Financial Statistics, both through Global Insight; total government outlays from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F116, and 
National Economic and Financial Accounts, Table 380-0007 through Statistics Canada Fiscal Reference Table 33. Sources for the 
United States: ‘Real’ GDP growth rate from Global Insight; unemployment rate from the IMF through Global Insight; hourly earnings 
and CPI from Global Financial Data; total government spending from the OECD Economic Outlook through Fiscal Reference Table 
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53, Statistics Canada. Sources for the G-7: ‘Real’ GDP growth rate from OECD Statistics; unemployment rate, hourly earnings growth 
rate and CPI from OECD through Global Insight; total government spending from the OECD Economic Outlook through Fiscal 
Reference Table 53, Statistics Canada. 
 
The neoliberal era has brought higher unemployment, slower growth and the near 
total stagnation of wages. The official unemployment rate was almost always higher in 
Canada than in the United States, but the pattern between the two countries is not 
markedly different. Hourly earnings began to stagnate in the United States in the 1970s 
and the experience of labour in Canada from 1980 onward is similar to the United States 
and the G-7. An important question emerges from this data: how can we account for the 
slower growth (heightened stagnation) in terms of GDP and wages? We will address this 
question in Chapter 7.  
To conclude: amid the sometimes spectacular corporate failures of the post-FTA 
period, the corporate state was re-established and dominant corporations grew larger 
and more powerful than they had been at any point in the postwar era.28 How should we 
understand the modern corporation and what does its emergence and evolution mean in 
the context of Canadian capitalism? In Chapter 4 we will review how the various schools 
of thought have tried to make sense of the development of Canadian capitalism. We will 
also survey how the various perspectives have understood the emergence and evolution 
of the modern corporation. Once this theoretical and historical groundwork has been 
laid, we will be prepared to examine the structure, composition and performance of the 
largest firms in Canada. 
 
                                                          
28 The term ‘corporate state’ is used colloquially and in contrast to the ‘welfare state’. The corporate state 
captures an approach to governance that seeks to reverse or undermine the Keynesian welfare state, 
replacing it with pro-business policies and institutions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The Political Economy of the Modern Corporation: 
Surveying the Literature 
 
 
As for the famous “struggle for life,” for the time being it seems to me more asserted than 
proved. It happens, but as the exception; the overall aspect of life is not a state of need 
and hunger, but instead, wealth, bounty, even absurd squandering — where there is a 
struggle it is a struggle for power… One should not confuse Malthus with nature.  
- Friedrich Nietzsche (1889) 
 
 
 
 
Our investigation into the evolution of dominant capital in Canada intersects with three 
overlapping literatures: it bears close proximity to studies on corporate power in Canada, 
but it also has points of contact with Canadian political economy as such as well as 
studies on the modern corporation. This chapter will review all three areas with a view to 
setting the literary context and framing the questions that will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. At this point in our inquiry we should wish to know what 
questions have been asked by others, what answers have been offered and how 
satisfactory these answers are, both analytically and empirically. Once we have an 
understanding of how others have framed questions, we will we be able to appropriately 
reframe an alternative set of questions.  
The present chapter will be delivered in four sections, the first three 
corresponding with a particular literature. The first section will survey the various 
perspectives on Canadian political economy that have developed over the past century. 
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Some of these perspectives have tried to make sense of corporate power, others have 
ignored the subject altogether. However, all of the approaches have tried to come to 
terms with Canada’s unique political-economic development, which is why they deserve 
a ‘hearing’ in this study. The second section will review how different schools of thought 
have understood the modern corporation and its role in twentieth century capitalism. 
The perspectives reviewed in the second section all agree that the modern corporation 
changed twentieth century capitalism, but they disagree as to how capitalism has 
changed and the political-economic significance of those changes. The third section will 
explore what others have argued about the development of corporate power in Canada 
and the fourth section will close with a series of questions that will serve as the basis for 
subsequent chapters. 
 
4.1 Perspectives on Canadian Political Economy 
Efforts to explain the development of Canadian capitalism are commonly categorized 
into broad theoretical perspectives, some competing and some complementary, some 
having roots outside Canadian intellectual life and some indigenous to Canada. These 
perspectives raise different questions, utilize different methods, hold differing 
suppositions, privilege certain explanatory principles and generate alternative narratives. 
In what follows we will briefly review five broad approaches to Canadian political 
economy (CPE): the Old Canadian Political Economy (OCPE), the New Canadian 
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Political Economy (NCPE) and neoclassical, Marxist and feminist perspectives.1 Each 
perspective has raised important questions and added to our understanding of Canada’s 
political-economic development. Studies on corporate power in Canada are a subset of 
CPE, so before we review what others have said about the development of large 
corporations in Canada we need to understand how the various perspectives have framed 
Canada’s political-economic development.2 
 The OCPE grows out of the work of Mackintosh (1923) and Innis (1930; 1954; 
1956) and lasts from the 1920s through the 1960s. Both Mackintosh and Innis object to a 
conception of Canadian development that privileges monarchical and constitutional 
considerations above Canada’s geocontinental context.3 For them, Canada’s unique 
trajectory is most clearly disclosed when one considers the centrality of staples exports. 
Canadian development was fuelled by the production of exportable goods from raw 
resources to developed markets in the imperial centres. As Mackintosh puts it, the ‘prime 
requisite of colonial prosperity is the colonial staple’ (1923: 4). Innis goes further. He 
views the entirety of Canada’s economic, political and socio-institutional development as 
centering on staples production. But staples production can only be understood once one 
comes to grips with Canada’s unique geography, climate and the complex transport and 
communications systems required to connect the staple producing hinterland to the 
                                                          
1 Easterbrook and Watkins (1967) edit a volume dedicated to the OCPE, Clement and Drache (1978) 
Drache and Clement (1985), Clement and Williams (1989), Clement (1997) and Clement and Vosko (2003) 
on the NCPE. Laxer (1991) and Watkins and Grant (1993) edit volumes that include submissions from all 
five perspectives.  
2 This review adopts the taxonomy of Laxer’s (1991) survey of the various perspectives on CPE, and in some 
instances, draws on his assessment of the various perspectives. 
3 According to Drache (1995: xv), Innis thought of himself as a ‘dirt economist’, meaning he examined 
economics in the light of the political and the social.  
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markets in the imperial centre. The history of successive staples exports, Innis (1930) 
argues, is the history of Canada’s economic, political and socio-institutional growth. 
Watkins (1963) contends that the staples theory of economic growth is Canada’s 
most distinctive contribution to economic history, though he is careful to stress that it is 
not a general theory of economic growth. Instead, its applicability is confined to newly 
formed, resource intensive, export driven political economies. These societies have 
unique institutional relationships and scholars working within the OCPE recognize that 
the conventional understanding of state-business relations, in which the former is 
presupposed to be static and security-oriented while the latter is dynamic and wealth-
oriented, cannot account for the peculiar relationship between the Canadian State and 
industrial development.4 Easterbrook and Aitken’s (1956) textbook embraces the staples 
perspective and posits that Canada’s industrialized political economy developed out of a 
succession of staples exports: first fish, then furs followed by timber, wheat and minerals.  
Instead of subordinating historical facts to the logic of abstract market forces or 
mathematical models, the OCPE emphasizes historical development and the integration 
of numerous explanatory factors, including geography, climate, and technology, the role 
of elites, external (metropolitan) markets and geopolitical location.5 During the 1950s the 
writing of economic history would be transformed by the gradual adoption of 
neoclassical techniques. Norrie, Owram and Emery (2008: xi-xii) tell us that the ‘new 
economic history’ dropped the ‘political’ from ‘political economy’ and methodologically 
                                                          
4 Fowke (1952) and Aitken (1964) are two prominent examples. 
5 Norrie, Owram and Emery (2008: xix) contest the idea that there is anything like a ‘staples theory’  
because it cannot be disproven; all explanations are post factum descriptions. They contend that it is more 
appropriate to call it a ‘staples thesis’. 
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privileged quantification, model building, counter-factuals and hypothesis testing over 
history. The new economic history textbooks gradually supplanted the old staples 
perspective and the OCPE was soon eclipsed by neoclassical economics.6  
  The NCPE grows out of the counter culture of the 1960s, and in so doing, rejects 
the neoclassical orientation towards econometrics and modelling. NCPE is eclectic in 
terms of organizing concepts and it embraces the political orientation of the New Left, 
particularly its anti-Stalinist Marxism and its anti-imperialist dependency theory.7 Kari 
Levitt’s Silent Surrender (1970) would be among the earliest manifestos embodying this 
new approach, though Mel Watkins is also credited as a seminal figure in the 
development of the NCPE (Laxer 1991: xv-xvi).8  
As Levitt sees it, there is an inherent tension between foreign ownership and 
national sovereignty. The higher the degree of foreign direct investment a society accepts, 
the lower its degree of economic and political self-determination (1970: 9). Canada was 
the preeminent example in this regard, for it had the highest levels of foreign ownership 
in the world and was, in her eyes, the world’s richest underdeveloped country.9 Canada’s 
lack of freedom in economic and political matters was rooted in its branch-plant status 
and the process that generated this condition she called the ‘new mercantilism’. The logic 
of the new mercantilism is straightforward: large American firms need to expand their 
                                                          
6 Examples of the latter include Marr and Paterson (1980) and Pomfret (1981) 
7 Although Innis’s work remains a pillar of the NCPE, C.B. Macpherson’s neo-Marxism also played a 
supporting role. See Clement and Williams (1989: 8-10) for a discussion. 
8 A collection of Watkins’ writings are compiled in Staples and Beyond (2006). 
9 Kellogg (2005) contests the idea that Canada is best understood as a rich underdeveloped society. As he 
sees it, Left nationalists like Levitt overstated the degree of foreign ownership and so misinterpreted key 
aspects of Canadian capitalism. Watkins (2007) comes to Levitt’s defence, and to the defence of the staples 
approach generally, by claiming that Kellogg misuses and misinterprets the data. 
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operations in order to secure their profits, and they need greater profits to secure their 
expansion. So as powerful states like the United States export ownership titles, weaker 
states like Canada become recolonized. The outcome for weaker states is a loss of policy 
autonomy, political-economic dependence and a fractured national culture (1970: 24-25).  
The dependency and underdevelopment line of inquiry was followed by Naylor 
(1972; 1975) and Clement (1975; 1977a; 1977b) in what became known as the Naylor-
Clement thesis. Together they argue that the brittleness of Canadian sovereignty is 
attributable to the Canadian bourgeoisie, who never developed an independent industrial 
base, but were content to service the industrially productive sectors of the economy 
which were American-owned.10 As Naylor views it, Canadian underdevelopment and 
dependence is rooted in the ‘imperial linkage’ which connects the structure of capital and 
of the capitalist class from the imperial centre to the Canadian hinterland (1972: 2). The 
dependent character of the Canadian ruling class and the material benefits that secure 
that dependence are responsible for Canada’s branch plant status.11 The NCPE would 
blossom in the 1980s and cover a broad array of subjects including labour, gender, the 
Canadian State, communications, regionalism and Canada’s location in the geopolitical 
order, to name a few topics (see Clement and Williams (1989)). 
                                                          
10 Carroll (1986) contests this claim, arguing that domestic capitalists developed a diversified industrial 
base and, as a consequence, Canada’s developmental path is similar to other advanced societies. Williams 
(1979; 1983) roots Canada’s relative industrial weakness in its Confederation-era policy of import-
substitution industrialization and in its heavy reliance on foreign technology. Laxer (1989) traces Canada’s 
high levels of foreign ownership to the relative weakness of farmer’s movements.  
11 Smardon (2010; 2011) contests much of the NCPE literature by suggesting that Fordist techniques were 
utilized in Canada much earlier than previously recognized. One implication, he argues, is that Canadian 
and American industrialization followed parallel, not diverging, paths. 
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 The NCPE exhibits many topical and methodological continuities vis-a-vis the 
OCPE. Like the OCPE, the NCPE tries to sort out why Canada remains heavily reliant on 
staples exports, why its industrial base remains relatively weak and why important 
political-economic decisions about its future often seem to be made outside its borders. 
Like the OCPE, the NCPE privileges historical explanation over model building and 
hypothesis testing, and it focuses on the intersection between the material context of 
Canadian life and ideological suppositions that guide elites in their decision-making. 
Perhaps the most notable break between the two approaches is the NCPE’s embrace of 
Marxist and anti-imperialist ideas, which helps explain why the NCPE was more 
politicized than the OCPE (Laxer 1991: xv-xvii).  
Neoclassical efforts to explain Canada’s political-economic development have 
tended to come from those working within or near the staples school. Mackintosh 
(1923), for example, appears to have accepted neoclassical assumptions about economic 
decisions coming in response to market prices, the latter produced through the 
intersection of equilibrium-seeking demand and supply. In generating a staples theory of 
economic growth, Watkins (1963) modifies some aspects of the staples approach to make 
it compatible with the neoclassical theory of international trade. Neoclassicists tend to 
emphasize the ‘economic’ aspects of Canadian development, understood as social 
behaviour in response to market signals. By trying to explain how an open trading 
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environment is influenced by geography and climate, the neoclassical school downplays 
‘the political’ or treats it as an impediment to development (Laxer 1991: xxi-xxiv).12  
The formal breakup of political economy into ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ has meant 
that a large literature on Canadian economic development has been generated since the 
1960s by economists. However, these authors (which are too numerous to name) no 
longer see themselves as working within or even near ‘political economy’. Instead of 
looking at state power, the class structure, the role of elites or other similar matters that 
have occupied the attention of OCPE and NCPE, neoclassicists concentrate on the 
(supposedly) autonomous sphere of the market and business. Inflation, trade, 
investment, debt, consumption and other ‘economic’ categories are presupposed to be 
separate from the power processes of the polity. But in a world with huge multinationals, 
powerful states and international institutions like the World Bank, IMF and WTO, the 
explanatory utility of quarantining politics from economics (or power from business) is 
low to nil.     
 Myers’, A History of Canadian Wealth (1914) represents the earliest study undertaken 
using a Marxist framework, Laxer tells us (1991: xviii-xix). Myers’ task is to show the 
deep interconnections between business and politics and to help expose the corruption 
and exploitation that lay behind the amassment of great Canadian fortunes. The way 
Laxer (1991: xviii-xix) recounts it, Marxist analysis in Canada was either dormant or 
undertaken by people connected to the Communist Party of Canada until academic 
Marxism was revived in the 1970s. Many of the scholars working within the NCPE were 
                                                          
12 McCallum (1980) and Drummond (1987) are examples of scholars working within the neoclassical 
school. 
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Marxist in orientation, but Laxer credits Pentland (1959; 1981) as among the earliest to 
utilize Marxist tools to uncover aspects of Canada’s development — notably the 
formation of a market for labour and a class of people to occupy it — that had been 
neglected.  
The dependency-underdevelopment theme was also taken up by Marxists, but 
instead of trying to explain why Canadian capitalists remained dependent upon 
capitalists in the imperium, they drew attention to the internal class relations of 
Canadian capitalism. Panitch (1981: 8-9) is one such example insofar as he takes Levitt 
(1970) and others to task for neglecting the relationship Canadian capitalists have to 
other classes in Canada and the role this relationship plays in characterizing Canadian 
dependency. Panitch’s criticism of Levitt reveals something distinctive about Marxist 
approaches: while the OCPE and NCPE both focus on the role elites play in shaping 
development, they largely neglected other social classes in Canada. Marxists stepped in 
to fill this gap by examining the working class and its relationship to the capitalist class. 
Like the OCPE and NCPE, Marxists have sought explanations in the light of history, but 
they do not put as much emphasis on geographical or technological factors (which is 
surprising, given their materialist bent). For them, the exploitation of wage labour by 
capital and the struggles created therein reveal the developmental direction of Canadian 
society (Laxer 1991: xviii-xix). 
Feminist perspectives began to take shape in the 1980s and have continued to 
develop into the present. Maroney and Luxton (1987) and Brym and Fox (1989) draw 
attention to the invisibility of women in Canadian political-economic history. The focus 
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on state and business in social development ignored the role women played in building 
Canada. Cohen (1988) utilizes the work of Pentland (1981) in order to unzip the interplay 
between patriarchy and women’s socio-economic role. Feminists have not only explored 
those aspects of Canadian development that have been overlooked by scholars who have 
been preoccupied with the state and business, but have also tried to sort out the way 
gendered power relations infuse households and markets (Laxer 1991: xix-xx).  
As Vosko (2002) sees it, feminist CPE has unfolded through four overlapping 
phases. The first phase brought attention to the ‘gender blindness’ of conventional 
political economy. The second phase took the form of a debate over which ‘level of 
analysis’ (2002: 60) is most appropriate in explaining female domesticity and women’s 
subordination: some argued that material relations are the determining factor, others that 
ideological considerations are paramount and yet others incorporated both into the 
causal picture. The third phase, according to Vosko, saw theoretically grounded case 
studies and the fourth shifted the terrain slightly to study the intersection of race, class 
and gender, all under the spotlight of domination (2002: 64-65).  
Methodologically, feminist CPE follows the OCPE and the NCPE in turning to 
history to make sense of current problems, and similar to Marxism it takes class 
domination and power relations to be of supreme importance. Its major addition to 
political economy has been to make subsequent research in other schools sensitive to 
gender and to considerably widen the scope of scholarly questions. Whereas the OCPE 
and, to a greater extent, some of the early NCPE overlooked the socio-economic role of 
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women and ignored patriarchy as a form of social power, feminist CPE has increased the 
resolution with which questions are posed and problems framed.   
 The purpose of this review has not been to tear down any of the writers working 
within the various schools of thought. Each perspective adds to our understanding of 
Canada’s unique political-economic development. However, there is a wide chasm in the 
literature. None of the studies reviewed here have tried to measure or map the structure 
and performance of the largest Canadian-based firms over the entire postwar era. It goes 
without saying that none have looked at the development of Canadian capitalism in the 
light of differential accumulation (it being a new approach). We simply do not have some 
of the most basic facts at our disposal, such as: how concentrated is the Canadian 
political economy in terms of equity market value, assets, profitability and ownership?; 
has the level of concentration changed over time, and if so, what drives concentration?; 
more specifically, what role do mergers and acquisitions play in fuelling the growth of 
large firms?; and finally, what are some of the distributive consequences of larger relative 
firm size?  
One reason these questions have not been posed is they are intimately bound up 
with power, and none of the approaches comes to a satisfactory understanding of the 
place (socio-institutional) power occupies in modern political economy. Instead of 
focusing on markets (like the neoclassicists), geography and climate (like the OCPE), the 
subordination of Canadian elites to foreign elites (like the NCPE), the internal class 
relations of Canada (like the Marxists) or the role of gender in Canadian capitalism (like 
feminist CPE), this study will take its cue from N&B’s theory of capitalist development 
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as well as other heterodox approaches and examine the development of the largest 
Canadian-based corporations from the standpoint of institutional power.  
Now that we have surveyed how the different schools of thought have made sense 
of Canadian political economy, we turn our attention to the modern corporation and 
how scholars in the twentieth century have understood its emergence and evolution.  
 
4.2 The Modern Corporation as an Object of Inquiry 
If we define the modern corporation as a joint-stock, limited liability company infused by 
the state with permanence and a legal status that distinguishes it from its owners — an 
‘artificial person’ — then we can date its emergence to the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.13 A series of legislative initiatives in the British parliament culminated in the 
1862 Companies Act. Hereafter, firms no longer needed to acquire a special charter; the 
act of registration was sufficient, and limited liability was automatically granted 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005: 52).14  
In the United States, a series of judicial decisions gradually removed the 
restrictions on corporate activity and simultaneously invested them with new rights. 
Among the most important legal rulings was the decision by Supreme Court Justice 
                                                          
13 All private corporations are companies, but not all companies are corporations. The word company, from 
‘compagnia’, fuses two Latin words: ‘cum’ and ‘panis’, which means ‘breaking bread together’. It has its 
roots in medieval Italy and is associated with the creation of double entry bookkeeping in the mid-
fourteenth century (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005: 8).  
14 The pre-modern corporation has a long and bloody history. For centuries there was no formal separation 
of commercial activity from organized violence. The East India Company, for example, ruled India for 
generations and, at one point, had an army of 260,000 troops — twice the size of the British army. Early 
chartered companies helped develop the slave trade and acted as subcontractors for European imperialism 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge: xvi, 34-35). Moore and Lewis (1999) trace the history of the corporation to 
the ancient world, but note that the term ‘multinational’ is misleading in this context because the term 
‘nation’ had an entirely different connotation. 
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Stephen J. Field in the Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886), who ruled that 
corporations are persons and so are entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
‘equal protection’ under the law (Nace 2005: 96-97). Similar judicial manoeuverings 
followed and by 1914 the corporation was the dominant business institution in America 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005: 59).  
The library housing studies on corporate power is large, making this review, by 
necessity, highly selective. Studies on the corporation have dealt with numerous topics 
and from many angles, including the relationship between the corporation and: power; 
private property; the state, namely what role each plays in shaping development and 
what role each should play in shaping development; foreign investment and national 
sovereignty; and social stratification, to name a few prominent topics. We will review 
some of the major studies in each topic area. 
Veblen (1904; 1923) is among the earliest to note the broad cultural significance of 
the corporate form, especially the role it played in reorganizing power in America. As he 
sees it, the historical stature of modern Western civilization is the product of the 
industrial system and the industrial system is under the control — through the large 
corporation — of business (1904: 8). His examination of the corporate form leads him to 
conclude that there is a disjuncture between the ‘material’ interests of the ‘industrial 
community’ and the ‘vested’ interests of the ‘absentee owners’. The former are ‘best 
served by a smooth, uninterrupted interplay of the industrial process’ while the latter can 
enhance business gains through ‘large and frequent disturbances to the system’, namely 
unemployment (1904: 19, 24). Ownership of industrial equipment confers the ‘legal right 
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of sabotage’, as he describes it, and allows the absentee owner to control the volume of 
output in order to ‘bring the largest net returns in terms of price’ (1923: 66-67). For 
Veblen, then, the corporation is an instrument of control in the service of private gain.15  
 Berle and Means (1932) view the emergence of the joint-stock company as 
ushering in a ‘corporate revolution’ insofar as it radically altered the property regime. The 
ascent of the corporation drove three important developments which changed the socio-
institutional fabric of America in so profound a way as to render traditional economic 
theory obsolete: first, an increasing concentration of corporate assets; second, an 
increasing diffusion of stock ownership; third and consequently, an increasing separation 
of ownership from control (1932: xxix-xxxi). The managerial or separation thesis, as it 
has come to be known, spawned an entire literature that has since addressed a series of 
questions.16 If concentration is increasing what are the consequences for competition and 
price formation? If salary-collecting managers as opposed to profit-oriented proprietors 
control the corporation, will they steer it in a profit maximizing direction or has the 
incentive structure been fundamentally altered? And if the corporation has become a 
bureaucratic machine run by professional managers, does this mean that the capitalist 
class has been dislodged from its position of dominance, and consequently, that social 
power has been dispersed? Furthermore, why did the corporate form emerge in the first 
place?  
                                                          
15 A point Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Chapter 12) stress and build upon. 
16 The first and most obvious set of questions: is it true that concentration is increasing, that stock 
ownership is dispersing and that ownership is delinking from control? We will elaborate on, and try to 
answer, these questions in Chapter 5. 
100 
 
 On the subject of concentration, competition and price formation, Means (1935) 
went on to uncover a new historical phenomenon: ‘administered prices’. Based on 
extensive statistical evidence, Means asserts that an administered price is one which is 
set for a period of time and across many transactions. In contrast to competitive prices, 
which are flexible and change frequently, an administered price is rigid, changes 
infrequently and is inflexible (1935: 401-2). Means (1972a) re-tested his hypothesis four 
decades later and found that it had not been refuted. The increase in corporate power 
after the Second World War led Means to develop two additional concepts: 
‘administrative competition’ and ‘administrative inflation’ (Means 1983: 469-76). The 
former is a non-classical form of competition in which a small number of large firms have 
a high degree of pricing discretion. The latter is a new type of inflation in which prices 
rise sharply in recession.  
It appeared to Berle that concentrated corporate power had led to a planned 
political economy, with the large corporation shaping the life activity of entire 
communities. Berle neatly summarizes the new theoretical dilemma:  
In a system of corporate concentration the result of competition is some sort of planning; 
and planning does not reduce power but increases it… The corporation is now, essentially, 
a non-statist political institution (Berle 1955: 38, 44). 
 
Berle (1955: 13) maintained that American capitalism was more efficient and humane 
than Soviet communism, but both he and Means recognized that the essential difference 
between the two systems was not that the latter was controlled by a small group of 
powerful men while the former was controlled by market forces. Instead, both systems 
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were controlled by power institutions; the difference lay in who made what decisions 
(Berle and Means 1932: xxxvii).17   
 In his Concept of the Corporation, Drucker contends that the emergence of the 
corporate form was ‘the most important event in the recent social history of the Western 
world’ (1945: 9). As he views it, the corporation is the first autonomous power institution 
emerging from society which is not dependent on the national state. As a consequence of 
his detailed case study of General Motors, Drucker concludes that the essence of the 
corporation is social and organizational; it exists to efficiently organize human effort in 
the service of economizing output (1945: 40).  
Like Drucker, Chandler (1977) recognizes that the modern corporation led to a 
reorganization of power, but he also posits that it came into being to increase efficiency. 
The corporation absorbed activities that had previously been coordinated by markets and 
this means that a new class of professional, salaried managers control the allocation of 
resources. The ‘visible hand’ of the managerial hierarchy eclipsed the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the horizontal market, he argues, when administrative coordination was better suited to 
increase output, contain costs and enlarge profits. But this could only happen once the 
volume of economic activity made managerial hierarchy more efficient and profitable 
than market coordination (Chandler 1977: 1-3). The emergence of managerial hierarchy 
created a new source of social power. Chandler agrees with Berle and Means that 
ownership and control were de-linking, but Chandler also argues that professional 
                                                          
17 Stigler and Friedland (1983) test and contest Berle and Means’ separation thesis. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that the separation of risk-bearing (ownership) and decision-making (control) is common across 
many organizational forms and that it can be attributed to the benefits of specialization. 
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managers pursued policies that increase long-term firm stability, growth and 
employment (1977: 6-10). So for Chandler, new technology and enhanced efficiency 
simultaneously explain and justify ‘managerial capitalism’.  
Williamson (1981) roots the modern corporation in a series of ‘organizational 
innovations’ that were aimed at minimizing transaction costs, an argument derived, in 
part, from Ronald Coase. Coase saw a basic division between resource allocation through 
the price mechanism and through an ‘entrepreneur-coordinator’ (1937: 92). The reliance 
on markets to coordinate human effort, Coase posits, involves ‘transaction costs’, which 
include: information gathering costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs, etc. Firms 
emerge to economize on these costs by absorbing them and continue to grow in size until 
the cost of an additional transaction within the firm is equal to the cost of the same 
transaction through the market (Coase 1937: 96). Williamson recognizes that 
corporations emerged for other reasons as well such as technological imperatives and the 
quest for monopoly gains, but ultimately the firm is an instrument in the service of 
efficiency (1981: 1537).18  
 Scholarly attention has not been confined to explaining the emergence and 
growth of corporations, nor has it been restricted to the relationship the corporate form 
has to the property regime. International corporate expansion after the Second World 
War created new practical and theoretical problems. As Gilpin (1975: 5) views it, the 
intersection of states, multinationals and foreign investment created an academic blind 
                                                          
18 For a similar view of multinational corporation see Caves (2000). Jones (2005: 289) asserts that the 
historical evidence supports the argument that multinationals have grown to economize on transaction 
costs while admitting that ‘precise measurement of such transaction costs is elusive’, which makes it 
unclear what the ‘historical evidence’ could be. 
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spot for the simple reason that economists are unwilling to admit the reality of power 
and political scientists tend to ignore markets. Out of this academic blind spot came a 
series of competing paradigms to account for the tension between the foreign investment 
conducted by multinational corporations and the national planning done by states.  
 Working from a liberal internationalist perspective, Vernon’s Sovereignty at Bay 
(1971) argues that there is a tension between the autonomy of nation states and the 
foreign investment of multinational corporations and that the former would have to yield 
to the latter for the sake of national prosperity and global efficiency. Vernon would also 
have us believe that the threats posed by multinationals to states are overstated. The loss 
of national policy autonomy has more to do with the revolutions in communication and 
transportation that are leading to a more interconnected world than it does with 
corporate hegemony. The evidence? When we consider all the social ills ascribed to 
multinationals — inequity, waste, pollution, etc. — we realize that these problems are 
also found in the Soviet Union and other societies where multinationals are either 
banned or restrained (1977: 191-3). If the threats posed by multinationals are overstated, 
so are the options presented for dealing with such threats. Vernon insists that neither 
states nor multinationals are going to disappear. The challenge for policy makers is to 
reduce the conflict between these institutions (1998: ix). 
Marxists, like Hymer (1979), working in the dependency paradigm have been less 
inclined to see the activities of multinationals in such sanitized terms. Hymer sees in the 
multinational corporation the culmination of a process that began with the industrial 
revolution. There has been a tendency, he says, for the ‘representative firm’ to increase in 
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size from the workshop to the factory to the national corporation to the multi-divisional 
and now the multinational corporation (1979: 54-55). This growth path has brought both 
quantitative and qualitative changes. As the ‘representative firm’ increases in size, first 
the national and then international economic order are remade in the image of the 
corporation.  
Hymer argues that two laws govern the interplay between the multinational 
corporation and international economic order: the ‘law of increasing size’ implies that 
decentralized market exchange will be dislodged as a small number of large firms 
centrally plan world production; the ‘law of uneven development’ implies that the 
international economic order will produce growth and development for the core 
countries while simultaneously producing poverty, underdevelopment and dependence 
for the periphery. The danger in leaving multinationals unregulated, Hymer argues, is 
made manifest when capital crosses national borders: it ‘pulls and tears at the social and 
political fabric’ of a society and ‘erodes the cohesiveness of national states’ (1979: 72).19  
So as corporations grow in size and internationalize their operations through foreign 
investment, a fundamental conflict emerges between the national planning done by 
territorial-bound states and the international planning done by trans-border firms 
(Hymer and Rowthorn 1970: 90). This tension diminishes national self-determination 
and undermines the possibility of a coherent public policy.  
                                                          
19 Other critics of multinationals such as Barnet and Muller (1974: 13-14) and Barnet and Cavanagh (1994: 
14-15) note that the multinational corporation is the first secular institution in human history that has the 
power to centrally plan and manage on a global scale. This creates a distressing tension, they say, between 
international firms and national governments. For Korten (2001: 22), ‘economic globalization’ has meant, in 
practice, ‘market tyranny’ as the activities of multinationals render ‘democratic institutions impotent’. 
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 Robert Gilpin contests the beneficial, harmonious corporate-led order posited by 
Vernon and the imperial, conflict ridden corporate-led order posited by Hymer. As he 
views it, power resides in a society’s industrial base. This means that foreign investment 
from the developed core to the underdeveloped periphery tends to accelerate the 
redistribution of industrial power from rich to poor societies. He notes, however, that 
foreign investment generates mixed results. In the short term, foreign investment may 
strengthen the core, but over the long haul it can only delay (not reverse) the relative 
decline of the core (Gilpin 1975: 77). In contrast to Hymer and the Marxists, Gilpin views 
the expansion of capitalism as leading to development, not exploitation. The 
‘contradictions’ of capitalism are most apparent when we consider the diffusion of 
development: a global capitalist order does not tend to concentrate wealth, industry, 
technology and power but to disperse it (1975: 260). In contrast to Vernon and the liberal 
internationalists, Gilpin sees a positive role for states to play in promoting and steering 
global development.20    
 Using sociological tools, a group of scholars have examined the modern 
corporation through the prism of social stratification and elite unity. Mills’ The Power Elite 
(1956) had a formative influence on later scholars, particularly G. William Domhoff. As 
Domhoff (2002: 42) sees it, the American State is controlled by a class of owners and top 
executives from the largest corporations who hold ‘structural power’ through private 
                                                          
20 For an elaboration see Gilpin (2001: Chapter 11). Gilpin’s ‘state-centric realism’ is not theoretically far 
from a Keynesian-inspired mercantilist position. The latter views national interests as prevailing over 
corporate interests and national political-economic objectives being prioritized over global efficiency. See 
Gilpin (1975: 231-5) for a discussion. 
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control of investment.21 Their cohesion as a class is cemented through a common 
economic interest and their power is enhanced through their dominance of a densely 
interwoven policy planning network (2002: 182). Through an examination of 
membership in the network of interlocking corporate directorships stretching back to 
the nineteenth century, Domhoff posits that the existence of large corporations in 
America in the late nineteenth century — long before the emergence of ‘big government’ 
— meant that they and their policy planning affiliates could strategically shape the 
regulatory agencies, White House offices and the military apparatus that would become 
increasingly important in the twentieth century (2002: 191). The corporation, in this 
view, is an instrument of class power. 
 Other sociological studies established connections between corporate power and 
the class structure, policy formation and elite control of the state. Useem (1984), for 
example, views the political mobilization of dominant corporate interests as stemming 
from the decline in corporate profitability in the United States and United Kingdom in 
the 1970s. The inter-corporate networks that connect the largest firms created an ‘inner 
circle’ that worked in tandem with the state to assure ‘class-wide benefits’ (1984: 4-5). 
Schwartz (1987) argues that the corporate elite constitutes a ruling class in America. One 
important way in which this class exercises power is through its constraining influence 
on governmental activity. In contrast, Scott (1997) accepts the separation thesis 
advanced by managerialism. Because Scott believes that the link connecting ownership 
and control has been severed, he examines interlocking directorships as the key power 
                                                          
21 Domhoff’s Who Rules America? was first published in 1967 and is now in its fourth impression. His analysis 
therein is deepened and extended in Domhoff (1970). Similar analyses are performed in Domhoff (1996) and 
Domhoff and Dye (1987).   
107 
 
relation in contemporary capitalism (1997: 7).22 At a global level, Mazlish and Morss 
(2005) contend that there is a ‘global elite’, but dominant proprietors and corporate 
managers are only one part of it. Those holding corporate power are flanked by others 
whose family background or position within a global organization (such as the World 
Bank) also put them in a position of power.  
Now that we have reviewed how the modern corporation has been understood by 
institutionalists, managerialists, organizaitonal theorists, liberal internationalists, 
Marxists, state-centric realists and social stratification researchers, how has corporate 
power been understood in Canada? 
 
4.3 Corporate Power in Canada  
The major approaches to corporate power in Canada have been sociological and 
biographical. Studies in economic sociology, social stratification and elite organization 
document the linkages between large corporations, the class structure and the state. It 
has been left to historians and journalists to document powerful corporate personalities 
and how their life activities shape the development of Canadian capitalism. Gustavus 
Myers’ A History of Canadian Wealth (1914) is perhaps the earliest study detailing the 
linkages between the class structure, dominant corporations and great Canadian 
fortunes. Myers tries to demonstrate the interplay between ‘free enterprise’ and state 
power in the acquisition and enlargement of private fortunes.  
                                                          
22 Vogel (1989) outlines the political power of business elites in the United States and Galambos and Pratt 
(1988) chronicle the historical interplay between American business and public policy formation.  
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The Royal Commission on Price Spreads (1935) represents the first attempt to measure 
the level of concentration in the corporate sector. The research was conducted during the 
Great Depression and was nominally about ‘the causes of the large spread between the 
prices received for commodities by the producer… and the price paid by the consumers’ 
(1935: 1). In effect, though, it was an inquiry into the consequences of the increasing 
concentration of corporate power generated by the merger wave of the late 1920s. Some 
of its conclusions are startling, not because they are false, but because the verbiage was 
generated by professional men reporting to the Government of Canada. It is worth 
quoting some of the commissioner’s basic findings at length:  
The depression has… demonstrated that the strong and the organized are attaining an ever 
increasing position of dominance in our economic life; that power is becoming 
concentrated. With this concentration, old theories of economic control are proving 
inadequate… Simple competition, however, can be destroyed without the immediate 
substitution of monopoly. Somewhere between the two there is ‘imperfect’ competition… 
price no longer automatically adjusts itself to supply and demand… The dominant 
producers fix the price they deem most profitable and attempt to adjust their production 
to sales at that determined price… under imperfect competition, the bargaining advantage 
of strong organized groups may lead to the exploitation of the weak and disorganized…  
 
They conclude:  
It is not enough to say… that these problems are the result of depression and will vanish 
with the depression. It may be true that when recovery is achieved, competition will 
become less predatory, discrimination less general, and exploitation less obvious… 
[However, it is] a tragic delusion that the solution for these economic problems can be left 
to automatic forces, because the conditions which once permitted the easy and equitable 
operation of such forces have ceased to exist (Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads 
(1935: 5-9)). 
 
This is perhaps the earliest official statement in Canada that the modern corporation has 
fundamentally altered capitalism. Subsequent studies on corporate power all unfolded in 
the postwar era, but the Royal Commission on Price Spreads signalled the new reality and the 
new problems that had to be addressed. 
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 In blending Marxism with Canadian nationalism, Park and Park (1962) represent 
a precursor to the NCPE. They examine the structure of the corporate sector as a way of 
explaining both the heightened stagnation in, and foreign domination of, the Canadian 
economy. As they view it, the instrument of foreign domination is foreign investment, 
primarily American, but they also trace the structural features of Canadian dependence 
to a small clique of ‘finance capitalists’ who control the non-financial corporate sector 
and who, in their submission to the dictates of profit maximization, have led Canada into 
the orbit of American capital (1962: 22, 37, 74). In terms of evidence, they note that more 
than half of the 64 largest corporations, ranked by assets, are controlled by American and 
British investors.  
Porter’s The Vertical Mosaic (1965) is a seminal work in social stratification and has 
acted as a touchstone for researchers who examine social power in Canada. In sketching 
an image of the ‘economic elite’, Porter begins by accepting the validity of the managerial 
thesis, specifically an assumed increase in corporate concentration and the separation of 
ownership from control (1965: 21-22). Earlier in his career, Porter (1956) made an attempt 
to measure the concentration of economic power in Canada. For the years 1948-1950, he 
pinpointed 159 dominant corporations and estimated that they controlled at least 36 
percent of the gross value of production in manufacturing. These 159 dominant firms 
were controlled, he estimated, by 922 individuals who held the 1,317 directorships, 
though he notes that 203 individuals (22 percent) held 598 (45 percent) of the 
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directorships (1956: 204, 210).23 The power wielded by this group had not been studied 
in any detail, he thought, because: 
Economics as a science does not seem to have the necessary tools to work at this problem 
of overall economic concentration, perhaps because in the long run the question is one of 
power and not of markets (1965: 232). 
 
Porter’s analysis of corporate power in Canada was important in many ways, not least 
because it was among the earliest to argue that managerialism had limited applicability 
in Canada.  
As Marxists, Park and Park (1962: 11) view the owning class as the ruling class 
and assume that those who govern do so on behalf of dominant owners. This perspective 
makes the Parks disinclined to accept Berle and Means separation thesis. Porter works 
from a non-Marxist perspective and ends up challenging managerialism on two grounds: 
first, he cites studies which indicate that, between the 1930s and the 1960s, there had not 
been an appreciable increase in corporate concentration; and second, the relationship 
between investors, directors and managers is very close in Canada. As he views it, at the 
apex of the class structure we find a tightly interlocked network of corporate directors 
who hold ‘ultimate power’ and are ‘the real planners’ of the Canadian economy (1965: 
255). He concludes that Canada is like other industrial societies insofar as it has 
experienced a high degree of corporate consolidation during the early part of the 
twentieth century; however, the relationship between corporate power and the class 
structure is atypical insofar as the economic elite in Canada has greater than normal 
power. Managerialism implies a dispersion of economic power as owners lost control 
                                                          
23 Ashley (1957) criticizes Porter’s selection on the grounds that it was too large. Rosenbluth (1961) also 
tries to measure corporate concentration in Canada and finds that 53 non-financial private firms with 
assets over $100 million controlled 25 percent of all the ‘real’ assets of all corporations in 1956.  
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over the modern corporation, but in Canada Porter argues that power remains highly 
centralized  (1965: 239-42). 
  Clement’s (1975; 1977a) studies in social stratification take as their point of 
departure the validity of managerialism. Clement begins by presupposing that corporate 
capitalism tends toward increasing concentration (1975: 31) and that the economic elite 
is made up of senior management and directors instead of proprietors (1975: 5).24 
Defining the corporate elite more in terms of power (understood as command over 
resources) than in terms of wealth, Clement (1975: 98, 128) uses assets and sales together 
as the best approximation of corporate power. Using this metric, his study examines the 
113 dominant corporations whose assets surpass $250 million and whose sales exceed 
$50 million. Interlocking directorships, he claims, tend to further concentrate corporate 
power.25  
In the two decades between 1951 and 1972, Clement identifies two processes: first, 
an increasing concentration of capital into a smaller number of larger firms; and second, 
increasing Americanization of the Canadian economy through heavy foreign investment 
(1975: 155-6, 168). Expanding his study to North America (1977a), Clement notes that the 
Canadian corporate sector is more heavily concentrated than the American. In 1965, for 
example, the 100 largest manufacturers accounted for 46 percent of value added in 
Canada but only 33 percent in the United States. He also notes that Canada’s level of 
concentration exceeds America’s in 50 of 56 industries (1977a: 140).  
                                                          
24 Clement (1975: 97) would also have us believe that increasing corporation concentration was 
accompanied by increasing income inequality between 1948 and 1968, a claim we will contest in Chapter 8 
and 10. 
25 Brownlee (2005) updates Clement’s work and argues that the corporate elite in Canada is more unified, 
more class conscious and more mobilized in shaping public policy in recent times than in the past.   
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 Niosi (1978) laments the fact that most studies of the Canadian economy focus on 
corporate concentration in the light of foreign control, and in so doing, neglect large 
Canadian-controlled firms. He would have us believe that there is indeed a ‘big 
bourgeoisie’ in Canada — a ruling class — that is distinct from American capital and 
which presides over the corporate sector through its strong equity position in dominant 
Canadian corporations (1978: 169, 173). Niosi asserts that Park and Park (1962), Porter 
(1965) and Clement (1975) lacked data on stock ownership and, in their reliance on 
interlocking directorships, drew erroneous conclusions. In contrast to the Marxian 
argument made by the Parks, the chartered banks do not control non-financial 
corporations. In contrast to managerial and elite theorists like Porter and Clement, major 
shareholders sit on the board of directors but need to be analytically distinguished from 
non-equity board members and non-equity management (1978: 166-9).  
Niosi unpacks the ownership structure of the 136 largest Canadian controlled 
firms (ranked by assets in 1976) and finds that 30 percent are majority owned and 38 
percent minority owned, leaving only 32 percent under management control (1978: 78-
79). Thus, there is a Canadian ruling class distinct from ‘finance capitalists’, distinct from 
American capital and distinct from upper tier management that exerts control over the 
Canadian economy through a strong equity position.  
Niosi (1981) goes on to contest the claims of Canadian nationalists who saw 
Canada as being under the dominion of American capital. The ‘indigenous bourgeoisie’, 
he suggests, plays a dominant role in Canada and is ‘healthy and vigorous’ (1981: 2-4). His 
examination of Canadian multinationals (1985) finds that Canadian firms, while small in 
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comparison to large American firms, are nevertheless on par in terms of sales and assets 
with Japanese and European multinationals. What’s more, Canadian multinationals 
operate in stable oligopolistic markets and account for an overwhelming percentage of 
Canadian direct investment abroad: 86 percent is attributable to 65 firms and 65 percent 
is traceable to just 16 giant firms (1985: 170).     
In terms of explaining the growth of large firms, Veltmeyer (1987: 27) draws on 
the Monopoly Capital school of Marxism and identifies two processes: first, large firms 
have higher than normal rates of profit and so grow through internal accumulation; and 
second, large firms consolidate competing units through merger. Also working within 
the Monopoly Capital school, Houten (1991: vi) tries to measure concentration in the 
corporate sector. He identifies 500 of the largest firms, ranked by assets, and finds that 
they control an additional 3,130 firms and account for 64 percent of assets and 64 percent 
of profit (as of 1986-87). If this level of asset and profit concentration appears high, the 
concentration of ownership is far more pronounced. Houten (1991: 94) identifies the 
eight largest Canadian conglomerates and finds that they are controlled by nine families. 
When the shares owned by the Big Five banks are excluded, he estimates that this small 
clique controlled more than half of the shares traded on the TSE 300 composite index.      
 Carroll (2010) examines corporate power from the Marxian standpoint of class 
power. Corporate power, he states, manifests itself in the highly unequal distribution of 
control over resources. This division between those who do and do not control resources 
creates unilateral dependence of the latter on the former. This dependence enables the 
controllers of resources to ‘frame agendas, make decisions and secure [the] compliance’ of 
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workers, communities and states (2010: 2). Carroll’s (1986) earlier work examined the 
corporate sector in Canada from 1946-1976 and found that the ‘silent surrender’ argument 
generated by Levitt (1970) and other Canadian nationalists was false. Like Niosi (1978), 
Carroll sees an indigenous capitalist class that preserved and even expanded its 
accumulation base across all sectors of the Canadian economy.  
In mapping the social network of interlocking directorates, Carroll finds that 
Canadian-controlled firms remain at the centre while American-controlled firms sit on 
the periphery. Updating and expanding his analysis, Carroll (2010: 55, 104, 125) maps the 
inter-corporate ownership of the top 250 Canadian firms across the last quarter of the 
twentieth century and finds that, contrary to Levitt and the dependency theorists of the 
1970s, Canada’s corporate elite are nationally embedded. Wealthy families continue to 
make up the largest fraction of the elite, with family control increasing in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century (albeit through inter-corporate ownership), which means that 
the de-personalization of control associated with managerialism still does not apply in 
Canada (2010: 202-3).   
Blending economic sociology with biography, Newman (1975; 1981; 1998) 
examines corporate power by chronicling the full life cycle of the Canadian 
Establishment, from schooling and upbringing through professional life, home life, club 
membership, consumption patterns, business conquests, political exploits, peccadillo’s, 
and finally, death. Newman estimates (1975: 543-4) that, as of the mid-1970s, the 
Canadian Establishment is made up of approximately 1,000 men — an ‘untitled 
aristocracy’ — who are a ‘surprisingly compact self-perpetuating group’ and who ‘act as a 
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kind of informal junta, linked much more closely to each other than their country’. Their 
power, he says, resides in their ‘ability to compel obedience, to shape events and trends 
— political and cultural as well as economic’ to their advantage (1975: 543). Some might 
question the existence of such a social entity. To the skeptics, Newman states: 
The existence of an Establishment is not some woolly writer’s literary invention. It is real. 
It is the hidden hand behind the hidden hand that organizes the means of production, 
decides who gets what and how much, when things get done and why they get vetoed 
(1998: 10).  
 
In the first volume, Newman sees the Establishment as differing from its forebears 
insofar as wealth and authority used to centre on powerful families, but in more recent 
times it is to be found in sprawling national corporations. The shift from personal to 
institutional power, however, does not signal a shift to de-personalized managerial 
capitalism. Newman’s research leads him to posit: the ‘alert CEO realizes that he is easily 
replaceable, that there is no substitute for ownership, that the only real security lies in 
establishing a strong equity position’ (1975: 240). ‘The corporate order’, he would have us 
believe, ‘is a system of private governments lacking the restraints of public 
accountability’ with the largest firms acting as ‘centres of power’ (1975: 266). To those 
who might think this signals a conspiracy, Newman replies: the Establishment has ‘little 
need to conspire’ for the simple reason that ‘they think the same way naturally. They 
recognize so few conflicts of interest because their broad interests seldom conflict’ (1975: 
542).26  
                                                          
26 The second volume, The Acquisitors (1981), is essentially an extension of the first with a Westward tilt. 
The first volume centred on the commercial and industrial centre of Canada — Ontario and Quebec — 
while the second shifted to the newly flush, resource-rich Canadian West. 
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By the third volume, Titans, things had changed considerably. Newman announces 
that the Old Establishment is ‘dead’ and that Canada has become a ‘full-blown 
meritocracy’ (1998: xi). Canada is still dominated by a corporate elite, to be sure, and its 
members move in and out of federal government cabinet seats, direct cultural institutions 
govern universities, and perhaps most importantly, act as ‘the hidden hand behind the 
hidden hand that organizes means of production, decides who gets what and how much, 
when things get done and why they get vetoed’ (Newman 1998: xviii, 10).27 The Titans, as 
he describes them, ‘create personal fortunes instead of jobs’ by manipulating people’s 
perception of what things are worth (Newman 1998: 105-6).  
Fleming (1991: 158) also documents the life activities of the powerful and notes 
that the ‘overlapping relationship’ between business and government is ‘cemented by a 
largely one way flow of ex-politicians and bureaucrats into corporate boards and 
management teams’. Take Peter Munk, for example. Munk is the Founder and Chairman 
of Barrick Gold, the world’s largest gold company and one of the largest Canadian-
domiciled firms. Munk appointed former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Francis (2008: 
195) reports, to the board because he has ‘access to heads of state’ that can be used ‘for 
both social and business or mining-claims purposes’. According to Newman (1998: 192), 
Munk explained that he put Mulroney on the board of Barrick because ‘he has great 
contacts’ and ‘knows every dictator in the world on a first-name basis’. Such is the 
relationship between dominant proprietors and governing officials in Canada.  
                                                          
27 Clarke (1997: 5-6) describes the new corporate politics or ‘corporate rule’ as being the product of a ‘silent 
coup’ and ‘hostile takeover’. Dobbin (2003) echoes Clarke when he judges the new political reality as 
involving corporations attaining ‘super-citizen’ status.   
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4.4 What are the Questions? 
Let’s sum up. First, Canadian political economists have argued that Canada’s 
developmental trajectory is unique in many respects and, with the exception of those 
working within the neoclassical school, have sought explanations in the light of history. 
Second, international scholars working from numerous perspectives recognized that the 
advent of the modern corporation changed capitalism in fundamental ways, especially as 
it pertains to the organization and exercise of power. Third, the majority of studies on 
corporate power in Canada have argued that the corporate sector is dominated by an 
elite, but contrary to managerial suppositions this elite is largely comprised of 
proprietors with strong equity positions in the firms they control.  
While tentatively accepting the validity of these studies, there remains much to 
be understood. To begin, most of the studies on large firms in Canada are too dated to be 
of much use today. The bulk of the studies on the structure of corporate ownership, for 
example, were conducted prior to the CUFTA and the NAFTA. The two decades since 
the trade and investment liberalization regime was instituted may have radically altered 
the structure of corporate ownership in Canada. Accordingly, Chapter 5 will (partially) 
map the structure of corporate ownership, and in so doing, update the historical picture. 
Second, existing studies are insufficiently attentive to how corporate power can and 
should be measured. Chapter 5 will also evaluate the explanatory utility of the various 
ways of measuring corporate power before exploring what the actual metrics of 
corporate power tell us about the evolution of large firms in Canada. Third, if corporate 
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power has grown in recent times, we should wish to understand the growth pathways 
that large firms have historically traversed. One such growth pathway, mergers and 
acquisitions, will be probed in Chapter 6. Fourth and finally, we should wish to know if 
there is a relationship between the relative size of the largest Canadian-based firms and 
the distribution of income — a subject we will explore in Chapter 8 and 10.  
There is yet to be a study that empirically documents and quantitatively maps the 
changing structure, composition and performance of the largest Canadian-based firms 
across the entire postwar era. In Chapter 5 we will take up the managerial hypothesis as 
set out by Berle and Means (1932) by questioning whether concentration in the corporate 
sector has increased and whether control has delinked from ownership. Addressing the 
managerial hypothesis will be a first step in sorting out if ‘corporate power’ is a 
meaningful concept in the Canadian context.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Maple Leaf Multinationals:  
A Profile of Dominant Capital1 
 
 
In a system of corporate concentration the result of competition is some sort of planning; 
and planning does not reduce power but increases it… The corporation is now, 
essentially, a non-statist political institution. 
   - Adolf Berle (1955) 
 
 
 
 
Is dominant capital a meaningful category in the Canadian context? If it is, how many 
firms comprise this bloc? How have the largest firms performed over the postwar era? 
Has dominant capital ‘differentially accumulated’, i.e., has it outperformed the corporate 
universe in Canada and has it beaten global benchmarks? Is the corporate sector manager 
controlled or is ultimately authority wielded by proprietors? And how ‘globalized’ has 
the corporate sector become over the past century? The three chapters in Section I 
outlined some conceptual tools, furnished some historical context and reviewed some of 
the relevant literature as a way of preparing us to deal with the matter at hand: large 
firms or ‘dominant capital’. Capital is at the centre of capitalism and its most 
conspicuous institutional form is the multi-unit, vertically-integrated, globally-scaled 
corporation. The present chapter will identify and map the evolution of the largest 
Canadian-based firms over the postwar era, arguing that ‘dominant capital’ is indeed a 
meaningful category in the Canadian context.  
                                                          
1 The term ‘maple leaf multinationals’ is found in Bliss (1987: 481). 
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In making this argument, the managerial view of contemporary capitalism (which 
gained a lot of academic traction over the past century) will be challenged. Specifically, 
the present chapter will demonstrate that corporate concentration has increased in 
recent decades — reaching a historic extreme — but the associated increase in corporate 
power has not been mitigated by a separation of ownership from control. To a great 
extent, large firms remain under the control of dominant proprietors, which means that 
an increase in the level of concentration has simultaneously served to increase the power 
wielded by the small cluster of families and institutional investors that own the largest 
firms.  
 The argument will be delivered in ten sections. The first section will sketch an 
image of the corporate sector in the aggregate before specifying the bloc of firms that 
make up the proxy for dominant capital. The second will demonstrate that, despite the 
appearance of high turnover amongst the top Canadian-based firms, the relative position 
of the largest firms is remarkably stable over time. Once the longevity of the largest firms 
has been established, the third section will review how the various schools of thought 
have tried to measure corporate power. This review will serve as a backdrop to the fourth 
section, which will map the history of corporate profitability in North America.  
The fifth section will begin to assess the managerial view of contemporary 
capitalism by exploring how measures of aggregate concentration in Canada fluctuated 
over the postwar era. The sixth will plot N&B’s differential measures of corporate power 
and assess their usefulness. The seventh will explore the history of corporate ownership 
in Canada by reviewing some of the most important studies on the subject. The eighth 
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section will try to add to that literature and update our historical picture by mapping the 
structure of ownership for the largest Canadian-based firms. The goal will be to sort out 
if dominant capital is manager controlled or if ultimate control resides with owners. The 
ninth section will contrast the performance of the Canadian corporate sector as a whole 
and dominant capital in particular against global benchmarks and assess the extent to 
which the corporate sector in Canada has globalized over the past century. The chapter 
will close with a summary of the findings and an elucidation of some follow-up 
questions.    
 
5.1 The Canadian Equity Market 
Ideally, our study would examine the largest firms in the Canadian corporate universe. 
However, lack of publically available data on privately owned corporations compels us to 
restrict our focus to the universe of publically traded firms.2 Canadian stock exchanges 
date back to the 1830s with the creation of the banking system, but the number of firms 
listed remained very small until the twentieth century. At the time of Confederation, for 
example, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) only had 18 issues trading and the Montreal 
Stock Exchange (MSE) had 64 listings. On the eve of the First World War the TSX had 
grown to 200 listings and by 1936 it was the third largest stock exchange in North 
America.  
During the twentieth century other exchanges were added in Vancouver (1907), 
Winnipeg (1909), Calgary (1913) and Edmonton (1953). The Canadian equity market was 
                                                          
2 The following historical overview is derived from Forbes and Johnston (1980: 5-8) and a historical fact 
sheet from the TMX Group’s (2012) company website: http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TMXHistory.pdf. 
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re-configured in 1999: thereafter the TSX would host the trading of senior equities, the 
MSE would handle derivate trading and the smaller exchanges would combine to form a 
venture exchange specializing in junior equities. Two years later the TSX absorbed the 
venture exchange and in 2007 the TSX and MSE merged to form the TSX Group, a fully 
integrated exchange. Because the TSX was the largest exchange throughout the latter 
half of the twentieth century (listing the majority of large firms) and because reliable 
long-term data pertaining to the TSX are available, it will occupy our attention. 
 Our first task is to disaggregate the corporate sector with a view to answering the 
question: how do we specify the number of units in dominant capital?3 There are multiple 
ways to answer this question. N&B (2009: 316) note that one way of delineating 
dominant capital from the universe of firms is to use a Gini index. Mapping the entire 
distribution of the corporate universe would enable us to overcome the arbitrariness 
associated with selecting a cut-off point. The difficulty with this method, they note, is 
the lack of available data. In the Canadian context, Krause and Lothian (1989: 3.22-3.23) 
note that the selection of an arbitrary cut-off point can easily obscure the picture. They 
use the Gini coefficient to map the concentration of corporate sales, profits and assets 
between 1977 and 1986, noting that had they selected the top 25 firms (ranked by sales) 
there would have been an increase in the overall level of concentration, but had they 
selected the top 1,000 firms there would have been no change.  
Despite the difficulty associated with determining a cut-off, the ease associated 
with such a method impels us to use it. The top 60 firms ranked annually by equity 
                                                          
3 Bearing in mind that the meaningfulness of ‘dominant capital’ in the Canadian context can only be 
assessed at the end of the dissertation. 
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market capitalization will be used as a proxy for dominant capital. There are four main 
reasons for selecting the top 60 firms. First, the TSX has an index — the ‘TSX 60’ — 
which investors use as a large cap benchmark. Second, the S&P 500 is one of the main 
equity benchmarks in the U.S., and given that the Canadian political economy is 
approximately one-tenth the size of the American, utilizing 60 firms gives us a 
proportionate measure. Third, the Forbes Global 2000 is one of the most high profile 
global equity listings in the world and its selection of the top 2,000 global firms, selected 
on the basis of sales, profits, assets and market value, usually contains 60 or so Canadian-
domiciled firms (in 2012 66 firms made the list, up from 60 in 2006). The fourth reason 
for choosing 60 firms is practical usefulness, but this can only be demonstrated as we 
proceed through the remainder of the monograph. In the final analysis, utilizing the top 
60 as a proxy for dominant capital is only justifiable if it reveals phenomena that would 
otherwise remain undisclosed. 
 With our proxy for dominant capital identified, how do the top 60 firms fit into 
the structure of the Canadian equity market? Table 5.1 presents some basic information 
about the universe of listed firms as of May 2012. At that point, the entire equity market 
was made up of more than 4,000 firms worth some two trillion dollars. However, 98 
percent of that value was attributable to the 1,600 or so firms that made up the TSX. 
Because the market value of the Venture Exchange is comparatively insignificant and 
because data for it are unavailable until recently, our focus will be on the TSX proper. 
The top 60 firms on the TSX account for less than 4 percent of the total number (1,587) of 
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firms, but make up 60 percent of the total market value, thus signalling a very high degree 
of concentration.  
The average equity value of the top 60 is $20 billion, which puts it well above the 
‘typical’ large cap cut-off of $10 billion. Our selection of the top 60 is further justified 
when we consider the magnitude of the change associated with the top 100 or the top 
200 firms. Adding 40 firms to our sample of 60 would only raise the level of 
concentration from 60 to 70 percent. Adding 100 more firms to that sample would only 
boost the concentration from 70 to 78 percent. Thus, we can safely conclude that 
selection of 60 firms is not too small.  
Table 5.1 
The Canadian Equity Market: Aggregate and Disaggregate Views (May 2012) 
 TSX Venture Top 60 Top 100 Top 200 Total Market 
Issues Listed 1,587 2,567 60 100 200 4,154 
Equity Value 
(Billions $CAD) 1,965.5 43.5 1,210.5 1,397.9 1,573.4 2,009.0 
Percent of Canada’s  
Total Value 98% 2% 60% 70% 78% 100% 
Average Size  
(Billions $CAD) 1.238 0.017 20.174 13.979 7.867 0.484 
Cut-off Value 
(Billions $CAD)   7.179 3.010 1.088  
Note: A handful of firms were removed from the disaggregate measures (General Motors, for example) because they are not 
headquartered in Canada. Values are as of 31 May 2012.  Source: TMX Group’s Equity Financing Statistics.  
 
 Let’s turn from the structure of the equity market to its sectoral composition. 
Table 5.2 portrays the decade average share of total market value attributable to the 
seven largest sectors: finance, materials, oil & gas, industrials, telecom, utilities and 
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technology.4 The first three sectors make up the bulk of the Canadian equity market. In 
2010, for example, finance, materials and oil & gas accounted for 77 percent of total 
market value, up from 46 percent in 1975. The next four largest sectors — industrials, 
telecom, utilities and technology — only accounted for 14 percent of total market value in 
2010. This is in stark contrast to 1975, when industrials, technology and utilities together 
accounted for more than half the value of the total market. 
Table 5.2 
The Sectoral Distribution of the Canadian Equity Market 
(Percentage Shares of Seven Major Sectors: Decade Averages) 
Decade Finance Materials Oil & Gas Industrials Telecom Utilities Technology 
1970s 13.0 28.5 15.9 9.6 0.4 9.8 16.3 
1980s 16.8 16.0 24.5 7.2 0.6 4.9 12.7 
1990s 21.9 12.0 21.2 5.7 1.1 4.3 12.0 
2000s 29.4 10.6 22.7 4.6 4.7 3.6 8.3 
Note: For the 1970s, the data begins in 1973 for all the sectors except Telecom, which begins in 1976.  Source: Thomson Reuters 
Datastream Professional.  
 
The information in Table 5.2 raises two significant issues. In the mid-1970s, the 
Canadian equity market was distributed between six sectors, so there was a fair degree 
of diversification. This sectoral diversification has been reduced in recent years, with 
three sectors comprising a strong majority of the entire market. Given this, we should 
expect the majority of the top 60 firms to fall into finance, energy and materials. Second, 
the shift in relative weight between the various sectors might suggest high turnover 
amongst the constituent members of the top 60. Does the dramatic change in sectoral 
distribution signal high turnover amongst the largest firms? 
 
                                                          
4 The Materials sector includes firms that control the discovery, development or processing of raw 
materials. This will include the mining and refining of metals, chemical products and forestry products.  
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5.2 Survival and Longevity amongst Large Firms 
N&B (2009: 316) argue that we should not expect corporate membership in dominant 
capital to be stable across time given the ‘highly transformative nature’ of differential 
accumulation. In support of their contention they draw on Orwell’s (1949: 218) claim 
that a ruling group remains a ruling group so long as it can designate its successors. But 
this line of reasoning seems askew. Surely the individuals who control the largest 
corporations in Canada do not nominate successors in other firms. If a corporation is 
dislodged from the ranks of the top 60 it is a near certainty that its institutional 
replacement is not handpicked. In one-party authoritarian states, succession is one of the 
primary tasks of the upper echelon of the ruling party and considerable energy is spent 
cultivating and selecting replacement members; thus, Orwell’s dictum accurately 
captures the power dynamic in those settings.  
In the corporate world, however, nomination happens within firms, not between 
them. The absence of competition between political parties in a one-party state confers 
enormous power on the top tier of the ruling party. The presence of competition between 
large firms, however faint, reduces power at the top of the corporate hierarchy. In short, 
power and competition are offsetting, not complementary. At the top of the corporate 
hierarchy we find the nomination of successors within firms and the displacement of 
competitors between firms, which makes Orwell’s observation about ruling groups’ 
succession inappropriate. 
There is another way of thinking about the relationship between the stability of a 
dominance hierarchy and power. In describing the process of ‘creative destruction’, 
127 
 
Schumpeter (1942: 82-84) argues that capitalism is a ‘method of economic change’. The 
‘capitalist engine’ is kept ‘in motion’ as a consequence of new consumer goods, new 
methods of production and transportation, new markets and new organizational forms. 
Others have long noted this, Schumpeter admits, but most failed to grasp a more 
fundamental fact: capitalism not only administers existing structures; it creates and 
destroys them. This ‘creative destruction’ seems to imply, in part, that power at the top of 
a corporate hierarchy should be mitigated (potentially, if not factually).  
Because the corporate institutions themselves rise and fall — are created and 
destroyed — the political-economic power bound up with the corporate dominance 
hierarchy is less secure than the power associated with governmental or state dominance 
hierarchies, which are more permanent. For example, the Canadian Government is a 
more stable institution than, say, Barrick Gold. As far as liberal-democratic societies go, 
state power is often assumed to be tolerable if it is constitutionally circumscribed, but 
also if the people who wield power do not hold onto it for an indefinite period of time. 
Governmental power, in other words, is restrained through the competition associated 
with regularly scheduled elections. Though the corporate world is not subject to popular 
elections, competition has the effect (again, at least potentially) of dislodging people 
from occupying the top of the (corporate) dominance hierarchy indefinitely, thus 
mitigating the power found there.    
If we are to meaningfully speak about corporate power we should expect to find a 
higher degree of stability amongst the constituent members of dominant capital than we 
would find lower down the corporate hierarchy. The greater the power at the top of the 
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corporate hierarchy, the more stable it should be as an institutional grouping. Lower 
down the corporate hierarchy we would expect to find rapid turnover and even failure as 
small and medium-sized firms succumb to the pressure of changing market conditions. 
High turnover and failure amongst small and medium-sized firms is one of the features 
separating the highly dispersed power of the corporate universe from the highly 
concentrated power of dominant capital. Longevity within the ranks of the top firms is 
one indirect way of assessing corporate power, so how stable are the largest Canadian-
based firms? 
 Boothman and Austin (2005) track the survival of the largest non-financial and 
industrial firms between 1973 and 2003, noting that many disappeared across this period. 
The decline of Eaton’s, Hiram Walker, Massey-Ferguson and Seagrams — all household 
names in Canada — signalled the failure to ‘construct durable positions’ (2005: 32). 
Boothman and Austin quote a National Post article which stated that only 16 of the 40 
firms on its 1964 list of large firms made it to the Financial Post’s 2003 list of the top 500 
firms.  
Boothman and Austin capture the magnitude of the turnover amongst large 
Canadian firms with data reproduced in Table 5.3. The sample is split between non-
financials and industrials, with two batches of firms selected for each group (one larger, 
one smaller). Their research shows that among the two groups of the largest firms (top 
50 non-financials and top 25 industrials), only 40 percent of the sample survived from 
1973 to 2003. The disappearance of 60 percent of the largest firms in one generation 
suggests a high degree of turnover. They also note that the wider samples (100 top non-
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financials and top 75 industrials) indicate another interesting phenomenon: the lower we 
go in the rankings, the higher the turnover, with one-in-four firms surviving to 2003. 
Their research demonstrates that approximately half of the firms in the two wider 
samples were added since 1988. Despite the seemingly high turnover, they stress that 
most firms disappeared as a consequence of merger. Outright bankruptcy was rare (2005: 
34).   
Table 5.3 
Survival and Longevity among Large Canadian Firms 
Sample 
Percentage from the 1973 Group 
1973 1988 2003 
Top 50 non-financials 100 62 40 
Top 100 non-financials 100 52 29 
Biggest 25 industrials 100 68 40 
Biggest 75 industrials 100 53 24 
Source: Adapted from Boothman and Austin (2005: 35), Table 2. 
 
Some might be tempted to suggest that the decline of large firms is a consequence 
of changing consumer tastes or new technological imperatives. This is not so, they stress. 
Amongst the largest Canadian firms, ‘only the actors changed, not the forums in which 
they played’ (2005: 35), meaning the turnover among large firms is not the product of 
sectoral rise and decline. Rather, the sectoral distribution of large firms remained 
relatively constant. This suggests that the seemingly high turnover amongst the largest 
firms, which would have signalled less power at the top of the corporate hierarchy, is 
mitigated by the fact that very few large firms actually fail. If firms disappear from the 
rankings of the top firms it is far more likely that they do so as a consequence of merger 
than of failure. What’s more, some firms fall out of the top rankings without disappearing 
altogether; instead, they slide down the hierarchy to a lower position.  
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How does turnover amongst large firms compare with turnover in the corporate 
universe? Research undertaken by economists at Statistics Canada indicates that the 
average yearly exit rate across the private sector is nine percent (Ciobanu and Wang 
2012). The exit rate amongst the large sample of firms in Boothman and Austin’s study is 
roughly three percent. This latter exit rate, recall, included firms that were acquired as 
well as those that failed. If large firms disappear, it is far likelier that they do so as a 
consequence of merger; if small or medium-sized firms disappear, it is far likelier that 
they do so as a consequence of bankruptcy. Given the much larger size (read: power) of 
the top firms, it isn’t surprising that their exit rate is much lower.5    
Stability amongst the top firms is reinforced when we consider data in Appendix 
A. There, the top 100 firms are listed according to equity market capitalization in 2012 
along with their stock market listing date and their effective founding date. The mean 
effective founding date for the top 100 firms is 1943. For the top 60 firms it is 1928. The 
largest firms in Canada are generations, not decades, old. If ‘creative destruction’ were at 
play amongst the largest firms and if they failed at a rate of 9 percent (or even close to it), 
we would expect the average effective founding date of the largest firms to be 
comparatively recent. This is not so. The average effective founding date of the top 20 
firms is 1899; for the bottom 20 (of the top 100) it is 1972. The larger the firm, the older 
                                                          
5 To calculate the average exit rate amongst the larger two samples of firms in Boothman and Austin’s 
study we can use the following formula:  Exit Rate = N = I × (1 – r)t. ‘N’ stands for the percentage of firms 
that survive until the end of the period (40 percent); ‘t’ stands for the time span (1973 to 2003, or 30 years) 
and ‘I’ stands for the initial percentage of firms in the sample (100 percent); ‘r’, or the average annual exit 
rate, is what we are trying to determine. Thus: 40 = 100 × (1 - r)30, therefore the exit rate, r, is approximately 
three percent. Note that the average annual exit rate amongst large firms is three percent, which is much 
lower than the exit rate of nine percent found in the corporate universe (the latter tabulated by Ciobanu 
and Wang 2012). 
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the vintage. A few high-profile failures/takeovers have done little to dislodge the largest 
firms from their position of dominance. 
To recap, the Canadian equity market is highly skewed in its sectoral distribution 
toward finance, energy and materials. It is also highly concentrated in terms of its market 
value. The top 60 firms, which we will use as our proxy for dominant capital, account for 
60 percent of all market value. Many of these firms pre-date the twentieth century 
(indeed, some pre-date Confederation) and despite the appearance of high turnover, 
membership at the top of the corporate hierarchy is remarkably stable. So far we’ve taken 
a snapshot of the recent past. What we’re really interested in is chronicling the changing 
power of dominant capital. Has the power of dominant capital increased over time? This 
question presupposes another: how should we measure corporate power?  
 
5.3 Measuring Corporate Power 
In Chapter 4 we saw that institutionalists, managerialists, Marxists and to a limited 
extent, liberals, all agree that the emergence of the modern corporation fundamentally 
reorganized power in capitalism. Have these schools of thought tried to measure 
corporate power, and if so, how? Berle and Means measure corporate concentration 
(which is understood here to be their proxy for corporate power) by determining the 
proportion of manufacturing assets under the control of the 100 largest manufacturing 
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firms.6  Using this metric, they find that concentration increased from 40 percent in 1929 
to 49 percent in 1962 (1967: xxix).  
Two related difficulties plague this method. First, comparing concentration at 
two points in time ignores everything in between, which might lead to erroneous 
conclusions, especially if each datum comes at a different point in the business cycle. 
Second, there is a good deal of ambiguity around what constitutes a ‘manufacturing 
corporation’. With the rise of conglomeration in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
many large firms had manufacturing operations while maintaining financing and other 
divisions. This raises a broader question — one which both Veblen and N&B tackle: why 
do we distinguish financial from non-financial corporations? The relevant distinction is 
not between manufacturing and financial corporations, but between business and 
industrial activities. All corporations are businesses, by definition, so our focus should be 
on the corporate universe as such, independent of what (industrial) activities a particular 
corporation controls. 
 Institutionalists like Dugger (1985; 1988) claim that power is bound up with size. 
In his view, ‘power and size interact in a cumulative fashion’ such that ‘more power leads 
to larger size and larger size leads to more power’ (1988: 80). In terms of accounting for 
size (power), Dugger employs the IRS classification of large firms, defined as assets above 
$250 million. He then compares the proportion of corporate assets, revenues and net 
income at two points in time: 1965 and 1982. The shortcoming with this method is that 
                                                          
6 Means (1983: 467) later clarified his thinking on corporate power, saying that he was not referring to 
‘monopoly power’, but to the power that ‘arises naturally from active competition among a few large  
independent corporations and is reflected in the pricing discretion in the hands of individual competing 
enterprises’.  
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the cut-off of a large firm remains constant over time at $250 million while the general 
price level increases, so the increase in concentration (if it is to be found at all) will tend 
to be overstated as inflation makes more firms rise above the size threshold. Dugger was 
on the right path, however, in rejecting industry concentration ratios. The rise of the 
conglomerate corporation, he suggests, means that many large firms operate in several 
unrelated markets and have ‘purely financial objectives’ (1985: 11).  
Also working within the institutionalist school, Grant (1997: 453) reviews seven 
different ways that corporate power can be measured with a view to determining which 
technique can be used to generate testable hypotheses. The seven measurements include: 
(1) industry concentration ratios, (2) aggregate concentration ratios, (3) the density of 
corporate interlocks, (4) the profit share of national income, (5) the ratio of the marginal 
product of labour to the real wage, (6) union density and (7) the proportion of total 
government revenue derived from corporate taxes. As he sees it, the latter two represent 
the most promising methods for measuring corporate power.  
Grant’s assessment seems unwarranted. In Chapter 9 we will see that union 
density is a good approximation for the institutional power of organized labour; it is not 
a good approximation for corporate power. As for the proportion of government revenue 
coming from corporate  income taxes, this metric does not adequately capture corporate 
power for the simple reason that as the corporate profit share of national income grows, 
so too does the percentage of government revenue retrieved from those profits (assuming 
the fixity of corporate income tax rates). To remedy this defect, a better measure of 
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corporate power vis-à-vis taxation is the effective corporate tax rate differential taxation 
(a subject that will be probed in Chapter 7).  
 Marxists have also tried to develop measures of corporate power. Bowles, Gordon 
and Weisskopf, for example, try to connect gyrations in corporate profitability with 
Social Structures of Accumulation, highlighting the importance of power and struggle in 
determining profitability (1986: 132). They take as their sample the domestic, non-
financial corporate universe (the ‘capitalist core’) and provide two measures of corporate 
profitability. The first they called the ‘rate of return on capital’, measured as the ratio of 
capital income (net profit plus net interest) to the capital stock (net fixed capital stock 
plus inventories). The second is Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of the market value of 
capital assets to the current net replacement cost of capital assets (1986: 135). As a 
political sociologist of Marxian persuasion, Domhoff looks at corporate power through 
the lens of class domination and understands this type of power to manifest itself as 
distributive power or ‘power over’ (2002: 9-10). In contrast to Bowles, Gordon and 
Weisskopf, Domhoff uses the distribution of personal income and wealth as a proxy for 
corporate power.  
Corporate profitability and the top income share will both be utilized as broad 
measures of institutional power. However, if N&B and Veblen are correct in their claim 
that capital is financial wealth, then trying to measure corporate power using the ‘capital 
stock’ or ‘capital assets’ is an impossibility insofar as the entities being measured, at least 
as they are understood by neoclassical and Marxian economists, are themselves fictional. 
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Corporate profitability (benchmarked against GDP) and the top income share will be 
used as broad proxies for power. 
 Not everyone is persuaded that corporate power can be accurately measured, 
much less that it is increasing. Tullberg, for example, argues that many critics of 
globalization exaggerate the power of corporations when they compare corporate sales 
to national GNP, which makes the largest global firms appear as big as medium-sized 
countries (2004: 326). As he sees it, comparing corporate ‘value-added’ to national GNP 
yields a more accurate comparison. Roach (2005) would have us believe that the 
empirical research used to bolster the claim that multinationals possess huge political 
power (or that it is increasing) is thin. The problem, he says, is that we lack a consensus 
measure on corporate power. Industry concentration ratios are a common way of 
measuring market power, and by this definition many U.S. industries are oligopolistic, 
but he notes that there has been little change in these ratios over the past few decades. 
National concentration ratios are not much better because they fail to capture the impact 
of foreign competition and they do not account for conglomeration (Roach 2005: 32). 
Aggregate concentration ratios, Roach continues, partially overcome these shortcomings. 
By this measure, corporate power in the U.S. increased during the 1990s. Roach goes on 
to mention the ‘countervailing power’ argument advanced by Galbraith (1952), who 
asserted that union membership is one limit on corporate power. Union membership has 
declined, Roach notes, in 13 of 19 OECD countries, which he takes to mean that corporate 
power has increased in those jurisdictions (2005: 33). 
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As a preliminary way of assessing the aggregate power of capital, N&B use the 
capital share of national income, comprised of corporate profit and net interest (2009: 
273-4). This is a much simpler and more straightforward way of measuring capitalist 
power. Despite the attractiveness of this measure, this study will begin to analyze 
corporate power by charting the corporate profit share of national income. This is the 
more appropriate metric for two reasons. First, this study is focused on the largest 
corporate units in Canada and corporate income comes in the form of profit. Second, if 
one of the core aspects of corporate power is control over employment levels, and if the 
distribution of corporate revenue between owners (in the form of profit) and workers (in 
the form of wages and salaries) manifests a type of struggle, it makes more sense to 
utilize profit as a measure of power than profit plus net interest.  
A note about data sources before proceeding. This study utilizes data from 
multiple sources, but disaggregate data on the largest Canadian firms are taken from the 
Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (for the period 1950-1959) and Compustat 
through the Wharton Research Data Services (for 1960-2012). The completeness of both 
databanks diminishes as we go back to the early years of the postwar era. Gaps were 
filled using company annual reports obtained from Moody’s Corporate Manuals through 
Mergent Webreports and various issues of the Report on Business’s Top 1000 
Companies. The picture that emerges from these sources is undoubtedly imperfect, but is 
detailed enough to give us the historical impression we are after.  
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5.4 Corporate Profitability in North America 
Now that we have reviewed how others have tried to measure corporate power, we begin 
with the corporate profit share of national income. Figure 5.1 documents aggregate 
corporate profit and the profit of the top 60 firms in Canada (both as a share of GDP) 
from 1926 and 1950, respectively. The national corporate profit share peaked in 1950-51 
before beginning a secular decline, bottomed out in the early 1990s just as the TAIL 
regime came into effect and then surged upward over the past two decades. The profit 
share of the top 60 firms took a similar path: secular decline from the 1950s through early 
1990s followed by a secular rise over the past two decades.  
 
Note: the top 60 firms are ranked annually by equity market capitalization.  Source: 
total pre-tax corporate profit and GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 
and F13 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2011); common shares 
outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit from the  Canadian Financial 
Markets Research Centre and Compustat through WRDS; Moody’s Corporate Manuals 
through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies (various issues 
from 1985-2010).  
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The pattern exhibited by the top 60 firms becomes more remarkable once we 
recognize that, in principle, its share of national income should shrink over time. Over 
the six decades from 1950, the number of units in the numerator is held constant at 60 
while the number of entities that make up the denominator (GDP or total economic 
activity) increased many times over. The fact that the top 60 managed to nearly double 
its share of national income to 7.3 percent in 2006 from 4.1 percent in 1950 signals an 
enormous increase in the power of the largest firms. Both measures suggest that the 
power of corporations declined during the early decades of the post-war era, only to 
rebound in the neoliberal era. But is this pattern unique to Canada? 
No, it’s not. Figure 5.2 maps the aggregate and disaggregate history of corporate 
profitability in the United States. The profit share of the corporate universe, the top 500 
and the top 60 firms (all as a percent of GDP) are mapped from 1929 and 1950 onward. 
The national profit share reached a high in 1942 before taking a secular decline, bottomed 
out in 1982 and rose thereafter to a high in 2010. In the Preface to the 1983 edition of his 
Concept of the Corporation, Drucker contends that corporations are primarily run for the 
benefit of employees, not owners (1946: xviii-xix). His claim is predicated on the fact that 
the national wage bill in the United States climbed to 85 percent by the early 1980s, up 
from 40 percent 100 years beforehand. The long-term profit squeeze during the postwar 
era could be one reason why managerialists concluded that corporations were primarily 
serving stakeholders rather than shareholders. The evidence Drucker marshals is not very 
convincing, if only because it fails to explain why the national wage bill increased during 
the first few decades of the postwar era, but even by his logic the secular resurgence of 
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corporate profit over the neoliberal era suggests that corporate power has increased (and 
that corporations, once again, are run for the benefit of owners). 
In their investigation of the United States, N&B use the largest 100 firms as a 
proxy for dominant capital. In this study, the top 500 firms are used for two reasons: first, 
the S&P 500 is treated by investors as the main equity market benchmark in the U.S.; 
and second, the Canadian political economy is approximately one-tenth that of the 
American, so utilizing the top 500 firms gives us a proportionate measure for the power 
of the top 60 firms in Canada.  
 
Source: GDP and total corporate profit (with inventory valuation adjustment and capital 
cost allowance) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight; common 
shares outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit from Compustat through 
WRDS (for top 500 and top 60 profit share). 
 
The profit share pathway of the top 500 in the U.S. differs from the corporate 
universe, having risen from the 1950s through 1980 before taking two deep dips in the 
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early 1990s and 2000s. In the past decade the profit share of the top 500 surged. Like the 
profit share of the top 60 in Canada, the top 500 measure in the U.S. also rose 
dramatically between 1950 and 2006. The profit share of the top 60 in the U.S. is also 
included in Figure 5.2 to highlight the scale difference between the top firms in Canada 
and the U.S. In Canada, the profit share of the top 60 accounted for more than 4 percent 
of GDP in 1950 and nearly reached 8 percent by 2006. The profit share of the top 60 in the 
U.S. began at a similar level, 3.6 percent, but only rose to 4.8 percent by 2006 before 
settling at 4.2 percent in 2010. Interestingly, the pattern of the top 60 in both 
jurisdictions takes a similar course, moving horizontally for the first four decades before 
pushing upward over the last two decades.  
Let’s turn our attention away from the profit share of national income to 
aggregate concentration, and in so doing, begin to address the managerial view of 
contemporary capitalism. 
 
5.5 Aggregate Concentration 
The managerial hypothesis advanced by Berle and Means (1932), to restate, posits that 
three related processes reconfigured the property regime in America: an increasing 
concentration of corporate assets, coupled with an increasing dispersion of stock 
ownership, resulting in a separation of ownership from control. Despite the widespread 
influence of the separation thesis, not everyone found it persuasive. Zeitlin (1974; 1989), 
for example, contends that the evidence supporting the managerial thesis is thin and that 
we should not treat its validity as a social fact. His claim emerges out of a re-examination 
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of the data Berle and Means utilize. Zeitlin finds that in approximately half of the cases 
where they defined a firm as ‘management controlled’, Berle and Means were unable to 
determine the holdings of the largest stockholder and had labelled the firm ‘presumably 
management controlled’. As Zeitlin tabulates it, only 23 percent of their sample of 200 
firms could clearly be counted as ‘management controlled’. Zeitlin concluded: if the 
evidence for the separation thesis is weak then there is good reason to think that large 
corporations continue to be controlled by proprietors (1989: 9).  
Herman (1981) questions whether the profit motive was ever weakened by the 
rise of salary-oriented managers. As he sees it, ‘the frequently assumed decline in 
managerial interest in profits, which supposedly should result from the decreased 
importance of direct owner control, has not, in fact, been proved’ (1981: 112-13). Mizruchi 
(1987) reviews the managerial debate and finds that the evidence supports Zeitlin’s 
contention. Management never displaced owners as the controllers of corporate America; 
the structure of the upper class, he argues, remains intact.  
In Chapter 4 we reviewed how Canadian scholars responded to the managerial 
hypothesis, noting that it was accepted by some and contested by others. Clement 
appears to accept managerial suppositions when he claims that ‘the history of corporate 
capitalism is to concentrate’ and that large firms tend to be controlled by management 
(1975: 31). Despite the high level of corporate concentration in Canada, Porter notes that 
the trend from the 1930s through the 1960s appears to be flat, not rising (1965: 239-42). 
What’s more, ownership has not delinked from control, thus making Canada’s case 
‘atypical’. Porter’s skepticism of managerialism is shared by Niosi, whose  research posits 
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that two-thirds of the largest Canadian-based corporations are controlled by individuals 
or families, leaving only one-third under the control of management  (1978: 167). Carroll, 
too, notes that the corporate sector remains controlled by wealthy families and that this 
form of control increased in the latter quarter of the twentieth century (2010: 202-3).  
Has concentration increased in the Canadian corporate sector, as the managerial 
thesis implies? Berle and Means focus on assets, but a more encompassing view would 
include revenue, market capitalization and profit. An increase in aggregate concentration 
will be interpreted as an increase in power among the largest firms and vice versa. Figure 
5.3 displays the share of corporate assets and corporate revenue accounted for by the top 
60 firms from 1961 and 1965, respectively. The two metrics are tightly and positively 
correlated over five decades and followed an upward, wave-like pattern (despite the 
differences in scale).  
Asset concentration increased from 27 percent in 1961 to 46 percent in 2010. 
Given that there are approximately 1.5 million corporations in Canada, the fact that the 
top 60 accounted for nearly half of all corporate assets in 2010 signals a startling degree of 
concentration. The concentration of corporate revenue amongst the top 60 firms also 
followed an upward tilting wave-like pattern, but its overall level is much lower and the 
increase was less pronounced than in the case of assets. Between 1965 and 2010, 
aggregate revenue concentration increased from 14 to 24 percent. 
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Note: total corporate assets are tabulated by subtracting the total assets of government 
financial and non-financial business enterprises from the total assets of government and 
business enterprises. Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre and 
Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding, closing share price, revenue 
and assets; Moody’s Corporate Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on 
Business Top 1000 Companies (various issues from 1985-2010); total corporate revenue 
from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (1965-1971) and Cansim Tables 180-0002 (1972-
1987), 180-0001 (1988-1998) and 180-0003 (1998-2010); total corporate assets from Cansim 
Tables 378-0052, 378-0055 and 378-0072. 
 
The pattern of asset concentration reveals why scholars in previous decades were 
unable to detect increasing concentration. The Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration 
(the Bryce Report) is perhaps the most exhaustive study of corporate power ever 
conducted in Canada. The authors state that asset concentration changed very little 
between 1967 and 1976 and they were right: it only increased from 26 to 29 percent. They 
further speculate that concentration had probably declined in every decade from the 
1920s to the 1970s (1978:11). ‘Speculate’ is put in quotation marks because the writers did 
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not have continuous data in their possession; they relied upon data from the Royal 
Commission on Price Spreads (1935), which compared asset concentration in 1923 and 1933. 
The Bryce Report computes concentration ratios for 1966, 1971 and 1975 and so had 
insufficient basis to make claims about long-term asset concentration. The lack of 
continuous long-term data has prevented scholars from seeing the pronounced increase 
in aggregate asset concentration that took place over the last half century, partially 
because the bulk of that increase came between 1991 and 2001 in the second-to-last 
merger wave.7  
In their study of dominant capital in the United States, N&B map aggregate 
concentration over the postwar era, noting that the level and trend for both profit and 
capitalization is high and climbing (2009: 318). The picture for Canada is somewhat 
different. Figure 5.4 plots aggregate concentration for capitalization and pre-tax profit. 
The numerator in both instances is the top 60 firms ranked annually by equity market 
capitalization. The denominator in the capitalization ratio is the total market value of all 
stocks listed on the TSX and for the profit ratio the denominator is total pre-tax profit 
for the Canadian corporate universe (including listed and unlisted firms).  
Surprisingly, the concentration of market capitalization is J-shaped: it declined 
for nearly three decades before gradually rising throughout the 1980s and then surging 
upward from the mid-1990s onward. The level of concentration in the mid-1990s was 
roughly what it was in the early 1950s — 34 percent. Given that the concentration of 
                                                          
7 Recall: Clement and others relied upon aggregate asset concentration data for three points in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, which led them to believe that it did not increase during that time. That perception was 
correct based on the data, but over the half century since 1960 the trend is unmistakably upward. 
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equity capitalization declined for a generation, we cannot state that concentration is 
perpetually increasing. Aggregate concentration for pre-tax profit is different. It 
increased modestly in the 1950s, moved horizontally for three decades and then surged 
upward after 1990. At their respective peaks, the top 60 firms accounted for 65 percent of 
all equity market value and 60 percent of all profit — a staggering degree of 
concentration.  
 
Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre and Compustat through WRDS for 
common shares outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit; Moody’s Corporate 
Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies (various 
issues from 1985-2010); total market capitalization from Global Financial Data, TSX 
Review, e-Review and Factbook; total pre-tax profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, 
Series F3 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2010). 
 
To recap, the corporate profit share of national income and the profit share of the 
top 60 firms suggest that corporate power has increased dramatically in the neoliberal 
period. This claim is bolstered when we consider the four different measures of 
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concentration, all of which reached historic highs in recent years. What do other 
measures of corporate power tell us about the development of large firms in Canada? 
 
5.6 From Aggregate Concentration to Differential Accumulation 
Even though aggregate concentration is a commonly used metric to capture the power of 
large firms, N&B argue that it tends to understate the actual power of big business. They 
explain that this deficiency is to be found in the definition of aggregate concentration. 
The formula for calculating aggregate concentration can be expressed, they say, like this: 
1. Aggregate concentration = 
    
   
 = 
 
 
 × 
 
 
 
Where (s) stands for the average size — measured in terms of revenue, assets, etc. — of a 
firm within dominant capital, (n) for the fixed number of dominant capital firms, (S) for 
the average size of a firm in the corporate universe and (N) for the number of firms in the 
corporate universe.  
The level of concentration is dependent upon the differential size of dominant 
capital, (s/S), which tends to rise over time as dominant firms grow larger while firms in 
the corporate universe remain small, and the ratio of dominant capital firms to the 
corporate universe, (n/N), which tends to shrink over time as new firms are added to the 
corporate universe while the number of dominant capital firms remains fixed. The fact 
that these two ratios tend to move in opposite directions makes it difficult, they say, to 
sort out what the level and trend in aggregate concentration ratios precisely signals 
(2009: 318-19). 
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 In addition to the numeric problems associated with aggregate concentration 
ratios, N&B add a theoretical dimension. As they see it, the numerator and the 
denominator are not only quantitatively different in scale; they are qualitatively different 
sociological and political-economic units. The numerator is comprised of dominant 
capital — a group N&B assert is coterminous with the ‘ruling capitalist class’. They 
argue that the owners and controllers of the largest firms that make up this dominant 
capital are socially and culturally intertwined, are closely connected to governing 
authorities and hold a common world view. Recall Newman’s reference about the 
Canadian Establishment: they ‘recognize so few conflicts of interest [between 
themselves] because their broad interests seldom conflict’ (1975: 542). The denominator, 
N&B counter, is made up of people who think and behave quite differently. Individual 
units in the corporate universe tend to be small, fragmented and perhaps most 
importantly, their activities tend to undermine each other (2009: 319). In short, the 
organized power of dominant capital is qualitatively distinct from the disorganized 
powerlessness of the corporate universe.   
 N&B created new measures to capture the power of large firms — differential 
capitalization and differential profit — and these measures have the potential to 
overcome the statistical and theoretical limitations alluded to above. The crucial 
innovation appears to be the shift from absolute to relative measures, which may have 
grown out of their critique of neoclassical assumptions about business behaviour.8 
Neoclassical economics, they explain, assumes that capitalists are like other ‘economic 
                                                          
8 The following explanation is inspired from N&B (2009: 309-12) and from two courses directed by 
Jonathan Nitzan at York University, which the author was enrolled in as a graduate student. 
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actors’ insofar as they strive to maximize profit and market value. The reasoning is simple 
enough: no upward limit has ever been identified toward which capitalists strive, hence 
they are profit maximizers.  
This assumption may be deeply ingrained in the psyche of economists, they tell 
us, but it won’t help us deal with the real world for two reasons. First, no one has any 
clue what the maximum profit of a given firm is or what the maximum return on a given 
security should be. Second, capitalists themselves don’t think in maximizing terms 
because they don’t exist in a vacuum. In actuality, the performance of a CEO, hedge fund 
manager or global investor isn’t measured against an absolute standard like 
maximization; it is measured against a relative benchmark. There exists a ‘normal’ rate of 
return which investors try to beat. Investors are conditioned to outperform rivals and 
accumulate faster than the average, i.e., they strive to accumulate differentially. The 
distinction between absolute and differential accumulation might sound soft, almost 
semantic, but it is crucial. In the United States, the main equity market benchmark is the 
S&P 500. In Britain, it is the FTSE 100. In Canada, it is the S&P/TSX Composite Index. 
Large corporations strive to beat these averages and this is the broader meaning of the 
term ‘performance’, they argue.  
From a neoclassical perspective, profit maximization relates to human motivation 
insofar as economic agents are presupposed to behave in a way that maximizes net 
pleasure (the difference between pleasure and pain, or in business terms, profit and loss). 
This understanding does not appear to leave any room for power as motivational energy. 
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Differential accumulation, on the other hand, assumes that power is a goal and because 
power is relative the relevant measures should be differential.9  
To illustrate the point, consider Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company 
controlled by billionaire investor Warren Buffet. At the height of the financial panic in 
2008, Berkshire’s annual return was -9.6 percent. Was this the ‘maximum’ possible 
return that year? If we are unable to answer that question, then how are we to assess the 
business significance of -9.6 percent? There is not a soul on the planet capable of credibly 
answering the first question, including Warren Buffet himself. The second question can 
only be answered — indeed, is only intelligible — by looking at some benchmark, i.e., the 
average performance of a comparator group. In 2008, the average performance of the S&P 
500 was -37 percent. So Warren Buffet’s firm outperformed the average by beating the 
main equity market benchmark. Benchmarking, not maximizing, is the only game in 
town and the actual measure of corporate performance. Given N&B’s critique, what does 
the differential performance of dominant capital look like in Canada?   
In this instance, differential capitalization is a ratio which compares the average 
capitalization of a firm in the top 60 with the average of all firms listed on the TSX. 
Differential profit is a ratio which also uses the average of the top 60 firms for the 
numerator, but the denominator is made up of the average profit of the entire corporate 
universe. Both series are plotted in Figure 5.5 (note the difference in scale between the 
two axes due to the different denominators).  
                                                          
9 For the purposes of this dissertation, utilizing differential measures does not imply that power is the only 
motivator in political-economic matters. There appears to be a variety of motivations propelling business 
behaviour, but when it comes to the activities of dominant proprietors, dominant executives and top state 
officials, power cannot be downplayed or ignored as a goal. 
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Differential capitalization falls fairly steadily from a value of eight in 1950 to a 
value of three in 1980. By 1995 an average firm within the top 60 had risen to seven times 
the average of the TSX before surging to 23 in 2007 — a three-fold increase in just 13 
years. It is remarkable that, as of 1980, an average dominant capital firm only had 3 times 
the capitalization of an average firm on the TSX. The rise from 3 to 23 in just three 
decades signals that the top 60 firms have de-linked from the rest of the corporate 
universe.  
 
Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre and Compustat through WRDS for 
common shares outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit; Moody’s Corporate 
Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies (various 
issues from 1985-2010); total market capitalization and number of listed firms from Global 
Financial Data, TSX Review, e-Review and Factbook; total pre-tax profit from Historical 
Statistics of Canada, Series F3 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2010); total 
number of firms in the corporate universe from Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate 
Concentration (1978: 141, Table 6.1), Cansim Table 181-0001 and the Business Register 
Division of Statistics Canada. 
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How do we account for this de-linking? According to N&B (2009: 321), over the 
long-haul and for broad enough aggregates or averages, capitalization is driven 
principally by earnings, which means that the differential profit of the top 60 should help 
explain why the capitalization of the largest firms pulled away from the rest of the pack 
(note the tight correlation between the two series even though their denominators 
differ). Differential profit continuously increased over the postwar era, but its upward 
trajectory was fairly modest between 1950 and the mid-1990s. It, too, took off after the 
TAIL regime was instituted. In 1950 an average firm in the top 60 had pre-tax earnings 
234 times larger than the overall average. By 1994 that ratio crested 5,000 and by 2010 it 
surpassed 13,000 — an enormous jump in the differential size of dominant capital. 
The picture that emerges using N&B’s differential measures is somewhat 
different from what we have encountered using more conventional measures. Large firms 
either failed to beat the average — they differentially de-accumulated — or they beat it 
modestly during Keynesian era. Using differential indicators, the pattern began to change 
in the 1980s and then reversed entirely in the 1990s just as the TAIL regime came into 
effect. Since 1994, dominant capital firms pulled away from the corporate universe and 
now exhibit a historically unprecedented degree of power.  
Now that we have plotted differential measures for Canada, we should like to 
begin to understand their explanatory utility. How do we know that the selection of 60 
firms instead of 100 or 500, for example, as our proxy for dominant capital is appropriate? 
And does the use of differential measures, in particular, help explain phenomena that 
would otherwise remain mysterious?  
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When Canadians turn on the television to watch the nightly news, they are 
invariably bombarded with information about the performance of the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, notably whether the Composite Index closed ‘up’ or ‘down’. To most people 
this information is irrelevant insofar as their day-to-day lives go. But the gyrations of the 
TSX have a direct bearing on many important decisions made in the Canadian political 
economy that do impact people’s day-to-day lives: decisions by businesses about whether 
to build new factories or expand the workforce; decisions by the Bank of Canada about 
interest rates and the money supply; decisions by commercial banks about acquisitions 
and lending; and decisions by governments about ‘bailouts’, ‘stimulus’ and ‘austerity’. So 
the well-being of Canadians is tied to fluctuations in the TSX. Given its importance, how 
can we explain the pattern of growth of the TSX? 
Figure 5.6 plots the closing value of the S&P/TSX 300 Total Returns Index 
(adjusted for inflation) and the differential profit of the top 60 firms from 1940 and 1950, 
respectively. The first series is the main equity benchmark in Canada and the second 
captures the differential performance of dominant capital. There is a very tight and 
persistent relationship between the two series over the postwar era. The differential 
performance of the top 60 firms appears to explain the inflation-adjusted pattern of the 
composite index, and by implication, the entire Canadian equity market. If the selection 
of the top 60 firms as a proxy for dominant capital requires justification, and if reliance 
on differential measures needs to demonstrate their usefulness, then explaining the level 
and trend of the Canadian equity market represents a promising beginning.  
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Source: S&P/TSX 300 Total Returns Index from Global Financial Data; Canadian 
Financial Markets Research Centre and Compustat through WRDS for common shares 
outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit; Moody’s Corporate Manuals through 
Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies (various issues from 1985-
2010); total pre-tax profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 (1926-1960) and 
Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2011); total number of firms in the corporate universe from 
Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (1978: 141, Table 6.1), Cansim Table 
181-0001 and the Business Register Division of Statistics Canada.    
 
Now that we have plotted a variety of measures of corporate power, what can we 
say about their evolution over the postwar era? Table 5.4 summarizes the eight measures 
of corporate power surveyed so far. During the Keynesian era the story is mixed: 
according to some measures corporate power increased, but using other measures it 
decreased. The story in the neoliberal era is unambiguous: corporate power increased.  
The next matter to sort out is ownership of the corporate sector. We know that 
dominant capital firms, treated as a bloc, have become more powerful in the neoliberal 
era. The managerial hypothesis implies that increasing (asset) concentration when 
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accompanied by the dispersion of stock ownership leaves control of corporations in the 
hands of management. If the control of corporations is in the hands of senior management 
then the power of dominant capital in Canada might be lessened. However, if control of 
large firms continues to flow from ownership, then this, together with the uptrend in 
corporate concentration would signal an increase in the power of dominant proprietors. 
Table 5.4 
Measures of Corporate Power and their Respective Trends 
 
Indicator 
Period Trend 
1950-1980 1980-2010 
Total corporate profit (share of GDP) Declines Rises 
Top 60 profit (share of GDP) Declines Rises 
Aggregate concentration: assets Rises Rises 
Aggregate concentration: revenue Rises Rises 
Aggregate concentration: capitalization Declines Rises 
Aggregate concentration: profit Declines Rises 
Differential capitalization Declines Rises 
Differential profit Rises Rises 
Source: See Figures 5.1 and Figures 5.3-5.5 
 
5.7 Who Owned and Who Controlled Dominant Capital in the Past? 
Are the largest corporations in Canada controlled by a cadre of professional managers or 
by proprietors? Within the confines of this study, it will not be possible to identify the 
individuals that actually control the Canadian corporate sector. Such an endeavour would 
require in-depth analysis of the micro-decisions taken within each firm, something that is 
beyond the purview of this study. The control of a given firm can unfold through any 
number of legal mechanisms including family control, ownership pyramids, dual-class 
shares, voting coalitions, etc.  
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What we are after is a broader question: is ownership sufficiently diffuse that, by 
default, we can assume that management wields ultimate control, as Berle and Means 
argue, or is ownership sufficiently concentrated to allow proprietors to wield ultimate 
control? Answering this question normally involves determining an ownership threshold 
above which firms are assumed to be owner controlled and below which they are 
assumed to be manager controlled. There are any number of ways to parse the control 
threshold, but many writers — Berle and Means included — recognize that effective 
control may come with less than 50 percent of voting stock. A 50 percent threshold is an 
obvious cut-off point, but 20, 10 or even 5 percent may give the largest shareholder 
effective control.  
What does the literature have to say about corporate ownership in Canada? It has 
long been noted that the concentration of corporate ownership in Canada has led to 
highly centralized control by proprietary interests. Newman, for instance, claims that at 
one point in the 1950s, nine families controlled nearly half the shares on the TSX (1998: 
29). Niosi picks apart the ownership structure of the largest 136 Canadian-based firms 
(ranked by assets in 1976) and finds that management only controlled 32 percent of such 
firms. Minority control (20-50 percent) made up 38 percent of the sample, majority 
control (50-80 percent) made up 21 percent of the sample, leaving 9 percent under semi-
absolute control (80-100 percent). Niosi notes that weighing the firm by size rather than 
number yields similar results and that this ownership pattern holds across all sectors of 
the Canadian economy (1978: 77-80). Houten argues that in the early 1980s the eight 
largest Canadian conglomerates were controlled by nine families. Excluding the shares 
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controlled by the Big Five banks, this bloc controlled more than half of the shares on the 
TSX Composite Index (1991: 94). In her study of Canadian business, Francis (1986) notes 
that 32 families and five conglomerates together control 40 percent of the largest 500 
firms, with families alone owning 31 percent. This fact makes the concentration of 
ownership in Canada high relative to the United States, she says.  
Until the 1980s, at least, it’s clear that ownership is highly concentrated amongst 
a small number of powerful families. How does Canada compare with other 
jurisdictions? Rao and Lee-Sing contrast corporate ownership structures in Canada and 
the United States and find that a majority of Canadian firms are legally controlled in all 
size classes while widely-held firms (with top shareholder owning less than 20 percent of 
voting stock) are predominant in the United States. Their sample size includes 766 
Canadian firms and 3,000 American firms, selected on the basis of sales and assets in 
1993. In the Canadian sample, 56 percent were legally controlled (above 50 percent), 21 
percent effectively controlled (20-50 percent), leaving 23 percent widely-held (1995: 47, 
76-7).10 
The higher-than-normal concentration of proprietor control usually comes in the 
form of control blocks held by wealthy families and multilayered holding companies. 
Based on data in 1989, Daniels and Iacobucci report that only 16 percent of the 550 largest 
firms in Canada are widely held using a 20 percent threshold (2000: 82). While these 
figures might suggest that the managerial hypothesis has no place in the Canadian 
context, the authors note that the Canada-U.S. FTA in 1988 and the NAFTA in 1994 
                                                          
10 See McNaughton and Green (2006) for an analysis of the ownership relations between industry 
groupings in Canada for the two decades between 1976 and 1995. 
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appear to have added a dose of competition to the Canadian political economy, and 
consequently, led to a reconfiguration of corporate ownership. In December 1988, 29 
percent of the firms on the S&P/TSX 300 Composite Index were widely held (based on a 
10 percent threshold), but by December 1997 66 percent were widely held (Daniels and 
Iacobucci 2000: 93). In her later work, Francis notes this change. By 2007, corporate 
ownership had been ‘democratized’, she argues, and the ‘stranglehold on business, 
banking and politics’ that those 32 families from the 1980s had had been broken (2008: 3, 
16). As of 2007, only 21 percent of the largest firms (ranked by revenue) were family-
controlled, with 38 percent widely-held.11  
 How does Canada compare with other jurisdictions? A group of researchers at 
Harvard mapped corporate ownership patterns across the rich industrialized world. 
Using data from the mid-1990s, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) construct 
a corporate ownership database for the 27 richest countries in the world based on two 
samples of firms: the top 20 in terms of market capitalization (the ‘large’ sample) and the 
smallest 10 firms with market capitalization of at least $500 million (the ‘medium-sized’ 
sample). Their purpose is to determine the proportion of firms that are manager 
controlled (the ‘Berle and Means corporation’) and the proportion that have ‘ultimate 
owners’. They employ two definitions of control: first, a firm has an ultimate owner if the 
largest shareholder has direct and indirect voting rights in excess of 20 percent; and in 
the second definition they dropped the threshold to 10 percent. Table 5.5 reproduces 
some of their data. 
                                                          
11 Also worth noting, in the mid-1980s the 50 largest firms in Canada were composed primarily of American, 
Japanese and European subsidiaries. By 2007 the largest 50 firms were overwhelmingly Canadian-based. 
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The results of their research indicate that the Berle and Means corporation is 
relatively uncommon, especially in contrast to family control. The 27 country average 
indicates that, for large firms at the 20 percent threshold, widely held firms are not much 
more common than family controlled firms (36 versus 30 percent). As we move from large 
to medium-sized firms and as we drop the control threshold from 20 to 10 percent, the 
parity between the two types of control disappears. Widely held firms become the 
exception; family controlled firms become the norm. The authors also note that families 
tend to have control rights in excess of their cash-flow rights through the use of pyramids 
and that they tend to hold management positions in the firms they control. La Porta et. al. 
conclude: families are the ‘ultimate owners’ and wield control in the Berle and Means 
sense of the term (1999: 502).12  
Table 5.5 
The Dispersion of Corporate Ownership around the World 
Country Control of Large Firms Control of Medium-Sized Firms 
 
20% Cut-off 10% Cut-off 20% Cut-off 10% Cut-off 
Widely 
Held Family 
Widely 
Held Family 
Widely 
Held Family 
Widely 
Held Family 
Canada 0.60 0.25 0.50 0.30 0.60 0.30 0.40 0.50 
United States 0.80 0.20 0.80 0.20 0.90 0.10 0.50 0.30 
United Kingdom 1.00 0.00 0.90 0.05 0.60 0.40 0.10 0.60 
Germany 0.50 0.10 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.10 0.40 
France 0.60 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
Average: Richest  
27 Countries 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.35 0.24 0.45 0.11 0.53 
Notes: ‘Large firms’ are the top 20 ranked by market capitalization of common equity at the end of 1995. ‘Medium-sized firms’ are the 
smallest 10 firms in each country with market capitalization of common equity of at least $500 million at the end of 1995. The richest 
27 countries are based on 1993 per capita income (some excluded for lack of significant stock markets). Source: La Porta et. al. (1999: 
492-95), Table 2 and 3. 
 
                                                          
12 The authors examine other forms of ultimate ownership besides families, including: the state, widely held 
financial institutions, widely held corporations and a miscellaneous category (La Porta et. al. 1999: 476). 
These other types of control are not relevant to the argument and are ignored. 
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The data used by La Porta et. al. indicates that Canada stands in between the 27 
country average and the American and British models of corporate governance. Among 
large firms with a high control threshold, the widely held firm is more common in the 
United States and the United Kingdom than it is in Canada, and slightly less common in 
Germany and France. The ownership pattern remains consistent across the five countries 
recounted in Table 5.4: as we move from large to medium-sized firms and as we drop the 
control threshold from 20 to 10 percent, the widely held firm becomes increasingly rare 
while family control becomes more common. Thus, Canada tends more towards the 
dispersion of ownership. Nevertheless, the Berle and Means corporation is not the norm 
in Canada. 
Other studies on corporate ownership around the world tell much the same story. 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) plot corporate ownership concentration in a sample of 39 
countries which together make up 99.5 percent of total world equity market 
capitalization. Opting for a 20 percent control threshold, the authors find that Japan has 
the highest dispersion of ownership, with only 4 percent of its equity market controlled 
by blockholders, and Chile has the highest concentration of ownership, with 90 percent 
of its equity market controlled by blockholders. Based on this sample, Canada tends more 
towards dispersed ownership, with 28 percent blockholders, but because Gourevitch 
and Shinn opt for a higher threshold (20 percent), their argument tends to overstate the 
degree of dispersion and understate the degree of concentration. That caveat aside, their 
160 
 
conclusion is that dispersed ownership structures are relatively uncommon globally 
(2005: 17-18).13 
 Defining a firm as ‘owner controlled’ if the combined direct or indirect voting 
stake exceeds 10 percent, Morck, Percy, Tian and Yeung (2005) trace the changing 
structure of corporate ownership in Canada across the twentieth century.14 In 1902 
approximately half of the 100 largest non-financial firms (weighed by assets) in Canada 
were widely held, with 10 percent falling into the ‘family controlled pyramid’ category. 
However, by the end of the merger wave that concluded in 1910, only 29 percent were 
widely held, with 40 percent falling into the ‘family controlled pyramid’ category. State 
control of corporate assets began during the First World War and rose steadily until the 
1990s when an ambitious privatizing program led to a steep decline in state ownership.  
 Interestingly, widely held firms became more common from 1910 through the 
1960s and became more anomalous thereafter. Family controlled pyramids followed the 
opposite pattern: their prevalence decreased as we move to mid-century and then became 
more prevalent in the latter half of the twentieth century. Family pyramidal groups grew 
rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, the authors state, at which time the privatization of state 
assets led to a jump in widely held firms. While the authors note that no clear pattern 
emerges across the twentieth century, they also assert that family controlled pyramids 
constitute the most common form of ownership at the beginning and end of the 
                                                          
13 An ambitious attempt to map the structure of corporate ownership on a global scale is performed by 
Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston (2011). Using network analysis, they find that 147 firms — which they call 
an ‘economic super-entity’ — control 40 percent of the 43,060 global corporations. Their concern is not 
with ultimate owners; rather, it is with inter-corporate control. However, their study reveals a highly 
concentrated network of control that spans the entire globe. 
14 The following historical summary is drawn from Morck et. al. (2005: 98-110). 
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twentieth century. At mid-century Canada’s corporate sector resembled America’s, with 
freely standing, widely held firms constituting the norm. By the end of the century, the 
widely held firm only accounted for one-in-four firms — a far cry from the managerial 
view of capitalism.  
 The literature on Canadian corporate ownership does not offer a clear response to 
the managerial thesis. In the decades between the Second World War and the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1988), most researchers agreed that Canadian corporate 
ownership was highly concentrated amongst a small cluster of families whose large 
equity stake assured them effective control. Newman (1975), Niosi (1978) and Houten 
(1991) fall into this camp. The trade and investment liberalization agreements put in 
place in the late 1980s and early 1990s ‘democratized’ the corporate sector by dispersing 
ownership according to much of the more recent scholarship, making the widely held 
firm the most common form of ownership. Daniels and Iacobucci (2000) and Francis 
(2008) take this managerial position, while Morck, Percy, Tian and Yeung (2005) argue 
against the separation thesis. Which is the correct view of contemporary Canadian 
capitalism? Is the Canadian corporate sector under the control of proprietors or has 
ownership been democratized, leaving control in the hands of a managerial class?    
 
5.8 Who Owns and Who Controls Dominant Capital in the Present? 
The picture that emerges from the research reviewed here suggests that, among large 
firms, owner control is more prevalent than manager control. The corporate sector 
remains predominantly controlled by individuals and families through large equity 
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stakes. The only shortcoming with existing studies is their date of publication. If we 
assume that the TAIL regime that was put in place in 1994 might have reconfigured the 
structure of corporate ownership, what does it look like in more recent times?  
Table 5.6, based partly on original research performed for this study and partly on 
recently published data, presents the structure of corporate ownership for three samples 
of firms across seven thresholds of control. The TSX is carved into three blocks of firms 
according to equity market capitalization: the top 60, top 100 and the top 200. Even 
though this is a much larger sample than the one generated by La Porta et. al. (who only 
examined a total of 30 firms in each jurisdiction), it remains numerically small. Recall: 
there are approximately 1,600 firms on the TSX and a further 2,600 on the Venture 
Exchange. In terms of equity market value, however, the top 60 sample accounts for 60 
percent, the top 100 sample accounts for 70 percent and the top 200 sample accounts for 
78 percent of the total. Thus, the numeric shortcomings associated with the three 
samples are more than offset by their disproportionately large market value.  
Ownership is parsed according to a six-way classification scheme: under 5 
percent, 5-10 percent, 10-20 percent, 20-50 percent, majority owned by domestic interests 
and majority owned by foreign interests. A seventh type of control is added wherein the 
founder or his descendants act as Chairman or CEO. This type of control is found across 
all sample sizes and usually appears when the founder has a large equity stake in the firm. 
Selecting a threshold to separate manager from owner control is somewhat arbitrary if 
we assume that owner control can happen with less than 50 percent of voting rights. 
Insisting on 50 percent voting rights seems unnecessarily stringent, but 5 percent might 
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not be stringent enough. Accordingly, a 10 percent threshold will be used to separate the 
widely held Berle and Means firm from an owner controlled firm.  
The research for Table 5.6 came in two parts. The first part involved using the 
Bloomberg Professional database to retrieve (in July of 2012) the stockholder list of each 
firm, which revealed the percent of common shares held by the top shareholder. The 
major limitation (for the purposes of this study) with the Bloomberg database is the 
inability to distinguish different classes of stock. Many large firms issue two (or more) 
classes of shares: those with special voting rights are distinguishable from shares that 
either don’t carry voting rights or carry diminished voting power.15 To remedy this 
shortcoming, the Financial Post Magazine’s ‘FP 500’ was utilized. This resource provides 
ownership information on the 500 largest corporations with operations in Canada. 
Published in the April of 2013, the FP 500 specifies if a firm is ‘widely held’, which is 
assumed to mean less than 10 percent of voting stock, or if the firm has a ‘major voting 
interest’, including specification of the percentage held by the largest shareholder.  
If the Bloomberg data provides a rough sketch of corporate ownership in Canada, 
use of the FP 500 data increases the level of resolution. For example, Rogers 
Communications is one of the top 60 firms in Canada and even though Bloomberg 
registered it as having a top shareholder with less than 5 percent of voting stock (Fidelity 
Investments in Boston is the largest holder of common shares at 4.65 percent), the 
company is effectively controlled by the Rogers Family Trust. The descendants of the late 
Ted Rogers hold 90.9 percent of the super-voting Class A shares. Likewise, Canadian Tire 
                                                          
15 See Brealey, Myers, Marcus, Maynes and Mitra (2006: chapter 13) for a discussion of corporate 
governance in Canada. 
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Corporation is registered as having a top shareholder in the 5-10 percent range even 
though it is controlled by the Billes family through ‘common special voting stock’ 
(Francis 2008: 210). Martha, Freddy and David Billes — the children of Alfred J. and John 
W. Billes, the founders — own 61 percent of the preferential shares.  
Between Bloomberg and the FP 500, a fairly clear picture of the structure of 
corporate ownership in Canada is obtained. It should be noted that this information 
indicates what might be called ‘tier I’ ownership, meaning it ignores the complicated 
inter-corporate and pyramidal ownership schemes that are to be found across the 
Canadian corporate sector. Charting the inter-corporate ownership and pyramid 
schemes would be a dissertation unto itself and is beyond this inquiry, even though it is 
what would be required to arrive at the ‘ultimate owners’.  
Table 5.6 
Tier I Ownership of Canadian Equities 
Control Threshold Top 60 % Top 100 % Top 200 % 
Top shareholder 0-4.99% 23 38% 30 30% 40 20% 
Top shareholder 5-9.99%  9 15% 19 19% 48 24% 
Top shareholder 10-19.99%  10 17% 23 23% 57 29% 
Top shareholder 20-49.99%  8 13% 13 13% 24 12% 
Majority owned:  domestic 8 13% 12 12% 25 13% 
Majority owned:  foreign 2 3% 3 3% 6 3% 
Total 60 100% 100 100% 200 100% 
Founder or family as 
Chairman or CEO 15 25% 23 23% 37 19% 
Weighted market value  
under Canadian control 53%  53%  54%  
Weighted market value 
 under American control 36%  35%  34%  
Notes: percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Firms that are not headquartered in Canada were removed in order to 
maintain consistency (General Motors, for example). The list of top firms is as of 31 May 2012. Ownership data was retrieved from 
Bloomberg Professional in July of 2012 and updated using the ‘FP 500’ from the Financial Post Magazine, updated to April 2013.  Source: 
ownership figures are computed from Bloomberg Professional and the Financial Post Magazine’s ‘The FP 500’; aggregate and disaggregate 
data from TMX Group’s Equity Financing Statistics.  
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What does the information in Table 5.6 tell us? First, nearly half (46 percent) of 
the top 60 sample have controlling shareholders (using the 10 percent threshold). The 
prevalence of owner control rises above 50 percent for the larger two samples. Second, if 
we drop the control threshold from 10 to 5 percent (for arguments sake), the prevalence 
of manager control drops considerably; among the top 200 sample, for instance, only one-
fifth of firms would be classified as manager controlled. Third, the proportion of firms 
that fall into the 20 and 50 percent thresholds remain constant across the three sample 
sizes. Fourth, majority control is comparatively rare, accounting for 15-16 percent across 
all three sample sizes. Fifth, situations where the founder or his descendants control the 
firm through occupation of an executive position are common across all samples sizes. 
Among the top 60 firms, for instance, one-quarter of the firms are controlled by the 
founders; for the top 200 sample, the proportion is one-fifth. Sixth and finally, across all 
three sample sizes, more than half of the weighted value of Canadian equity is owned by 
Canadians and one-third by Americans.  
The information contained in Table 5.6 suggests that the widely held, Berle and 
Means firm is not the norm. Control of the Canadian corporate sector still flows, in large 
measure, from the substantial equity stake of dominant proprietors. Another indirect 
way of assessing the concentration of corporate ownership in Canada is presented in 
Appendix B, which links some of the richest families in Canada with some of the largest 
Canadian-domiciled firms. In every year since 1999, Canadian Business magazine published 
a list of the 100 highest net worth Canadian families. If the Berle and Means separation 
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thesis were true, there would be no reason to expect that the people populating the 
richest 100 list would have substantial equity holdings in large Canadian-domiciled 
firms. However, if the link between ownership and control remains intact, then we 
would expect that the richest families in Canada also happen to be significant owners of 
dominant capital firms.  
So what does Appendix B tell us? The first column indicates the Rich 100 rank in 
the 2012 issue, the second lists the family name, the third indicates family net worth and 
the fourth column connects the family to a large Canadian-domiciled firm. Note that we 
have confined our investigation to the universe of listed firms. Some of the richest 
Canadians control firms that are not listed on a stock exchange and so don’t fall into 
some of our measures of corporate power. That said, we are safe in presuming that the 
differential performance of large, unlisted firms closely resembles the top listed firms.  
As Appendix B makes clear, the net worth of the richest Canadians are derived 
largely from their concentrated equity holdings of dominant Canadian firms. For 
example, the Thomson family has long been Canada’s richest family through its majority 
stake (55 percent) in Thomson Reuters, the eighteenth largest firm by equity market 
capitalization on the TSX. The Desmarais family, who descended from Paul Desmarais — 
one of the great Canadian conglomerators — controls four of the top 60 Canadian firms. 
And while the Rich 100 list contains a few token celebrities like Hollywood director 
James Cameron, it is almost entirely populated by dominant proprietors. Indeed, 35 of 
the richest Canadian families derive their fortunes from ownership of 20 of the top 60 
167 
 
firms and 38 of the top 200 firms. The link between ownership and control, not to 
mention great fortunes, remains strong in Canada.   
 If the picture we have painted so far suggests that owner control represents a 
common form of ownership in Canada, what is the degree of dispersion/concentration 
amongst non-controlling owners? The image crafted by Berle and Means is of a corporate 
sector dominated by a few dozen large firms that have stockholder lists that run 
anywhere from the tens of thousands into the millions (1967: ix). In Canada, more than 
half of large firms have controlling shareholders, so instead of dispersed ownership we 
have comparatively high levels of ownership concentration. But what about the non-
controlling shareholders; how concentrated is this group?  
Table 5.7 represents one way of determining the level of concentration amongst 
non-controlling owners. For each firm, a list of stockholders ranked from largest to 
smallest was generated using data from Bloomberg Professional. From there, the 10 
largest shareholders were parcelled off. Some firms had incomplete ownership structures 
and for some firms there were technical difficulties in retrieving the entire ownership 
structure such that, in the end, the top 60 sample had 530 shareholders (instead of 600), 
the top 100 sample had 930 shareholders (instead of 1,000) and the top 200 sample had 
1,921 shareholders (instead of 2,000). The final step was to determine who populated the 
top ten positions in the shareholder lists and the frequency with which they appear 
(without removing the controlling shareholders).  
Table 5.7 outlines the following information: the parent company, the investment 
vehicle, where the firm is headquartered and then for each of the three sample sizes it 
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counts the number of times an owner appears on the list of top 10 owners, irrespective of 
firm size or the proportion of shares held. The picture that emerges from this research is 
interesting. Thirteen large institutional investors dominate the list of top shareholders in 
all three sample sizes. The Big Five banks, the five largest asset managers in Canada and 
three of the largest asset managers in the United States together dominate non-
controlling ownership of the Canadian equity market.  
Table 5.7 
Top Institutional Owners of the Largest Canadian-Domiciled Corporations 
Organization Investment Vehicle HQ 
Top 
60 % 
Top 
100 % 
Top 
200 % 
Royal Bank of Canada 
RBC Global Asset 
Management Toronto 58 11% 86 9% 141 7% 
Blackrock Inc.  New York 54 10% 80 9% 112 6% 
Fidelity Investments Pyramis Global Advisors  Boston 45 8% 67 7% 91 5% 
TD Bank TD Asset Management Toronto 41 8% 63 7% 90 5% 
Bank of Montreal BMO Financial Toronto 30 6% 36 4% 41 2% 
Power Financial Corp. 
Investors Group 
Mackenzie Financial Montreal 24 5% 48 5% 99 5% 
CI Financial Corp. CI Investments Inc. Toronto 22 4% 37 4% 71 4% 
The Capital Group 
Companies Capital World Investors Los Angeles 17 3% 26 3% 35 2% 
Jarislowsky Fraser Ltd.  Montreal 17 3% 17 2% 24 1% 
Bank of Nova Scotia Scotia Asset Management  Toronto 17 3% 24 3% 35 2% 
CIBC 
CIBC Global Asset 
Management Toronto 15 3% 24 3% 35 2% 
Industrial Alliance 
Insurance and Financial 
Services Inc. IA Clarington Investments Toronto 8 2% 25 3% 54 3% 
Dundee Wealth 
Goodman and Company 
Investment Counsel Toronto 5 1% 17 2% 38 2% 
Totals    530 67% 930 59% 1,921 45% 
Notes: the top 10 owners of each firm in each sample (top 60, 100 and 200) were retrieved from Bloomberg Professional. From there, 
the above chart documents the number of times each owner appears in the top 10 (irrespective of weighted value of their holdings). 
Some firms had incomplete ownership structures (due to a majority holder or technical difficulties in retrieving the entire ownership 
structure) such that the top 60 batch of firms had 530 observations (instead of 60 x 10 = 600), the top 100 had 930 and the top 200 had 
1,921. Firms that are not headquartered in Canada were removed from the top firm’s listings in order to maintain consistency. The list 
of top firms was as of 31 May 2012. Ownership data was retrieved in July 2012. Source: ownership figures are computed from 
Bloomberg Professional; organizational structures and headquarters from company websites.  
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Among the top 10 shareholders of the top 60 sample, the Royal Bank of Canada 
(RBC) appears 58 times, which means that it has a significant stake in 58 of the 60 
largest firms. The RBC is a top shareholder in 86 of the top 100 firms and in 141 of the top 
200 firms. Blackrock Inc., the world’s largest asset manager, has a stake in 54 of the top 
60 and 80 of the top 100. At the low end of the non-controlling owners we find Dundee 
Wealth, which has a stake in 58 of the top 200 firms. These 13 institutional investors 
account for two-thirds of the top stockholder list for the top 60 firms. As we move to the 
top 100 and top 200 samples, they account for less of the top stockholder list, but even 
amongst the top 200 sample they still account for nearly half. In sum, while many firms 
have a controlling shareholder, there is a remarkably high level of concentration amongst 
the non-controlling owners as well. This research challenges the view of Francis (2008) 
and others who claim that the Canadian corporate sector has been ‘democratized’ in 
recent decades. On the contrary, effective control of the corporate sector appears to 
reside with a remarkably tight cluster of families and institutions.  
To summarize, owner control through a large equity stake is a common form of 
ownership in Canada. Concentrated ownership of large Canadian-based firms becomes 
even more pronounced when we consider the small group of institutional investors who 
dominate the list of non-controlling owners. What’s more, the great fortunes listed in 
Appendix B connect the top 100 firms in Appendix A to dominant proprietors. Thus, the 
‘separation thesis’ advanced by managerialists appears invalid for Canada.  
Let us shift our attention away from the domestic market to assess how Canadian 
equities stack up against global equities. Dominant capital in Canada has managed to 
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differentially accumulate over the past three decades in Canada, but how has it 
performed against global benchmarks?  
 
5.9 Canadian Capital in Global Context 
To begin to unpack this question, we need to add some context. The past generation not 
only saw a political-economic shift in rich industrialized societies away from Keynesian 
welfare policies towards neoliberal globalization-promoting policies; it also brought with 
it the relative decline of the rich industrialized societies and the relative ascent of the 
developing world. Blockbuster growth in the ‘Asian Tigers’ — South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan — was followed by rapid growth in China, India, Brazil and 
Russia, the so called ‘BRIC’ countries. This has come at a time of slower growth in North 
America and Europe (captured in Table 3.1). The relative decline of the rich 
industrialized societies is presented in Figure 5.7.  
The proportion of global GDP accounted for by Developed Countries, Developing 
Countries and the United States are presented next to a ratio of Developed to Developing 
Country GDP. In 1970, Developed Countries accounted for 69 percent of global GDP, 
falling to 62 percent in 2011. The United States has seen its share fall from one-third to 
one-fifth. The Developing Countries, in contrast, doubled their share of global GDP 
between 1970 and 2011, with most of that increase coming since 2003. The differential 
between Developed and Developing Countries is measured by the broken line, which 
approximates the relative decline of the Developed Countries. In 1970 Developed 
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Countries had four times the GDP of Developing Countries; as of 2011 they had less than 
double, with the bulk of the decline coming in the past decade.  
 
Source: Developing Country, Developed Country, U.S. and World GDP — all in U.S. 
dollars at current prices and current exchange rate — from UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
The relative decline of the Developed Countries serves as a backdrop to the global 
performance of Canadian equities. In the postwar era, the United States was not only the 
largest political economy, but its equity market has also served as the global benchmark. 
The close trade and ownership linkages between Canada and the United States is one 
reason why Canadian equities tend to move in tandem with American equities. As a way 
of adding to the historical context, how have American profits and equities performed 
globally? Figure 5.8 depicts the performance of American equity market capitalization 
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and net profit as a share of the global total over the past four decades.16 The trend is both 
unambiguous and revealing. Capitalization of American equities declined sharply 
between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, rose until the early 2000s and declined 
thereafter. This pattern appears to be driven by trends in corporate profitability.  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional for world market capitalization, world 
net profit, U.S. equity market capitalization and U.S. net profit.  
 
If the trend in both measures is unambiguously downward, the change in the 
actual level is also startling. In 1974 American corporations constituted two-thirds of 
total global equity market value, falling to one-third by 2012. The profitability of 
American corporations nearly halved between 1981 and 2012, falling from three-fifths of 
                                                          
16 See Nitzan and Bichler (2009b) for a methodological discussion and empirical investigation of the decline 
of U.S.-based firms. 
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the global total to one-third. So the rapid descent in the share of global GDP attributable 
to the Developed Countries is matched by the steep decline in the share of American 
equities and profit relative to the global total. In the context of this dual decline, how 
have Canadian equities fared?  
Figure 5.9 maps the equity market value and net profit of Canadian corporations 
as a share of the global total. Despite the relative decline of Developed Country GDP 
(taken as a bloc) and in sharp contrast to the American equity market, which saw a 
halving of its share of the global total, Canadian equity market capitalization as a share of 
the global total rose from 2.7 percent in 1973 to 4.1 percent in 2012. The relative increase 
in equity market value is only partially mirrored by profit, which declined from 3 to 2 
percent, only to rise back to 3 percent of the global total.  
What’s also notable about Figure 5.9 is the U-shaped pattern: both series fell 
dramatically in the 1980s, moved horizontally through the 1990s before climbing upward 
during the 2000s. So the relative ascent of Canadian equities and profit took place since 
the late 1990s. We will postpone our explanation of this trend until a later chapter, but 
for now what we need to understand is the global rise of Canadian capital over the past 
decade amidst the global decline of American capital and of the Developed Countries.  
If differential accumulation is a measure of corporate power, we should wish to 
know how dominant capital in Canada stacks up against its counterpart in the United 
States. Figure 5.10 contrasts the average equity market value of the top 60 Canadian firms 
with both the top 60 and the top 500 American firms from 1950 onward.  
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Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional for world market capitalization, world 
net profit, Canadian equity market capitalization and Canadian net profit.  
 
Contrasting the relative performance of dominant capital in Canada with two 
benchmarks in the United States yields an interesting picture. The first thing to note is 
the symmetry between the two series — only the level differentiates them (note the scale 
differences on the axes). In terms of differential capitalization, the top 60 Canadian-
based firms trailed the top 500 U.S. average in the 1950s and 1990s and beat the average 
in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 2000s. In terms of relative firm size, the top 60 Canadian-
based firms were two-thirds the value of the top 500 American-listed firms in 1950, fell to 
one-quarter their value by 2001 before surging to nine-tenths their value by 2010. Over six 
decades, the top 60 Canadian-based firms outperformed the top 500 American-based 
firms, with the past decade proving to be the most dramatic.  
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Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (for Canada) and Compustat 
through WRDS (Canada and the US) for common shares outstanding and closing share 
price; exchange rate from Global Financial Data. 
 
Comparing the performance of the top 60 Canadian-based firms with the top 60 
American-based firms yields a similar pattern, but a drastically different level. The top 60 
American-based firms were nearly 10 times the size of their Canadian counterparts in 
1950, rose to 20 times their size in 2001 before falling to five times their size in 2010. The 
pattern, however, is similar: the top Canadian firms trailed the average in the 1950s, beat 
it from 1960 to 1990, trailed the average again throughout the 1990s only to beat it during 
the past decade. Even though the largest American-based firms remain five times larger 
than their Canadian counterparts, they have been dramatically outperformed during the 
past decade. 
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Now that we have charted Canadian equities as a share of the global total and 
documented the differential performance of dominant capital relative to international 
benchmarks, the last piece of the puzzle is to sort out how globalized Canadian capital 
is. If the global movement of capital is not primarily about international production 
networks or the cross-border flow of goods and services, but instead, as N&B claim 
(2009: 356), ownership, how globalized is Canadian corporate ownership?  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has 
developed a ‘transnationality index’ (TNI) for host economies and another for the world’s 
largest corporations. Let’s deal with the host economies’ TNI first.17 It is made up of the 
average of four shares: (1) FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation; (2) 
FDI inward stocks as a percentage of GDP; (3) value added of foreign affiliates as a 
percentage of GDP; and (4) employment of foreign affiliates as a percentage of total 
employment. The resulting number is a proxy for the extent of globalization.  
Where does Canada stand, according to UNCTAD? The value for Canada is 15.5, 
which puts it in the middle of the pack. Amongst developed countries, Japan is on the 
very low end at 1.1, next to the United States which comes in at 6.4. On the very high end 
we find small European countries like Hungary (33.5) and at the top, Belgium (65.9). The 
weighted average of the group is 11.8, which means Canada’s political economy is more 
transnational than the average country, given its relative size.  
How does the transnationalization of domestic political economies stack up 
against the transnationalization of the largest corporations? Beginning with its World 
                                                          
17 The transnational index is as of 2005, but the data which feeds into it is from 2003-2005. The data can be 
downloaded from:  http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2008_transnationality_chart_en.xls.   
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Investment Report in 1995, UNCTAD has published a TNI for the 100 largest non-financial 
corporations in the world. The index is calculated as the average of: (1) foreign assets to 
total assets; (2) foreign sales to total sales; and (3) foreign employment to total 
employment. In 1993, at the inception of the UNCTAD data, the average TNI for the top 
100 firms was 47. This metric climbed to 54 by 1998 and reached 56 by 2003 (UNCTAD 
2007: 15, Table 7). The UNCTADs’ World Investment Report (2010: 18, Table 1.8) notes that 
the TNI climbed through the financial crisis, reaching an all-time high of 63.4 in 2008. So 
nearly two-thirds of the operations of the largest firms are globalized. With this context 
in mind, how internationalized is Canadian capital?   
Figure 5.11 develops a proxy for the globalization of Canadian business 
ownership, computed as follows: the sum of dividends on portfolio investment plus 
dividends, reinvested earnings and profit on foreign direct investment all as a percent of 
total pre-tax corporate profit.18 When this metric rises, the profits from the foreign 
operations of Canadian-based firms are increasing relative to the profits from domestic 
operations and vice versa. This is a loose proxy for the ‘transnationality’ of Canadian 
corporate ownership, but it suffers from numerous defects. First, it is an aggregate metric 
which will conceal all the disaggregate changes within the corporate sector. We are 
primarily interested in dominant capital, not capital as such, and this metric buries 
dominant capital in the corporate universe. And second, it ignores sales, assets and 
employees, which are also good indicators of the extent of globalization. The chief virtue 
                                                          
18 This measure is inspired by a similar measure developed by Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 357), Figure 15.6. 
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of this proxy is that it is simple and reliable data are available such that we can map its 
history over a longer time horizon. What does this proxy tell us? 
 
Note: data interpolated between 1928, 1933, 1936 and 1938 (continuous thereafter). 
Source: total pre-tax corporate profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 
(1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2011); dividends on portfolio investment, 
and dividends, reinvested earnings and profit on direct investment abroad from Cansim 
Table 376-0012. 
 
Figure 5.11 clearly depicts the rising significance of the foreign operations of 
Canadian corporations. Foreign operations rose rapidly in the 1920s and reached a peak 
of 30 percent in 1933. A three decade-long decline began thereafter such that, by 1960, the 
profits of Canadian corporations were almost entirely domestic in origin. A long term rise 
in foreign operations began thereafter, reaching a high of 46 percent in 2011. Recall: the 
‘host economy’ TNI for Canada was 15.5 and the TNI for the top 100 non-financial 
corporations was 63 in 2008, so it appears that the proxy developed in Figure 5.11 puts 
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Canada’s corporate sector in between these two metrics. Canada’s corporate sector is 
more globalized than the entire Canadian political economy but less globalized than the 
100 largest non-financial multinational corporations.  
It is probably fair to conclude that the overwhelming majority of firms in Canada 
are wholly domestic in their operations, from their assets and sales to their employment 
and profitability. A small cluster of firms, probably ranging in the hundreds, account for 
the bulk of the profit associated with Canadian direct investment abroad. This 
assumption is corroborated by researchers at Statistics Canada who note that, as of 1994, 
there were only 1,300 Canadian-based firms operating abroad. At that time there were 
approximately 900,000 corporations registered in Canada, which means that less than 
0.2 percent of all Canadian firms accounted for the entirety of foreign receipts.  
What’s more, there is a very high level of concentration within those 1,300 firms: 
the top 159 Canadian-based TNCs accounted for 50 percent all foreign assets, with the 
top 20 accounting for 40 percent.19 To restate in slightly different terms: approximately 
one percent of one percent of Canadian firms account for nearly half the foreign 
operations of the corporate universe, which is a remarkable high level of concentration. 
So even though Figure 5.11 depicts the extent of transnationalization for the Canadian 
corporate universe, we can safely presume that the top 60 firms account for the bulk of 
the foreign operations of Canadian firms. 
Two questions present themselves. First, why do we see a secular decline during 
the 1930s and 1940s and a secular rise since the 1950s in the extent of 
                                                          
19 These facts are extracted from Rao, Legault and Ahmad (1994: 107). 
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transnationalization? Second, what accounts for the semi-cyclical pattern of this 
measure? In other words, are there identifiable processes that are driving the de-
globalization and re-globalization of Canadian corporate ownership? This and other 
questions will be addressed in Chapter 6.    
 
5.10 Summary 
So what do we know now? Dominant capital can be approximated by 60 firms. This is a 
numerically small bloc whose membership is remarkably stable over time. In many 
respects, this bloc of firms dominates the Canadian equity market and drives the political 
economy. By some measures, the power of this bloc diminished across the Keynesian era 
and by others it increased. During the past three decades of neoliberal globalization, 
however, there seems to be an unambiguous increase in the differential power of capital.  
In terms of ownership, the corporate sector remains under the control of a small 
clique of proprietors whose large equity stakes assure them control over many large 
firms. In terms of performance, the corporate sector as a whole and dominant capital in 
particular outperformed global benchmarks during the past decade. And finally, the 
corporate sector globalized throughout the 1920s, de-globalized from the 1930s to the 
1950s and then re-globalized thereafter, reaching a historic high in recent years. 
 A few questions follow. First, why do the various measures of aggregate 
concentration increase over time and what accounts for their pattern? Second, are there 
identifiable processes that can account for the differential performance of dominant 
capital? More specifically, what role has breadth (amalgamation) and depth (stagflation) 
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played in the evolution of large firms across the twentieth century? And finally, what 
processes are driving the globalization of the Canadian corporate sector? These and other 
questions will be addressed in Chapters 6 through 10. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions: 
The Market-Destroying Enhancement of Market Power 
 
 
Gambling is when you roll the dice; business is when you control the dice. 
   - Peter Munk, Founder and Chairman of Barrick Gold1 
 
 
 
 
Exposure to commodities and market exchange is a seemingly inescapable aspect of life 
in contemporary capitalism. A new historical subject came into being to capture the fact 
that individuals are perpetually engaged in the purchase of commodities: ‘the consumer’. 
Many Canadians would readily identify as consumers insofar as they regularly engage in 
the acquisition of goods and services. And while market exchange is a common feature of 
life in contemporary Canada, there is a type of market exchange which most Canadians 
do not directly participate in and yet it has played a central role in the development of 
Canadian capitalism: the market for corporate ownership and control.  
The acquisition of corporate organizations through merger or acquisition is a 
form of market exchange, but it is unlike other markets in a few crucial respects. First, 
we normally think of a commodity as something produced for sale on a market (Polanyi 
1944), but corporate organizations are neither ‘produced’ in the conventional sense of the 
term nor are there established marketplaces for them to be exchanged, at least not in the 
                                                          
1 Barrick Gold is the largest gold mining company in the world. Quoted in Newman (1998: 193). 
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ordinary sense of the term ‘market exchange’.2 Second, commodities are typically 
acquired for one of two purposes: as inputs in a production process or for direct 
consumption by the purchaser. The acquisition of a corporate organization, in contrast, 
is neither directly ‘consumed’ nor is the organization itself used as an ‘input’ in a 
production process. And third, the acquisition of a corporate organization has an unusual 
property: it has the potential to eliminate markets as the basis for exchange. Corporate 
amalgamation is (potentially, at least) a form of market-destroying market exchange. 
These aspects of corporate amalgamation create something of a puzzle. Exactly what is 
‘acquired’ in a merger or acquisition and why would an investor engage in this type of 
market exchange? Furthermore, what are the long-term consequences of this type of 
market exchange on the structure and performance of large Canadian-based firms?  
Chapter 5 chronicled the postwar evolution of large Canadian-based firms and 
demonstrated that, by numerous metrics, corporate power increased over the past three 
decades. Three questions followed. First, how do we account for the secular increase in 
aggregate concentration? Second, how do we account for the secular increase in the 
transnationalization of Canadian corporate ownership? And finally, what role has 
mergers and acquisitions played in fuelling differential accumulation? Provisional 
answers to these questions will be supplied through an investigation of the history of 
corporate amalgamation in Canada. Large firms developed historically and if we are to 
explain their growth we need to understand the role of M&A. In response to the 
                                                          
2 ‘Markets’ and ‘market exchange’ may be understood locations in virtual or physical space and time in 
which owners of property meet prospective buyers of property in order to exchange property. Corporate 
organizations usually control the production of goods and/or services for the purpose of being sold on a 
market. Outside of equity and debt markets, we do not normally think of corporate organizations as being 
produced for sale on a market. 
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questions outlined above, this chapter will advance three arguments: M&A play a pivotal 
role in increasing aggregate concentration; M&A contribute to the enlargement of 
differential earnings; and finally, evidence indicates that M&A are a crucial ingredient in 
the globalization of Canadian corporate ownership.  
  The chapter is organized into seven sections. The first section maps the history of 
green-field investment (‘external breadth’) as a way of setting the stage for M&A 
(‘internal breadth’). The second reviews some of the qualitative history of M&A 
domestically and internationally and then uses N&B’s tools to unpack the quantitative 
history of corporate amalgamation in Canada. The third surveys existing studies of M&A 
and the fourth chronicles the role that M&A have played in transforming and enlarging 
corporate power. The fifth section uncovers some of the history of cross-border M&A 
and assesses whether corporate Canada is being ‘hollowed out’, as some Canadian 
political economists fear (Arthurs 2000). The sixth section examines the role global 
amalgamation has played in transforming the foreign ownership of Canadian equities and 
the seventh closes by providing a synopsis and some corollary questions. 
 
6.1 External Breadth: Green-Field Investment 
What role has breadth played in fuelling differential accumulation? Before we can begin 
to answer this question we need to review how N&B frame the relationship between 
breadth and differential accumulation. N&B (2009: 327) suggest that capitalization (K) 
can be expressed as a formula comprised of four ‘elementary particles’: future earnings 
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(E), hype (H), a risk coefficient () and what they call a ‘confident normal rate of return’ 
(rc). They convey the formula this way:   
1.      
     
 
Differential capitalization (DK), by implication, is a ratio of the average capitalization of 
dominant capital (which they denote using the D subscript) and the average of the 
universe of listed companies (which they express without a subscript). Because the 
normal rate of return is common to both dominant capital and the universe of listed 
corporations, they drop it from the equation, thus arriving at: 
2. DK  
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N&B tell us that dominant capital can differentially accumulate through a combination 
of the following three processes: (1) increasing differential earnings (ED/E); (2) increasing 
differential hype (HD/H); or (3) reducing differential risk (D/). It follows, they claim, 
that in order for us to understand the quantitative expression of dominant capital’s 
differential performance we need to understand the historical power processes, which 
are partly qualitative, that propel differential earnings, risk and hype (2009: 327-8).  
As they see it, differential earnings are the most potent long-term ingredient of 
differential capitalization. They express the level of earnings (E) this way: 
3.               
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The level of earnings for a given firm is the product of the number of employees 
multiplied by the average earnings per employee. Through equation (3), N&B claim that 
a firm can raise its differential earnings by increasing the formal size of the organization 
(measured as the number of employees) or by deepening the ‘elemental power per unit of 
organization’ (measured as earnings per employee). The former process they label 
‘breadth’ and the latter ‘depth’ (2009: 328). The derivation of breadth and depth out of 
the constituent parts of capitalization culminates in the assertion that dominant capital 
firms have two broad pathways open to them in their quest for differential accumulation: 
(1) increase employment faster than the average; (2) increase earnings per employee 
faster than the average (2009: 329). Adding ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions leads to 
the classification scheme relayed in Table 2.1 (p. 49). 
Green-field investment or ‘external breadth’ involves proprietors paying to have 
new capacity built and/or adding net new employment. N&B label it ‘external’ because, 
from a societal standpoint, it amounts to a net increase in industrial capacity. They 
identify two limits to green-field investment: (1) a dominant capital firm is limited by the 
extent of the waged labour force; (2) the more immediate limit is the downward pressure 
on prices and earnings per employee resulting from additional capacity. In other words, 
increasing external breadth poses a threat to depth (2009: 329-30). What does external 
breadth look like in Canada?  
Figure 6.1 portrays green-field investment in Canada from 1926-2012, measured as 
the dollar value of business spending on non-residential structures, machinery and 
equipment as a percent of GDP. Green-field investment sharply declined in 1929 and did 
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not rebound in a significant way until the end of the Second World War. The Canadian 
Government spent heavily from 1939-1945 to prosecute the war and then radically 
retrenched its spending after 1945, which may help explain the pattern in that period. 
Following the Second World War, business sharply increased green-field investment. 
Despite the heavy cyclicality the first few decades of the postwar era experienced an 
upward trend in green-field investment, even though the postwar peak was in 1957.  
 
Source: gross fixed private investment from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F23+24 
(1926-1960), Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 (1981-2012); nominal GDP 
from Global Financial Data (1920-1926), Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1927-
1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2012).   
 
Between 1981 and 1993 green-field investment fell dramatically before stabilizing 
at a lower level. Whereas Canadian business spent roughly 12.5 percent of GDP on the 
expansion of industrial capacity in the Keynesian era, in the neoliberal era that figure fell 
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to just 10 percent of GDP. It is also noteworthy that the trade and investment 
liberalization (TAIL) regime instituted in 1988 did nothing to increase business spending 
on the expansion of industrial capacity. The cyclical peak reached in 1998 was the lowest 
peak in the postwar period. At the onset of the ‘free trade’ era in 1989, green-field 
investment was 11.3 percent of GDP. In the subsequent period not a single year reached 
that level. Even the increased exploitation of Western Canada’s energy resources (which 
should have been most evident between 2003 and 2008) did not increase green-field 
investment. In sum, when we contrast the experience of the Keynesian welfare era (1945-
1980) with neoliberal globalization (1980-2012), we see a move from rapid capacity 
expansion to industrial capacity stagnation.   
Moving from external breadth to differential breadth yields the two series in 
Figure 6.2. The broken line portrays aggregate employment concentration in Canada, 
measured as the employment of the top 60 firms as a percent of private sector.3 The thick 
black line captures differential breadth, measured as a ratio of the average employment of 
the top 60 firms and the average employment of all private sector firms. Aggregate 
employment concentration varied from year to year, but the secular trend was one of 
higher concentration between 1950 and 1990 and lower concentration thereafter. In 
contrast, differential employment climbed rapidly in the four decades after 1950, rising 
from approximately 80 in 1950 to 2,000 by 1990, but only increased modestly after 1990.  
                                                          
3 Davis and Cobb (2010: 47) find a negative association between employment concentration and income 
inequality in the U.S. and elsewhere. The correlation between employment concentration and income 
inequality in the U.S. from 1950-2006 is -0.80, for example. In Canada, the correlation between employment 
concentration and the 0.1 percent income share from 1950-2010 is -0.62, which lends empirical support to 
Davis and Cobb’s broader argument that employment concentration may reduce inequality.  
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Inset within Figure 6.2 is a table which suggests why differential breadth slowed 
in recent years. It lists total employment for the top 60 firms at different points in time, 
rounded to the nearest thousand. In 1950 the top 60 firms employed approximately 
429,000 people, rising to 731,000 in 1970 and topping 1.3 million by 1990. By the year 
2000, total employment dropped to 1.2 million and in 2006, just before the crisis, total 
employment fell to nearly 1.1 million before settling at 1.4 million in 2010.  
 
Note: Private sector employment in Canada had to be estimated between 1950 and 1975. 
For the years 1960-1975, an industrial employment index was used (with rebasing). For 
the years 1950-1959, the growth rate of total employment was used. Source: Common 
shares outstanding, closing share price and number of employees for the top 60 firms from 
Compustat through WRDS; total employment and private sector employment in Canada 
from Cansim Table 282-0012 (1976-2010), industrial employment index from Historical 
Statistics of Canada, Series D528 (1960-1975). 
 
Treated as a bloc, the largest firms in Canada effectively ceased to expand 
employment after 1990. The private sector, by contrast, increased employment by one-
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third over the same period. The total number of corporations in Canada grew by four-
fifths since 1990 (the likely cause being the rise of incorporated ‘self-employment’), so the 
modest increase in differential employment was not driven by changes in the numerator 
(the average employment of the top 60 firms), but by changes in the denominator (the 
corporate universe).  
Taken together, the facts represented in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 are the beginnings of 
an answer to the question raised in Chapter 3. Recall that Table 3.1 documented GDP 
growth in Canada across the postwar era. The decades between 1940 and 1980 witnessed 
rapid growth while the decades from 1980 through 2010 witnessed slower growth. We 
wanted to know what accounted for the change in growth between the two periods. The 
past few decades have seen corporate Canada spend comparatively less on expanding 
industrial capacity (Figure 6.1). This period also roughly corresponded with the largest 
firms failing to expand employment, even though differential employment has increased 
modestly (Figure 6.2). This suggests that the heightened stagnation experienced in 
Canada in recent decades might be related to the retrenchment of external breadth.  
 From the standpoint of differential accumulation, we should not expect large 
firms to continuously increase green-field employment faster than the average. N&B 
assert that such a strategy would be ‘suicidal’. The chief goal, they say, is not to increase 
the formal size of the organization as such (breadth), but to increase differential earnings 
(breadth multiplied by depth) (2009: 335). The threat of excess capacity means that 
expanding breadth externally is not the best path towards differential accumulation. As 
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they see it, a better route for dominant capital is internal breadth through mergers and 
acquisitions.    
 
6.2 Internal Breadth: Mergers and Acquisitions 
Shifting from external to internal breadth brings us closer to dominant capital and 
differential accumulation because, as N&B tell us, small and large firms alike expand 
industrial capacity and increase employment, but corporate amalgamation is a game 
initiated almost exclusively by large firms (2009: 339). Reviewing the historical backdrop 
of mergers and acquisitions will help us make sense of the role they have played in 
fuelling differential accumulation.  
The narrative around the development of M&A from the late nineteenth to the 
early twenty-first centuries is one of a series of ‘waves’. Gaughan (2007) tells us that, 
using the absolute number of M&A, merger activity was largely confined to the United 
States till the latter part of the twentieth century, with Europe and other developed 
societies playing a marginal role. Developing societies only began to participate in M&A 
activity in a major way in the closing decade of the twentieth century. The absolute 
number of M&A in Canada is small relative to the U.S., but the pattern in the former 
closely tracks that of the latter. Accordingly, the history of corporate amalgamation in 
the U.S. and Canada will be told side-by-side. 
 The first merger wave in the United States began after the Depression of 1883 and 
lasted until 1904. The major form that M&A took was horizontal, meaning firms 
combined with competitors in their own industries to form monopolistic market 
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structures. US Steel, for example, was formed when JP Morgan conjoined Carnegie Steel 
with his Federal Steel. By the end of the first merger wave, US Steel controlled nearly one 
half of the U.S. steel industry, having combined 785 separate steel-making units. Morgan 
wanted to dislodge ‘aggressive competitor managers’ and replace them with an ‘orderly 
market’. Gaughan (2007: 33) argues that the drive for monopoly did not go unnoticed by 
regulators, who drafted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 in an effort to combat the 
power of trusts.  
The first merger wave in Canada began slightly later. Spurts of M&A activity 
(measured in terms of the absolute number of acquisitions) can be seen in 1889-93, 1899-
1903 and 1905-1907 before a burst of sustained activity from 1909-1913. In terms of the 
number of acquisitions, Canada’s M&A wave of 1909-1913 was small relative to the U.S., 
but adjusting for relative size, the scale of the activity was significant (Marchildon 1996: 
289, 292). Price-fixing had been legalized in Sir John A. MacDonald’s Anti-Combines Law 
(1889) insofar as action would only be taken if restrictive activity ‘unduly’ or 
‘unreasonably’ reduced competition. From this law it followed that cartels were legally 
endorsed in Canada (Morck et. al. 2005: 115). Despite this endorsement, the heightened 
consolidation of the first M&A wave led to the Combines Investigation Act (1910) which 
prohibited monopolies, price-fixing and other monopolistic behaviour.     
  The second U.S. merger wave lasted from 1916-1929 and was christened the 
‘oligopoly wave’ by Nobel laureate George Stigler (1950: 31) because vertical mergers — 
combinations in the same sector amongst firms that stand in a buyer-seller relationship 
— predominated. It is thought that the U.S. Congress’s passage of the Clayton Act of 
193 
 
1914, which made it more difficult to merge for monopoly, was one reason why firms 
chose to expand outside their industries (Gaughan 2007: 38).4  
The second merger wave in Canada was fuelled, in part, by a crisis in the financial 
system. The years after the First World War brought deflation, bankruptcy and bank 
failures. By the mid-1920s the Canadian State responded by consolidating financial 
institutions, such that in 1910 the Canadian financial system had 30 chartered banks and 
by 1928 there were only ten (Morck et. al. 2005: 112).    
 The third U.S. merger wave lasted from 1965-1969 and was baptized the 
‘conglomerate wave’ because large firms diversified their holdings by acquiring firms in 
unrelated sectors. A fourth merger wave lasted from 1984-1989. The twin attributes 
which characterized it were the prevalence of mega-mergers and the role of hostile 
takeovers. In the conglomerate wave of the 1960s large firms swallowed small- and 
medium-sized firms in unrelated sectors. The merger wave of the 1980s saw large firms 
absorb other large firms, such that the number of $100 million dollar mergers increased 
23 times from 1974 to 1986. A fifth merger wave began in the 1990s that was international 
in scope. Whereas most merger activity in prior waves had been concentrated in the U.S., 
the fifth wave saw intensive takeover activity in Britain, Germany, France, Asia and 
Central and South America. In addition to being international in scope, the merger wave 
of the 1990s was fuelled, in part, by a global privatization push. Another feature of the 
fifth wave was the emergence of a developing country-domiciled acquirer, whose size 
                                                          
4 We will explore N&Bs argument — that firms have approached their envelope of their own industries, 
sectors and national political economy’s — below. 
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was usually a consequence of the privatization of state assets (Gaughan 2007: 40-41, 53-
55, 63-66).  
 The third merger wave in Canada also unfolded in the 1960s and saw the rise of 
conglomerates, while the fourth merger wave in the 1980s brought larger deals and the 
beginnings of continental consolidation. In the late 1980s the Mulroney Progressive 
Conservatives uncorked ownership restrictions in the financial sector and, over the next 
decade Canada’s Big Five Banks swallowed the largest brokerage houses, underwriters 
and trust companies (Morck et. al. 2005: 112). The fifth merger wave in Canada brought 
many more cross-border deals, but the activity was largely confined, both in terms of 
acquirers and targets, to the U.S. A sixth merger wave began in 2003 and lasted to 2007 
and its defining feature, for Canada at any rate, was the absorption of some of the largest 
Canadian-based firms. Household names like Inco, Falconbridge, Alcan, Dofasco, Stelco, 
Algoma, Molson’s and the Hudson’s Bay Company — some of the oldest and most iconic 
firms in Canada — disappeared as the largest global players in energy and materials 
swept up their rivals.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, a continuous data series on mergers and 
acquisitions does not exist for Canada. Using data drawn from numerous sources, the 
evolution of M&A activity in Canada is partially captured in Figure 6.3, which portrays 
the number of M&A from 1885-2012 (see Appendix C for an explanation of the various 
sources). The peaks of the six merger waves correspond with business cycle peaks and 
are observable on the chart. The inset figure maps the type of merger from the first 
decade of the twentieth century through to the 1970s. If the story about M&A that was 
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recounted above is accurate, then we should expect the following: horizontal (monopoly) 
combinations should begin as the most common form of merger in the first merger wave 
(1910); as we proceed to 1929, vertical (oligopolistic) combinations should increase in 
prevalence and horizontal combinations should diminish; as we proceed to the third 
merger wave in the late 1960s, conglomerate mergers should become comparatively more 
important, with horizontal and vertical combinations declining. This is exactly what the 
inset figure demonstrates. 
 
Source: See Appendix C for data on mergers and acquisitions.  
 
In their discussion of the evolution of M&A, N&B ask why there are M&A cycles 
in the first place and how these cycles relate to the development of dominant capital. The 
metaphor they use in discussing the increasing importance of M&A is the need for large 
196 
 
firms to ‘break their envelope’. The emergence of large firms coincided with the first 
merger wave, N&B tell us. Firms expanded within their original industries, eventually 
arriving at a leading (and often monopolistic) position. At this point, further expansion 
required that large firms penetrate their industrial universe, their ‘envelope’, and expand 
outwards across an entire sector. This involved large firms absorbing firms up the supply 
chain towards extraction and down the supply chain towards the ultimate consumer. 
The consequence was the formation of vertically-integrated, oligopolistic market 
structures. Further expansion required that large firms transcend their sectoral universe 
and push up against the universe of nationally-domiciled firms through the formation of 
diversified conglomerates. Once the pool of desirable nationally-based takeover targets 
had been exhausted, large firms needed to puncture their ‘national envelope’ and acquire 
firms in other jurisdictions, hence the need for a ‘global wave’. This line of reasoning leads 
to N&B’s assertion that the inner logic of M&A has within it ‘spatial integration’ and 
‘globalization’ (2009: 330, 348-9).5 This is a testable claim, for it might well be the case 
that the trend in cross-border amalgamation either stays steady or even declines over 
time. We will assess this claim below.      
Another way of examining the growing importance of M&A is by contrasting it 
with green-field investment. N&B (2009: 338) plot a ‘buy-to-build’ indicator which 
captures the basic calculus open to proprietors: the purchase of existing capacity in the 
                                                          
5 Evidence suggests that the fourth and fifth merger booms in the two closing decades of the twentieth 
century were dominated by horizontal acquisitions, thus leading to renewed industry concentration. Given 
the logic laid out by N&B, it seems reasonable to suppose that the movement towards cross-border M&A 
would begin with firms acquiring foreign rivals within their core industries (see Pryor 2001). 
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form of M&A or the payment to have it built anew. This ratio depicts the relationship 
between internal and external breadth and it is plotted for Canada in Figure 6.4.  
 
Note: data on non-residential structures and equipment only dates to 1926. Values for 
1914 through 1925 are estimated using gross fixed private investment (from Urquhart 
(1993), Table 1.2, pp. 16-17), with proper rebasing.  Source: See Appendix C for data on 
mergers and acquisitions; gross fixed private investment from Historical Statistics of 
Canada, Series F23+24 (1926-1960), Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 
(1981-2012). 
 
There are three things worth noting. First, the series more clearly demonstrates 
the wave-like pattern of M&A over the past century. The second, third, fourth, fifth and 
sixth merger waves are more clearly discernible in Figure 6.4 than they are in Figure 6.3. 
The second feature to note is the increasing importance of M&A relative to green-field 
growth. In the three-quarters of a century from 1914-1988, for every dollar spent on 
building new capacity, 23 cents was spent on M&A (on average). In the quarter century 
since 1988, every dollar spent on expanding capacity has seen (on average) 93 cents spent 
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on M&A — a four-fold increase. Third, the inset figure shows the proportion of total 
M&A (measured by the total number) accounted for by cross-border M&A. The data 
spans 1945-2012 and clearly demonstrates the accelerated globalization of corporation 
amalgamation. It, too, demonstrates a wave-like pattern with each successive peak 
reaching a higher degree of internationalization. So N&B’s assertion that M&A should 
show a tendency for ‘spatial integration’ and ‘globalization’ survives refutation, at least in 
the Canadian context.  
The history of green-field investment and M&A in Canada is interesting in its 
own right, but what we are really after is the developmental tendencies of the largest 
firms in Canada, which means that we should wish to know what bearing these 
processes have on the institutional and organizational structure of the political economy. 
In the next section we will take on some of the theories offered to explain M&A. We will 
then be prepared to examine the role breadth has played in restructuring the corporate 
sector.  
 
6.3 Amalgamation: A Black Box in Political Economy? 
At a minimum, explanations for M&A usually try to account for two things: merger 
motives (causes) and post-merger outcomes (effects). This seems appropriate insofar as a 
merger outcome, an intended effect, will be either incoherent or meaningless unless it is 
logically tied to an underlying cause or core motivation. Though seemingly 
straightforward, the identification of motivational energy and post-merger consequences 
is not easy. Consider the difficulties surrounding motivation. What counts as a valid 
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motive and how can we discover what it is? After all, motivation is not a physical fact; it 
is metaphysical and thus has the potential to be unknown even to the person who 
manifests it. Will the motivation be the same in all cases and across all individuals or will 
there be variation? What happens if there are multiple motivations at play? How do we 
determine which are central and which are peripheral?  
In terms of post-merger outcomes, what are the relevant measures? Should we 
look at stock prices, accounting data or industrial measures? Do we look at the impact of 
a merger on the participating firms in isolation or do we extend the scope to include the 
industry, sector or the entire market structure? And what is the relevant time horizon? 
Do the first few days or months after a merger announcement suffice or should we 
elongate the time horizon to include years or even decades? Researchers have answered 
these questions differently, and as a consequence, there does not appear to be much in 
the way of a consensus on M&A, hence the black box analogy.  
 One of the most extensive studies ever conducted on M&A in Canada was the 
Report of Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (known as The Bryce Report, 1978). In 
terms of uncovering M&A motives, the Bryce Report relied upon evidence captured in 
surveys from the owners of merged firms. The authors begin with an important 
admission: ‘we should not expect to find pursuit of enhanced market power cited in the 
public record as a merger motive’, a seemingly safe presumption (1978: 148). Condensing 
their rather long elaboration, the list of merger motives includes: (1) an ‘attractive 
investment’ at a ‘reasonable price’; (2) efficiency and economies of scale; (3) obtaining 
access to a lucrative market, a reliable source of supply or the improvement of product 
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quality; (4) the ‘rationalization’ of an industry; (5) the desire to enter an industry or 
expand within it without ‘creating excess capacity’ or ‘upsetting the price structure’; (6) 
tax exemptions; and (7) the desire by ‘dynamic men’ to ‘create a corporate empire’ (1978: 
150-3).  
The list is deeply revelatory.6 The first motive, an ‘attractive investment’, is a 
tautology. It doesn’t explain why an investment is ‘attractive’ and what makes for a 
‘reasonable price’. The second motive, increased efficiency, sounds desirable. However, 
efficiency is much more difficult concept to sort out than mainstream economists 
assume. After all, we might ask: efficiency for whom and in what way and how measured? The 
third motive, enhanced product quality, cannot be directly tied to mergers in the first 
place insofar as a merger is a legal combination of business units, not the synchronization 
of industrial processes.  
Motives four through seven all hinge on business actions to deepen the 
distribution and so, in capital as power terms, boost differential accumulation. The 
fourth motive, the ‘rationalization’ of an industry, is business jargon for the restriction of 
productive capacity and diminishment of industrial serviceability. Plant and equipment 
will be left idle and workers will be separated from their work (i.e., fired). Fifth, the 
desire to expand into an industry without changing the price structure speaks wholly to 
the desire to redirect income streams while maintaining or deepening earnings margins. 
Tax exemption, the sixth motive, is also about distribution, but in this case it centres on 
                                                          
6 Brander (1988: 113-4) argues that just because there are private gains flowing from M&A activity, it does 
not follow that the public interest is being served. Many who have authored studies on M&A in Canada 
appear to hold the opposite assumption, namely that if a merger benefits shareholders it is automatically 
beneficial to other stakeholders or to society at large. A priori assumptions about the automatic beneficence 
of M&A will not be made in this study. 
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redistributing the tax burden. In the seventh and final motive, corporate empire, the 
allusion to power is unmistakable and does not require elaboration. 
Long as the Bryce Report list of merger motives is, it is not complete. Growth is the 
most common motive cited but feeding out of growth are the twin concepts ‘operating 
synergies’ and ‘financial synergies’. Operating synergies refer to enlarged revenues or 
diminished costs (economies of scale or scope) while financial synergies usually come 
from a reduction in the cost of capital (Gaughan 2007: 117, 124-5). Knubley, Krause and 
Sadeque (1991) cite geographic and product line expansion, favourable regulations and 
cheaper inputs as overarching motives. Baldwin, Beckstead, Gellatly and Peters (2000) 
find that M&A activity is motivated by diversification strategies. They argue that large 
firms which operate in saturated industries have a basic choice available to them: they 
can absorb competitors up the production chain or down the distribution chain with a 
view to enhanced efficiency (through cost containment).7 The second choice is to acquire 
firms in unrelated sectors in order to diversify, and in so doing, reduce risk (by insulating 
themselves from ‘demand shocks’, for example). Besides cost-cutting and risk reduction, 
another motive includes the acquisition of a strategic asset such as research and 
development capabilities, patents, trademarks, etc. The ultimate motivator, for these 
researchers, appears to be the maximization of shareholder value.8  
 Shifting from merger motives to outcomes, the literature on M&A in Canada, 
Brander (1988: 111) argues, reveals two broad positions: those who viewed M&A activity 
                                                          
7 Caves (1987) and Scherer (1988a) question whether amalgamation leads to enhanced efficiency. 
8 The view advanced by Baldwin et. al. (2000) is consistent with arguments advanced by Penrose (1959) and 
Marris (1964) who assert that firms diversify through M&A in order to grow. 
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favourably argue that Canadian firms need to grow larger if they are to compete in global 
markets, while their opponents tended to see M&A as creating corporate leviathans that 
‘wield enormous power’ and ‘dominate the economy’. Studies on post-merger 
performance in Canada document mixed results. Baldwin and Gorecki (1987), Baldwin 
and Caves (1992) and Baldwin (1995) find that takeovers have a positive impact on the 
combined firm in terms of market share, productivity and profitability. Jog and Riding 
(1988) and Tarasofsky and Corvari (1991) find that approximately an equal number of 
M&A succeed or fail. Financial event studies, like those performed by Eckbo (1986; 1988) 
and Eckbo and Thorbum (2000) posit that takeovers increase stock prices and fetch 
significant positive average announcement returns for shareholders. André, Kooli and 
L’Her (2004) use a longer time frame for their event study and find just the opposite, 
namely that Canadian acquirers significantly underperform. Amplifying the diversity of 
results, Ben-Amar and André (2006) argue that Canadian shareholders obtain 
abnormally high returns at the date of announcement relative to results in the U.S.  
Eckbo (1988: 206) summarizes a common viewpoint among merger studies in 
Canada by arguing that M&A promote the ‘efficient allocation of corporate resources’, 
which he conceives to be a socially useful function. M&A not only lower the ‘transaction 
costs’ of corporate resource reallocation, he states, but they also discipline managers who 
might not pursue shareholder wealth maximization strategies, thus helping explain why 
the (purported) separation of ownership from control has endured as a corporate form 
(1986: 258).  
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Outside Canada, Scherer (1988b) finds that much of the M&A activity of the 
1960s and 1970s was later reversed. And while stock prices might have risen at the time of 
announcement, he notes, pre-merger targets usually performed better in relation to their 
post-merger form. Agrawal and Mandelker (1992) document negative and significant 
abnormal results, Loderer and Martin (1992) find negative but insignificant abnormal 
returns in the post-merger years and Gugler, Mueller Yortoglu and Zulehner (2003) find 
a post cross-border acquisition decrease in the market value of acquiring firms.  
Within mainstream thought, the research on M&A filters into two broad 
approaches. The approaches are distinguished primarily by what they seek to explain 
and the methodology they use to arrive at answers.9 The financial approach looks at 
M&A as a market for corporate control that shifts business assets towards those who 
will most efficiently and profitably employ them. Mergers are evaluated favourably if 
share prices rise after a merger announcement relative to a reference group (so called 
‘financial event studies’). The assumption is that financial markets will judge, through 
pre- and post-merger share prices, whether the merger is likely to enhance efficiency and 
profitability, thus raising the overall market value of a firm.  
The industrial organization approach examines the long-term performance of 
mergers, usually using profitability or other accounting data as a barometer of merger 
success. This approach concedes that efficiency may play a role in terms of motives and 
                                                          
9 The following overview of the approaches and theories is adapted from Khemani (1991: 2-4) and 
Mcdougall (1995: 1-4).  
204 
 
consequences, but the drive for monopoly and market power are also taken as important 
merger motives and post-merger consequences.10  
There have been comparatively few Marxist analyses of M&A in Canada. The 
studies that have been performed tend to take as their point of departure the work of 
Baran and Sweezy (1966), among others. Clement, for example, sees heightened 
concentration as an inevitable outcome of the historical development of capitalism (1975: 
31). The amalgamation process, he explains, creates fewer and larger corporate units and 
culminates in the creation of a ‘monopoly sector’ that replaces competitive markets with 
increasingly centralized planning (1977a: 132-5). Carroll and Klassen view M&A as 
feeding the accumulation process, first by centralizing capital into fewer units and then 
by concentrating it (2010: 10). Veltmeyer explains how concentration unfolds (1987: 27). 
Larger firms have higher rates of profit on average, thus enabling them to grow faster 
through ‘internal accumulation’, i.e., by ploughing their enlarged earnings into expansion. 
In the Marxist analysis, then, M&A contribute directly to heightened concentration 
through the absorption of other firms and indirectly by increasing firm size, enlarging the 
rate of profit and enabling firms to grow through internal accumulation.  
                                                          
10 These two broad approaches have spawned three theories: internalization theory, technological 
competence theory and transaction cost theory. Internalization theory presupposes that profitable firms 
possess intangible assets that make them desirable takeover targets. These intangible assets are hard to 
acquire because of barriers to entry, high transaction costs, etc., thus making M&A the least onerous route 
for obtaining them. This theory is usually used to explain horizontal mergers. Closely related to 
internalization theory is the technological competence theory, which emphasizes the growing importance 
of ‘technological assets’. These technological assets can be parsed according to whether the knowledge 
they embody can be codified (i.e., recorded as information that others can easily use) or cannot be codified 
(specific learned abilities that are note easy to replicate, practical knowledge, etc.). The latter are thought 
to be of supreme importance in terms of business performance, thus inducing firms to try to acquire it 
through M&A. Transaction cost theory is predicated on the notion that coordination problems exist 
within particular markets and that firms respond by replacing market transactions between firms with 
intra-firm transfers (Williamson 1975). According to this theory, individual firms participate in M&A to 
cut costs and enlarge profits. From a societal standpoint, M&A are thought to enhance total efficiency. 
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To summarize, scholars working within the financial approach view M&A 
activity through the prism of enhanced efficiency and wealth maximization. 
Amalgamation motivations are thought to derive from profit maximization, which grows 
out of the utility maximizing calculus of rational agents. The financial approach ignores 
power as a motivating factor and the amassment of power as an institutional outcome. 
The industrial organization approach assumes that firms are motivated by profit 
maximization, thus inducing efforts to enhance efficiency. However, it also makes room 
for ‘market power’ in its explanations (see Khemani 1988: 31-33, for example). Despite 
this, scholars using the industrial organization approach have not detailed exactly how 
M&A fuel the growth of corporate power. It is presupposed that M&A are part of the 
drive for monopoly and increased market power, but existing studies have not 
empirically documented this assertion. Finally, Marxists have typically seen M&A as 
concentrating and centralizing capital, and thus indirectly incorporate power into the 
explanatory picture. However, their studies suffer from similar shortcomings insofar as 
they do not empirically document the linkages between amalgamation and power. So 
what is the relationship between M&A and power? 
 
6.4 Amalgamation and Power 
The Bryce Report (1978: 156) asserts that there is no long-term relationship between M&A 
activity and corporate concentration in Canada.11 Eckbo (1983) claims that, as far as the 
                                                          
11 This conclusion was challenged by Stanbury and Waverman (1979). The Bryce Report also invited criticism 
from Radwanski (1979) and Clement (1979) for wholly embracing a business standpoint in assessing the 
relationship between corporate power and Canadian society. 
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Canadian evidence goes, enhanced market power neither serves as a merger motive nor as 
a post-merger consequence. Instead, he claims that post-merger gains are the result of 
enhanced efficiency. Eckbo (1985) also asserts that the evidence for mergers in the U.S. 
does not support the market power hypothesis. Gaughan (2007: 149) summarizes: there 
is little evidence that firms are motivated to merge to increase monopoly power. It is time 
to test these claims against the historical evidence in Canada.  
 The first question is whether there is a relationship between relative firm size 
(the institutional-organizational structure of the corporate sector) and profitability 
(pricing-distributive power). Lafrance (2012) finds that medium-sized firms are more 
profitable than both large and small firms. In Canada, the relationship between 
performance and size, she says, takes an inverted U-shape: as firms increase in size they 
become more profitable, but beyond a certain point increased size is associated with 
lower profitability. Firms with 5 to 20 employees tend to be more profitable than their 
larger counterparts, thus indicating a non-linear relationship between size and 
profitability. The difficulty with Lafrance’s study is the selection of measures. She 
classifies firm size according to the number of employees and measures profitability 
through return on assets (ROA), tabulated as earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets. Given Lafrance’s suppositions about measurement, it is indeed puzzling 
that larger firms have lower profitability than do medium-sized firms. However, the 
puzzle is more apparent than real.   
 Borrowing tools from N&B’s toolkit allows us to construct a markedly different 
picture. First, N&B classify firm size according to equity market value. The advantage 
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with this classification scheme is that it embraces the vantage point of investors, whose 
perception of the flow of future earnings (and thus the present value of listed firms) 
shapes political-economic development. Second, in place of ROA, N&B (2009: 50-1) 
build upon Kalecki’s ‘degree of monopoly’, which they measure using the markup — the 
percent of profit in sales revenue — and which is understood in this context to be a 
quantitative proxy for market power. Kalecki devised the concept to capture price-
formation within semi-monopolistic settings. Among the numerous factors influencing 
the degree of monopoly, Kalecki (1943a: 49-50) tells us, are the ‘process of concentration’ 
and subsequent ‘formation of giant corporations’.12 The percent of profit in sales is a more 
appropriate metric in this instance because it contrasts two flows, whereas Lafrance’s 
use of earnings against assets contrasts a flow with a stock.  
Figure 6.5 depicts four series: the upper part of the figure contains the net markup 
for the top 60 firms, the corporate universe as a whole and the corporate universe less the 
top 60 firms. The differential (gross) markup of the top 60 firms is in the bottom portion 
of the figure. Net markups are included because they capture the impact of taxation and 
the ability of firms, especially large firms, to avoid taxation. Differential gross markups 
are also included to capture the more straightforward differences between large and 
small firms in terms of pre-tax earnings margins.  
                                                          
12 Other factors affecting the degree of monopoly include the power of trade unions, which will be 
examined in Chapter 8 and 10. Kalecki (1938: 65) asserts that the degree of monopoly also has a bearing on 
the distribution of income amongst classes, a claim we will also examine in Chapter 8 and 9.  
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Source: Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding, closing share price, net 
income and total revenue; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Moody’s Corporate 
Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business’s Top 1000 Companies; Cansim Tables 
380-0029 and 180-0001, 180-0002 and 180-0003 for net corporate profit and total corporate 
revenue, respectively. 
 
A few things warrant our attention. First, despite heavy cyclicality, the long-term 
pattern is V-shaped for the top 60 firms and for the corporate universe. Both series 
trended downward till the early 1990s, trended upward thereafter and reached historic 
highs in 2007-08. Second, the overall pattern changes when we remove the top 60 firms 
from the corporate universe.13 The reason for including the non-dominant capital 
corporate universe is to discern what impact, if any, the top 60 firms has on the average 
markup of the corporate universe. The impact is considerable. Instead of reaching a 
                                                          
13 The correlation coefficient for the markup of the top 60 and the corporate universe is 0.81 between 1967 
and 2010. The correlation for the top 60 and the non-dominant capital corporate universe falls to 0.47 over 
the same period (all series smoothed as three year moving averages).  
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historic high in 2007-08, the non-dominant capital corporate universe reached a series 
high in 1975. The overall trend from the 1960s onward was downward for this group. 
Third, the markup of the top 60 firms is higher than for the corporate universe, which is 
suggestive of linkages between size and power. Despite the cyclicality and the difference 
in respective levels, the data suggest that the dominant capital markup reached half-
century highs in recent years. Fourth and finally, the differential markup trended 
downward from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s and trended upward thereafter, 
which bolsters the claim about heightened power at the top of the corporate dominance 
hierarchy in recent times.  
As reviewed in Chapter 4, Means (1935) connected concentration and prices in a 
way which indicated that the existence of larger corporate units leads to ‘non-classical’ 
price formation or ‘administered prices’. Kalecki also connected the existence of larger 
corporate units with differences in price formation. The ‘dual economy’ literature would 
have us believe that the existence of large firms has the effect of reducing competition 
because relative differences in firm size gives rise to different competitive behaviour, 
performance and market power (see Bowring 1986, for example). As reviewed in Chapter 
5, numerous schools of thought understand aggregate concentration to be a proxy for 
corporate power. The question to be addressed is: do increases (decreases) in the level of 
aggregate concentration bear any relationship to increases (decreases) in the markup of 
the largest firms in Canada? In other words, there is a linear relationship between the 
relative position of the largest firms and the extent of their market power.  
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Figure 6.6 begins to answer this question by presenting two series. The thick 
black line measures the aggregate concentration of equity capitalization and the thin 
broken line measures the markup of the top 60 firms. The former may be understood as a 
proxy for the institutional-organizational structure of the corporate sector and the latter 
for the market power of the largest firms. The two series are positively correlated over 
the long term. Aggregate concentration declined from the early 1950s to the late 1970s 
and climbed thereafter. The markup trended downward till the early 1990s and rose 
thereafter. As large firms took up more ‘market space’ in recent decades, their market 
power increased. Concentration and the markup reached historic highs in recent years, 
indicating that relative size is closely associated with market power. Lafrance’s argument 
about the non-linearity of size and profitability is invalidated when we measure size 
through capitalization and when we benchmark profitability against revenue.  
The establishment of quantitative linkages between concentration and market 
power is difficult enough; the qualitative mechanics of how large firms increase their 
market power is far more difficult to uncover. In the language of classical and neoclassical 
economics, ‘perfect competition’ is a condition in which a large number of buyers and 
sellers, perfect information, free entry and exit and homogenous products prevail. Under 
this market structure, sellers do not have the ability to influence price. But as firms 
combine and the market structure moves from the competitive end of the spectrum to the 
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oligopolistic and monopolistic end, large firms go from being price-takers to price-
shapers and price-makers.14 
 
Source: Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding, closing share price, 
net income and total revenue; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Moody’s 
Corporate Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business’s Top 1000 
Companies (various issues from 1985-2010); total market capitalization from Global 
Financial Data, TSX Review, e-Review and Factbook. 
 
Blair argues that as aggregate concentration increases, market behaviour changes. 
‘Communities of interest’ form around powerful families and financial groups and this 
enables them to coordinate their activities to a greater extent than would otherwise be 
possible. Independent (read: competitive) behaviour is lessened, Blair continues, as 
dominant proprietors and executives openly or tacitly agree that firms should avoid the 
                                                          
14 See Means (1972b) for an elaboration. See Bowring (1986) for a discussion of the dual economy and the 
resulting differences in competitive behaviour, performance and market power. 
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disruptions associated with ‘price competition’ and aim, instead, at a healthy ‘target 
profit rate’ (1972: 60-61).  
Olson explains some of the mechanics (and impediments) that individuals and 
institutions face in organizing for collective action through the building of coalitions.  
The larger the number of individuals or firms that would benefit from a collective good, the 
smaller the share of the gains from action in the group interest that will accrue to the 
individual or firm that undertakes the action… the incentive for group action diminishes as 
group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common interest than 
small ones (1982: 31). 
 
The numeric scale of groups like (non-unionized) workers, taxpayers and consumers 
makes it difficult to organize for collective action. The incentives, Olson explains, are not 
strong enough to pull such groups together. One reason for this is that the services 
provided by such coalitions are often distributed to every member of the coalition 
equally, and among broad coalitions, this makes the ‘per unit’ benefit small. What’s more, 
the cost of organizing such coalitions may be large, which acts as an additional 
impediment to collective action.  
The opposite logic is at play with small groups like dominant capital firms 
(operating in oligopolistic markets). In the context of the coordinating activities 
between large firms — activities that would include setting market prices, containing the 
rate of industrial expansion or lobbying — because they are few in number, the 
organizational burden is much smaller. What’s more, such firms stand to 
disproportionately benefit from collective action. Smaller groups, Olson asserts, possess 
disproportionate ‘organizational power’ or ‘cartelistic power per capita’ (1982: 41). It is 
imperative to note that the activities of such coalitions will tend to benefit coalition 
members, even though said activities may reduce total societal efficiency or hamper the 
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growth of aggregate income. These negative effects arising from coalitional behaviour 
will be felt more strongly by non-coalitions members, i.e., by society at large.   
 This line of reasoning helps explain why shifts in the relative position of the 
largest firms in Canada (measured through aggregate concentration) are linked with the 
changes in the markup of the largest firms. Though qualitative in character and 
somewhat messy, we should presume that the reduction of competitive pressures 
resulting from oligopolistic market structures can unfold in any number of ways. The 
point is that the qualitative collusion and cooperation among large firms has quantitative 
manifestations. This line of reasoning may also prove useful in subsequent chapters, 
notably Chapter 7, which chronicles the concurrent rise of large firms amidst the 
deceleration of GDP growth, and in Chapters 9 and 10, which explore the distribution of 
income. 
Let’s illustrate this thinking with an example. Potash Corporations’ activities 
around capacity utilization and the profit-pricing structure (detailed in Chapter 2) is but 
one instance indicating that collusion and tacit agreement unfolds even in the context of 
globalized markets. Recall that Potash Corporation ‘slashed production’ to ‘protect 
prices’ because their ‘strategy’ was premised on the belief that ‘price is much more 
important than volume’. This activity led it to be designated the ‘industry disciplinarian’ 
(Bouw 2012). In this instance, clandestine collusion was not even necessary; an open 
agreement amongst the global players was in place to hedge against the threat of higher 
inventories and the associated reduction in prices and profit margins. In the language of 
Veblen, industry is subordinate to business in this market. In the language of Olson, the 
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‘selective incentives’ were in place to entice the major players to cooperate (1982: 29). 
And from the standpoint of N&B’s framework, this has plenty to do with power.  
Recall: at the end of Chapter 5 we asked what accounts for the cyclical pattern 
and secular increase in aggregate concentration over the postwar period. Figure 6.6 
establishes a link between concentration and market power, thus heightening the 
importance of finding a satisfactory answer to the question. We are now prepared to 
address the question: does amalgamation fuel concentration? Figure 6.7 contrasts the 
buy-to-build indicator, measured as mergers and acquisitions as a percent of business 
spending on fixed assets, with the concentration of corporate assets, measured as the 
total assets held by the top 60 firms as a percent of the Canadian corporate universe. The 
two series are tightly and positively correlated over half a century, which supports the 
contention that amalgamation fuels concentration. 
The amalgamation index appears more cyclical than asset concentration, which 
makes sense when we consider that each amalgamation wave serves to concentrate 
corporate assets. However, when the wave subsides firms (more often than not) do not 
divest themselves of their newly acquired assets.15 Thus, while amalgamation is wave-like 
in its pattern its consequences for concentration tend to be cumulative.16 Asset 
concentration increased from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s in tandem with the 
conglomerate merger wave before declining for a decade. In the 1990s the overall level of 
                                                          
15 This is partially explained by the fact that we are comparing a flow with a stock. 
16 Khemani (1988: 19, 31-33) notes that Canada’s level of aggregate concentration is high and has increased 
over time. Furthermore, he cites empirical research which documents a positive relationship between the 
level of aggregate concentration and firm profitability, which is suggestive of links between takeover 
activity, high levels of concentration and increased market power. Potential spillover effects, he says, 
include higher levels of wealth and income inequality. The findings documented in this and later chapters 
support Khemani’s assertions. 
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asset concentration rose by one-half, fuelled in part by the largest merger wave in 
Canadian history. These findings are in contrast to the Bryce Report, which did not find a 
relationship between M&A activity and corporate concentration. It is also in sharp 
contrast to the scholars reviewed in the previous section who argue that the pursuit and 
attainment of enhanced power is neither a merger motive nor a post-merger consequence.  
 
Note: total corporate assets are tabulated by subtracting the total assets of government 
financial and non-financial business enterprises from the total assets of government and 
business enterprises. Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre and 
Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding, closing share price and 
assets; Moody’s Corporate Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business 
Top 1000 Companies (various issues from 1985-2010); total corporate assets from Cansim 
Tables 378-0052, 378-0055 and 378-0072; business spending on fixed assets from 
Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F23+24 (1926-1960), Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-
1980) and 384-0038 (1981-2012). See Appendix C for data on mergers and acquisitions.  
 
But the relationship between amalgamation and power has other dimensions as 
well. Consider what N&B say about the relationship between differential earnings, on 
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the one hand, and breadth and depth, on the other (2009: 329). The differential earnings 
of dominant capital, they say, can be portrayed through the following equation: 
4. 
  
 
   (
          
         
)    (
                      
                     
)  
Where (E) denotes the level of earnings, the subscript D refers to a dominant capital firm 
and the absence of a subscript refers to the average. Differential earnings can be boosted 
by increasing employment faster than the average (breadth) or by increasing earnings per 
employee faster than the average (depth). The latter, they say, captures the ‘elemental 
power per unit of organization’ and speaks to the ability of dominant proprietors to 
project their indirect power across society as a whole. They summarize: 
Seen from a differential-accumulation perspective, amalgamation is a power process whose 
goal is to beat the average and redistribute control. Its main appeal to capitalists is that it 
contributes directly to differential breadth, yet without undermining and sometimes 
boosting the potential for differential depth (2009: 346).    
 
Let’s put this claim to the test. We have discovered that aggregate asset concentration 
has increased in Canada over the past half century and that this process unfolds side-by-
side the increasing markup of large firms. We have also demonstrated that concentration 
moves in tandem with amalgamation waves. So are N&B correct in asserting that M&A 
also serve to protect and possibly deepen differential depth?  
Figure 6.8 maps two series. The buy-to-build indicator is plotted next to N&B’s 
measure of differential depth, the latter computed as a ratio of the average profit per 
employee of the top 60 firms to the private sector. In 1950 the average profit per employee 
of a firm in the top 60 was 2.6 times that of an average firm in the business sector. By 2010 
that ratio increased to 4.7. This implies that, as of 2010, the ‘elemental power’ of 
217 
 
dominant capital was nearly five times what it was in the business sector — nearly twice 
the level in 1950. The statistical strength of the association is weak, but it grows stronger 
over time.  
 
Note: Private sector employment in Canada had to be estimated from 1950-1975. For the 
years 1960-1975, an industrial employment index was used (with rebasing). For the years 
1950-1959, total employment was used (with rebasing). Source: See Appendix C for data 
on mergers and acquisitions; business spending on fixed assets from Historical Statistics 
of Canada, Series F23+24 (1926-1960), Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 
(1981-2010); differential profit per employee for the top 60 firms from Canadian Financial 
Markets Research Centre and Compustat through WRDS for common shares 
outstanding, closing share price, pre-tax profit and total employees; Moody’s Corporate 
Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies (various 
issues from 1985-2010); total pre-tax profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 
(1950-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2010); total employment and private sector 
employment in Canada from Cansim Table 282-0012 (1976-2010), industrial employment 
index from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series D528 (1960-1975). 
 
The positive correlation between the two series suggests that N&B’s assertion 
holds in the Canadian context. However, the fact that the two series move together, not 
inversely, might interrupt another of N&B’s assertions, namely that breadth and depth 
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tend to move inversely to each other. Figure 6.8 suggests this is not so.17 As merger waves 
contribute to heightened concentration, it appears that the profit per employee of large 
firms increases. Recall the end of Chapter 5, which asked how we can account for the 
globalization of Canadian corporate ownership across the past century given the pattern 
it takes in Figure 5.13. N&B hypothesize (2009: 332, proposition 5) that the logic of 
M&A, which grows out of the constituent parts of differential accumulation, points in 
the direction of ‘spatial unification’ and ‘globalization’. Can the globalization of Canadian 
corporate ownership be accounted for by the drive for differential breadth?  
According to Figure 6.9, the answer is ‘yes’. The thick black line portrays N&B’s 
amalgamation index against a proxy for the transnationalization of Canadian corporate 
ownership. The two series are tightly and positively correlated from the 1920s onward. 
The timing and duration of the amalgamation waves in Canada appears to have 
contributed to an increase in the foreign operations of Canadian-based firms relative to 
their domestic operations. Recall the inset chart in Figure 6.4, which showed that cross-
border acquisitions have become more prevalent in the decades since 1945. This is 
consistent with N&B’s argument that amalgamation waves require large firms to ‘break 
their envelope’ by expanding outward from their original universe of corporations, the 
final envelope being the universe of nationally-domiciled firms. The amalgamation waves 
of the 1990s and 2000s were primarily global and, unsurprisingly, the 
transnationalization of Canadian corporate ownership sharply increased over these two 
decades, reaching a historic high.   
                                                          
17 This assertion is qualified by the fact that Figure 6.8 contrasts the regime of breadth (M&A) with a 
measure of depth (profit per employee), which do not necessarily belong in the same analytical category. 
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The reasons for the strong statistical relationship between the buy-to-build 
indicator and the transnationalization proxy are not obvious, but the fact that both series 
are semi-cyclical and rise secularly over the postwar era suggests what the answer might 
be. Each amalgamation wave in Canada appears to have increased foreign assets relative 
to domestic assets, and hence, foreign income relative to domestic income. However, 
from Figure 6.4 we know that the level of foreign acquisitions relative to domestic 
acquisitions steadily increased since 1945. But why would foreign income decline relative 
to domestic income after the merger wave subsides?  
 
Note: Data on corporate transnationality interpolated between 1928, 1933, 1936 and 1938 
(continuous thereafter). Source: See Appendix C for data on mergers and acquisitions; 
business spending on fixed assets from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F23+24 
(1926-1960), Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 (1981-2011); dividends on 
portfolio investment and profits, reinvested earnings and dividends on direct investment 
from Cansim Table 376-0012; total pre-tax profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, 
Series F3 (1928-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2011). 
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Each of the major merger waves in Canada was followed by a deep recession 
(1929, 1973-74, 1981, 1990 and 2000-01) and it is possible that large Canadian firms that 
built up their foreign assets during the merger wave divested themselves of a portion of 
those foreign assets in order to cope with the downturn (whether they used their 
increased liquidity to reduce their debt load or for some other reason is beside the point). 
But it wouldn’t make sense to acquire foreign assets during the boom only to fully divest 
in the bust, so the long-term consequences of foreign acquisitions tend to be a rise in 
foreign income relative to domestic income.   
Let’s review the progression laid out in this section. Large firms have greater 
market power than their rivals in the corporate universe (Figure 6.5) and this power is 
closely tied to the concentration of equity market capitalization (Figure 6.6). 
Amalgamation seems to be a factor in the concentration of corporate assets (Figure 6.7). 
Amalgamation has also contributed to the deepening of differential depth (Figure 6.8) 
and helps explain what is driving the globalization of Canadian corporate ownership 
(Figure 6.9).  
Recall that one of N&B’s key claims (2009: 332, proposition 8) is that the process 
of differential accumulation is driven over the long-term by M&A. The research 
presented here supports their contention for Canada. Some questions follow. What 
impact has international investment in general, and cross-border amalgamation in 
particular, had on transforming the structure of Canadian corporate ownership? Has the 
global amalgamation drive of the past few decades led to the ‘hollowing out’ of corporate 
Canada, as some scholars (Arthurs 2000, for example) fear? 
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6.5 Is Corporate Canada Being ‘Hollowed Out’? 
In Chapter 4 we reviewed how some scholars understood the role of multinational 
corporations and foreign investment in international affairs. On one end of the spectrum 
we find the liberal internationalism of Vernon (1971), who would have us believe that the 
expansion of multinational corporations abroad through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is a progressive process insofar as it serves to enhance national prosperity and promote 
global efficiency. On the other end of the spectrum we find the Marxian-inspired stance 
of Hymer (1979), who asserts that developing societies that play host to large flows of 
FDI from the developed world lose their ability to steer domestic development and thus 
sacrifice a portion of their national autonomy. In Canada, most of the research on foreign 
investment and cross-border M&A has tended toward the liberal internationalist end of 
the spectrum, albeit with a few notable exceptions.  
 In terms of background facts on foreign investment, Statistics Canada (2010: 69) 
reports that there are roughly 2,000 Canadian-based multinationals, which means that 
approximately 0.1 percent of Canadian firms participate in international investment 
(calculation based on author’s archives).18 The 100 largest Canadian multinationals, they 
tell us, account for 80 percent of the total direct investment abroad — a figure which 
brings us very close to our proxy for dominant capital (the top 60 firms). So the process 
of international investment amongst Canadian firms is highly concentrated. At present, 
                                                          
18 The motivations for FDI are very similar to those for M&A, so we need not duplicate our efforts in this 
respect. Globerman (1994: 3-4) provides a list of FDI motives, which can be parsed and condensed as 
follows: (1) pursuit of higher revenues or lower costs, (2) enhanced ability to reach and service customers, 
(3) increased market power and (4) risk reduction. Statistics Canada defines a multinational corporation 
as a firm that engages in foreign direct investment and owns or controls ‘value-adding’ activities in more 
than one country (see Baldwin and Gellatly 2007: 14). 
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there are approximately 70,000 multinational corporations around the world — a four-
fold increase since 1990 and these firms make up one-third of global trade, most of it 
intra-firm.19  
In developed countries, 85 percent of FDI inflows are made up of M&A (in 2006). 
This is in stark contrast to developing societies, where only one-third of FDI takes the 
form of M&A. In terms of inward and outward FDI for Canada, the U.S. is both the top 
destination and the top source. The U.K. comes in at a distant second followed by 
European countries (Rao, Souare and Wang 2009: 1-4). In terms of the industrial location 
of inward FDI, Baldwin and Gellatly (2005) claim that the sectoral mix has stayed 
relatively stable over the three decades between 1961 and 1991. For the 1990s, the large 
inflow of FDI was concentrated in those sectors that already displayed high degrees of 
foreign control, Taylor (2001) reports. Likewise, Chow (1997) and Marth (2004) indicate 
that most foreign investment has taken place in finance and insurance, energy and 
materials — precisely those sectors that register as the most heavily weighted on the 
TSX. And finally, Acharya and Rao (2008: 6) note that among OECD countries, Canada is 
the fifth highest in terms of inward FDI restrictiveness and is more restrictive than the 
42-country average in all sectors except electricity. It is also more restrictive than the 
U.S. in all sectors aside from finance. 
                                                          
19 The concentration of Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA) abroad appears extraordinarily high. 
Baldwin and Gellatly (2007: 37-38) relay research performed by Gorecki (1990; 1992) which indicates that, 
as of the mid-1980s, one-third of CDIA was attributable to the eight largest investor firms. Chow (1994: 56) 
reports that 93 percent of CDIA is held by 10 percent of Canadian multinationals. And globally, Rao, 
Legault and Ahmad (1994) assert that one percent of all multinationals account for nearly 50 percent of the 
total world stock of outward direct investment.  
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To add further context to our examination consider Figure 6.10, which maps the 
history of gross Canadian international investment flows from the late 1920s onward. 
The thick black line captures gross direct investment flows and the thin broken line 
captures the sum of portfolio plus direct investment flows, both as a percent of gross 
fixed private investment. The inset table measures the decade average gross direct 
investment flows as a percent of GDP for Canada, Developed and Developing Countries.  
 
Source: Portfolio and direct investment flows from Cansim Table 376-0002; gross fixed 
private investment from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F136 (1927-1960) and 
Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Table 2 (1961-2010); gross 
direct investment flows and GDP for Canada, Developed Countries and Developing 
Countries from UNCTAD Statistics (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).  
 
Direct investment moved horizontally for the decades spanning the late 1920s to 
the early 1990s, staying within a range of 0 to 20 percent. This historical trend broke 
down in the early 1990s just as Canada entered into a trade and investment liberalization 
Decade 
Average Canada
Developed 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
1970s 2.8 1.0 0.5
1980s 2.2 1.3 0.9
1990s 3.8 2.9 2.8
2000s 7.8 5.3 4.6
Direct Investment Abroad plus Foreign                               
Direct Investment (% of GDP )
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regime (TAIL hereafter) with the United States and Mexico. Direct investment surged in 
the 1990s before going into steep decline after the market downturn and recession of 
2000-01. It rebounded briefly thereafter, and then after the crisis of 2008 it declined 
again. Despite the recent decline, the past two decades stand out as being a period of 
intense international investment in Canada. The pattern with gross total investment — 
the sum of portfolio and direct — is somewhat different. Total investment flows fell off a 
cliff after 1929 and do not recover until after the Second World War, at which time it 
steadily rose until the takeoff in the early 1990s. Again, the 2000-01 market downturn and 
recession acted as an inflection point. 
Distinguishing portfolio from direct investment is useful because, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, a 10 percent ownership threshold serves as a reasonable proxy for changes in 
effective control. Whereas the sum of portfolio and direct investment captures the overall 
change in international ownership, honing in on direct investment helps us make sense of 
the changing distribution of corporate control. The inset table indicates that Canada’s 
participation in global investment was and is historically high. In the 1970s, gross FDI 
flows (relative to GDP) in Canada were nearly triple the level in Developed Countries 
and nearly six times the level in the developing world. These ratios have declined 
considerably, but Canadian participation in global investment remains above the 
Developed and the Developing Country averages.  
The explosion in international investment in the 1990s sets the context for Harry 
Arthurs (2000) question: is corporate Canada being ‘hollowed out’. As Arthurs views it, 
the question is closely related to economic power. Changes in corporate governance, he 
225 
 
says, led to declining autonomy for the subsidiaries of foreign transnationals. This not 
only reduced Canadian representation on the boards of foreign transnationals and 
diminished the autonomy of local management, but it threatened the market for 
specialized professional services in key cities such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 
With large Canadian firms getting swept up in the amalgamation wave of the 1990s, this 
effectively meant the hollowing out, not just of corporate Canada, but of entire cities and 
regions. In Arthur’s distressed question we hear the echo of Kari Levitt (1970), who saw 
heavy inflows of FDI into Canada as undermining national autonomy, something she 
considered akin to a ‘silent surrender’. 
 Arthurs and Levitt stand on the end of the spectrum, near Hymer, which views 
foreign investment with trepidation. But on this they are nearly alone in Canada. Most 
studies performed tend to draw favourable conclusions from higher levels of foreign 
investment, even foreign takeovers of Canadian-based firms.20 On the benefits of inward 
FDI, Baldwin (1995) finds that foreign controlled firms have higher labour productivity, 
pay higher wages and perform better than domestic firms. A study by Statistics Canada 
(1981) finds that foreign firms are much likelier to engage in trade and that they account 
for the bulk of domestic imports into Canada. Olineck and McMechan (1996) suggest 
that U.S.-controlled firms account for the majority of Canadian exports to the United 
States. So Canada’s trade exposure increases with higher levels of FDI.  
With respect to the hollowing out hypothesis, most researchers agree that the 
evidence does not support it. Whereas Arthurs focused on changes in corporate 
                                                          
20 Baldwin and Gellatly (2007) provide an overview of the research done at Statistics Canada on 
multinational corporations and foreign investment. The review in this paragraph draws extensively on 
their summation.   
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governance, the hollowing out debate has tended to centre on net Canadian cross-border 
acquisitions and head office activities. Baldwin, Beackstead and Brown (2003) and 
Beckstead and Brown (2006) do not find evidence that would suggest that head office 
functions were being reduced in the 1990s or 2000s. In fact, Baldwin and Brown (2004) 
find evidence from the manufacturing sector which suggests that higher levels of foreign 
ownership contribute to head office formation and employment.  
For the period 1997-2002, Marth (2004:1-2) reports that Canadian-based firms 
were net acquirers of foreign firms as a whole and U.S.-based firms in particular. He 
notes, however, that the dollar value of inward acquisitions was greater than the dollar 
value of outward acquisitions. Hirshorn (2008: 35) also denies the existence of hollowing 
out. Instead, he argues that both inward and outward acquisitions contribute to head 
office growth in Canada. On the issue of large takeovers, Grant and Bloom (2008: 40-41) 
examine deals in excess of $500 million (in constant dollars) between 1994 and 2007 and 
find that Canadian firms were more likely to be acquired by other Canadian firms than 
they were by foreign firms. What’s more, Canadian firms acquired more foreign firms 
than were acquired by foreign firms. They speculate that the value of the Canadian dollar 
may have played a role in fuelling outward Canadian acquisitions.21 Despite this, foreign 
acquisitions tended to be larger than Canadian acquisitions. And in terms of head office 
functions, they suggest, Canadian firms are more likely to downsize the head office of a 
domestic acquisition than are foreign firms (2008: 49).  
                                                          
21 This assertion will be examined in Section 6.7. 
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Carroll and Klassen (2010: 22) view the matter more critically, but still conclude 
that the evidence for hollowing out is thin. They note that a number of large Canadian 
firms have fallen from leadings positions, but other Canadian-based firms have taken 
their place. They see the period of intense takeover activity as constituting ‘regional elite 
reproduction’ in North America, not hollowing out.   
 The studies reviewed here appear to unanimously agree that hollowing out is not 
occurring in Canada. However, the method of arriving at this answer varies and it almost 
always excludes what is happening in comparable jurisdictions. Given that the two 
decades since 1990 have been a period of intense takeover activity around the world, how 
have Canadian-based firms behaved in relation to firms in comparable jurisdictions? The 
hollowing out question might become clearer if it is couched in differential terms. Insofar 
as the hollowing out metaphor makes sense, it could be said to take place if one or both 
of the following were to occur: (1) the average rate of Canadian acquisitions abroad is 
slower than in comparable jurisdictions; (2) the average rate of takeovers of Canadian-
based firms is faster than in comparable jurisdictions. Given the global nature of merger 
waves, is corporate Canada absorbing foreign firms faster than the average or are 
Canadian firms being taken over faster than the average? 
Figure 6.11 presents the answer to this question for the years 1990-2011. The thick 
black line tells the story for purchasers. It is a ratio which uses the average Canadian 
cross-border acquisition (measured as the total dollar value divided by total number of 
acquisitions) for the numerator and the average Developed Country-domiciled 
acquisition for the denominator. The thin broken line measures the same two things, but 
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for sellers. Canadian-based firms acquired foreign firms faster than the Developed 
Country average, as indicated by the positive trend line. And on the seller side, Canadian-
based firms sold to foreign-based firms more slowly than the Developed Country average, 
as indicated by the negative trend line. Couched in differential terms, corporate Canada 
is not being hollowed out; it is doing the hollowing out. 
 
Note: differential amalgamation is computed as a ratio of the average transaction value 
(total dollar value divided by total number of acquisitions) of a Canadian-domiciled 
purchaser/seller and the average value of a Developed Country-domiciled purchaser/seller.  
Source: numeric and dollar value of total cross-border M&A from UNCTAD Cross-
Border M&A Database, Web Tables 9-12 (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 
 
We should be careful about drawing conclusions from this data, if only because it 
registers changes at an aggregate level. This study is primarily concerned with the 
activities of large firms, not the universe of firms as such. That being so, what happens 
when we increase the resolution and specifically examine large acquisitions? Table 6.1 
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contrasts aggregate and disaggregate statistics on Canadian cross-border acquisitions. 
The three columns to the left register decade averages for the total number, total dollar 
value and average size of all cross-border M&A in current dollars. The three columns to 
the right capture the same three measures for billion dollar acquisitions in constant 
dollars.  
The average number of overall cross-border acquisitions nearly doubled from the 
1990s to the 2000s and the average dollar value more than tripled. Whereas the average 
acquisition in the 1990s was valued at $40 million USD, in the 2000s it more than 
doubled to $90 million USD. In gross terms there were nearly ten thousand acquisitions 
between 1990 and 2009. Corporate Canada was a net acquirer of nearly 500 firms, but 
registered as a net seller in terms of dollar value, at nearly $25 billion USD. So Canadian 
firms did more purchasing of foreign firms, but the value of Canadian acquisitions abroad 
tended to be smaller than the value of foreign acquisitions of Canadian-based firms. 
Table 6.1 
Cross-Border Amalgamation in Canada 
Decade 
Averages 
Total Cross-Border Acquisitions Billion Dollar Cross-Border Acquisitions ‡ 
Number 
Dollar 
Value† 
Average 
Size† Number 
Dollar 
Value* 
Average 
Size* 
1980s —— ——  3 8.3 2.9 
1990s 345 13.8 0.04 8 27.1 3.2 
2000s 606 51.8 0.09 22 79.8 3.6 
Total Gross Values 9,511 656.4 0.07 329 1,135.4 3.45 
Total Net Values 491 -24.4  11 -117.5  
† Billions of nominal $U.S. Dollars         ‡ Data begins in 1982         * Billions of constant (2010) $U.S. Dollars 
Note: There is a discrepancy between the dollar value of all cross-border acquisitions and of billion dollar cross-border acquisitions, 
the latter being considerably larger than the former. It is unclear why this is so, but one possible answer might come from the way 
UNCTAD registers cross-border M&A. Cross-border M&A sales are calculated on a net basis as follows: sales of firms in the host 
economy to foreign TNCs minus sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy. The data cover only those deals that involved an 
acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 percent.  Source: Numeric and dollar value of total cross-border M&A from UNCTAD 
Cross-Border M&A Database, Web Tables 9-12 (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics); billion dollar deals from SDC Platinum through 
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Thomson Reuters for the years 1982-1993 and Financial Post Crosbie Mergers and Acquisitions for the years 1994-2009; U.S. 
Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight.  
 
Shifting from aggregate to large (billion dollar) cross-border M&A activity, the 
total number and dollar value of billion dollar deals nearly tripled in each decade, rising 
from an average of three per year in the 1980s to 22 per year in the 2000s. The average size 
in inflation-adjusted terms also rose in each decade. Of the 329 billion dollar deals 
between 1982 and 2009, Canadian firms were net acquirers. But even though Canadian 
firms netted 11 foreign firms, the dollar value of Canadian acquisitions abroad tended to 
be smaller than that of foreign acquisitions of Canadian-based firms. Of the 
approximately $1.1 trillion USD in corporate assets that traded hands over the three 
decades, Canadian firms netted negative $118 billion. This indicates that, among the large 
players, Canadian purchases tended to be considerably smaller than Canadian sales. This 
result adds some support to Arthurs’ claim that corporate Canada is being hollowed out. 
Adjusting for size, large Canadian-based firms are disappearing at a faster rate than they 
are absorbing firms abroad.  
Now that we have examined the gross, net and differential aspects global 
amalgamation, how has the structure of foreign corporate ownership changed over time 
and how does Canada stack up against comparable jurisdictions in terms of its 
international exposure? 
 
6.6 Transnational Canadian Corporate Ownership 
Foreign ownership has been a major concern of political economists in Canada from the 
birth of Canadian Political Economy. Scholars like Innis (1930) examined Canada’s 
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colonial history and questioned why important decisions about Canada’s industrial 
future were perpetually being settled outside its borders. Levitt (1970) struck an 
intellectual chord with her generation by expressing fear about high levels of foreign 
ownership. As she saw it, Canada was the richest dependent country in the world and 
the chief instrument of its dependence was American FDI. As continental integration 
accelerated and American control of Canadian industry intensified, Canada would 
become re-colonized and forfeit its political-economic sovereignty, she argued (1970: 9).  
 It was apparent to Levitt that this process wasn’t primarily about markets. After 
all, large firms were replacing markets with centralized planning. In practice, the fact of 
planning meant that a tension would arise between the policy planning done by 
Canadian governments and the business planning done by American corporations (1970: 
73, 118-19). It was inevitable, she thought, that large American firms would use the 
American State to protect their investments abroad. So as American multinationals 
exported ownership claims to Canada, Canadians would be pulled more closely into the 
American orbit. And as Canada’s corporate and technocratic elite were drawn closer to 
the American imperium, it would become increasingly difficult to defend the very idea of 
Canadian independence (1970: 142). Laxer (1989) followed Levitt in trying to sort out 
Canada’s dependent economic status. Arthurs (2000) is just the latest in a long line of 
scholars who have wondered if Canada can maintain its political-economic sovereignty 
in the face of centripetal forces of American-led globalization. 
 Levitt and others raise a legitimate fear: how can a society consider itself 
sovereign when important decisions about its national future are made by foreigners? A 
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counter argument would run as follows. Multinational corporations, irrespective of their 
national domicility, have the same ultimate objective: differential accumulation. For the 
sake of this goal they will sacrifice productive efficiency and industrial serviceability. 
And while the proprietors and executives who control the organization might embody 
nationalist sentiments, at the end of the day if they do not submit themselves to the 
requirements of differential accumulation their institutional survival will be threatened. 
Many aspects of the corporate organization are geared towards the differential 
enhancement of shareholder wealth. This implies, as Veblen recognized and N&B echo, 
the subjugation of industry to business. Whether the decisions are made by individuals 
who carry a foreign passport, the objectives of the firm will be couched in differential 
business terms, not industrial terms. To borrow a clichéd tautology, ‘business is 
business’. So why does it matter if a firm is headquartered in another jurisdiction?  
As we’ve already noted in Chapter 5, Canadians own just over 50 percent of the 
shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, thus ownership of Canadian equities is 
already global. The location of corporate owners matters from the standpoint of legal 
jurisdiction, of course, but business is not coterminous with industry, so the fear about 
foreign decisions (business) controlling the economic (industrial) future of Canadians 
might be misplaced.  That critique aside, how has the secular increase in foreign 
investment in recent decades transformed the structure of foreign ownership in Canada? 
Figure 6.12 maps the history of foreign ownership from the 1920s onward. The thick 
black line captures the stock of Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA) and the 
broken line captures the stock of FDI in Canada, both as a percent of GDP. The inset 
chart tabulates the share of corporate revenue and assets controlled by foreign interests.  
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Note: for CDIA and FDI, data are interpolated between 1926, 1930, 1933, and 1939 and are 
continuous after 1945. Foreign control of corporate revenue and corporate assets are 
tabulated using two separate series. The years 1965-2000 come from Baldwin and Gellatly 
(2005), Table 1, p. 18. The second series runs from 1999-2010 and comes from Cansim 
Table 179-0004. Data for the years 2001 to 2010 are rebased to reflect the difference 
between the two series. Source: stock of direct investment from Cansim Table 376-0037; 
nominal GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1927-1960) and Cansim 
Table 380-0016 (1961-2011).  
 
The stock of FDI hit a historic high in 1933. At that time, for every dollar of CDIA 
there were more than five dollars of FDI in Canada. The foreign ownership of Canada 
decreased dramatically in the following decades, but by 1960 the ratio of inward to 
outward FDI reached five-to-one again. Foreign ownership diminished in the 1960s and 
1970s, something that puzzled scholars. Morck et. al. (2005: 117), for example, speculate 
that the nationalist manoeuvers taken by the Trudeau Liberals, particularly the Foreign 
Investment Review Agency (FIRA), contributed to the decline of foreign ownership. The 
declining significance of foreign ownership is more perceptible in the inset figure. The 
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percent of corporate revenue and assets that are under foreign control declined from the 
early 1970s when the FIRA was instituted to the late 1980s when the Mulroney Tories 
signed the Canada-U.S. FTA. Both measures climbed throughout the 1990s before 
stabilizing over the past decade.  
Even though the stock of FDI in Canada has approached postwar highs in recent 
years, there has been an even more significant shift with the stock of CDIA. There is 
virtually no change in the stock of CDIA for the three decades after the Second World 
War. The outward orientation of Canadian capitalists was almost non-existent. That 
orientation began to change in the late 1970s as Canadian business expanded abroad. It 
took until 1986 for the stock of CDIA to match its 1933 high (relative to GDP), but the 
really historic moment comes in 1996 when, for the first time since record keeping began, 
the dollar value of CDIA surpassed FDI in Canada. Canadian capitalists have 
internationalized their activities over the last three decades, and while the market 
downturn appears to have acted as a stumbling block to international investment, the 
level of CDIA remains above FDI.  
 If the increasingly outward orientation of corporate Canada represents the 
maturation of Canadian capitalists, then how does Canada compare with comparable 
jurisdictions? Figure 6.13 generates a ratio of the stock of outward to inward FDI for 
Canada, the U.S. and the Developed Countries. Historically, the U.S. and the Developed 
Countries had outward-to-inward ratio’s well in excess of 1.0. As is evident from the 
figure, Canada was an outlier as late as the 1980s insofar as it had more inward than 
outward FDI. As of 2011, Canada is nearer the U.S. and Developed Countries, both of 
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whose ratio of outward to inward FDI was approximately 1.30, with Canada not very 
different at 1.13. 
Why has the outward orientation of corporate Canada increased in recent 
decades? The answer to this question is likely to be complex, but consider the issue of 
currency valuation. The inset chart in Figure 6.13 contrasts the value of the Canadian 
dollar relative to the U.S. dollar and the value of the stock of Canadian outward FDI as a 
percent of the stock of American outward FDI. Arthurs’ (2000) hollowing out thesis 
came in the context of a quarter-century-long depreciation in the value of the Canadian 
dollar relative to the U.S. dollar. That depreciation might have induced the fear that 
Canadian assets would be foreign acquired at ‘fire sale’ prices.  
 
Note: stock of direct investment denominated in $U.S. dollars. Source: inward and 
outward stock of FDI from UNCTAD Statistics; Canada-U.S. exchange rate from Global 
Financial Data. 
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Georgopoulos (2008) asks whether there is a relationship between Canada’s 
relative currency valuation and foreign M&A activity. The results of his research indicate 
that foreign M&A activity will increase in response to changes in the relative value of the 
currency, but only in high research and development industries (2008: 452). But as the 
inset chart clearly shows, the relative value of the Canadian dollar is closely associated 
with the outward orientation of Canadian capitalists, as measured by the stock of 
outward FDI. It makes sense, at least hypothetically, that a stronger Canadian dollar is 
more likely to induce Canadian capitalists to make acquisitions abroad than they would 
if the relative value of the dollar was lower. There are plainly many other factors at play 
including corporate profits, credit conditions and, because Canadian equity is so heavily 
bound up with materials and energy, commodity prices.  
Given that the relative value of the Canadian dollar appears to play a role in the 
outward acquisition activities of capitalists, and so the structure of corporate ownership, 
what shapes the relative value of the Canadian dollar? Figure 6.14 stacks the relative 
value of the Canadian dollar up against differential commodity prices, the latter 
computed as a ratio of the Returns/Jeffries CRB Commodities Total Returns Index and 
Canada’s consumer price index. Commodity prices fluctuated heavily between the First 
and Second World War, reaching a series high in 1946. Over the postwar era, commodity 
prices steadily declined, with two significant exceptions: the early 1970s and the period 
between 2000 and 2007, which saw significant increases. The relative value of the 
Canadian dollar, on the other hand, also fluctuated greatly in the first half of the 
twentieth century, reaching a series high in 1959 (where it traded at $1.05 USD). The 
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Canadian dollar declined precipitously between 1974 and 2001, closing at $0.628 USD. By 
2007 the Canadian dollar was trading above the American dollar yet again. Given that the 
two series stretch back to the First World War, it is striking how closely synchronized 
their fluctuations are.  
 
Source: Exchange rate, Reuters/Jeffries-CRB Total Returns Index and consumer price 
index from Global Financial Data. 
 
 
Thus, the increase in the relative value of the Canadian dollar since 2001 might be 
one reason why Canadian proprietors have increased their foreign holdings relative to 
American proprietors. The question arises: if Canadian capitalists have gone on a global 
buying spree on account of the high Canadian dollar and the high commodity prices that 
fuel it, how do we account for differential commodity prices? Is it ‘demand and supply’ or 
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‘scarcity’ that shapes base commodity prices, and by implication, the relative value of the 
Canadian dollar, or is it something else? This question will be addressed in Chapter 9. 
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has detailed some of the history of mergers and acquisitions in Canada. 
There appear to be strong linkages between M&A, on the one hand, and corporate asset 
concentration and the globalization of Canadian corporate ownership, on the other. In 
other words, internal breadth through merger and acquisition has been one of the main 
pathways that large firms take in their quest for differential accumulation.  
This chapter also contributed to the ‘hollowing out’ debate by introducing the 
concept of ‘differential amalgamation’. The evidence suggests that Canadian-based firms 
have been purchasing foreign firms faster than the Developed Country average and 
selling out to foreign interests more slowly than the Developed Country average. This 
pattern suggests that corporate Canada is not being hollowed out; it is doing the 
hollowing out. However, disaggregate evidence indicates that Arthurs’ hollowing out 
hypothesis is not entirely wrong. At the level of billion dollar acquisitions, corporate 
Canada has been a net seller in terms of dollar value since the early 1980s.  
The history of foreign investment and foreign ownership was also disclosed and 
the connection these processes have to currency valuation and differential commodity 
prices was outlined. Large Canadian-based firms have matured in recent decades as 
evidenced by their heightened acquisition activities abroad, which appear to be a partial 
consequence of high commodity prices and a high Canadian dollar.  
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 Chapters 5 and 6 outlined the structure of the corporate sector and detailed some 
of its transformations. Chapter 7 continues the inquiry by focusing on the pattern of 
growth and stagnation in Canada. How do we account for the shift from rapid growth in 
the immediate decades of the postwar period to the stagnant growth in the decades since 
1980? What role has the development of large firms played in propelling growth and 
stagnation in Canada?  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
From Robust Growth to Stagnant Growth 
 
 
For a substantial and very influential part of the modern industrial population, 
recession, stagnation, and the underemployment equilibrium are not adverse phenomena 
and are much to be preferred to the relevant corrective action.  
   - John Kenneth Galbraith1   
 
 
 
 
In the academic and the popular imagination, growth is what lifts nations out of poverty. 
Growth is associated with modernization, technological advancement, material security 
and mass prosperity. The reasons why nations strive for growth are not far removed from 
why individuals desire a growth in their personal income: enhanced security, expanded 
comfort and a fuller realization of human capabilities. The overt objective of Adam 
Smith’s, Wealth of Nations — perhaps the foundational text of modern political economy — 
was to determine why some nations are comparatively wealthier than others. Growth, in 
short, has occupied a central position in the economic imagination in recent centuries. 
Twentieth century political economists were driven to understand the determinants of 
growth, too. However, the opposite of growth, namely stagnation, recession and 
depression also attracted considerable attention. Linkages between depression, political 
upheaval and revolution in the past century made it imperative for political economists 
to understand what promotes (and what undermines) growth. 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Kirshner (1998: 76), footnote 50. 
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 In contemporary Canada, government officials, business leaders, economists, 
policy makers and the citizenry at large seem perpetually concerned with GDP growth. 
There are good reasons for this. The rate of growth has an impact on tax revenues and 
budget deficits, health care spending and education funding, infrastructure 
improvements and housing starts, corporate revenue and consumer spending, and more 
recently, the realization that human civilization may be trespassing on ecological 
boundaries. Much of the ‘economic’ phenomena witnessed in contemporary Canada are 
linked with the rate of GDP growth. And, almost as a matter of definition, the quality of 
life enjoyed by Canadians is intimately bound up with the growth of their incomes.2  
 The early decades of the postwar era exhibited rapid growth and the decades 
since 1980 have exhibited comparatively sluggish growth (stagnation) in Canada and 
other OECD countries. Why has growth slowed in recent decades in Canada? More 
specifically, how do we account for the shift from robust growth in the Keynesian era 
(roughly 1945-1980) to the sluggish growth of the neoliberal era (1980-present)? Is the 
stagnation of recent decades related to the development of large firms? The present 
chapter will map the history of GDP growth in Canada and explore some of its 
determinants. The primary objective will be to sort out what role, if any, large firms have 
played in propelling growth/stagnation in postwar Canada.  
                                                          
2 Subjective assessments of happiness rise with income, but only up to a point. Kahneman and Deaton 
(2010), for example, parse assessments of well-being in the U.S. into two compartments: day-to-day 
emotional well-being and overall life satisfaction. They find that both assessments rise as individuals climb 
the income scale. However, ‘diminishing returns’ eventually set in and happiness ‘plateaus’ around $75,000 
in annual income. Beyond that point, more income does not translate into more happiness. This subject 
will be revisited in Chapter 8.  
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 It must be stressed that the present Chapter will not aim at a complete 
explanation of the determinants of GDP growth. The subject is sufficiently complex to 
warrant an entire study, perhaps an entire academic career. Urbanization, demographic 
shifts, technological change and many other factors have a bearing on growth. However, 
many of these factors fall outside the purview of this study. Another caveat pertains to 
the location of causal mechanisms. While manifesting itself at a domestic level, the 
pattern of growth/stagnation in postwar Canada is similar to that found in other 
advanced societies. This complicates its study. If the pattern of growth in Canada is also 
exhibited by comparable jurisdictions, then putting the explanatory emphasis on 
national developments might be misplaced. Nevertheless, insofar as there are domestic 
aspects to growth and stagnation in Canada we can search for domestic causes while 
recognizing the limitation of such an approach. With some stylized facts in hand we will 
formulate broad generalizations about some of the determinants of growth in Canada.  
 The Chapter is carved into seven sections. The first section maps the history of 
GDP growth and unemployment in Canada as a way of contextualizing the discussion 
that follows. The second section explores some of the determinants of growth in Canada 
by honing in on three variables: the unemployment rate, green-field investment and 
government spending. The third section disaggregates the political economy and 
contrasts the top 60 firms with the private sector to see if large firms have exacerbated or 
alleviated the stagnation tendencies of postwar Canadian capitalism. The fourth section 
queries whether or not rapid growth is something that should be desired by large firms, 
theoretically speaking. Assembling arguments made by Nitzan and Bichler, Veblen and 
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Kalecki, a case can be made that moderate stagnation is ‘optimal’ from the standpoint of 
large firms.  
Sections five and six explore what impact the development of large firms may 
have had on the rate of growth in Canada. Three aspects are highlighted: first, the size 
and income position of the largest firms; second, the decision by the corporate sector to 
stockpile cash; and third, changes in the corporate income tax regime. There is evidence 
to suggest that stagnation may be a partial consequence of increasing corporate 
concentration. The seventh section provides a summary of some of the key arguments 
and poses some questions to be addressed in Section III of the dissertation.  
 
7.1 Mapping the History of Growth and Stagnation in Canada 
In Chapter 3 (Table 3.1) we learned that the level of growth in Canada was relatively high 
in the immediate postwar period (1950 to 1980) compared with the succeeding period 
(1980 to 2010). A similar pattern is evident in the United States and in the OECD as a 
whole. The political-economic shift from a Keynesian welfare regime towards neoliberal 
globalization has been documented in great detail both inside and outside Canada.3 The 
program of deregulation, privatization, tax cuts and trade and investment liberalization 
was largely sold to the Canadian public as a way of accelerating GDP growth. So why 
was the period immediately following 1945 characterized by rapid growth and the period 
after 1980 characterized by slow growth (stagnation)? Let’s explore this question by 
putting the history of growth in deep historical context.  
                                                          
3 Two of the best pieces of scholarship exploring the shift toward neoliberal globalization in Canada are 
Clarkson (2002) and McBride (2005). Harvey (2005) supplies a critical take on the neoliberal program 
globally. 
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Figure 7.1 provides a picture of growth and stagnation in Canada using two 
measures. The bars represent the decade average rates of inflation-adjusted GDP growth 
per capita from 1870 to 2010. The 1990s and 2000s are shaded in red to remind the reader 
that they represent the period after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) 
was put in place. The linear series captures the decade average unemployment rate from 
1920 through 2010. An additional data point was added in the 2000s to capture the rise of 
precarity in the Canadian labour market, measured as the official unemployment rate 
plus discouraged workers, involuntary part-time workers and the waiting group (data 
are only available for that decade).  
 
Source: GDP from Global Financial Data (1870-1925), Historical Statistics of Canada, 
Series F13 (1926-1960) and Cansim Tables 380-0016 (1961-1980) and 384-0037 (1981-2010); 
unemployment rates from Global Financial Data (1920-1975) and Cansim Table 282-0086 
(1976-2010). CPI and total Canadian population from Global Financial Data. 
 
245 
 
Viewing the facts in deep historical context enables us to see how poorly the 
neoliberal era has performed in terms of GDP growth, especially the so-called ‘free trade’ 
era. The 1930s and 1940s were historic extremes in Canada. Stagnation reached a historic 
high in the 1930s: the unemployment rate soared and GDP growth was virtually nil. In 
the following decade, Canada moved closer to full employment than at any point in its 
history and, as a partial consequence, the rate of growth in that decade reached a historic 
high.4 In contrast to the 1940s, one could say that all postwar decades exhibited high and 
rising stagnation. On the unemployment side of things we see increasing stagnation in 
each successive decade from a low reached in the 1940s to a high in the 1990s. The first 
decade of the new millennia appeared to have lower unemployment than any decade 
since the 1970s, but when we factor in the rise of labour market precarity (not to mention 
‘self-employment’), unemployment remained high even in the 2000s. Under this 
interpretation the neoliberal era exhibited heightened stagnation. 
Despite increasing unemployment over the postwar decades, GDP growth was 
historically high in the Keynesian era. By way of contrast, the 1980s was the worst 
growth decade since the 1930s, the 1990s was worse than the 1980s and the 2000s was 
roughly the same as the 1980s. Therefore, we can unequivocally say that, despite many 
advertisements to the contrary, neoliberal institutions and policies (importantly and 
especially the ‘free trade’ agreements) did not lead to accelerated growth. Instead, 
                                                          
4 In Chapter 10 we will (conceptually and empirically) explore the experience of the 1940s in greater detail.  
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Canadians have experienced heightened stagnation.5 How do we explain the shift from 
robust to stagnant growth in Canada?    
 
7.2 Some Long-Term Drivers of Growth 
To explain slower GDP growth from one period to the next one has to make an attempt 
to explain growth as such. So what drives GDP growth in Canada? Given the complexity 
surrounding the determinants of growth, we will restrict the focus to a few basic factors: 
unemployment, business spending on industrial capacity (‘green-field investment’) and 
government spending.6 We begin with unemployment. A simple explanation for the rate 
of GDP growth is implied in Figure 7.1: decades with a higher unemployment rate tended 
to exhibit lower growth and decades with a lower unemployment rate tended to display 
higher growth.  
The 1930s and 1940s offer the clearest example of this relationship. The 1930s was 
the lowest growth decade on record and exhibited the highest level of unemployment on 
record. In the 1940s, the Canadian State put people back to work in unprecedented 
numbers, pushing unemployment to historic lows and, in the process, helped propel the 
rate of GDP growth a historic high. For the most part, this pattern held in the postwar 
decades as well. In very basic terms, it appears that the rate of growth is bound up with 
                                                          
5 Brennan (2013a; 2013b) explores some of the distributional impacts of trade and investment liberalization 
in Canada, including a discussion of the failed predictions vis-à-vis GDP growth. 
6 This short list is not meant to preclude the recognition that there are other factors which propel growth, 
including technological change and innovation, for instance. However, from a Veblenian standpoint, 
‘innovation’ and ‘technological change’ are primarily industrial categories, not business categories. This means 
that such variables reside outside the scope of this study (for theoretical reasons). This does not imply that 
these variables are unimportant from a growth standpoint. 
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the proportion of the workforce that is able to find paid employment, which makes 
intuitive sense.7  
 Recall Veblen’s distinction of ‘business’ from ‘industry’: the expansion of 
productive capacity (industry) involves proprietors paying (business) to have new 
infrastructure and equipment built. Is there a relationship between green-field 
investment and GDP growth? Figure 7.2 contrasts the rate of change of business 
spending on non-residential structures and equipment with the rate of change of GDP 
per capita. Both series are adjusted for inflation and smoothed as 10-year moving averages 
to capture the cyclically-adjusted (‘secular’) trend.  
The relationship between the two series is remarkably close over the past 
fourteen decades. Green-field investment soared between the early 1930s and early 1940s, 
held steady till the early 1950s and then fell precipitously in the early 1960s. Despite the 
drop, the rate of growth of green-field investment remained high in the 1960s and 1970s in 
relation to the decades that came after 1980. The decline in GDP growth since 1980 
appears to be closely tied with the decline in business spending on fixed assets. How do 
these facts relate to processes explored in previous chapters?8   
In Chapter 6 we explored the history of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
(‘internal breadth’) and noted that the major merger waves grew in size during and after 
the 1980s. Between 1914 and 1988, the dollar value of mergers and acquisitions 
                                                          
7 However, one might argue that this just pushes the explanatory emphasis back one level because we are 
now compelled to explain what determines the unemployment rate. Instead of trying to explain the 
unemployment rate, we will proceed with an explanation of growth (while recognizing that the two are 
closely associated). 
8 Unsurprisingly, the rate of change business spending on fixed assets (adjusted for inflation) is negatively 
correlated (-0.41) with the overall unemployment rate from 1919-2012 (and the strength of the relationship 
increases to -0.51 if we take the cyclically-adjusted trend of each series). 
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represented roughly 23 percent of the dollar value of green-field investment. Between 
1988 and 2012, the dollar value of mergers and acquisitions soared to roughly 93 percent 
of the dollar value of green-field investment — a four-fold increase. If business 
investment has three component parts — the maintenance of existing industrial capacity 
(gross), the creation of new industrial capacity (net) and the redistribution of control of 
existing industrial capacity (amalgamation) — and if the former two processes are 
closely associated with GDP growth, then it follows that a surge in the relative value of 
mergers and acquisitions should depress the rate of GDP growth. Stated differently, the 
acceleration of corporate amalgamation plays a role in decelerating GDP growth.9  
 
Note: data for expenditures on non-residential structures and equipment only dates to 
1926. For the period prior to 1926, the inflation-adjusted rate of change of gross fixed 
private investment (includes residential and non-residential structures and equipment) is 
used as a proxy. Source: inflation-adjusted GDP from Global Financial Data (1870-1925), 
                                                          
9 In Chapter 10 we will probe some of the consequences of amalgamation on the distribution of income. 
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nominal GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1926-1960) and Cansim 
Tables 380-0016 (1961-1980) and 384-0037 (1981-2012); CPI and total Canadian population 
from Global Financial Data; expenditures on gross fixed private investment from 
Urquhart (1993: 16), Table 1.2 (1871-1926); expenditures on non-residential structures and 
equipment from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F23+F24 (1926-1980) and Cansim 
Table 384-0038 (1981-2012). 
 
 We would be remiss if we neglected the role of government in promoting or 
impeding growth. In conventional economic theorizing, the private sector is deemed to 
be productive, dynamic and wealth-generating (and is often deemed the domain of 
‘freedom’). The disciplining effect of competition combined with the coordinating effect 
of market signals means, in conventional theory, that resources in the private sector will 
be put to efficient use. The public sector, by contrast, is sometimes conceived as parasitic, 
static and wealth-redistributing (a ‘necessary evil’). Because government is a monopoly 
and tax revenue is generated through coercive means, the deployment of tax revenue in 
the form of government spending will tend to be misallocated because of the absence of 
price signals. This logic implies that the growth of the public sector through increases in 
government spending (generated through increased borrowing or higher taxation) might 
lead to slower GDP growth (by ‘crowding out’ private investment or by other means).  
What is the relationship between government spending and growth? Do 
increases in government spending impede growth? Figure 7.3 contrasts the rate of change 
of total government spending and the rate of change of GDP per capita. Both series are 
adjusted for inflation and smoothed as ten-year moving averages to highlight the secular 
trend. There is a tight and persistent relationship between the two series and the 
strength of the relationship increases over time. Government spending soared to a 
historic high between 1939 and 1945, largely as a consequence of the war effort. GDP 
growth also reached a historic high during the same period. In the decade following the 
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War government spending radically decelerated and was negative for a few years. 
Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, government spending accelerated once more 
before going into long-term decline after 1975. The pattern of GDP growth is markedly 
similar. 
 
Source: inflation-adjusted GDP from Global Financial Data (1870-1925), nominal GDP 
from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1926-1960) and Cansim Tables 380-0016 
(1961-1980) and 384-0037 (1981-2012); CPI and total population from Global Financial 
Data; total government spending (all levels) from Urquhart (1993: 17-18), Table 1.3 (1870-
1926), Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F116 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0022 
(1961-2011). 
 
Canadians built their welfare state in the Keynesian era — transportation 
infrastructure, health care and post-secondary institutions, a social safety net as well as a 
modern civil service — and these activities are linked with the expansion of government 
spending and rapid GDP growth. Beginning in the mid-1970s, both the rate of GDP 
growth and the rate change of government spending decelerated. There isn’t enough 
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information to draw a firm conclusion here, but the evidence suggests that accelerating 
government spending may have been a key ingredient in the high rate of growth 
witnessed in the Keynesian era, and correspondingly, decelerating government spending 
a key aspect of the heightened stagnation experienced in the neoliberal era. 
We have to be careful in imputing causality in this instance: it may be the case 
that government spending accelerates in periods of rapid growth and decelerates in 
periods of weaker growth, so the causal direction may run in the opposite direction. 
Despite the caution, the facts in Figure 7.3 suggest that increases in government spending 
are not associated with depressed rates of growth. As the largest ‘economic unit’ in 
society, it makes intuitive sense that a secular increase in government spending should 
help propel growth. What role has the development of large firms played in propelling 
growth and stagnation?  
 
7.3 Containing Creativity: Large Firms and Stagnation 
Thus far, the discussion of growth and stagnation has unfolded on an aggregate level. 
Table 7.1 begins to disaggregate the historical picture by contrasting rates of growth for 
the private sector with those found among the top 60 firms. The second column captures 
GDP growth per capita (adjusted for inflation). The remaining columns plot two 
variables: the rate of growth of business spending on fixed assets (adjusted for inflation) 
and the rate of growth of employment. The information is assembled as decade averages, 
with the bottom three rows contrasting the average for the Keynesian period (1950-
1980), the neoliberal period (1980-2012) and the difference between the two periods.  
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As alluded to in Figure 7.1, the neoliberal period not only failed to bring 
accelerated growth; it witnessed deeper stagnation, with the overall rate of growth 
falling by three-fifths between the two periods. If business spending on fixed assets and 
employment are two key drivers of growth, how do the largest firms compare with the 
private sector? Did large firms lead the shift to heightened stagnation?   
Table 7.1 
Green-Field Investment and Employment:  
Aggregate and Disaggregate Rates of Growth  
Period 
GDP per 
Capita* 
Private Sector Top 60 Firms 
Total Spending on 
Fixed Assets* 
Total 
Employment 
Average Spending  
on Fixed Assets* 
Average 
Employment 
1950s 3.0 6.8 1.9 -- 2.7 
1960s 3.7 4.8 2.6 10.1 2.8 
1970s 3.6 6.8 2.4 8.4 3.9 
1980s 1.5 0.8 2.1 3.2 2.2 
1990s 0.9 1.9 0.9 3.4 1.2 
2000s 1.6 1.0 1.5 6.4 0.3 
1950-1980 3.3 6.1 2.3 9.6† 3.3 
1980-2012 1.4 2.1 1.5 5.1 1.2 
% difference -1.9 -4.0 -0.8 -4.5 -2.1 
* Inflation-adjusted                 † 1960-1980                
Note: total private sector employment was estimated between 1950 and 1975 using an industrial composite 
employment index, with proper rebasing.  Source: GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1926-1960) 
and Cansim Tables 380-0016 (1961-1980) and 384-0037 (1981-2012); consumer price index and total Canadian 
population from Global Financial Data; business investment in non-residential structures and equipment from 
Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F23+F24 (1950-1960) and Cansim Tables 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 
(1981-2012); private sector employment from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series D528 (1950-1975) and Cansim Table 
282-0012 (1976-2012); employment and ‘capital expenditures’ for the top 60 firms from Compustat through WRDS. 
 
Let’s begin with business spending on fixed assets (‘green-field investment’). The 
private sector spent heavily between 1950 and 1980, ranging from five to seven percent in 
average annual growth. This rate slowed drastically in the succeeding decades, falling 
within a range of one to two percent. The top 60 firms spent at a faster rate on fixed 
assets in every period, ranging from eight to ten percent in the Keynesian period and 
253 
 
falling to a range of three to six percent in the neoliberal period. Note that business 
spending on fixed assets by the top 60 firms doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s. This is 
likely due to the fact that materials and energy firms are over-represented in Canada and 
there has been a commodity boom since 2003. Despite the fact that the rate of growth of 
business spending on fixed assets among the top 60 firms was higher than the private 
sector in every period, the percentage decline between the Keynesian and neoliberal 
periods was greater among the top 60 firms: the rate of growth fell by 4 percent for the 
private sector and 4.5 percent for the top 60 firms.  
In the Keynesian period, the private sector expanded employment at an average 
annual rate of 2.3 percent per year, falling to 1.5 percent in the neoliberal period. The 
largest 60 firms expanded employment at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent in the 
Keynesian period, falling to just 1.2 percent per year in the neoliberal period. The three-
fifths decline in the rate of employment growth among the top 60 firms is matched by a 
three-fifths decline in the rate of GDP per capita growth over the same two periods.  
So what does this information tell us? As has already been discussed, it appears 
that the rate of growth is closely associated with business spending on fixed assets and 
with employment. The rate of growth of green-field investment fell over the two periods 
for both the private sector and for the top 60 firms. However, the rate of growth fell more 
for the top 60 firms, which suggests that they led the shift to slower growth. This claim is 
bolstered by trends in employment. In the Keynesian period, the top 60 firms expanded 
employment faster than the private sector average, but in the neoliberal period they 
expanded employment slower than the private sector average. This information suggests 
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that the largest corporate units played a key role in accelerating growth in the Keynesian 
era and accelerating stagnation in the neoliberal era.  
A point of clarification is required on the matter of corporate motivation and 
business intention. This study has deliberately shied away from an examination of human 
motivation, intention and other subjective phenomena, opting instead to focus on the 
objective aspects of political-economic development, such as measurable shifts in the 
institutional and organizational environment. Whether large firms deliberated slowed 
spending on industrial expansion is (as far as this study is concerned) not the primary 
issue. Even if it were, it would not be possible to sort out business intention and 
motivation across the universe of corporations (in the aggregate).  
It is analytically significant that the various measures of business performance 
probed in Chapter 5 and 6 — the profit share of national income, aggregate 
concentration, the markup and differential accumulation — were low and/or falling in 
the Keynesian era (a period of rapid growth) and were high and/or climbing in the 
neoliberal era (a period of sluggish growth). Mainstream economic thinking might 
presume that rapid growth is something that is (or ought to be) desired by business, but 
Canadian business performed poorly in decades of rapid growth and performed 
exceptionally well amidst sluggish growth. This does not confirm that business prefers 
sluggish to rapid growth, but it makes the mainstream assumption about business 
motivation vis-à-vis growth more suspect.  
Why is it that the robust growth of the Keynesian era occurred with low and 
falling measures of business performance but the sluggish growth of the neoliberal era 
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appeared with high and rising measures of business performance? Do these facts imply 
that business prefers sluggish to rapid growth?  
 
7.4 Is Stagnation Good for Business? 
A common assumption in contemporary Canada — shared by politicians, policy makers, 
economists and the broader citizenry — is that business favours rapid growth. After all, 
governments undertake all sorts of activities to ‘prime the capitalist pump’ and ‘create 
conditions favourable for growth’. The multiple layers of Canadian government have 
reduced regulations, signed trade and investment liberalization agreements, cut 
corporate income tax rates, privatized state assets, curtailed budgetary deficits, etc., in 
the hope (officially, if not factually) that business will hire Canadian workers, invest in 
expansionary projects, and consequently, the growth process will accelerate. But what if 
rapid growth is a threat to business?  
Utilizing some of Veblen’s concepts, N&B build an argument as to why business 
fears both excessive slack and full capacity utilization. Glut and maximum growth alike, 
they tell us, produce the same outcome: a collapse in profitability. N&B provide a 
thought experiment to illustrate their reasoning. What would happen if all the major 
industries in a developed capitalist society were to produce at full socio-technological 
capacity rather than at ‘what the traffic will bear’? The torrent of goods and services that 
would flood the market (and accumulate as inventory) would put enormous downward 
pressure on prices and ‘undermine the tacit agreements and open cooperation among 
256 
 
dominant firms’. The end result would be depression and, potentially, political 
disintegration (2009: 236).  
 N&B assert that business profitability requires production, but not a ‘free run of 
production’. Corporate institutions need to control the direction of industrial activity, 
they say, but they also need to curtail the expansion of industrial activities below full 
socio-technological potential. This situation, which they label ‘business as usual’, entails 
proprietors centring their business activities between two extremes: at one pole is 
excessive glut and depression, which generates low capitalist earnings, and at the other 
pole is find full capacity utilization, which also leads to low capitalist earnings.  
N&B empirically support their claim that the optimal business distribution 
involves a moderate degree of stagnation and under-capacity utilization by contrasting 
capitalist earnings and unemployment in the United States from the 1920s onward. At 
the height of the Great Depression, unemployment (their proxy for ‘industry’) was 
comparatively high and capitalist earnings (their proxy for ‘business’, measured as profit 
and net interest as a percent of national income) was historically low. A short decade 
later, during and shortly after the Second World War, both unemployment and capitalist 
earnings approached historic lows again. In the first instance, there was excessive slack 
and in the second instance there was not enough slack. The ideal position for business 
owners — the optimal distribution — is between the two extremes, with a moderate 
degree of stagnation (2009: 237-9).  
In ‘The Political Aspects of Full Employment’, Kalecki (1943b) captures another 
aspect of the counter-intuitive relationship between growth and business performance. 
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As a consequence of government spending (financed through government borrowing), 
Kalecki argued that full employment had become a realistic public policy goal by the 
1930s and 1940s. However, he went on to contend that the business class would 
staunchly oppose the policy measures required to achieve full employment. Kalecki cited 
a variety of reasons, but one stands out: if, through deficits, government could maintain 
full employment then  
‘the sack’ would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the 
boss would be undermined and the self assurance and class consciousness of the working 
class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions of work 
would create political tension… and [an increase] in wage rates [would result] from the 
stronger bargaining power of the workers… (1943b: 140-1)  
 
Interpreting Kalecki broadly, the control of unemployment by large corporate units may 
be thought of as an institutional weapon insofar as it constrains the aspirations and 
demands of the workforce. In the context of relatively high unemployment, the portion of 
the labour market that is employed will be less likely to press for higher compensation or 
improved working conditions. The threat of unemployment and idle capacity will tend to 
temper the demands of workers. But with a government policy of full employment, 
labour market precarity would be lessened and the workforce could grow emboldened to 
demand improved compensation and working conditions. This implies that the sluggish 
growth (stagnation) associated with moderate unemployment may be welcomed by 
business as a substitute to the full employment potential associated with the financial 
capabilities of the modern state.  
 This may be why, in the epigraph to the present chapter, Galbraith stated that 
there is a portion of the citizenry who are in favour of stagnation and underemployment: 
business owners and top executives may favour slower growth because it elevates the 
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social position of business while depressing the aspirations of much of the workforce. So 
rather than full employment and rapid growth being something desired by business, it 
could pose a serious institutional threat. If moderate stagnation is something that will be 
welcomed by business as a substitute for robust growth, then how does the evolution of 
large firms fit into the stagnation picture?  
   
7.5 Corporate Concentration and Stagnation 
There is another way in which the activities of large firms may have contributed to the 
slower growth of recent decades and it is linked with their relative size and position. 
Consider what Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of Canada, said in a speech to 
the Canadian Auto Workers union in 2012: he chastised corporate Canada for holding 
large quantities of what he called ‘dead money’, rather than investing it in expansionary 
activities (Carmichael, Blackwell, Keenan 2012). At the time of Carney’s statement, the 
non-financial corporate sector had stockpiled more than half a trillion dollars of cash on 
its balance sheet. Let’s explore the meaning behind Carney’s words by honing in on the 
activities of the largest firms.  
 Figure 7.4 contrasts two series. The thin broken line captures the rate of growth 
of average employment among the top 60 firms, smoothed as ten-year moving averages to 
highlight the cyclically-adjusted trend (since a rate of change can swing wildly from year 
to year). The thick black line plots a ‘build-to-hoard’ ratio for the top 60 firms, measured 
as average expenditure on fixed assets to cash. Despite contrasting a flow (investment in 
fixed assets) with a stock (cash), the ratio is useful in that it captures a basic calculation 
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made by all large firms: (1) what proportion of assets should be held in the form of cash; 
and (2) how much should be spent on the expansion of industrial capacity. By 
contrasting actual money spent on fixed assets with the level of cash — money that could 
be spent on fixed assets — we get a picture of the growth/stagnation tendencies among 
large firms. 
 
Source: common shares outstanding, closing share price, employment, capital 
expenditures and cash from Computstat through WRDS.  
 
From a growth standpoint, Carney was right to chastise corporate Canada. 
Among the largest firms, the reduction in expenditures on fixed assets relative to cash is 
closely associated with the stagnation of employment growth. Note the trend: in the 
1960s and 1970s, employment growth was relatively high and trended upward. 
Expenditures on fixed assets relative to cash were also high and trended upward. In the 
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decades after 1980, the rate of employment growth slowed and remained relatively low. 
So too did the spending on fixed assets (relative to cash). It appears that decisions made 
by the top 60 firms around employment, green-field investment and cash were a partial 
driver of the shift towards heightened stagnation in Canada. 
Carney apparently thought that corporate Canada was too motivated by the 
desire for liquidity and not motivated enough to deploy its considerable resources on 
growth-enhancing activities. Why would corporate Canada be motivated to hold large 
quantities of cash rather than investing it in new fixed assets? Many factors are at play, so 
we’ll just list a few. First, in a volatile market, prices and profitability may fall 
considerably in a downturn. Having more cash on hand helps stabilize earnings by 
having the resources to cover fixed costs amidst declining prices. This may be more 
applicable for the firms operating in industries with greater price variation, such as 
materials and energy firms, for instance.  
Second, having large quantities of cash on hand can help elevate market 
capitalization by reducing risk. Investors often evaluate a firm based on its dividend 
payment history (the level and stability of its payments). By holding larger quantities of 
cash, firms can stabilize their dividend payments over the business cycle.  
Third, possessing larger quantities of cash makes snap acquisition decisions easier 
to realize. Acquisitions amongst large firms are often financed through debt, but many 
small- and medium-sized acquisitions are made using cash.  
Fourth, a lower level of inflation makes the ‘penalty’ associated with holding cash 
less severe. Sitting on a large pile of cash when annual inflation is 10 percent is far costlier 
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than cash-hoarding at an inflation rate of 2 percent, which may be one reason why the 
proportion of cash declined in the 1960s and 1970s, just as the level of inflation was 
ramping up, and grew in the 1990s and 2000s — the period when the annual rate of 
inflation was declining and/or low.10 
 The reasons why large firms hold a greater quantity of cash are complex and may 
be a consequence of many factors, but why it is that firms obtain large quantities of cash 
in the first place is, perhaps, the more immediate question. If large firms can ‘choose’ a 
cash-heavy portfolio, what conditions must be in place for that to be an option? Stated 
differently, is the growth of larger more profitable firms a pre-condition for the hoarding 
of cash? Before we explore that question, let’s pause to consider something that should 
pose a challenge to mainstream macro economists in Canada.  
Since the late 1970s, the Canadian political economy has been restructured along 
neoliberal lines. State assets have been privatized, trade and investment has been 
liberalized, corporate income tax rates have been reduced, inflation is low and stable, 
government debt is historically low and, apart from the recent crisis, budget deficits have 
been low or in surplus. Corporate profitability has also soared, approaching a historic 
extreme and average hourly earnings have stagnated (unionization itself having declined) 
since the 1970s. So why have employment growth, green-field investment and GDP 
growth stalled? If governments at all levels have restructured the Canadian political 
                                                          
10 Discussion of the interest rate and monetary policy is deliberately omitted. Both have a bearing on the 
decisions by firms to hold larger (or lesser) quantities of cash. Such a discussion would take us outside the 
scope of this study. 
262 
 
economy to create conditions favourable to business, then why don’t we see rapid 
employment growth and industrial expansion?  
 In his General Theory, Keynes argues that the economy can remain in a period of 
prolonged underemployment and stagnation in the context of unhindered markets.11 This 
view was foreign to many economists in the 1930s who assumed the truth of ‘Say’s Law of 
Markets’ — a doctrine which held that the mere offering of a commodity for sale on a 
market automatically generates the income required to purchase it. Say’s law meant that, 
in the aggregate, supply would equal demand. This line of reasoning implied that the 
unencumbered market would tend towards equilibrium — full employment and stable 
prices — thus making the persistence of glut impossible (see Hunt 2002: 135-9).12  
 Whereas Say argued that all output was transmitted through to income, that all 
income would either be consumed or saved, and that savings would be transmitted 
through to investment, Keynes argued that some income might be not be spent on either 
consumption or investment. A gap might arise between savings and investment and as a 
consequence money would fall out of circulation. This gap created the possibility, in 
Keynes’ term, of sustained disequilibrium. Keynes referred to this gap as ‘hoarding’.  
So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money, 
the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered sufficiently 
attractive… except by organising markets wherein these assets can be easily realised for 
money (1936: 160-1, emphasis in original). 
 
Issuing a rebuttal to the conservative economic doctrine of J.B. Say, Keynes argues that 
‘hoarding’ can lead to glut and stagnation. What’s more, the difference between saving 
                                                          
11 Keynes offers a variety of reasons for this, including the ‘liquidity trap’, the ‘low interest-elasticity of 
investment’ and the ‘stickiness’ of money wages. See Blaug (1968: 642-7) for a discussion.   
12 Blaug notes that Say’s Law only holds in a barter economy. In a monetary economy there can be a general 
oversupply of commodities if there is an excess demand for money (1968: 145-6). 
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and investment can be exacerbated by a highly unequal distribution of income, since the 
rich are far likelier to save and store their money than are workers (see Hunt 2002: 413-4 
for a discussion).13  
Let us take Keynes’ idea of ‘hoarding’ and connect it with the distribution of 
factor income amongst large firms (since this is a type of distribution too). We’ve already 
seen that the growth rate of employment among large firms resembles the level of green-
field investment relative to cash (Figure 7.4). It seems plausible to surmise that as a small 
cluster of large firms increase in size and market power, they pull away from the rest of 
the corporate universe in terms of cohesiveness, business behaviour, political activities, 
etc. If this cluster of firms manages to increase its income share through a deepening of 
earnings margins, then it will obtain a larger proportion of the ‘funds available’ to control 
green-field spending.  
We have already documented that the growth of firm size (concentration) is 
associated with enhanced market power (registered in the markup). It follows that larger 
firms claim have a greater income share and, by implication, more extensive control over 
investment decisions. If these large firms stockpile a larger quantity of cash (to reduce 
risk, facilitate snap acquisitions or for some other reason), then it may be the case that 
the growth of large firms itself figures heavily in corporate hoarding. And the growth of 
corporate hoarding may be a key driver of stagnation. 
                                                          
13 It is not the author’s purpose to rehash the intricacies of Keynes argument or to highlight all the 
differences between the classical doctrine and Keynes’, but merely to seize one aspect of it, namely his 
discussion of hoarding. Even then, the concept of hoarding was related to the quantity of money, the rate of 
interest, liquidity preferences, etc. What’s more, Keynes spoke about the ‘propensity to hoard’ (1936: 174) 
in the aggregate, whereas the analysis here centres on largest firms in the corporate sector. And stagnation is 
obviously facilitated by more than just the ‘propensity to hoard’, though this is one aspect of it. 
264 
 
Let’s explore this line of reasoning empirically. Figure 7.5 contrasts two series: the 
thin broken line portrays the relative position of the top 60 firms in the Canadian 
political economy by dividing net profit by GDP. The thick black line is total corporate 
cash, measured as domestic and foreign currency and deposits as a percent of the total 
assets amongst all private non-financial corporations. The two series are tightly 
intertwined over half a century.14  
 
Source: GDP from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F13 (1950-1960) and Cansim 
Tables 380-0016 (1961-1980) and 384-0037 (1981-2012); common shares outstanding, 
closing share price and net profit from Computstat through WRDS; total corporate assets 
and corporate cash from Cansim Tables 378-0054 (1961-1989) and 378-0121 (1990-2012).  
 
Between the early 1960s and the early 1990s, the stockpile of corporate cash 
averaged four percent and the band within which is varied was narrow, falling between 
                                                          
14 Cash (as a percent of assets) among the top 60 firms is also strongly correlated with the net income of the 
top 60 firms (as a percent of GDP) (the correlation is 0.65) and is also strongly correlated with cash as a 
percent of assets among the non-financial corporate universe (0.66). 
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three and five percent. This pattern broke down in the 1990s, just as the TAIL regime 
came into effect, a major merger wave commenced and the rate of inflation dropped 
precipitously, stabilizing at a low level. Between 1990 and 2012 (the year of Carney’s 
speech), the stockpile of corporate cash nearly tripled from 4 to 11 percent of assets. This 
is a significant fact on its own, but it becomes more significant when we plot it against 
the income position of the largest firms. For the four decades between 1950 and 1990, the 
income share of the largest firms was effectively flat, averaging two percent, and falling 
within a range of one to three percent. This pattern broke down after 1990 as well, and 
the income share of the top 60 firms more than doubled over the next two decades, 
reaching a historic extreme in 2007.  
It seems plausible to suppose that as the largest firms claim a larger proportion of 
national income through greater size and market power, their capacity to stockpile cash 
increases. By hoarding cash, they help stabilize dividend payments, thus depressing risk, 
and have more liquidity for acquisition activities (and to hedge against downturn). One 
consequence of the stockpiling of cash is that fewer national resources get deployed for 
the expansion of employment and industrial capacity. And because the rapid growth 
associated with full capacity utilization and full employment will be feared by business 
(because of the downward pressure it puts on prices), we see that, conceptually and 
empirically, there is nothing inherently incompatible with large firms improving their 
relative position in the political economy even though the hoarding of cash effectively 
restrains growth (whether the restraint is the intention or not). It is in this way that the 
growth of large firms may indirectly contribute to slower growth, thus making 
stagnation the ‘flip side’ of increasing corporate concentration.  
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As previously mentioned, between the Keynesian and neoliberal era’s public 
policy in Canada was reconfigured to create conditions more favourable to business. The 
official purpose of the policy shift was to accelerate growth. Is it possible that some of 
the policy measures may have contributed to the stagnation of recent decades?   
 
7.6 The Corporate Income Tax Regime and Stagnation 
There is another aspect to this story that bears investigation. The income share of the 
largest firms captured in Figure 7.5 is net of corporate income taxes. This means that the 
effects of changes in corporate income tax (CIT) rate are built into the picture. In recent 
decades successive Canadian governments, Liberal or Conservative, have aggressively 
reduced CIT rates. CIT rate reductions were often advertised to the Canadian public for 
two reasons. First, they were supposed to lead to accelerated GDP growth. In 
mainstream theory, reductions in CIT rates mean a reduction in the cost of capital, thus 
inducing a greater supply of capital. Cutting CIT rates, so the reasoning goes, leaves firms 
with a greater proportion of their profits, and thus with more resources to plough back 
into job-creating investment projects. The resultant addition to economic activity is 
supposed to create additional tax revenue that more than offsets the lost revenue 
resulting from the CIT rate reductions. Thus, CIT rate reductions ‘pay for themselves’. 
And second, CIT rate reductions were advertised as being ‘necessary’ to maintain global 
tax competitiveness.15 Canadians were told that if other jurisdictions slashed CIT rates, 
                                                          
15 ‘Necessary’ is put in scare quotes because it is often those on the political Right who make this argument. 
This is puzzling because the concept of necessity is in direct conflict with freedom and personal 
responsibility — two of the core values (in principle, if not in practice) held by those on the political Right. 
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Canada would become a less attractive place to invest, and consequently, would lose out 
on future investment and growth opportunities.16  
It is outside the scope of this study to examine the investment and growth 
consequences of CIT rate reductions in any detail, but it is worth mentioning that, over 
the long-haul, there does not appear to be a positive relationship between effective CIT 
rate reductions and either employment growth or investment in new industrial capacity. 
Whether we look at the effective federal CIT rate or the effective overall CIT rate, whether 
we look at the top 60 firms or the private sector in the aggregate, or whether we look at 
employment growth or business investment in fixed assets, there simply is no long-term 
relationship between CIT rate reductions and enhanced growth.      
 If the hoarding of cash by large firms helps propel stagnation, do reductions in 
CIT rates enable firms to acquire a larger stock of cash? According to Figure 7.6, the 
answer is ‘yes’. The thick black line captures corporate cash, measured as domestic and 
foreign currency and deposits as a percent of the total assets amongst all private non-
financial corporations. The thin broken line is the average effective CIT rate on the 
largest 60 Canadian-based firms, measured as income tax as a percent of pre-tax income. 
Note that the CIT rate is positioned on an inverted scale to facilitate its comparison with 
the level of cash. 
                                                          
16 Jack Mintz of the University of Calgary is sometimes described as the ‘tax czar’ of Canada. Publishing an 
annual report on global tax competitiveness, Mintz claims that the reduction of CIT rates in Canada has 
led to more investment and improved economic growth with no significant decreases in government 
budgetary revenues (because of a corresponding increase in the corporate tax base). See Chen and Mintz 
(2012), for example.  
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There is a tight and negative relationship between the stock of cash held by non-
financial corporations (relative to assets) and the effective CIT rate. Average effective 
CIT rates trended upward in the 1950s, peaking at 51 percent in 1961, and trended 
downward thereafter, reaching a low of 19 percent in 2009. This represents a two-thirds 
reduction in just half a century. The holding of cash relative to assets in the non-financial 
corporate sector followed the opposite pattern, falling in the 1960s, rising gradually in the 
1970s and 1980s before surging in the 1990s and 2000s, just as the government frenzy for 
CIT rate reductions set in.  
 
Source:  common shares outstanding, closing share price, pre-tax income and income 
taxes paid from Compustat through WRDS; total corporate assets and corporate cash 
from Cansim Tables 378-0054 (1961-1989) and 378-0121 (1990-2012). 
 
So there are two mutually reinforcing processes at work here. As large firms grow 
in size, their income share in the political economy appears to deepen. And as the tax rate 
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on that income share is reduced, corporate income net of tax is enlarged, thus facilitating 
the stockpiling of cash. Instead of CIT reductions leading to accelerated growth, as is 
often advertised, it may the case that CIT rate reductions led to accelerated stagnation.  
As already stressed, corporate decisions about the holding of cash are impacted by 
many factors, such that the establishment of a simple causal link here is not possible. 
However, it seems plausible — and is empirically supportable — that tax give-aways in 
the form of CIT rate reductions leave firms with a larger quantity of cash. If that cash is 
ploughed into acquisitions, dividends or is simply stockpiled, as opposed to spent on 
expansionary industrial activities, then CIT rate reductions may be part of the causal 
picture vis-à-vis the stagnation of recent decades.  
 
7.7 Summary 
Let’s summarize what’s been argued in this chapter, beginning with a restatement of the 
disclaimers. The pattern of GDP growth in Canada is not unique. It is similar to the 
pattern in the United States and to the OECD countries as a whole. The present study 
has largely ignored the international aspects of GDP growth, opting instead to focus on 
the national aspects. This constrains what can be said about the determinants of growth 
in Canada. The same is true for the pattern of business spending on fixed assets, which 
also appears to track international trends. A second disclaimer centred on the making of 
mono-causal claims. Corporate decisions around the holding of cash, for example, are 
impacted by many factors that were not probed in this chapter, thus limiting the 
conclusions that may be drawn.  
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The disclaimers aside, the present chapter has sought to tell a story about the 
national aspects of GDP growth in Canada which bears some proximity to the 
development of large firms. The shift from robust growth in the Keynesian era to the 
stagnation of the neoliberal era that we observe in the aggregate political economy is not 
only exhibited by the top 60 firms — it appears that their activities have exacerbated 
both trends. Both employment and spending on fixed assets among the largest firms grew 
at a rapid pace between 1950 and 1980 and slowed considerably in the decades that 
followed. This may be part of the reason for sluggish growth after 1980.  
The income share and cash held by the largest firms remained relatively low in the 
Keynesian period and soared in the neoliberal period. Chapter 6 uncovered a surge in 
M&A activity in the neoliberal era. As firms grew in relative size, their earnings margins 
increased and their income share deepened. With a greater share of national income 
under their control, large firms also increased the extent of their control over investment 
decisions. And because growth is driven, in part, by green-field investment, and the latter 
drastically fell in the neoliberal era as a consequence of heightened merger activity, we 
speculated that the growth of large firms helped usher in slower GDP growth. This 
implies that heightened stagnation and a deeper corporate distribution (measured in 
terms of size and income share) are related. Corporate income tax rate reductions do not 
appear to have led to accelerated GDP growth. Ironically, CIT rate reductions may have 
contributed to stagnation by leaving a greater proportion of income in the hands of large 
firms to be hoarded in the form of cash.   
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According to the epigraph of this chapter, Galbraith would have us believe that 
some segments of the citizenry prefer stagnation to robust growth. Given the facts 
outlined in the present and previous chapters, there is some basis for his counter-
intuitive contention. After all, the corporate profit share of national income, the markup, 
aggregate concentration and differential accumulation were all low and trending 
downward in the Keynesian era — the period when GDP growth was high and 
accelerating. In the neoliberal decades, corporate profits began to soar, the markup was 
high and rising, and the relative position of the largest firms increased dramatically. This 
period corresponded with weak growth. Given this, it is far from self-evident that 
dominant capital firms prefer robust growth. Indeed, moderate stagnation may be the 
preferred condition.  
 Section II mapped the development of large firms, explored the history of 
corporate amalgamation and prodded some of the determinants of GDP growth. Section 
III will explore the distribution of income and assets among firms and households. Some 
questions to be addressed are as follows. How should we understand the distribution of 
income in contemporary capitalism? Has the distribution of income in Canada changed 
in recent times? If it has, how do we account for the level and pattern of income 
inequality in Canada? How does inflation fit into the picture? Is inflation linked with 
social conflict? If it is, are there clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from Canadian inflation? And 
what do distributional outcomes tell us about the evolving nature of commodified power 
in Canada? 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Conceptualizing the Distribution of Income 
 
 
The produce of the earth… is divided among three classes of the community… To 
determine the laws which regulate this distribution is the principal problem in Political 
Economy… 
- David Ricardo (1817) 
 
 
 
 
As the epigraph indicates, Ricardo believed that the primary task of political economy is 
to lay bare the underlying patterns and regularities which govern the distribution of 
income and wealth. Given the centrality of income and wealth in conditioning human 
possibilities on both an individual and social scale, it’s no wonder he thought it 
imperative to come to a satisfactory account of distribution. This study has probed the 
development of large firms by mapping their structure and chronicling their growth 
pathways. Some questions follow. Are there distributive consequences associated with 
the growth of large firms? Stated differently, is there a relationship between the 
organizational structure of the corporate sector and the distribution of income?  
These questions will be addressed in Chapters 8 through 10. The present chapter 
will explore some of the conceptual aspects of distribution as an analytical primer for the 
empirical research in Chapter 9 and 10. Why is the distribution of income socially 
significant? How have competing schools of thought tried to understand the distribution 
of income in general? What explanatory principles have been advanced to account for 
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recent changes in the level of income inequality in North America? And finally, do the 
schools of thought drawn upon in this study (capital as power, institutionalism, Post 
Keynesianism) have anything to offer in terms of explaining why the distribution of 
income fluctuates over time and how changes in the level of inequality might be 
interpreted?  
The argument in the present chapter will unfold over six sections. The first 
section will document the evolution of personal income inequality over the past century, 
and in so doing, present the puzzle to be solved. The second section will explore why 
income inequality matters by reviewing the work of two British epidemiologists who 
have recently compiled a large body of research detailing the socially corrosive effects of 
heightened inequality. It will also try to make a small contribution to this literature by 
outlining the historical relationship between income inequality and democratic 
engagement in Canada.  
The third section will critically review some of the hypotheses generated in recent 
times to explain the increasing income inequality experienced in some advanced political 
economy’s. The fourth section will use some of the tools laid out by Veblen, Kalecki and 
N&B to conceptualize how an alternative explanation for the distribution of income in 
Canada might be generated. This alternative explanation emphasizes how changes in the 
institutional environment — especially (but not only) the relative size of the largest 
firms, union density and the extent of governmental activities — shape bargaining and 
exchange. The fifth will trace a line from Nitzan and Bichler’s writings back through 
Cornelius Castoriadis to Aristotle with a view to coming to terms with some of the 
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philosophical issues that underpin exchange and distribution. The sixth section will 
summarize some of the key claims to emerge throughout the chapter.  
An important omission must be articulated. Any fulsome analysis of the 
distribution of income requires an examination of the size, orientation and scope of the 
State. The various organs of government can affect the distribution of income in 
numerous ways, some direct, others indirect. Perhaps the most obvious example of the 
State’s direct impact on the distribution of income is use of the tax-and-transfer system. 
The various sources of taxation, the level of taxation and the extent of monetary 
entitlement directly shape the distribution of personal income. There are many indirect 
areas of government activity that also shape the level of inequality, such as the State’s 
attitude and legal stance towards collective bargaining and labour unions, competition 
and anti-trust policy, monetary policy as well as other areas of regulation, including 
public ownership, trade and investment liberalization and environmental protection, to 
name a few. The following investigation into the distribution of Canadian income will 
bypass many aspects of State power and governance, focusing instead on market 
structure and on the broader interplay between corporate and labour organizations, 
while recognizing the limits of such an approach.       
 
8.1 A Snapshot of Income Inequality in Canada 
Personal income inequality is only one aspect of the distribution puzzle. Other aspects 
include the distribution of income between wages, profit and interest and the 
distribution of wealth (understood as financial assets and physical assets). 
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Concentrating on personal income inequality is the least onerous route into an 
examination of inequality and the major reason is the availability of long-term data. The 
analytical importance of personal income inequality is amplified when we consider the 
political attention it has received in recent years thanks in part to the Occupy Movement 
and similar popular struggles.  
Studies of personal income inequality often begin with the Gini coefficient, which 
is a broad measure of inequality.1 Statistics Canada publishes data on the Gini coefficient 
from 1976 onward. Until a decade ago this would have been the most common metric 
used in assessing inequality in Canada. However, a group of researchers surrounding 
Thomas Piketty of the Paris School of Economics and Emmanuel Saez of Berkeley have 
since uncovered the history of the top income share over the past century.2 Piketty 
(2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) first documented the top income share in France and 
the United States over the twentieth century. In France, the top percentile income share 
gradually declined from 1920 until the Second World War, fell rapidly during the War 
and then continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace, in the decades to follow before 
inching upward after 1980.  
The story with the United States is different. The top percentile income share was 
volatile between 1913 and 1939, fell rapidly during the Second World War, declined 
gradually during the decades following the War before surging upward around 1980. 
Whereas the top income share in France is L-shaped, in the United States it is U-shaped. 
                                                          
1 The Gini coefficient ranges from a low of zero (perfect equality) to a high of one (perfect inequality) and it 
denotes the percent of national income that would have to be redistributed in order to perfectly equalize 
incomes.  
2 Datasets on more than two dozen countries can be found at The World Top Income Database: 
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu. 
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Piketty and Saez note that the latter finding challenges the view of inequality advanced 
by Simon Kuznets (1955), who hypothesized that as societies modernize, income 
inequality will take an inverted U-shape. Kuznets speculated that as more people migrate 
from a rural/agricultural economic setting to an urban/industrial setting, inequality 
would first rise, eventually stabilize and then fall. Piketty and Saez’s research on the 
United States showed the opposite. 
Saez teamed up with Michael Veall to document the top income share in Canada. 
Using tax filer data, they detail the share of national income going to the top income 
share from 1920 onward.3 The picture that emerges for Canada is very similar to that of 
the United States and other English-speaking countries.4 Figure 8.1 plots the top 0.1 
percent income share and the Gini coefficient from 1920 and 1976, respectively. The top 
0.1 percent income share is comprised (roughly) of the richest 26,000 individuals whose 
pre-tax income in 2010 was $563,000 or more. Numerically, this number is far too large to 
be associated with dominant capital, but we can safely assume that the core of its 
membership is comprised of the dominant proprietors and corporate executives who 
together make up the Canadian Establishment. The Gini coefficient, by contrast, is a 
broad measure of income inequality.  
                                                          
3 See Saez and Veall (2005; 2007) and Veall (2010; 2012). Piketty (2005), Piketty and Saez (2006) survey 
the results of the initial studies on the top income share, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) provide an 
overview of the methodology and main empirical findings for the more than 20 countries studied, Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013) and Atkinson and Morelli (2012) empirically summarize the top income 
share data for 25 countries and Piketty and Saez (2013) unpack why the top percentile income share has 
increased in rich Anglo societies while remaining stable in rich non-Anglo societies. 
4 Top income share data for Canada used in this chapter come from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and 
Veall (2012) with series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall. Data were retrieved from the World Top 
Incomes Database. 
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Note: the top 0.1 percent income share excludes capital gains. It splices together 
(in 1982) two series that have different methodological and source breaks. 
Source: Gini coefficient from Cansim Table 202-0705; top income share from 
Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012), retrieved online from: 
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. 
 
The data indicate that the top income share was halved during the Second World 
War, declined gradually during the first few decades of the postwar era and then surged 
upward from the late 1970s onward. The Gini coefficient moves in tandem with the top 
income share, suggesting that the latter is a good proxy for the former.5 
In terms of periodizing the data, we can identify three more-or-less distinct 
phases: the quarter century from 1920-1945 is characterized by crises which involve the 
eclipse of classical liberalism and its replacement by versions of statism. In Eastern and 
Western Europe, national and international socialism take route while in North America, 
                                                          
5 Leigh (2007) finds that for 13 rich societies, the top percentile income share is a good proxy for broader 
measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient.  
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Great Britain and elsewhere, a liberal Keynesian welfare state begins to emerge. The 
second period spans 1945 through the late 1970s and, for Canada at any rate, corresponds 
with the growth and consolidation of the Keynesian welfare state. The third period 
begins in the late 1970s and is coterminous with the ascent and consolidation of 
neoliberal globalization. The facts surrounding income inequality in Canada fit this 
periodization scheme. The shocks associated with the Second World War radically 
reconfigured the distribution of income, the Keynesian welfare era saw heightened 
equality and neoliberal globalization has brought heightened inequality.  
Until recently it was thought that income inequality in Canada was being driven 
by the top quintile or top decile (Yalnizyan 2007, for example). Saez and Veall’s data, by 
contrast, shows that inequality is being driven by the top percentile and that the 
distribution within this bracket is highly stratified. This finding has led some to claim 
that North Americans have entered into a ‘New Gilded Age’, with levels of inequality not 
seen since the 1920s (see Yalnizyan 2010; Stiglitz 2011). 
 If personal income inequality in Canada fluctuates with the top income share, a 
pressing question emerges: how can we account for its level and pattern? The answer to 
this question is bound to be multifaceted and complex. Before addressing this question in 
Chapter 9 and 10, we need to understand why income inequality matters. 
 
8.2 Why Income Inequality Matters 
In 2009 two British epidemiologists named Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett 
published The Spirit Level. The thrust of their argument is that rich societies with less 
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income inequality — less relative poverty — do better on a wide range of social 
indicators even if they have lower absolute levels of wealth. Their research demonstrates 
that in the early stages of development, as societies modernize, there are many broad-
based improvements to people’s lives, notably life expectancy and happiness. But the 
relationship between national income per capita and life expectancy and happiness has 
limits. These gains from growth diminish over time and eventually level off. Once a 
society crosses a threshold, in their research it is GDP per capita of $25,000 USD, the 
above gains from growth plateau (2010: 8).6 
Wilkinson and Pickett note that the social problems in rich societies tend to be 
concentrated in the lower part of the social hierarchy: people die sooner, are less happy 
and generally fare worse if they are in the bottom income brackets. However, when they 
compare across rich societies they find that these social problems bear little or no 
relation to levels of average income. Across a wide range of social indicators such as levels 
of trust, mental illness (including drug and alcohol addiction), life expectancy, infant 
mortality, obesity, children’s educational performance, teenage births, homicide, 
imprisonment rates and social mobility, they find that all the problems associated with 
                                                          
6 To be clear: this is average income per person. This does not imply that individuals who attain this income 
cannot be made better off from the standpoint of life expectancy or happiness with more income. Instead, 
it means that in a society like Canada where national income per capita approaches $40,000 USD, 
Canadians have surpassed the point where more economic growth can be expected to contribute to 
increased average life expectancy and happiness. The ‘economics of happiness’ literature suggests something 
slightly different. Kahneman and Deaton (2010), for example, parse subjective assessments of well-being in 
the United States into two compartments: day-to-day emotional well-being and overall life satisfaction. 
They find that both assessments of well-being rise as individuals climb up the income scale. However, 
‘diminishing returns’ eventually set in and, for emotional well-being or ‘happiness’, it plateaus around 
$75,000 in annual income. Beyond that point, more income does not translate into more happiness. See 
Holmes (2010) for a discussion. Other literature on the economics of happiness suggests that the 
relationship between GDP per capita and subjective well-being may be more complex than Wilkinson and 
Pickett admit. See Easterlin (2001), Easterlin et. al. (2010), Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh (2010), Helliwell, 
Layard and Sachs (2012: chapter 2) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), for a small sample.    
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being at the bottom of the social hierarchy are more common in more unequal societies. 
This is another way of saying there is a positive relationship between income inequality 
and social pathology.  
This claim undermines the view that social problems are caused by poor material 
conditions. If the latter were true then richer societies would do better than poorer ones. 
What matters, they contend, is not absolute poverty, but relative poverty. Their 
conclusion: ours is the first generation in the history of humanity for whom 
improvements in the quality of life are not tied to increases in material comfort. Rather, 
reducing inequality is the best way to improve the quality of our social environment and 
social life, and this even applies to people at the very top of the social hierarchy (2010: 
275). If this conclusion is correct then inequality should no longer be thought of as a 
‘progressive’ value; it should be understood as a broad barometer of social well-being.  
The list of social ills that Wilkinson and Pickett generate is certainly long, but 
there might be an important omission. Consider a recent headline: ‘Canadians quickly 
losing faith in their democracy’ (Mackrael 2012). The survey of citizen sentiments was 
undertaken by Samara, a non-profit, non-partisan political research organization and it 
shows that only 55 percent of Canadians report being satisfied with the quality of their 
democracy. This is a historic low point and it represents a 20 percent decline in under a 
decade. The discontent appears to be attributable to a divergence between the views and 
interests of the citizenry and the responsiveness of elected officials (Anderson, 
Hilderman and Loat 2012).  
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Samara also surveyed the ‘politically disengaged’ to find out why they do not 
participate in the political process (Bastedo, Chu, Hilderman and Turcotte 2011). 
Disengagement, they find, is not confined to declining voter turnout, but includes party 
membership, political donations and protest activities. The authors find some surprising 
features of the politically disengaged: (1) their unwillingness to participate cannot be 
reduced to political apathy or ignorance — many are well-informed; (2) nor can their 
disengagement be attributed to a lack of democratic values — many embrace them. 
Among the factors unifying the politically disengaged is the perception that politics is an 
‘insiders game’ and that they stand on the outside. Government, bureaucrats and the 
media are ‘working for someone else’ and are unresponsive to their needs (Anderson et. al. 
2011: 3).  
What’s more alarming is that many came to this conclusion after having 
participated in the political process. In other words, they became outsiders, which is to 
say they did not cynically assume that politics was the exclusive game of the privileged. 
Instead, they learned from experience that ‘engagement is futile’ and that the political 
process is unresponsive to their views and interests (Anderson et. al. 2011: 4). 
Heightened political disengagement is not confined to Canada. In 2001, the 
American Political Science Association created a Task Force on Inequality and American 
Democracy (APSA Task Force for short) to study the ways in which trends in 
inequalities impacted democratic participation and governance. The APSA Task Force 
argued that rising concentrations of income and wealth threaten the ideals of equal 
citizenship and democratic governance because it amplifies the political voice of the 
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privileged while muting the political voice of the underprivileged (APSA Task Force 
2004: 18). Besides noting that political participation in the United States is highly 
stratified along socio-economic lines and that governing institutions are more responsive 
to affluent Americans, the authors of The Report express their fear that rising inequality 
will exacerbate these trends by threatening the values of fairness and inclusion which 
underwrite the ideals of equal citizenship  (2004: 5-6).  
 The fears expressed by the APSA Task Force are supported by subsequent 
research. Solt (2008) finds that higher levels of income inequality are positively 
associated with lower levels of political participation amongst all income groups except 
the most affluent. This finding is one possible answer, Solt asserts, to researchers (Brody 
1978 is the example he uses) who wonder why political participation is declining in 
developed democracies. The Meltzer-Richards model presumes that economic inequality 
would be mitigated in democracies because broad swathes of the electorate in lower 
income groups would support redistributive policies. And while this thesis seemed 
plausible (on the grounds that people tend to vote in their self-interest), Solt 
hypothesizes that redistributive policy can be avoided if the most affluent citizens can 
remove it from the policy agenda or if they can depress political engagement by making 
the democratic process itself meaningless to lower income groups.  
Evidence for the United States supplied by Gilens (2005) supports Solt’s 
hypothesis. Gilens finds that governments tend to respond to the interests of the public 
in general, but when the public is parsed according to socio-economic status, policy 
decisions strongly reflect the preferences of the top income group and bear no 
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relationship to the preferences lower income groups. This might be one reason why all 
but the most affluent choose not to participate with the same intensity (2005: 793).7  
 It seems intuitive that as the distribution of personal income and wealth becomes 
more unequal, with the rich pulling away from the rest of society, government priorities 
and behaviour might become more closely attuned to the most affluent members of the 
society. Even in the context of democratic institutions, the concentration of corporate 
assets and income may have an impact on the activities and orientation of government 
which, in turn, may produce a negative feedback loop on the levels of political 
engagement among lower income groups. The question arises: is there a relationship 
between the level of income inequality and level of democratic engagement?  
The data in Figure 8.2 suggests that the two phenomena might be related. The 
thick black line registers personal income inequality in Canada, measured by the Pareto-
Lorenz coefficient, and the thin broken line captures voter turnout in federal elections.8 
The Pareto-Lorenz coefficient captures the concentration of income among the rich (the 
higher the coefficient, the lower the concentration). The two series are tightly and 
positively correlated over the past century and the strength of the relationship increases 
over time.9 Income inequality decreased between 1920 and the 1970s and increased 
thereafter. Voter turnout in federal elections, which may be taken as broad proxy for 
                                                          
7 Kelly and Enns (2010) deny that governments are more responsive to rich than poor in terms of their 
policy priorities. And while heightened economic inequality might lead to depressed democratic 
engagement, Timmons (2010) argues that, from an international standpoint, there is no evidence to support 
the opposite position, namely that democratic institutions lessen the level of economic inequality. 
8 Saez and Veall (2007) compute this coefficient using the top income share estimates. As a rule they were 
estimated from the top 0.1 percent share within the top 1 percent share: a=1/[1-log(S1%/S0.1%)/log(10)].  
9 The Pearson correlation for the United States is 0.30 between 1912 and 2012 and rises to 0.57 between 
1944 and 2012 (for presidential elections). In Sweden, a country with a much lower levels of inequality, the 
correlation is 0.86 between 1948 and 2010 (for parliamentary elections). 
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democratic engagement, trended upward in the first half of the century, peaked in 1959 
and then tumbled to a historic low in 2008. It is worth noting that the 1988 ‘free trade’ 
election represents a turning point in both metrics; voter turnout dropped precipitously 
afterwards while income inequality surged. 
 
Source: Pareto-Lorenz Coefficient from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall 
(2012) with series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall. Retrieved from: http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/; voter turnout from Elections Canada, retrieved from:  
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e  
 
It would be unwarranted to argue that heightened income inequality is the 
monolithic cause of democratic disengagement. Plainly there are many factors which 
influence the level of political participation. And while there is no way to demonstrate 
causality, it seems reasonable to suppose that there is a relationship between the 
concentration of personal income, on the one hand, and the responsiveness of political 
institutions to the views and interests of the less affluent citizenry, on the other. This 
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finding is compatible with the studies undertaken by Samara (and others) which 
indicate that politics is an ‘insiders game’ and that there is a fundamental disjuncture 
between the ordinary citizen and governing authorities.10  
The findings of Wilkinson and Pickett in tandem with the potential damage that 
inequality inflicts on the democratic process makes the need to find an answer to the 
question of what drives income inequality even more imperative. If income inequality 
proxies as a barometer for social pathology, and if inequality is a threat to the democratic 
process, then how has the level of inequality in Canada been understood?  
 
8.3 Understanding the Distribution of Income 
Kaldor (1955-56) posits that there are four main theories of distribution: a classical 
theory associated with Ricardo, a Marxian theory, neoclassical theories, which he breaks 
into two subsets — the marginalist theory associated with Wicksteed, Clark and 
Marshall and the ‘degree of monopoly’ theory associated with Kalecki — and finally, a 
Keynesian theory. Brown (2005) argues that institutionalists such as Veblen, Commons 
and Ayres did not construct a systematic model of distribution, but that it is possible to 
paste their scattered insights together in a way that would make an institutionalist 
theory of distribution intelligible. To critically review each theory would be both long 
and redundant given how much academic attention each has received. Instead, we will 
concentrate on the neoclassical theory because it informs most of the recent scholarship 
on the distribution of income.  
                                                          
10 Tilly (2003: 42) argues that democratic regimes that fail to exercise collective control over ‘financial 
capital’ or fail to redistribute the value produced from it risk de-democratization. Given the research 
reviewed here, it is difficult to overstate the corrosiveness of inequality on the health of the body politic.  
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 The core claim that neoclassicists make is that both factor income and personal 
income are determined by the forces of supply and demand, which in turn, disclose the 
underlying productivity of the economic inputs/agents (see Samuelson and Nordhaus 
2010: Chapter 12 for an exposition). In this line of reasoning, ‘the market’ acts as a mirror: 
under conditions of perfect competition, the distribution of pecuniary rewards reflects 
the marginal productivity of the economic actors. The marginal productivity theory of 
distribution, as it has come to be known, was first articulated by J.B. Clark in his The 
Distribution of Wealth (1899), and it draws a causal line running from production to 
distribution:  
… the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, 
if it work[s] without friction, [will] give to every agent of production the amount of wealth 
which that agent creates… the social procedure is true to the principle on which the right 
of property rests… it assigns to every one what he has specifically produced (1899: v). 
 
Clark continues: 
In the final division that takes place within the sub-groups — the division that separates 
the gross earnings of each of them into wages, interest and profits — a law of production 
rules. So far as natural laws are unperverted, labor tends to get… what it separately 
produces; and capital does the same (1899: 21).  
 
Clark summarizes:  
… the whole of distribution, as well as the whole of exchange, would be included within 
the organized process of producing wealth. Unravel the web of the social product, tracing 
each thread to its source, and you will have solved the problem of distribution (1899: 21).  
 
As Clark sees it, distribution is a consequence of production. The wage rate and 
the profit rate are determined by the proportional productive contribution labour and 
capital, implying that each class of income and each individual income earner receives as 
income the market value of the difference in output attributable to the last unit of ‘input’. 
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As noted in Chapter 2, the theory advanced by Clark serves not only as a positive theory 
of distribution, but as a normative principle of distributive justice insofar as it 
simultaneously specifies the conditions under which the world of fact (is) and the world 
of value (ought) coincide. 
 Even though this theory enjoys considerable influence it has been subject to 
withering criticism. Recall Chapter 2 once more, which specified Veblen’s two-part 
criticism of neoclassical capital: first, the concept of capital as a stock of physical 
equipment breaks down in the face of ‘capital mobility’, which almost always signifies a 
transfer of ownership titles and legal rights, not a transfer of material-productive entities; 
and second, the concept of an aggregate production function presupposes that capital 
has a homogeneous property that can be aggregated in its own material-productive units, 
but no such property is evident in the actual world. If we are prepared to accept Veblen’s 
replacement definition, namely that capital is financial wealth — a pecuniary fact, not a 
mechanistic one — then it follows, as Veblen rightly shows, that Clark’s theory of 
‘natural distribution’ goes ‘up in the air’ (1908a: 200).  
Veblen argues that the returns to capital will reflect the ‘differential advantage’ 
that capitalists secure relative to each other and to the industrial community at large. But 
this does not imply Marxian-style exploitation, for Veblen asserts that the usefulness of 
labour, too, is dependent upon the ‘community’s accumulated technological knowledge’ 
and cannot be specified in atomistic terms. Clark’s theory of distribution, Veblen says, 
amounts to saying: ‘the wages paid to labour are just and fair because they are all that is 
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paid to labour as wages’ (1908a: 203). The notion that the distribution of factor or 
personal income reflects marginal productivity is, under these suppositions, nonsense.   
Brown contends that one of the main points of disagreement between 
institutionalists (like Veblen) and neoclassical orthodoxy is the notion that resources 
have ‘intrinsic worth’. Brown reminds us that Clark’s theory presupposes that the ‘just 
price’ of resources will be equivalent to their ‘inherent value’. Neoclassicists admit, he 
continues, that direct measurement of the relative productivity of the factors is not 
possible, but they presuppose that the competitive market will nevertheless reward 
factors in proportion with their intrinsic worth (2005: 919). This leap of faith should not 
have been possible after Veblen, but if neoclassicists at mid-century could safely ignore 
Veblen (who had been in his grave for two decades), the criticism levelled by Joan 
Robinson (1953-1954; 1959; 1970; 1971) and Piero Sraffa (1960) would be harder to duck. 
And so, perhaps unwittingly, neoclassicists were lured into the Cambridge capital 
controversies. The attack on the neoclassical theory of capital and distribution left the 
very thing Ricardo insisted we need to understand — the division of income between 
rentiers, capitalists and workers — shrouded in darkness. 
Even though the Cambridge capital controversies began as a dispute about the 
measurement of the quantity of capital in aggregate production functions, Robinson 
(1981) concludes that it was the meaning of capital that was called into question. The 
inability to quantify capital in non-price terms was deeply significant, for it meant the 
loss not only of the aggregate production function, but of the theory of distribution as 
well. And because ‘distribution theory is a special case of the theory of prices’, as 
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Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010: 288) assert, price formation was also lost. Given that the 
major theory of distribution over the past century is in serious disrepair (whether its 
proponents know it or not), how have scholars tried to explain the distribution of 
personal income? 
Three decades of increasing income inequality in North America and elsewhere 
has spawned a large literature trying to pinpoint underlying causes. In what follows we 
highlight three of the main hypotheses.11 One explanatory scheme focuses on 
technological change and the resulting alteration in demand for certain types of labour. 
The skill-biased technological change (SBTC) thesis, as it is known, suggests that 
technological change increases the demand for high skilled workers and depresses the 
demand for low skilled workers, thus explaining heightened wage inequality in the 
United States (a position endorsed by Moore and Ranjan (2005) and contested by Card 
and DiNardo (2002)).  
Others identify ‘globalization’ as the culprit behind heightened inequality 
(Krugman 2008, for example). Heightened international trade, particularly the import of 
manufactured goods by developed societies from developing societies, will have an 
impact on the wage distribution in rich societies. As developed countries import more 
labour-intensive manufactured goods from low-wage countries, Krugman argues, one 
effect will be downward pressure in both relative and absolute terms on the wages of less 
educated and/or lower skilled workers.  
                                                          
11 Veall (2012) and Volscho and Kelly (2012) provide useful literature reviews. Some of the materials cited in 
this brief overview were brought to the author’s attention through their reviews. Gordon and Dew-Becker 
(2007) provide a fairly comprehensive survey of the mainstream hypotheses. 
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A third explanation centres on executive compensation practices. Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) argue that surging executive compensation closely tracks firm size, and 
because pay is linked with performance, the growth of the former is explained by the 
growth of the latter. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) argue just the opposite: executive 
compensation far outstrips firm size and performance. Bebchuk and Fried (2006) 
document the disjuncture between pay and performance, arguing that the absence of 
arms-length institutional arrangements on corporate boards enables executives to 
upwardly influence their level of remuneration. Dysfunctional corporate governance is 
partially to blame for the surge in top incomes, they say. 
These theses suffer from two major difficulties. The fact that top incomes have 
surged in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States while remaining flat in 
France, Germany and Japan — all of which are advanced technological societies whose 
political economies have globalized — suggests that heightened inequality cannot be 
solely attributed to either technology (SBTC) or trade (globalization). A more 
fundamental criticism is derived from the untenability of the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution, which appears to backstop all three hypotheses. Attributing 
heightened inequality to SBTC, trade or executive compensation practices presupposes 
that pecuniary incomes reflect productive contributions, but the causal chain linking the 
distribution of income with production has never been established. Presupposing its 
truth is entirely inadequate; each hypothesis ends up ‘begging the question’. 
Other hypotheses have been offered which do not directly invoke productivity. 
Piketty and Saez (2006) identify the role played by changing social norms and 
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institutional arrangements. This thesis is broad enough to be factually plausible, but it 
lacks specificity. They do not detail what the social norms and institutional 
arrangements are, nor do they spell out how and why they are changing. Without an 
adequate exposition of these aspects, the assertion remains too general to be of much use.  
Stiglitz (2012a; 2012b) breaks rank from his economic peers when he describes 
the impact that politics (read: power) plays in shaping markets. What’s more, he 
discusses the role ‘monopoly profits’ play in fuelling inequality, but his discussion is 
predicated on the notion of ‘rent seeking’. The difficulty with the concept of rent seeking 
is that it presupposes that there is a natural (i.e., purely market determined) rate of profit 
which reflects marginal productivity, which then gets ‘distorted’ through political 
lobbying, skewed regulations and other ‘special interest’ group activities. But no such 
‘natural’ rate has ever been established.  
Outside the discipline of economics, scholars using ‘power resources theory’ 
(associated with Korpi 1978; 1983 and Stephens 1979) claim that unions and left wing 
parties reduce pre- and post-tax-and-transfer inequality (see Bradley et. al. 2003; Brady 
2009; Brady and Sosnaud 2010; Kelly 2005; 2009; Moller et. al. 2003). This claim might 
have some historical and institutional plausibility and it will be explored in what follows. 
Now that we have seen how others have made sense of rising inequality, let’s use 
the tools laid out by Veblen, Kalecki and N&B to conceptualize how an alternative 
explanation for the distribution of income in Canada might be generated. 
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8.4 Institutional Power and Distribution 
Let’s begin by revisiting some of the conceptual infrastructure laid out by Veblen. Veblen 
would have us believe that ‘industry’ is controlled by ‘business’, i.e., the material-
productive-technological apparatus of society is subject to the disciplining influence of 
the large corporation and the credit economy that grows around it. Veblen states:  
The economic welfare of the community… is best served by a facile and uninterrupted 
interplay of the various processes which make up the industrial system... but the pecuniary 
interests of the business men… are not necessarily best served by an unbroken maintenance 
of the industrial balance… Gain may come to them from a given disturbance of the system 
(1904: 19).  
 
Business aims at ‘differential gain’, calibrated in pecuniary terms. This can unfold through 
a limitation of industrial processes, namely unemployment. Veblen contrasts the 
inhibiting practices of business with the enhancing practices of the engineer and worker, 
who enter the picture not from the pecuniary side, but from the material side. The latter 
two are concerned with industrial-mechanistic processes, not business processes. Their 
concern is use value, not market value. The implication, as Veblen sees it, is that business 
activities belong under the theoretical heading of ‘distribution’ because their ultimate 
aim is the ‘alteration of the distribution of wealth’ (1919b: 294-7).  
Where does unemployment enter the picture? The ‘natural right of investment’, 
Veblen tells us, furnishes the legal right to withhold a part of the industrial apparatus 
from use. ‘Ownership of industrial equipment and natural resources’, he says, confers the 
legal right to ‘enforce unemployment’, an outcome he refers to as ‘sabotage’ (1923: 65-66). 
Business aims to limit industrial processes by restricting output to a level that will result 
in a price that absorbs the entire purchasing power of the underlying population. Recall 
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the example of Potash Corporation once more. The Potash executive stated that the 
volume of output would be restricted (industrial limitation) to a level that would yield the 
target price (differential business gain). Herein we find a link between profit and 
unemployment, or pricing and institutional power. The ability to control industrial 
processes by enforcing unemployment is one of the core institutional powers of capital.    
N&B develop this idea conceptually and historically by positing a ‘non-linear’ 
relationship between business and industry (2009: 232, 236-7). The way they conceive it, 
capitalist income (business) and capacity utilization (industry) are positively related up to 
a point, after which the relationship becomes negative. They explain: 
If industry came to a complete standstill, capitalist earnings would be nil… But capitalist 
earnings would also be zero if industry always and everywhere operated at full socio-
technological capacity… ‘business as usual’ means oscillating between these two 
hypothetical extremes… When sabotage grows too loose, industry expands toward its 
societal potential, but that too is not good for business, since loss of control means ‘glut’ 
and falling capitalist earnings. For owners of capital the ideal condition… lies somewhere in 
between (2009: 236-7). 
 
The claims made by Veblen and N&B are certainly unorthodox. Commenting on Veblen’s 
conception of the business man as saboteur of the industrial system, Heilbroner notes how 
bizarre the claim sounds in the light of the history of economic thought. Smith and 
Ricardo both put the capitalist at the centre of their story of economic progress. Even 
Marx, for all his vitriol over capitalistic ‘exploitation’, still viewed the capitalist as a 
progressive subject. Veblen, Heilbroner notes, puts the business man at the centre of the 
system only to assert that he derives an income by conspiring against industrial 
serviceability (1953: 234-5).  
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In Veblen’s scheme, the capitalist is only partially driven to facilitate production 
and enhance efficiency. The capitalist can also generate earnings by undermining 
production and impairing efficiency. These incendiary claims, Heilbroner notes, not only 
sound wrong, but foolish. Despite this, Heilbroner comes to Veblen’s defence. In Veblen’s 
historical setting, it was not unusual for the ‘captains of industry’ to have industrial 
infrastructure ‘sabotaged’, i.e., powerful businessmen would pay others to damage or 
destroy the property, plant and equipment of competitors. Heilbroner mounts an apologia 
for Veblen:  
[Veblen’s] essential thesis was all too well documented by the facts: the function of the 
great barons of business was indeed very different from the functions of the men who 
actually ran the productive mechanism. The bold game of financial chicanery certainly 
served as much to disturb the flow of goods as to promote it (1953: 238).    
 
N&B use the term ‘sabotage’ not to denote the physical destruction of industrial 
infrastructure (although that may be involved from time to time); instead, ‘sabotage’ 
implies the limitation of production and capacity under-utilization through 
unemployment.  
The argument to follow will use these ideas to unpack income inequality in 
Canada, but a caveat is appended: although unemployment may validly be thought of as a 
partial manifestation of capitalist power, the argument here is not predicated on the 
notion that proprietors always consciously collude or collectively intend to impair 
industrial processes through unemployment.12 The absence of evidence of intentionality 
                                                          
12 A personal anecdote to support the point: in 2013, the author attended a meeting of unionized railway 
workers in Canada. These workers noted that the CEO of one of the largest private sector railroads (who 
will remain nameless) and is known to the workers for his business ruthlessness, had an option in his 
contract that specified if he were to hit his ‘operating ratio’, which is a ratio between revenues and costs, he 
would receive a multi-million dollar bonus. As the fiscal year end approached, the CEO laid off a few 
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at a micro level is significant. Despite this, at the aggregate level there may be 
redistributive consequences (differential business gain) to higher and lower levels of 
unemployment (industrial limitation). So that is one way of linking the specifically 
capitalist power to enforce unemployment with the distribution of income. The next 
section will drill down further to see how the conditions of exchange shape the 
distribution of income. 
 
8.5 An Aristotelian Interlude 
N&B argue that the two main theories of capital, and by implication, the two main 
theories of exchange and distribution — neoclassical economics and Marxian political 
economy — are anchored in deeply problematic suppositions.13 Each system assumes 
‘intrinsic equivalence’ in production and exchange and a separation of economics from 
politics. And each system builds its universe of production and exchange using basic 
units or ‘elementary particles’: the neoclassicists build their universe with the ‘util’ (a 
unit of pleasure) and the Marxists build theirs with a unit of ‘abstract labour’ (and in so 
doing, highlighting the centrality of labour and production in social life). In response to 
the question, ‘what is capital’, N&B articulate the answer offered by the two main 
systems this way: 
… the endless diversity of commodities [can] be reduced to alternative groupings of 
identical utils or abstract labour time… The answer [to the question, ‘what is capital?’] lies 
in this transformation. Since exchange merely transfers the substantive quantities of 
production and consumption, it follows that underneath every ratio of prices there lies a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hundred employees (whose work was vital to the functioning of the railroad) in order to meet his 
operating ratio. This example establishes a direct line running from between business gain (salary bonus) 
to industrial sabotage (i.e., unemployment).  
13 The following discussion is drawn from Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 147-9). 
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corresponding ratio of utils or abstract labour. In both cases, the pecuniary appearance of 
capital is merely the mirror image of its material/energy substance. The financial liabilities 
on the right-hand side of the balance sheet derive their value from… the productive assets 
on the left-hand side (2009: 148). 
 
The problem with this formulation, they say, is that no one has ever been able to observe 
or measure utils or abstract labour and there is no convincing way to separate economics 
from politics. If the (quantitative) world of production and consumption, denominated 
in pecuniary terms, cannot be reduced to the quantitative world of utils and abstract 
labour, i.e., if intrinsic equivalence is not grounded in the ‘material sphere of consumption 
and production’, then they ask: ‘is there anything else… with which to explain the 
quantitative order of prices, exchange and distribution’? (2009: 148) 
Their answer is ‘yes’. N&B read through Castoriadis (1984) back to Aristotle’s The 
Nicomachean Ethics (2004), arguing that equivalence in exchange cannot be rooted in the 
properties of commodities. On their reading of it, Aristotle posits that equivalence in 
exchange is made possible through the nomos — the social, legal and historical 
institutions of society create the possibility of equivalence in exchange. There is no 
intrinsic property or quality to commodities which makes them exchangeable; social 
institutions create the basis for exchange. This much looser formulation, they note, 
means that prices and distribution are set somewhere along a continuum with social 
struggle on one end and cooperation on the opposite end. We might interpret their 
assertion this way: horizontal, egalitarian social structures will emphasize cooperation 
and have a more compressed distribution; hierarchically-organized, authoritarian social 
structures emphasize power and tend to have deeper distributions. The ratio of prices 
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(and by implication, incomes) does not reflect the ‘intrinsic worth’ of the goods and 
services; it reflects some combination of cooperation and power struggles in society.   
Let’s consider Aristotle’s formulation a bit more carefully because it will frame the 
interpretation of income distribution that follows. Plato posits that ‘a city comes to be 
because none of us is self-sufficient’ (1992: 369b) and as his student, Aristotle, reasoned 
similarly: ‘it is exchange that holds [society] together’ (2004: 1133a).14 Plato and Aristotle 
claim that political associations are formed because they create the conditions for people 
to exchange the goods and services they need to survive. If politics comes into being to 
facilitate exchange, how does the former make the latter possible? Here is the line of 
reasoning, and the riddle, that Aristotle offers: ‘Without exchange there would be no 
[political] association, without equality there would be no exchange, without 
commensurability there would be no equality’ (1133b 15). Political association rests on 
exchange, but exchange cannot take place without political association. For exchange to 
take place and human needs to be met, things and people must be made commensurate, 
which enables them to be equalized (though commensurability does not necessitate 
equalization). If we accept Aristotle’s suppositions, three questions follow: first, what is 
politics?; second, how does politics make exchange possible?; and third, how are things 
and persons made commensurate and equal? 
                                                          
14 In the Bartlett and Collins translation (2011: 1133a), the phrasing is: ‘people stay together through mutual 
exchange’. A friend and colleague, Stefanos Kourkoulakos, pointed this out for me. Kourkoulakos also 
noted that a term used in the adjoining sentence, ‘proportional reciprocity’ (metadosis), more accurately 
captures what holds society together for Aristotle. The terms ‘proportional reciprocity’ and ‘exchange’ and 
not substitutable, he argues, and reliance on the latter has the potential to mislead or distort Aristotle’s 
views on why a political community comes to be and what holds it together.    
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On the question of politics, Aristotle asserts that every art and every action aims 
at some good (1094a) and ‘politics’ is the science that studies the supreme good for 
human beings (1094b 5). ‘The good’, as he sees it, is ‘an activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue’ (1098a 15). On this understanding, politics is inextricably bound up with 
virtue and the good. Now, Aristotle discusses all sorts of virtues — moral, intellectual 
and otherwise — but justice is unique among them because it is ‘complete’ or ‘sovereign’ 
virtue, ‘the whole of virtue’ (1129b 25). And justice, as he sees it, cannot happen apart 
from political association. This is why people aren’t only concerned with exchange; 
exchange must be fair, i.e., just, otherwise ‘quarrels and complaints break out’ (1131a 20).  
So how does politics (that which aims at the good) make exchange (that which 
aims at material sustenance) possible? The short answer is the law, but we could broaden 
this formulation to include the customs, conventions, norms and institutions that grow 
out of the political community (the nomos). Aristotle says: 
The laws prescribe for all the departments of life, aiming at the common advantage either 
of all the citizens or of the best of them, or of the ruling class or on some other such basis. 
So in one sense we call just anything that tends to produce or conserve the happiness… of a 
political association (1129b 15).    
 
Note that Aristotle suggests that the law can aim at different things. It can serve the 
ruling class, the citizenry at large or some other group. The significance of this assertion 
will be unpacked below. 
If need brings people together, then justice (that which the law aims at) holds 
them together. The question of distributive justice, for Aristotle, arises whenever 
something is divisible in a political community. Distributive injustice will take place if X 
gets too much or too little of the divisible thing in relation to Y or Z (1130b 30). However, 
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it is not at all clear what this means vis-à-vis exchange. Aristotle clarifies: a just act will 
involve at least four terms — two people for whom the act is just, and two shares in 
which justice is manifest (1131a 15-20). But the precondition for exchange, he tells us, is 
the equalization of things such that the equality between the shares will be mirrored by 
the equality between the people. The problem: how can qualitatively different things and 
unequal persons be made commensurable and then equal? ‘Money’, Aristotle answers. 
Money grows out of society and has the capacity to make things and persons 
commensurable and, in practice if not in principle, enables their equalization (1133b 15).15  
Proportional reciprocation is the basis of fair exchange, Aristotle tells us (1132b 
30), and here we come to the rub of the matter because it is not self-evident that 
proportionality between people and things has an objective basis. Aristotle states:   
Everyone agrees that justice in distribution must be in accordance with merit in some 
sense, but they do not all mean the same kind of merit: the democratic view is that the 
criterion is free birth; the oligarchic that it is wealth or good family; the aristocratic that it 
is excellence. So justice is a sort of proportion… [and] proportion is an equality of ratios… 
(1131a 25-30).  
 
Everyone agrees that ‘merit’ should be the governing principle in distributive matters, but 
there is substantive disagreement about the content of ‘merit’.16 Aristotle recognized that 
the way people evaluate proportional reciprocity depends on a prior scheme of values. 
The question becomes: where do we locate this prior scheme of values?  
 There are two answers to this question, one collective and one individual. From a 
societal perspective, Aristotle recognized that ‘the law’ can aim at different things, as we 
                                                          
15 ‘Money’ or nomisma shares the same root as ‘custom’ or ‘law’, namely nomos.  
16 Castoriadis (1984: 310) interprets Aristotle as suggesting that the question of fairness in proportion 
requires what Castoriadis calls a ‘proto-value’ or axia, an ‘in accordance with’ statement. Castoriadis 
praises Aristotle for raising this question, but thinks it remains unresolved in his work. 
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noted above. And because the law creates the basis for exchange, different political 
regimes will produce different distributive schemes. We can interpret this to mean that 
democratic regimes will produce flatter distributions and non-democratic regimes will 
produce deeper distributions. How does this play out in practice? Consider two 
hypothetical distributive schemes: in Stockholm, lawyers earn, on average, twice as much 
as taxicab drivers and in New York City lawyers earn, on average, ten times as much as 
taxicab drivers (ratios of 2:1 and 10:1, respectively). In terms of positive explanation, it is 
fruitless to try to root the differing ratios in ‘demand and supply’ or ‘marginal 
productivity’. No one has ever been able to convincingly do so. What are we left with? 
The laws/institutions of Stockholm differ from those of New York and these differences 
shape exchange.  
In terms of normative evaluation, our sense of distributive fairness will be 
traceable to some prior scheme of values, even though we all agree that ‘merit’ should 
govern exchange. Aristotle tells us: ‘politics… prescribes what subjects are to be taught in 
states’ (1094a 25). The broad significance of this statement is that individuals are 
educated in the political community and their beliefs and values will be shaped by its 
laws, customs and conventions. And because ‘all lawful things are in some sense just’ 
(1129b 10), in Stockholm and New York both distributive schemes will be just, by 
definition (so long as they are lawful). So the law/politics shapes education, education 
shapes values and beliefs, and values shape the content of ‘merit’.  
If different political regimes produce different bases for exchange (different 
distributive schemes), and thus provide a factual explanation of the differing ratios, why do 
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some people normatively evaluate the ratios as ‘just’ and others as ‘unjust’? In one sense it 
will be just if it is lawful. But lawfulness is not the entirety of justice. Another crucial 
aspect of justice — the distributive aspect — is fairness. This raises a related question: if 
everyone in a society is educated according to the same laws (customs, conventions, etc.), 
why do some find the ratio of incomes fair and others unfair? Part of Aristotle’s brilliance 
is his recognition that (1) differing political institutions will produce differing 
distributive schemes and (2) within a given political community, even though all live 
under one law, there will still be substantive disagreement on distributive justice because 
different political types will evaluate distributive outcomes differently. Democrats anchor 
their values in freedom, oligarchs in possession and aristocrats in excellence. ‘Merit’ 
means different things to each political type.17 To say that the ratio of incomes between 
physicians and bus drivers in Stockholm is ‘more fair’ than the ratio in New York City is 
simply to align oneself with the more egalitarian (democratic) outlook of the Swedes as 
opposed to the more hierarchical (oligarchic/aristocratic) outlook of the Americans.  
If social conflict or struggle is an ‘eternal’ aspect of civilization — and here we 
need not confine ourselves to conflict over income and wealth, but also power, status, 
honour and other ‘divisible things’ in the political community — then understanding 
socio-institutional power might help us determine why the level and pattern of income 
and asset inequality in Canada fluctuates over time. Stated differently, if broad 
institutions shape exchange, then understanding the relative position of those 
institutions in the social hierarchy might help us come to a more satisfactory 
                                                          
17 This recollection of and reflection on Aristotle’s thought does not imply that he was a relativist (in 
distributive or other matters).  
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understanding of the distribution of income. The search for timeless ‘laws’ which always 
and everywhere govern the distribution of economic resources, under this line of 
reasoning, is misguided.  
 
8.6 Summary 
The distribution of income and wealth is among the most challenging puzzles to be 
solved in all of political economy. This is so, in part, because the distribution of income is 
shaped by individual choices and behaviour, on the one hand, and structures, institutions 
and norms (‘culture’), on the other. The interplay between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ makes 
the hope of coming to a ‘complete’ understanding of distribution — the problem Ricardo 
thought most pressing — very difficult, if only because one can never have a total 
understanding of either the entirety of individual (market) behaviour or the entirety of an 
institutional environment. We should be content if, by the end of our inquiry, we have a 
skeletal outline of some of the core processes driving the distribution of income and 
wealth. 
The research conducted by Wilkinson and Pickett (and others) strongly suggests 
that higher levels of income inequality exacerbate social problems. Given that income 
inequality has surged in Canada over the past three decades, this does not bode well for 
the health of the Canadian body politic. The present chapter has also argued that there 
may be linkages between income inequality and political participation, such that the 
heightened inequality of recent decades played a role in depressing the level of 
democratic engagement in Canada. 
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Chapter 9 will begin the empirical foray into inequality by analyzing some of the 
distributive aspects of inflation. In Chapter 10 we will explore the distribution of income 
and wealth in Canada by mapping the changing institutional configuration of large firms, 
labour unions and governmental organs. If business power is partially manifest in the 
capacity to enforce unemployment, is there a relationship between the exercise of this 
power and the distribution of income? Do unions act as a ‘countervailing power’ to 
capital, and if so, does this countervailance manifest itself in distribution? Has the 
growth of corporate power in recent decades — measured in terms of aggregate 
concentration, the markup or differential accumulation — shaped the distribution of 
income and wealth? And are there any long-term patterns and regularities which shape 
the level and pattern of inequality in Canada? 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Some Inflationary Aspects of Distributive Conflict 
 
 
It seems that economic science has not yet solved its first problem.  
What determines the price of a commodity?  
- Joan Robinson (1979) 
 
 
 
 
Twentieth century political economists exerted considerable intellectual energy trying to 
understand the twin problems of unemployment and inflation. For Canadians born in the 
postwar period, unemployment and inflation appear to be permanent fixtures of the 
political economy insofar as there is always some proportion of the work force searching 
for employment and the price level is always rising, albeit at a different rate in any given 
period. Perhaps the reason why so many political economists were driven to understand 
unemployment and inflation is each is linked with human suffering. Those unable to find 
work suffer from a variety of ills including deprivation, social isolation and shame.1 And 
those whose income does not rise as quickly as the overall price level are made worse off 
in terms of their purchasing power (their material well-being).  
Moving from the individual to the social, extreme episodes of unemployment and 
inflation have led to political transformation, sometimes degenerative, sometimes 
progressive. The hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s destabilized German 
consciousness to such an extent that many willingly embraced the totalitarian extremes 
                                                          
1 Also included is a long list of more objective ills including violence, mental health crises and substance 
abuse, for instance. See Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) for a discussion. 
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of Hitlerism as a substitute for the chaotic extremes of rapid inflation.2 Historically high 
levels of unemployment in Canada, the United States and elsewhere in the 1930s led to 
New Deal legislation and the formation of a welfare state. These extreme cases illustrate 
why unemployment and inflation have garnered the attention of governments, political 
economists and policy makers all over the world: if too many people are unable to find 
work or if prices rise (or fall) too quickly, outbreaks of violence and even revolution 
could be the ‘popular response’.3   
 ‘Stagflation’ is a term that crept into academic discourse to denote the experience 
of concurrent increases in the overall price level and in unemployment (or falling output). 
Stagflation is typically associated with the period spanning the late 1960s through the 
early 1980s in Canada and other OECD countries.4 However, it is not clear that the 
stagflation label should be confined to that period. In the period spanning Confederation 
through the Great Depression, the overall price level in Canada tended to move laterally 
from one business cycle to the next, rising in expansion only to fall back to its previous 
level in contraction. Between 1870 and the mid-1930s, for example, the number of years 
registering an increase in the overall price level (positive inflation) was nearly matched 
by the number of years in which the price level either did not change or decreased 
                                                          
2 This statement does not imply that the rise of National Socialism in Germany did not have causes other 
than hyperinflation, of course. 
3 The linkages between unemployment and inflation have also been a headache for economists. James 
Tobin, the Nobel Laureate, stated that the connection between unemployment and inflation is the 
‘principal domestic economic burden of presidents’ and the ‘major area of controversy and ignorance in 
macroeconomics’ (1972: 1). 
4 Definitions of stagflation vary depending on the scholar or the school of thought. Blinder and Rudd 
(2008), Means (1983) and Sherman (1977) all come at stagflation from a different angle, but define it 
similarly as ‘inflation amidst recession’ or ‘rising prices in the face of high and rising unemployment and/or 
falling output’. The starting point for the present discussion of stagflation is the recognition by Peterson 
that ‘stagflation is closer to the norm of the economy’s performance than is the opposite of stable growth, 
low unemployment and stable prices’ (1980: 279).    
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(deflation). The overall price level in 1910 was roughly where it was in 1870. Likewise, the 
price level on the eve of the Second World War was approximately what it was at the 
onset of the First World War.5  
A similar pattern is exhibited in the United States. Sherman (1977: 270) tells us 
that in 23 of the 26 business cycles prior to the Second World War, prices rose in 
expansion only to fall in contraction. In the period after 1945, prices almost always rose, 
even in the context of high and rising unemployment.6 The period after the Second 
World War is markedly different for Canada, too. Between 1945 and 2012, there was only 
one year in which the consumer price index registered a negative value. These facts 
suggest that nearly all the downturns in postwar Canada were stagflationary, meaning 
increases in unemployment and/or decreases in output appeared amidst rising prices.  
 Chapter 7 explored the shift from the relatively robust growth in the early 
decades of the postwar era to the stagnant growth of recent decades, so the stagnation 
backdrop has already been set. The present chapter will explore the experience of 
Canadian inflation.7 Instead of probing the many causes of inflation, we will ask a slightly 
different set of questions. Does inflation tend to appear amidst social conflict? Are there 
systematically redistributive aspects to inflation? Putting the two questions together: can 
inflation be viewed as a conflictual process which redistributes income between 
difference income groups, such that inflationary outcomes tend to produce distributive 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’? And importantly, what role have higher and lower levels of 
                                                          
5 Data from the author’s archive. 
6 In both Canada and the United States, higher unemployment in the postwar era may be associated with 
lower levels of inflation, but not with outright deflation (in contrast to the pre-WWII experience). 
7 With due recognition given to the fact that much of the experience of inflation in postwar Canada could 
be classified as stagflation. 
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inflation played in restructuring the corporate sector? Do large Canadian-based firms 
benefit from inflation? Do workers benefit from inflation? If inflation is harmful/beneficial 
to identifiable income groups, then how should we understand the shift in Canada to 
anti-inflationary monetary policy?8   
 The path that will be travelled to arrive at this set of questions is winding. We 
will explore some of the thinking done on inflation prior to the overt recognition of 
stagflation. This (seemingly) new type of inflation, with prices rising amidst recession, 
paved the way for new thinking about prices. Out of the ashes of the Keynesian 
explanation grew a new monetarist orthodoxy associated most closely with Milton 
Friedman. However, a diverse collection of heterodox scholars began to think of inflation 
(and stagflation) in power-laden terms. It is this latter group that we are primarily 
interested in, though we will begin by outlining some of the context within which this 
thinking emerged. Surveying some of these heterodox thinkers will help us frame the 
questions that will be addressed in the latter portion of the chapter.  
 It must be stressed that, like Chapter 7, the present chapter is largely exploratory. 
Inflation is sufficiently complex to warrant an entire study. And while it manifests itself 
at a domestic level, inflation is a process that is heavily associated with international 
developments. This complicates its study. The inflation rate in Canada has closely 
tracked the inflation rate in the United States and the OECD in recent decades, so it is 
not entirely clear that we can explore domestic inflation developments without studying 
their international analogues. Thus, the disclaimers offered in Chapter 7 also apply to this 
                                                          
8 The impact of inflation on debt, though interesting and important from the standpoint of distribution and 
inequality, falls outside the scope of this study. 
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chapter: given the complexity of inflation, and granted that it is heavily influenced by 
international developments, we will not aim at a complete or final explanation. Despite 
these challenges, some of the domestic aspects of inflation in Canada will be probed. 
 The chapter is organized into seven sections. The first section explores some of 
the thinking done on inflation by contrasting how some of the major schools of thought 
responded to the overt appearance of stagflation. Section two hones in on a cluster of 
heterodox thinkers who incorporated power into their thinking on inflation. A brief 
review of this scholarship will help frame the questions that will be tackled in 
subsequent sections. The third section will explore how prices, and therefore inflation, 
may be conceived in power-laden terms. More specifically, section three will examine the 
role that institutions and organizations have played in fuelling inflation in Canada. 
Rather than power operating a distance from market prices, it will be argued that broad 
power processes have a bearing on price formation.  
Section four concretizes the relationship between power and prices by zeroing in 
on one commodity — the price of labour power in Canada — to see if, or in what way, it 
relates to power. Section five probes whether we can meaningfully speak of distributive 
winners and losers from inflation in Canada. Section six explores the points of contact 
between the internationally organized violence embodied in regional and global wars and 
different measures of inflation. The seventh section summarizes some of the key claims 
and raises some corollary questions. 
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9.1 Stagflation and the ‘Great Divide’ 
Karl Popper, the Austrian epistemologist, argued that the ‘line of demarcation’ 
distinguishing scientific from non-scientific activities is falsifiability (1963: 51). An area of 
inquiry earns the moniker ‘scientific’ if an event, observation or experimental result can 
be specified in advance which, if perceived, would refute the hypothesis. Rather than 
irrefutability being a sign of explanatory strength, after Popper it came to be understood 
as a sign of ‘pseudo’ science. Simple yet elegant, Popper’s argument exerted enormous 
influence on subsequent philosophers of science.  
 Keynes’ writings did not analyze the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment in great detail. It was the empirical investigations of A.W. Phillips (1958) 
which demonstrated that, in Britain at least, there was a stable negative association 
between inflation and unemployment, such that policy makers faced a trade-off between 
them.9 In Keynes’ analysis, inflation results from an excess of aggregate demand over 
aggregate supply in the context of full employment and/or full capacity utilization. 
Conversely, unemployment and glut result from a deficiency of aggregate demand relative 
to aggregate supply. According to Popperian epistemology, then, the occurrence of high 
and rising unemployment amidst high and rising inflation would be an ‘event’ which 
would refute the Keynesian hypothesis. After all, it is illogical to simultaneously argue for 
an excess of aggregate demand (generating inflation) and a deficiency of aggregate 
demand (generating unemployment).  
                                                          
9 See Friedman (1977) and Sherman (1983) for a discussion from divergent perspectives.  
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 This may be one reason why the overt appearance of stagflation between the late 
1960s and early 1980s convinced many macroeconomists that the Keynesian explanation 
lacked validity in some crucial respects. Stagflation and the accompanying decline of the 
Keynesian paradigm opened the door to new (and old) thinking about inflation. 
However, it is not clear that stagflation is an episode that can be confined to a collection 
of years between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s. In postwar Canada, for instance, 
there is only one year which registered a decline in the overall price level after 1945 (that 
year was 1953). This means that the appearance of high and/or rising unemployment or 
slow growth after 1945 was always accompanied by rising prices. Thus, in a weak sense, 
all episodes of glut in postwar Canada were stagflationary.10  
 To understand inflation one must understand price formation. Joan Robinson 
once stated: ‘it seems that economic science has not yet solved its first problem. What 
determines the price of a commodity?’11 Her observation strikes a chord, for if we do not 
have a solid understanding of market prices then all ‘economic’ phenomena that come 
into contact with the price system becomes mysterious. After the Keynesian Revolution, 
many mainstream economists would have believed that inflation is a consequence of 
excess demand — ‘demand pull’ inflation. Given that episodes of sustained inflation were 
rare in countries like Canada and the United States prior to the Second World War, this 
theory might have seemed sufficient. After all, prices tended to rise in expansion only to 
fall in contraction (‘cyclical inflation’). Prices also rose in wartime as a consequence of 
                                                          
10 ‘Weak’ because rising unemployment and/or slow growth might appear amidst disinflation. 
11 This statement was first written in 1942, but was recounted in Robinson (1979: 41). Robinson recounted 
her statement in 1979 because, in her view, the stagflationary 1970s had demonstrated to economists that 
they lack an adequate understanding of price formation (even though the determinants of the price of a 
single commodity are not the same thing as the determinants of the overall price level).  
311 
 
full employment and full capacity utilization, so the thinking went, only to return in 
peacetime to previous levels (‘wartime inflation’). Sustained increases in the overall price 
level, even in the midst of rising unemployment or falling output (‘stagflation’), is a 
phenomenon that only appeared after 1945 in Canada and the United States (see 
Sherman 1983: 184-6 for a discussion of the U.S. experience). The recognition of 
stagflation challenged the received view of price formation and inflation.  
 However, the research results of Gardiner Means should have tested the 
confidence mainstream economists had in neoclassical price theory (his results preceded 
the recognition of stagflation by four decades). In 1934 Means supplied evidence which 
implied the existence of bifurcated price behaviour in the United States. In concentrated 
markets with a few large firms, ‘administered prices’ prevailed. An administered price is 
set for a period of time across a number of transactions. This rigidity suggested a degree 
of pricing discretion on the part of the seller. In less concentrated markets, classical 
competition and price formation were on display. Classical prices were flexible and 
changed frequently, which implied that the seller had little or no pricing discretion.12   
A distinction between rigid and flexible prices helped explain what made the 
depression between 1929 and 1932 ‘Great’. In the downturn after 1929, flexible prices not 
only changed more frequently than administered prices, but the amplitude of the change 
was greater. Means also noted that there was a negative relationship between price and 
production declines: large firms in concentrated industries held their prices — and their 
profit per unit, by implication — relatively steady, opting instead for drastic reductions 
                                                          
12 See Means (1935) for the research results and Means (1983) for a retrospective discussion of what his 
findings meant.  
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in production and employment. In the more competitive sectors, firms lacked market 
power and had no choice but to reduce prices. The price reductions meant that they did 
not have to cut production volumes nearly as much because demand increased at the 
lower price level (so the thinking went). This difference in behaviour implied that the 
heavy unemployment associated with the Great Depression unfolded primarily in the 
concentrated sectors. In Means’ research, then, we can trace a line of causation running 
from large firms (concentration) and the attendant market power through to price 
rigidity and finally deeper, more prolonged recessions (as large firms sacrifice volume to 
defend earnings margins).13 
The concept of ‘administered prices’ was eventually bolstered by what Means 
called ‘administered competition’ and ‘administered inflation’ (1983: 469). As Means 
viewed it, the growth of large firms and the resulting concentration in the American 
political economy ushered in a peculiar situation in which prices rose in the context of 
recession. Means called this ‘administered inflation’ and he examined four sources — all 
examples of what he termed ‘perverse pricing’: (i) full cost pricing; (ii) the risk of entry; 
(iii) arbitrary wage increases; and (iv) the expectation of inflation (1983: 477). The first 
three are relevant to the research that follows and will be briefly reviewed.  
                                                          
13 A sizable literature developed in the early decades of the postwar era to debate the significance of Means’ 
findings. Ackley (1959) argued that the administration of the price of labour (in the form of money wages) 
diminishes the significance of the difference between demand and cost inflation. Blair (1964) contended 
that the reality of administered prices (AP) turns the theory of price formation on its head insofar as prices 
can no longer be relied upon to equate demand and supply. Sherman (1977) used the concept of AP to help 
explain stagflation. Weiss (1977) tested the AP hypothesis against other data and found that it survived 
refutation. Goode (1994) argued that Means never demonstrated a connection between the degree 
concentration and the extent of AP. Despite all the debate, in more recent times AP appears to have been 
relegated to the periphery of academic economics. In the nearly 1,000 pages of Samuelson and Nordhaus’ 
(2010) introductory textbook, ‘administered markets’ appears on just one page and AP not at all.  
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In the case of full cost pricing, sellers estimate their variable and fixed costs at an 
expected production volume and then add their profit target per unit to arrive at an 
overall price. A decline in demand, Means tells us, means that if firms are going to hit 
their profit target they must increase the profit per unit, which translates into an increase 
in unit price amidst downturn. The second source of perverse pricing is capacity 
utilization amongst a few large firms. In a concentrated market with a high rate of return, 
if firms are operating at high capacity utilization (say, 90 percent) the threat posed by a 
new entrant is greater insofar as each firm’s share after the new entrant penetrates the 
market will be significantly reduced. If the established firms operate at lower capacity 
utilization (70 percent, for argument’s sake) the danger of a new entrant is much lower 
and the firms can aim at a higher target profit, thus connecting capacity underutilization 
(stagnation) with rising prices (inflation). The third source of perverse pricing is what 
Means labelled ‘arbitrary raising of wage rates’. Means states: ‘it is well recognized that 
increases in real productivity justify an increase in real wage rates’ (1983: 478). The 
implication seems to be that wage demands in excess of labour productivity have 
inflationary consequences. 
 Means argued that restructuring in the American economy over the twentieth 
century led to a shift from classical prices to perverse prices. By ‘restructuring’ he seems 
to have meant that as firms continued to grow in size and as the number of sectors 
characterized by high levels of concentration increased, the shift from classical prices and 
classical inflation to administered prices and administered inflation grew more apparent. 
When the balance between the two types of markets was skewed towards the 
competitive end of the spectrum, the overall price level rose in expansion only to fall in 
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contraction. Once a critical point was reached, however, and the weight of the sectors 
tilted towards perverse pricing, more prices went up in recession than went down and a 
new type of inflation — administered inflation — became the norm. Means baptized this 
the ‘Great Divide’. It was passed, he estimated, shortly after the Second World War.  
 Scholars working in numerous schools of thought appear to have seized upon this 
difference. Prior to the Second World War, sustained inflation was rare. Cyclical and 
wartime inflation seemed to be easily explicable in demand pull terms. However, demand 
pull inflation makes no sense in the face of recession. The decline of the Keynesian 
explanation for unemployment and inflation opened the door to other approaches. Many 
mainstream economists accepted Milton Friedman’s ‘natural rate hypothesis’ as a 
substitute.  
As Friedman (1977) saw it, government activity can produce high inflation, not 
necessarily as a deliberate policy, but as a result of pursuing other objectives, namely 
policies around full employment and welfare-style social spending. By expanding the 
money supply to achieve these types of public policy goals, governments helped create 
the conditions for inflation, which Friedman argued is generated when the money supply 
is increased faster than ‘real’ economic activity warrants (a situation he likened to ‘too 
much money chasing too few goods’). As Friedman viewed it, his natural rate hypothesis 
encompassed the original Phillips curve, but as a special case, and was able to explain a 
much more expansive set of phenomena, including stagflation (1977: 470).14  
                                                          
14 For a comparison of Friedman’s monetarist and the Post Keynesian ‘structuralist’ explanations of 
stagflation, see Colander (1982). 
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Not all economists accepted Friedman’s explanation of stagflation. In place of 
demand pull, some scholars began to think of inflation as a ‘cost push’ phenomenon (or as 
a ‘supply shock’ phenomenon). The question then became who is ‘pushing’ what cost? 
Three sources were pinpointed: labour unions contributed to inflation through excessive 
wage demands; oligopolistic corporations contributed to inflation through high earnings 
margins; and foreign governments/cartels contributed to inflation by limiting the flow of 
raw materials — particularly oil — in an effort to increase prices. The three causes were 
not always mutually exclusive. Some economists viewed the power of trade unions to 
inflate wages and the power of oligopolistic firms to inflate earnings margins as playing a 
multi-causal role in the stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s.15  
 The point here is not to review all the competing explanations or to assess the 
quality of the evidence. Such a feat is well beyond the confines of this study. Instead, we 
will hone in on a few key ideas and explore their validity in Canada. Keynesian and 
monetarist explanations for inflation tended to dominate academic economics in North 
America and elsewhere. However, other schools of thought generated useful ideas that 
may be put to work in the Canadian context to help unpack aspects of postwar inflation. 
 
9.2 Social Conflict, Inflation, Redistribution 
Outside the Keynesian and monetarist mainstream, scholars working from diverse 
schools including institutionalism, Marxism and Post Keynesianism began to look at the 
                                                          
15 See Peterson (1980; 1982) for a wage push explanation. Sherman (1977; 1983) and Kotz (1982; 1985) fall 
into the ‘profit push’ category. For a multi-causal explanation encompassing both wage demands and 
earnings margins, see Eichner (1976) and Dalton and Qualls (1979). On the ‘supply shock’ explanation see 
Blinder and Rudd (2008). Lutz (1981) and Blaas (1982) explain stagflation from an institutional perspective 
that focuses on the role of power. 
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inflation of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s — the stagflation — as a conflictual process. The 
explanatory frameworks differed in detail, but what is common to them is the insertion 
of power into the causal picture.  
 Working under the influence of Gardiner Means’ research results and the ‘Great 
Divide’ argument, Blair (1964; 1974), Eichner (1973; 1976) and Sherman (1977; 1983) 
viewed postwar stagflation as a consequence of the increased market power amongst 
oligopolistic firms.16 These writers argued that postwar inflation (stagflation) was a 
‘profit push’ or ‘full cost’ phenomenon, meaning large firms exercise market power and 
raise prices in the context of recession. Blair explained the mechanism. A ‘price leader’ in 
any given line of business sets a market price that encompasses unit costs (at a standard 
volume) plus a unit ‘target profit rate’. Once the leader establishes the price, competing 
firms follow suit.17 If, in the context of downturn, these firms face an increase in costs 
and/or wage rigidity, then they may engage in an inflationary increase of their markup in 
order to hit their profit target, hence stagflation (1964: 80).  
Since larger firms have a higher rate of profit, as Sherman (1983: 201) argued, it is 
the monopoly sector that is generative of inflation, even in the context of downturn.18 
Eichner neatly summarized the spirit of this theoretical viewpoint: 
                                                          
16 The clustering of these three scholars into the same category does not imply that there aren’t significant 
theoretical/paradigmatic differences between them. 
17 Over the course of the past century, researchers began to ask business executives how they set prices. 
This group included Hall and Hitch (1939), Lanzilotti (1958) and, more recently, Blinder, Canetti, Lebow 
and Rudd (1998). Pricing to achieve a target return — with costs and profit goals built into the market 
price — on the basis of standard volume was one of the most common answers provided, inducing some 
(Downward and Lee (2001: 466)), to claim that this research ‘reconfirmed’ Post Keynesian pricing theory.  
18 Sherman stressed that there is no evidence to support the notion that the wage demands advanced by 
labour unions are inflationary ((1977: 273) and (1983: 191)). This claim will be challenged in what follows. 
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Inflation results not from any ‘excess’ of aggregate demand but rather from the efforts of 
powerful groups in society to maintain their own relative income position… chief victims of 
the conflict are generally the less organized groups in society (1976: 271). 
 
By ‘powerful groups’ Eichner primarily meant the managerial corporation, or ‘megacorp’, 
though he included labour unions in the casual picture as well. Eichner stressed that, by 
‘oligopoly’, he did not mean the ‘fewness of sellers’, but rather ‘the recognized 
interdependence to which the fewness of the sellers gives rise’. This interdependence 
implied a behavioural shift in which the action taken by a single firm could be expected 
to engender a response from competitors. This behavioural difference was a ‘significant 
source of autonomous inflationary pressure’, in Eichner’s words (1976: 2).   
 Kotz (1982; 1985) argued similarly, claiming that the combination of monopoly 
power and class conflict is generative of ‘crisis inflation’ or stagflation. Kotz believed his 
innovation was to shift the explanatory emphasis away from the tension between firms 
and the classless category of ‘consumers’ (1985: 227). Instead, inflationary pressure is the 
consequence of the conflict between two factions of capital: monopolistic capital and 
competitive capital. Inflation in the midst of long-term stagnation is initiated when 
monopoly capital tries to increase its profit rate.19 This triggers a ‘three way battle’ 
between the two segments of capital and the working class — a battle which manifests 
itself as inflation (1982: 11).  
 Bearing strong similarity to the Post Keynesian ‘markup’ and Marxian ‘monopoly 
power’ approaches is the ‘conflict theory’ of inflation. This perspective views inflation as 
the product of the excessive claims made by different income groups over national 
                                                          
19 Devine (2000: 399) argued that the postwar American stagflation was the product of low profitability. 
Capitalists, he said, ‘punish society’ for low profits with high inflation and/or unemployment.  
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income (Rosenberg and Weisskopf 1981: 42). The wage bargain secured by workers and 
the pricing policy of business have the potential, so Rowthorn argued (1977: 216-7), to 
exceed what is available for each group from national income. The excess of income 
claims over available income produces inflation, which Rowthorn asserted would always 
transfer ‘real income from workers to capitalists’, such that any inflationary 
redistribution was always at the expense of workers (1977: 215-6). In this perspective, 
class conflict over national income fuels inflationary spirals. Burdekin and Burkett (1996: 
24) tell us that the ‘winners’ from inflation will be the ‘claimants enjoying relatively great 
economic and political power’.  
 By rejecting the real/nominal dualism, and by claiming that prices do not change 
at a uniform rate, N&B view inflation as the ‘surface consequence’ of a ‘redistributional 
struggle’ fought between different groups (2009: 369). One implication of this claim is 
that those who raise their price faster than others simultaneously redistribute income in 
their favour, thus creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.20 For N&B, ‘the key to inflation is 
power’ (2009: 376). In their research on the United States, N&B demonstrate that 
inflation tended to redistribute income from workers to capitalists and from small to 
large firms. They are careful to qualify their claims, however, arguing that there is no 
‘preset pattern’ between inflation and redistribution. Inflation is a ‘tricky process’ in that 
its consequences depend on the ‘relative power of the leading firms, capital in general and 
labour groups’. They argue that if the relative power between these groups changes, so 
too can the distributional outcomes (2009: 375).  
                                                          
20 Kirshner (1998) agrees that inflation is inherently distributional, creating winners and losers, and so 
must be understood as a political phenomenon.  
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More broadly, N&B argue that it is highly significant that sustained inflation only 
appeared for the first time in the early part of the twentieth century, making its 
appearance concurrent with the emergence of dominant capital as the crucial institution 
of contemporary capitalism. And because differential accumulation requires a moderate 
degree of stagnation (following Veblen, they call it ‘sabotage’), inflation in the twentieth 
century tended to appear with stagnation and crisis, hence their emphasis on stagflation. 
Inflation is similar to stagnation in that a moderate degree is ‘necessary’ for accumulation, 
but high levels can undermine it. If rapid or sluggish growth and if excessive inflation or 
outright deflation are hazardous to differential accumulation, then it seems that, 
according to N&B’s reasoning, low growth and low levels of inflation — moderate 
stagflation — would be ideal for dominant capital. We will explore this inference in 
what follows.  
 Rather than attributing causality to the earnings margins of large firms, some put 
the emphasis on worker wage demands. Weintraub’s (1978; 1978-1979) ‘wage cost 
markup’ theory proclaimed that inflation is a consequence of wages rising faster than 
productivity. The price-making equation, Weintraub continues, includes both labour 
costs and the markup. Weintraub argues that the latter is more stable than the former, so 
for us to explain the dramatic change in the level of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, it 
must be viewed as a wage push phenomenon. And because the flow of wages and salaries 
are what determine societal purchasing power, there is no effective difference between 
‘demand pull’ and ‘wage push’ inflation because the level of demand is a product of the 
average income of the workforce (1978-1979: 62). Weintraub did not explore the role 
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unions play in enabling worker wages demands, but Peterson (1982: 982) would have us 
believe that insofar as wages rise above productivity, power is what explains the gap. 
‘Power’ for Peterson (1980: 283) is ‘control over income’ and it is derived from either 
organizations like labour unions (or corporations) or through the pressure put on 
governmental bodies to shape policies to one’s advantage. 
The writers surveyed here often speak of ‘market power’ or ‘organizational power’, 
but what does this mean? What are the sources of this type of power and, importantly, 
how are these forms of power limited? 
 
9.3 Power and Prices, I   
In terms of business power, some of the writers surveyed link market power with firm 
size, such that larger firms have greater power and vice versa. However, it is not size 
alone that is determinative of power. Means (1983: 467) stressed that by ‘market power’ 
he did not mean ‘monopoly power’. As far as he was concerned, ‘market power’ arises 
‘naturally from active competition between a few large independent sellers’ and is 
reflected in their pricing discretion. Blair (1974: 468) argued similarly, claiming that 
market power resides in firms that have ‘substantial discretionary authority over price’.  
Kotz (1982: 6) spoke of ‘monopoly power’, claiming that there is a positive relationship 
between monopoly power, on the one hand, and collusive pricing and entry barriers, on 
the other. N&B, following Veblen, root accumulation — and therefore prices — in the 
‘right to exclude’ others from accessing the industrial apparatus of society, and ‘the 
ability to exact terms for not exercising that right’ (2009: 228).   
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 If firms possess these types of power, then what determines the actual level of the 
markup, i.e., what are the limits to this form of power? According to Sherman, the 
restraints faced by firms on the size of the markup are three-fold: first, the ability of 
consumers in the face of a price increase to switch to a substitute product market; 
second, the threat posed by potential entrants responding to higher earnings margins; 
and third, the likelihood that governments will intervene to reduce price gouging (1983: 
198-200). The combination of these three factors puts a ceiling on how high the markup 
can be pushed. We may add that an increase in the markup may lead organized labour to 
push for higher wages, thus constraining the overall proportion of firm revenue that ends 
up as profit. We will explore this latter possibility in Chapter 10.    
Labour unions, too, possess power. The collective ability of workers to refuse to 
work without a satisfactory contract imposes a penalty on employers who fail to meet 
worker demands around compensation, benefits and working conditions. The main 
institutional ‘weapon’ of labour is the work stoppage or strike — something which is 
bound up with the organizational capacity of labour unions. Limits on the power of trade 
unions are too numerous to list, but they include things like plant closure and state 
intervention in industrial disputes on the side of employers, for example.  
Perhaps the most important limitation on the institutional power of trade unions 
is unemployment. As alluded to earlier in this dissertation, Veblen argued that 
unemployment is derived from private ownership of industrial equipment. The ability of 
employers to ‘withhold any part of the necessary industrial apparatus’ puts them in ‘a 
position to impose terms and exact obedience’ from the industrial community. The 
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‘natural right of investment’, as he termed it, grants proprietors the ability to restrict the 
industrial activities of the community (1923: 65-66). As argued in Chapter 7, a moderate 
degree of unemployment (stagnation) may be viewed by business as ‘optimal’ insofar as it 
tempers worker demands, thus creating a more favourable distribution for business.   
In Chapter 6, we explored the linkages between concentration and the markup 
and found that larger firms have a higher markup than smaller firms. We also found a 
positive relationship between firm size and the extent of the markup. So for Canada, 
business power appears to be bound up with size. The power of labour unions can also 
be measured (and will be measured in what follows). A useful proxy for the institutional 
power of organized labour is union density, measured either as the extent of union 
coverage or union membership.  
 While heterodox thinking on stagflation is interesting in its own right, the 
purpose of reviewing it is to help us frame the appropriate questions for this study. Once 
we specify what we mean by ‘conflict’, can inflation in Canada be understood as a 
conflictual process? Does inflation have systematically distributive consequences? Are 
there distributive winners and losers from Canadian inflation? And what impact has 
inflation had on the structure and performance of dominant capital in Canada? 
Given these questions, our task is two-fold: if we are to understand inflation we 
must understand prices. So what determines the price of a commodity? And if prices are 
bound up with power, then does this imply that inflation has a power aspect to it? We 
begin our excursion into prices and inflation by asking a fundamental question: what 
determines the price of labour? This too is a price, and a very important one at that. Is the 
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price of labour shaped by ‘market forces’, as is so often claimed? This question will be 
addressed in the following section. 
 
9.4 Power and Prices, II: What Determines the Price of Labour? 
Neoclassical economics treats labour power like other commodities insofar as the level of 
remuneration (and employment) is thought to be shaped by the demand for, and supply 
of, labour. In this system of reasoning, workers receive as income the value of what they 
produce. This means that the level of compensation will be the market value of the 
difference in output attributable to the last unit of input added to the production 
process. How do unions fit into this picture, according to neoclassical orthodoxy? First, 
it is presumed that unions interfere with the ‘self-adjusting’ market by raising the ‘real’ 
wages of workers to ‘arbitrarily’ high levels. Second, neoclassical economics would have 
us believe that if unionized labour manages to raise its wage rate, it does so at the 
expense of non-unionized labour. In other words, unions can only redistribute income 
within a given national wage bill. They are unable to increase the national wage bill as 
such.21 If this set of assumptions and assertions were true, there would be no reason to 
suppose that the average wage rate in Canada bears any relationship to the institutional 
strength of organized labour.  
The historical facts suggest otherwise, however. Figure 9.1 and 9.2 contrast the 
institutional strength of organized labour and the hourly wage rate from 1910 through 
2012. Figure 9.1 captures inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings, indexed to 100 in 
                                                          
21 See Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010: 321), for example. 
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1910. The other series captures union density — a proxy for the institutional strength of 
organized labour — and is measured as total private and public sector union coverage as 
a percent of the workforce. The two series are tightly and positively correlated over the 
past century (a Pearson correlation of 0.85).    
 
Note: union density was estimated between 1911 and 1920 by taking total union membership as a percent of the Canadian 
population, with proper rebasing. Union density is defined as the percentage of the non-agricultural paid workforce covered 
by a union. Average hourly earnings index is adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.  Source: average hourly 
earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E198 (1910-1948) and IMF through Global Insight (1949-2012); consumer 
price index and Canadian population from Global Financial Data; union density from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 
E176 (1921-1975) and Cansim Tables 279-0026 (1976-1995) and 282-0078 (1997-2012). 
 
Union density increased from 8 percent in 1911 to 20 percent in 1920. A deep 
recession in the early 1920s reduced union membership from 374,000 to 261,000 — a 30 
percent decline. Unionization increased modestly in the interwar years, rising from 12 
percent in 1924 to 16 percent in 1940. In the generation between 1910 and 1940, inflation-
adjusted hourly earnings increased by roughly 40 percent. Things began to change more 
rapidly after 1940 when federal legislation ratified and supported collective bargaining 
and the right of workers to form unions. By 1944, with the Cooperative Commonwealth 
Federation’s popularity surging, the Mackenzie King Liberals drafted legislation (‘PC 
1003’), sometimes referred to as the ‘Magna Carta for Labour’, that mirrored the Wagner 
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Act of 1936 in the United States. After the war, with workers agitating to cement gains 
made during the war, Justice Ivan Rand made a landmark decision (commonly referred to 
as the ‘Rand formula’) which entrenched ‘agency shop’ and ‘dues check-off’ as core 
aspects of labour relations in Canada. Between 1940 and 1946, a framework was created 
for establishing the right to union security. The result was a surge in unionization, rising 
from 16 percent in 1940 to a historic high of 37 percent in 1975.  
How were these changes registered on the remuneration side of things? Between 
the Second World War and the late 1970s, average inflation-adjusted hourly earnings 
tripled. This period roughly corresponds with the growth of the middle class in Canada 
and accompanying creation of a shared prosperity. However, union density declined after 
1975, reaching a five-decade low of 32 percent in 2012. Hourly earnings stagnated after 
1977, rising a meager 3 percent in inflation-adjusted terms.  
To recap: in the third of a century between 1910 and 1940, hourly earnings grew 
by 40 percent; in the third of a century between 1940 and the late 1970s, hourly earnings 
grew by 200 percent; and in the third of a century since the late 1970s, hourly earnings 
grew by three percent. These facts create a puzzle: why did the growth of hourly earnings 
in Canada follow this pattern? A large part of the answer appears to be the changing 
bargaining position of wage earners resulting from the growth and maturity of unions.  
Some might argue that the statistical relationship between the level union density 
and the level average hourly earnings is ‘spurious’. One way of ‘testing’ this objection is to 
determine if there is a statistical relationship between the absolute difference in union 
density and the rate of change of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings. If the 
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correlation in Figure 9.1 is spurious then we wouldn’t expect a positive relationship 
between changes in each variable.  
Figure 9.2 demonstrates that changes in the overall level of unionization are 
statistically associated with the rate of change of hourly earnings. One series portrays the 
rate of change of average inflation-adjusted hourly earnings, smoothed as a 10-year 
moving average. By plotting a 10-year moving average, we eliminate the effects of the 
business cycle and capture the ‘secular’ trend. The other series is the absolute difference 
in the overall level of unionization, also cyclically-adjusted.  
A correlation of 0.52 is significant, given the analytical breadth and duration (nine 
decades) of the two series. Figure 9.2 demonstrates that when union density increased, 
average hourly earnings tended to grow faster. When union density grew less quickly (or 
contracted), hourly earnings grew at a slower rate (or shrank). Note the pattern. The 
secular trend in hourly earnings growth was positive and rising between 1920 and 1975. 
Unsurprisingly, this is also the period when unionization was expanding. Wage growth 
slowed abruptly in the late 1970s before plummeting in the 1980s and again in the 2000s. 
In this latter period, the imprint of unions on the Canadian political economy was fading.  
Figure 9.1 and 9.2 demonstrate that when the aggregate size of labour 
organizations increased, the rate of growth of average compensation tended to increase. 
These facts speak to the organizational capacity of labour institutions, but they are silent on 
the extent of workplace action that the Canadian workforce engaged in. Power unfolds on 
multiple levels in contemporary capitalism. Arguably, the crucial power relationship is 
those who control the levers of the state and those who must submit to lawful authority 
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— the governors and the governed. However, power is built into the relationship 
between owners and workers as well. It may not be the same form of power, but insofar 
as some people issue commands and other people are expected to obey, we can 
meaningfully speak of power in the workplace.  
The main ‘weapon’ that the labouring class has is the work stoppage. In labour 
negotiations, the employer has numerous bargaining advantages, including outsourcing, 
offshoring, lockouts, pro-business governmental legislation, plant closure and, in some 
historical epochs, resort to legal or extra-legal violence. The chief ‘weapon’ that 
employees have is their refusal to work. Work stoppages impose a cost on employers: by 
halting production, revenues will eventually shrink and profits eventually dry up, thus 
leveraging the position of employees in bargaining. A strike is an act of workplace 
disobedience, but its ramifications can be felt outside the workplace insofar as it signals 
to the broader society a challenge, however temporary, to the authority of employers. 
Strikes are among the clearest manifestation of a struggle between different income 
groups — namely proprietors (or their surrogate managers) and workers.  
Workers strike for reasons other than wages, of course, but does the extent of 
work stoppages help explain the average level of labour compensation in Canada? Figure 
9.3 and 9.4 contrast the extent of strike activity with average hourly earnings and with 
the national wage bill. Figure 9.3 captures the inflation-unadjusted rate of change of 
average hourly earnings, plotted against the extent of strike activity, measured as days 
lost as a percent of total work time. The adjusted national wage bill in Figure 9.4 equals 
total wages and salaries less the wages and salaries paid to the top percentile of the 
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population divided by GDP (all series in Figure 9.3 and 9.4 are smoothed as three-year 
moving averages to ease the visual assessment). By removing the wages and salaries 
portion of the top percentile income share from the national wage bill, we more closely 
approximate the class-based distribution of income. Also, because most people in the top 
percentile income group are not in a union, but may be either owners or managers, we 
will be able to determine if there is a relationship between labour disobedience and the 
share of national income going to the working and middle classes. 
 
Note: time loss during work stoppages in total work days was used to estimate the extent of strike activity between 1901 and 
1918, with proper rebasing. A work stoppage could result from either a strike or a lockout. Adjusted national wage bill is 
wages and salaries as a percent of GDP less the wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income share. Source: work 
stoppages from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E194 (1901-1908) and E197 (1919-1975) and Cansim Tables 278-009 and 
282-0018 (1976-2012); average hourly earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E198 (1901-1948) and IMF through 
Global Insight (1949-2012); wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income share from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall 
(2010) and Veall (2012) with series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall; wages and salaries and GDP from Historical Statistics 
of Canada, Series F1-13 and Cansim Table 380-0016.    
 
The extent of strike activity is closely associated with both the rate of growth of 
hourly earnings and with the share of national income going to labour. Over the past 
eleven decades, there have been three major strike waves. The first wave began at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and peaked in 1919, just after the First World War. 
Over the next decade, the extent of strike activity declined, but a second strike wave 
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began in 1930 that peaked in 1946. Strike activity trended downward till 1960 when a 
third wave began, which peaked in 1976. For the next third of a century, strike activity 
trended downward, and as of 2012, was at a postwar low.  
The pattern of wage growth in Canada also goes through three waves. Note that 
the strike waves and wage growth coincide with major crises: two World Wars, a Great 
Depression and the energy crisis-linked wars in the Middle East. The rate of growth of 
wages climbed: from 1 to 20 percent between 1915 and 1920; from 1 to 9 percent between 
1939 and 1943; and from 3 to 16 percent between 1962 and 1975. It is not entirely clear 
why domestic labour developments appear to be linked with outbreaks of internationally 
organized violence and/or crisis. In the case of the first two waves (corresponding with 
the two World Wars), the relative position of labour may have been strengthened in the 
shift from moderate or heavy stagnation to full capacity utilization and full employment. 
In the context of crisis, workers may have felt emboldened to push for gains. The 
experience of the 1960s and 1970s is different, of course. Unemployment did not drop to 
historic lows; it rose to postwar highs.    
The extent of strike activity is tightly correlated with the rate of growth of 
average hourly earnings and the strength of the relationship increases over time. It 
follows that if worker wage struggles increase the rate of growth of wages, this will be 
transmitted through to the national wage bill. Figure 9.4 shows that as labour unions 
expanded in scope and as workplace action intensified the share of national income going 
to workers increased. The institutional decline of labour unions and the pacifying of the 
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Canadian workforce seem to have played a role in the stagnant wage growth and 
shrinking national wage bill after 1980. 
In terms of answering the question: ‘what determines the market price of labour 
power?’, the evidence strongly suggests that the institutional growth of labour unions in 
tandem with workplace action shapes the average level of labour compensation in 
Canada. Note here that we have not invoked ‘demand and supply’, ‘productivity’, 
‘technology’, ‘globalization’ and the like. Although there are undoubtedly other processes 
that shape labour remuneration in Canada, it is startling how much can be explained 
without referencing the conventional explanatory variables.  
If labour organizations and workplace action increase worker compensation, is 
there a link between worker compensation and inflation? 
 
9.5 Inflation’s Victors and Vanquished 
We are now ready to explore questions around some of the causes of inflation, some of 
the distributive consequences of inflation and what impact inflation has had on the 
Canadian corporate sector. Recall from section 9.2 that some scholars viewed worker 
wage demands as a source of inflationary pressure (Weintraub 1978) while others argued 
that the evidence for such an assertion is non-existent (Sherman 1977). Are changes in 
Canadian labour compensation associated with inflation? Figure 9.5 and 9.6 contrast 
inflation with average hourly earnings and with strike activity. In Figure 9.5, the nominal 
rate of change of average hourly earnings is plotted against the annual inflation rate from 
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1902 to 2012. Figure 9.6 contrasts the extent strike activity with inflation from 1910 to 
2012 (both series smoothed as three-year moving averages to ease the visual assessment).  
 
Note: time loss during work stoppages in total work days was used to estimate the extent of strike activity between 1901 and 
1918, with proper rebasing. A work stoppage could result from either a strike or a lockout.  Source: work stoppages from 
Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E194 (1901-1908) and E197 (1919-1975) and Cansim Tables 278-009 and 282-0018 (1976-
2012); average hourly earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E198 (1901-1948) and IMF through Global Insight 
(1949-2012); consumer price index from Global Financial Data.    
 
The statistical association between inflation, on the one hand, and hourly 
compensation and strike activity, on the other, is visually unmistakable. Average worker 
compensation maps onto the rate of inflation very tightly (a Pearson correlation of 0.88 
over the past century). Note that in the Keynesian era, inflation was relatively high 
and/or rising. In the neoliberal era, inflation was relatively low and/or falling. Average 
labour compensation followed a similar pattern. Figures 9.3 and 9.5 together suggest that 
the extent of strike activity by workers (helps) shape labour compensation and labour 
compensation (helps) shape inflation. Figure 9.6 bypasses wages and directly contrasts 
strike activity with inflation. In deep historical perspective, workplace action (‘labour 
disobedience’) has an inflationary aspect to it.  
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The evidence suggests that wage gains achieved by workers, which are a partial 
consequence of the institutional growth of labour unions and the extent of workplace 
action, are inflationary. To restate an important caveat: the fact that Canadian inflation 
mirrors that found in other developed societies suggests that a wholly domestic 
explanation will be incomplete. However, the domestic manifestation of inflation must 
have some domestic aspects to it, so we are justified in exploring those aspects. The 
caveat aside, the argument here is not that worker wage gains are inflationary when they 
outstrip ‘productivity’. As argued in Chapter 2 and 8, the concept of productivity in 
neoclassical economics is so doubtful and its measurement so elusive that there is little 
basis for supposing that wages should ‘match’ labour productivity.22  
A common sense approach to wages and inflation would run as follows. When 
the bargaining position of workers is improved, either as the result of a social crisis like a 
World War (a situation in which society moves toward full employment) or when 
labour unions utilize the strike weapon to increase the value of wage settlements, the 
result is a higher proportion of firm revenue accruing to workers in the form of wages.23  
The resultant increase in worker purchasing power is then transmitted through to a 
higher overall price level. Note that inflation is measured using a consumer price index — 
                                                          
22 The concept of ‘value added’ denotes the difference in purchase and sale price, mediated by a ‘productive’ 
act. The concept implies that the difference in market price from one stage of production to the next 
reflects productivity. However, it has never been adequately documented how to separate price increases 
attributable to pure productivity from those due to market power. The Cambridge capital controversy 
made another shortcoming clear: conventional economic thinking has not solved the problem of attribution 
— what factor/agent is responsible for what bit of ‘value-added’? Is it the owner of capital, of land or of 
labour that produces ‘portion X’ of the product? This dilemma is usually ‘solved’ by looking at market 
income and assuming that it discloses proportional productive contribution — an utterly untenable move 
because of its circularity. 
23 For firms with the requisite market power, the wage demands of workers may be passed along to 
consumers in the form of higher prices, with the markup held intact. 
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precisely the measure we would expect wage gains to be most closely associated with 
(meaning the strength of the relationship between wage gains and producer or base 
commodity price inflation should be weaker or non-existent, which they are). 
The relationship between inflation and worker wage demands is more 
complicated than the foregoing analysis suggests, however. N&B argue that, insofar as 
the American experience goes, inflation has tended to redistribute income from labour to 
capital. In support of their argument they plot a ratio of corporate earnings per share to 
average hourly earnings against the annual rate of wholesale price inflation (2009: 371, 
Figure 16.2). Using their metric, it appears that postwar U.S. inflation tended to 
redistribute income from workers to capitalists. N&B stress that there is no pre-set 
pattern when it comes to the distributive effects of inflation, given that it is based on 
power struggles between different groups. This caveat implies that we cannot assume 
there to be a stable cross-country relationship between the occurrence of inflation and 
the redistribution of income from between different classes of owners. What is needed, 
then, is an investigation of the distributive effects of inflation on a case-by-case basis.    
 To that end, Figure 9.7 and 9.8 outline part of the Canadian experience. Figure 9.7 
contrasts inflation with the average earnings per share (EPS hereafter) of the top 60 
firms. Figure 9.8 reproduces for Canada N&B’s ‘capital-labour redistribution’ metric, 
measured as a ratio of corporate EPS for the Toronto Stock Exchange to average hourly 
earnings, plotted against the rate of inflation (measured in both figures using the 
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producer price index).24 At first glance, Figure 9.7 indicates that the EPS for the largest 
firms is closely associated with producer price inflation, given the correlation of 0.69 over 
six decades. The experience of the 1970s is exceptional, having registered two sharp 
increases (and subsequent decreases) in the rate of change of the overall price level. Even 
though worker wage gains appear as if they have inflationary consequences in Canada, 
the per unit earnings of the largest firms also appear to be inflationary (at higher and 
lower levels of inflation). 
 
Note: aggregate earnings per share are for the Toronto Stock Exchange and they were computed by dividing the price TSX 
earnings ratio by the TSX composite price index. The top 60 firms are ranked annually by equity market capitalization.   
Source: TSX Composite Price Index and TSX price earnings ratio from Cansim Table 176-0047; common shares outstanding, 
closing share price and gross income for the top 60 firms from Compustat through WRDS; average hourly earnings from 
Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E198 (1901-1948) and the IMF through Global Insight (1949-2012); producer price 
index from the IMF through Global Insight. 
 
Perhaps this ambiguity is why N&B plot their capital-labour redistribution 
metric — a differential measure which captures the per unit income of two different 
                                                          
24 According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: ‘The Producer Price Index (PPI) is a family of indexes 
that measures the average change over time in selling prices received by domestic producers of goods and 
services. PPIs measure price change from the perspective of the seller. This contrasts with other measures, 
such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), that measure price change from the purchaser's perspective. The 
PPI universe consists of the output of all industries in the goods-producing sector — mining, 
manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, and forestry — as well as natural gas, electricity, etc.    
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classes of owners, namely the owners of corporate equities and the owners of labour 
power. The positive (albeit weak) correlation in Figure 9.8 suggests that Canadian 
inflation tends to redistribute income from labour to capital. When we compress the 
time scale in Figure 9.8 to focus on the period many scholars associate with stagflation — 
the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s — we find that the strength of the statistical 
relationship increases. When we shrink the time scale further, focusing on the 1970s — 
the decade most closely associated with stagflation — the strength of the association 
between the two series increases. What is going on here?  
It would be easy to draw misleading inferences from the facts in Figure 9.7 and 
9.8. After all, the data seems to support the notion that, over the long-haul, inflation is 
beneficial to capital. However, when we strip the relationship in Figure 9.7 and 9.8 of the 
experience between 1970 and 1981 — the period most closely associated with stagflation 
— it turns out that there is no statistical relationship between inflation and capital-
favouring redistribution. The relationship between 1970 and 1981 is sufficiently strong to 
make the correlation between the 1950s and 2012, a correlation which is virtually nil 
outside the 1970s, appear positive. Over the long-haul and outside the experience of the 1970s 
there is no statistical relationship between Canadian inflation and either the earnings per 
share of the largest firms or the redistribution of income from labour to capital. 
Something about the 1970s was unique about the relationship between Canadian 
inflation and the differential power of capital. 
 So where does this leave us in terms of understanding the distributive aspects of 
Canadian inflation? Figure 9.9 and 9.10 begin to add some clarity to the matter. In Figure 
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9.9, the annual inflation rate is plotted against a metric which captures the distributive 
struggle between labour and dominant capital, the latter computed as a ratio of average 
hourly earnings to the average EPS of the largest 60 firms. Note that we have inverted the 
ratio here so that when the metric rises, labour is redistributing income from the top 60 
firms and vice versa. It turns out that, over the long-haul, inflation is systematically 
redistributive in favour of labour.  
 
Note: a work stoppage could result from either a strike or a lockout. The top 60 firms are ranked annually by equity market 
capitalization.  Source: common shares outstanding, closing share price and gross income for the top 60 firms from 
Compustat through WRDS; average hourly earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E198 (1901-1948) and the 
IMF through Global Insight (1949-2012); consumer price index from the IMF through Global Insight; work stoppages from 
Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E197 (1919-1975) and Cansim Tables 278-009 and 282-0018 (1976-2012); Pareto-Lorenz 
coefficient from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012), retrieved from: http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. 
 
Note: the strength of the correlation in Figure 9.9 is more than twice that of 
Figure 9.8. The clarity comes when we examine the episode of the 1970s. Even though the 
correlation coefficient in Figure 9.9 is 0.57 from 1950 through 2012, the correlation is 
negative between 1970 and 1980 (such that, when we subtract that period, the overall 
correlation grows from 0.57 to 0.65). Outside the stagflationary 1970s, Canadian inflation 
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tended to redistribute income from dominant capital to labour. During the 1970s, 
inflation redistributed income from labour to capital and to dominant capital.  
Some of the remaining ambiguity around the distributive consequences of 
Canadian inflation can be reduced by looking at the long-term consequences of inflation 
on the distribution of personal income. If inflation redistributes income from labour to 
capital, as the capital as power framework suggests, then we would expect the income 
share of the rich to increase in tandem with inflationary episodes. On the other hand, if 
labour union-backed, work stoppage-fueled wage gains are the principal driver of 
inflation — redistributing income from capital to labour — then we would expect 
inflation to erode the top income share.  
Figure 9.10 contrasts the extent of strike activity with the Pareto-Lorenz 
coefficient. The latter captures the concentration of income among the rich (the higher 
the coefficient, the lower the concentration). The two series map on very tightly to one 
another. A correlation of 0.67 over nine decades is strong, indicating that workplace 
struggle (which has a demonstratively inflationary aspect to it) contributed to the 
redistribution of Canadian income from the upper to the lower income brackets. The two 
series rose together from 1920, peaked in the 1970s and declined thereafter, reaching a 
postwar low in 2010. The term is used pejoratively, but insofar as strike action involves 
workers revolting against owners, this activity is a manifestation of ‘class struggle’. The 
outcome of this type of struggle appears to systematically redistribute Canadian income 
towards labour.  
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Let’s add another layer of complexity to Canadian inflation. N&B plot an 
additional differential measure which depicts the distributive struggle between 
dominant capital and capital as such. Their ‘differential markup’ captures the percent of 
net profit in sales and it is measured as a ratio of the Fortune 500 to the business sector. 
When it rises, large firms are redistributing income from small firms and vice versa. In 
the U.S., this ratio maps on tightly to postwar wholesale price inflation (2009: 373, 
Figure 16.3). Figure 9.11 portrays the experience for Canada. Consumer price inflation is 
contrasted with the differential markup, the latter measured as a ratio of the gross 
markup of the top 60 firms to the corporate universe. Note: the differential markup is 
plotted on an inverted scale.  
 
Source: common shares outstanding, closing share price, revenue and pre-tax income for 
the top 60 firms from Compustat through WRDS; total corporate revenue from the 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics (1965-1971) and Cansim Tables 180-0002 (1972-1987), 180-
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0001 (1988-1998) and 180-0003 (1998-2011); total pre-tax corporate profit from Cansim 
Table 380-0016; consumer price index from the IMF through Global Insight. 
 
The facts suggest that when inflation was high and rising — from the mid-1960s 
through the early 1980s — small firms were redistributing income away from large firms. 
The disinflationary period from the early 1980s onward was associated with the 
redistribution of income from small to large firms. So Canadian inflation not only appears 
to redistribute income from capital to labour; it also appears to redistribute income from 
large to small firms, generating differential de-accumulation.  
Let’s summarize what we have learned in this section. In absolute terms, strike-
fuelled worker wage gains (Figure 9.5 and 9.6) and the earnings per share of the largest 
Canadian-based firms (Figure 9.7) are both inflationary. Shifting to differential terms, 
and over the long-haul, labour groups are the distributive winners from inflation when 
compared with capital and dominant capital, the latter two being distributive losers. 
When we plot a differential measure comparing the Canadian corporate universe with 
dominant capital, we find that inflation tends to redistribute income from large firms to 
smaller firms (differential de-accumulation, Figure 9.11). The stagflationary 1970s appear 
to be the exception to this trend: in that decade (using differential measures), capital and 
dominant capital were distributive victors when compared with segments of labour. The 
level of personal income inequality (as captured in the Pareto-Lorenz coefficient) 
reinforces these findings: periods of high and rising inflation tended to lessen inequality 
and periods of low and falling inflation tended to increase inequality.    
The findings contained in Figures 9.5 through 9.11 synchronize with what was 
discovered in earlier chapters about the development of large firms. Chapters 5 through 8 
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documented the declining position of the largest Canadian-based firms in the Keynesian 
period (as registered in metrics as diverse as the corporate profit share of national 
income, differential accumulation, aggregate concentration, the profit markup and the 
top income share, for instance). In contrast, the social position and relative performance 
of the largest Canadian-based firms improved in the neoliberal era. If inflation was good 
for dominant capital, then we would expect the inflationary Keynesian period to 
improve, and the anti-inflationary neoliberal period to erode, the relative position and 
performance of the largest corporate units in Canada. The opposite is true: Canadian 
inflation tends to benefit labour groups and smaller firms at the expense of large firms.25  
Given the foregoing analysis, it seems that large firms should prefer lower levels of 
inflation. In what follows, we will see that this is not an entirely correct inference.  
 
9.6 Power and Prices, III: Organized Violence and Inflation 
In Chapter 5 we learned that the Toronto Stock Exchange is over-represented by firms 
operating in the base material, oil & gas and financial sectors (Table 5.2, p. 152). In 2011, 
for instance, 24 percent of total equity market value was accounted for by base material 
firms, 25 percent by oil & gas firms and 28 percent by financial institutions. The analysis 
thus far has focused on dominant capital in the aggregate. In what follows, we will pull 
dominant capital apart to examine its energy and base material components. The purpose 
is to determine what drives energy and base material price inflation and to sort out what 
bearing such inflation has on the structure and performance of the corporate sector. 
                                                          
25 This set of findings is complicated by the experience of the 1970s, which (using some metrics) registered 
differential gains for capital and for dominant capital. 
341 
 
 Consider the examples illustrated in Figure 9.12 and 9.13. Figure 9.12 contrasts the 
profit share of ‘dominant energy’ with the inflation-adjusted price of oil.26 ‘Dominant 
energy’ is defined as the cluster of Canadian-based firms operating in the oil and gas 
market that are among the largest 60 firms ranked annually by equity capitalization.27  
The facts suggest that the profit position of the largest energy firms, treated as a bloc, is 
closely tied to the relative price of oil. When the relative price of oil increased, as it did in 
the 1970s and 2000s, the profit position of dominant energy relative to the corporate 
universe tended to increase and vice versa.  
Shifting from energy to base materials firms, Figure 9.13 contrasts differential 
producer prices, computed as a ratio of the Fisher producer price index to the consumer 
price index (both for Canada), with the equity share of base materials firms — the latter 
measured as the percent of total equity capitalization on the TSX accounted for by base 
materials firms. Here again, a relative increase in producer prices is closely associated 
with an increase in the relative value of base materials corporations and vice versa.  
Figures 9.12 and 9.13, though hardly counter-intuitive, illustrate that the relative 
income position and organizational value of the largest corporate units in Canada are 
tightly bound up with the relative price of the commodities they sell. This suggests that 
large firms prefer inflated prices for the commodities they sell. And because the Canadian 
equity market is over-represented by energy and materials firms, we should expect base 
                                                          
26 This figure is inspired from a similar figure found in Nitzan and Bichler (2004: 304, Figure 11).  
27 The TSX defines the ‘oil & gas’ sector in a way which includes the following sub-industries: oil & gas 
drilling, oil & gas equipment and services, integrated oil & gas, oil & gas exploration and production, oil & 
gas refining and marketing and oil & gas storage and transportation. 
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commodity and producer price inflation to be welcomed by many large firms insofar as it 
serves to redistribute income and equity value in their favour.  
 
Note: both the number and identity of the corporate units comprising Dominant Energy changed from year to year, but they 
were always among the 60 largest firms ranked annually by equity market capitalization. The Materials sector includes firms 
that control the discovery, development or processing of raw materials (mining and refining of metals, chemical products and 
forestry products).  Source: common shares outstanding, closing share price and pre-tax profit for Dominant Energy from 
Compustat through WRDS; total pre-tax corporate profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 (1926-1960) and 
Cansim Table 380-0016 (1961-2011); the price of oil in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars from BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview); equity value of materials firms and for the entire TSX from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream Professional; Canadian producer price index (‘Fisher PI’) from the Bank of Canada through Global Insight and 
the Canadian consumer price index from Global Financial Data.  
 
A corollary question: what determines the relative price of a commodity like oil, 
or a broad basket of commodities like base commodity prices or producer prices? Is it 
‘demand’ and ‘supply’ or ‘scarcity’, as is so often stated? This is an expansive set of 
questions that cannot be answered with great precision in the context of this chapter. 
However, the broad contours of commodity and producer price inflation will be probed. 
Let’s begin with the price of oil, since this commodity plays a pivotal role in fuelling 
global capitalism.  
In The Global Political Economy of Israel, Nitzan and Bichler unpack some of the 
commercial and political history of the global oil market since the 1960s, arguing that a 
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cluster of large, mainly American- and European-based energy, armament, construction 
and financial corporations established a wide-ranging ‘alliance’ with OPEC (2002: 228-
9). All the parties stood to benefit from an increase in the price of oil, but this could only 
be realized through close cooperation. This ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’, as 
N&B term it, helped foster a ‘stylised interaction between energy crises and military 
conflicts’. The ensuing outbreak of ‘energy conflicts’ in the Middle East led to sharp 
increases in the price of oil and an associated increase in revenues and profits for the 
interested parties. 
N&B supply evidence which indicates that, over the long-haul, the price of crude 
oil is not shaped by ‘scarcity’, nor can it be explained through ‘excess demand’ or ‘excess 
supply’. The relevant proxy for scarcity, they tell us, is a ratio of proven reserves to 
current production.28 However, in the decades since the 1970s, the price of oil often 
moved in the opposite direction as the scarcity metric would imply, rising (in inflation-
adjusted terms) when increases in proven reserves were outstripping current production 
and falling when current production was outpacing proven reserves. According to Figure 
9.12, the price of oil climbed 530 percent between 1973 and 1980. This is despite the fact 
that, over the same period, proven reserves grew faster than current production (2002: 
229).  
N&B also argue that the concept of ‘excess demand’ and ‘excess supply’ are not 
terribly helpful in explaining variations in the price of oil. Conceptually, they tell us that 
                                                          
28 N&B build their argument around the relationship between the price of oil and scarcity — the latter 
measured as a ratio of proven reserves to current production. Whether this way of measuring scarcity is the 
most appropriate given that oil prices are often set on futures markets (where current production might 
not be the most relevant variable) is not the main issue. This is one way of quantifying scarcity. 
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‘demand and supply’ relate to the desires of buyers and sellers, which are neither 
observable nor measurable. Even when a conventional proxy, like inventory, is utilized 
(which is quantifiable), from a long-term perspective the price of oil often moves 
inversely to excesses or shortages in inventory. In the 1970s, as oil inventories were piling 
up, the price of oil soared. In the 1980s, the reverse happened: oil inventories were being 
depleted, which should have sent the price of oil higher, and yet it tumbled. Between 
1980 and 1998, the price of oil declined nearly 80 percent in inflation-adjusted terms 
despite the fact that inventory was declining.29 
 So how is the long-term price of oil to be explained? Neither scarcity nor OPEC-
induced oil shortages can be blamed, N&B contend. Instead, they argue that the price of 
oil depends on the ability of the major players to constrain the volume of output to ‘what 
the market can bear’. In other words, the capacity of the major organizations to shape the 
‘perceived scarcity’ associated with broader political circumstances. Rather than 
‘scarcity’ dictating the price of oil, it is collusion between sellers that is paramount (2002: 
229). A variety of conditions, they continue, including the militarization of the Middle 
East and associated outbreaks of organized violence enabled ‘sellers to charge higher 
prices and anxious buyers to foot up the bill’. Regional wars including the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the onset of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 
1980s, etc., helped create a climate of crisis and shortage, which helped elevate oil prices 
(2002: 232).  
                                                          
29 The author followed N&B’s technique of measuring inventory by subtracting global production from 
global consumption as a percent of their average. See N&B (2002: 230). 
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 Broad power processes, including internationally coordinated violence, have a 
bearing on the price of oil. The market for crude oil may be unique in this respect, but 
there may be similarities between oil price formation and base and semi-processed 
commodity price formation. Erten and Ocampo (2012) argue that non-oil price ‘super 
cycles’ track global GDP, which, they argue, means these commodities are ‘demand 
determined’. They note that with oil, causality runs in the opposite direction: prices tend 
to move inversely to global GDP. A commodity super cycle, Erten and Ocampo state, is 
often defined as decades-long, above-trend variation in a broad range of base material 
prices, sometimes lasting as long as 70 years over the entire life of the cycle.  
 Credit for the development of major analytical frameworks, they continue, often 
goes to Nikolai Kondratiev and Joseph Schumpeter. What’s interesting is that 
Kondratiev analyzed commodity prices over long waves, but deliberately excluded 
‘exogenous’ factors like wars and revolutions, choosing instead to focus on technological 
change.30 There may be some explanatory utility to engaging in such an exercise, but 
discarding organized violence and political transformation on account of it being 
‘external’ to the ‘economy’ has the effect of eliminating a lot of significant phenomena. 
Much that is interesting in the movement of prices is their relationship to social upheaval 
and political transformation.  
Whereas many assume that the price of oil is different from that of other 
commodities insofar as it is not ‘demand determined’, base commodities and producer 
prices are similar to oil in that mechanized warfare tends to send them soaring. Consider 
                                                          
30 Jacks (2013) studies commodity price super cycles from the mid-eighteenth century onward from an 
equally non-politicized viewpoint. 
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the two series contrasted in Figure 9.14. The first is differential commodity prices, 
measured as a ratio of the Reuters Jeffries CRB commodities price index to Canada’s 
consumer price index. The second is differential producer prices, measured as a ratio of 
the producer price index to the consumer price index (for the United States). The grey 
shading represents outbreaks of internationally organized violence, including the First 
and Second World War, major hostilities in the Middle East between 1973 and 1980 and 
finally, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and ensuring American-led invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq.   
According to Figure 9.14, over the past century major booms in base commodity 
and producer prices were tied to broad social crises and outbreaks of globally 
coordinated violence. Differential commodity prices shot up during the First World War 
then fell precipitously thereafter, trended upward again from the early 1930s till 1946, 
declined for a quarter of a century thereafter only to surge again in the 1970s. This was 
followed by a two decade-long decline, only to sharply increase yet again between 2001 
and 2007. Differential producer prices followed a similar pattern. For both sets of prices, 
internationally coordinated violence seems to be a precondition for inflation. 
It has long been understood that warfare often has inflationary consequences. 
Sherman (1983: 184), for example, argues that wartime inflation is easily explicable from 
the standpoint of conventional economic theory (whereas post-1945 inflation is not). In 
the American experience, prices rose rapidly in all the conflicts between the 
Revolutionary War and the First World War, but fell afterwards. Governments print or 
borrow money, put people to work, procure base and semi-processed commodities to 
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prosecute the war, etc. This has the effect, so the reasoning goes, of temporarily inflating 
prices. This type of inflation is ‘demand determined’, Sherman argues. However, what is 
misleading about the frameworks generated to explain base commodity inflation, like 
that of Kondratiev, is the exclusion of warfare from the explanatory picture.  
 
Source: Reuters Jeffries CRB commodities PI, Canadian CPI, American PPI and CPI, TSX 300 Composite TRI and the S&P 
500 TRI from Global Financial Data.  
 
The facts in Figure 9.14 suggest that, contrary to Erten and Ocampo’s argument, 
oil is similar to base commodity and producer prices insofar as they all appear to be 
shaped by warfare-fuelled social crises. Rather than using the language of ‘demand and 
supply’ to explain commodity super-cycles and variations in producer prices, and instead 
of viewing warfare and revolution as ‘external’ to the economy and price formation, over 
the long-haul base commodity and producer prices are linked with internationally 
synchronized violence. In other words, the application of political power is strongly 
related to price formation across a broad cross-section of commodities.  
Given these facts, it would be odd for an economist to try to study the pattern of 
commodity and producer prices while ignoring the social crises and outbreaks of state 
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violence that appear to condition them. Likewise, couching commodity and producer 
price inflation in the language of ‘market forces’, as if these concepts could be separated 
from power processes like global warfare, also seems misplaced. Given that inflation has 
redistributive consequences, it is deeply significant that commodity and producer price 
inflation are both linked with globally-coordinated violence insofar as it implies that the 
application of state violence and political power transfers income and wealth between 
different groups (a fact which is largely ignored by conventional economic thinking).  
Let’s review a few pertinent facts before spelling out some inferences. First, 
Canada’s equity market is over-represented by energy and base materials firms. Second, 
an increase in the price level has been shown to have systematically redistributive 
consequences between different income groups. Third, and at a disaggregate level, 
relative increases in base commodity and producer prices has redistributive 
consequences on the profit and equity position of factions within dominant capital (e.g. 
energy and base materials firms). Fourth, and over the long-term, base commodity and 
producer prices appear to be positively correlated with warfare-fuelled social crises. 
Given all this, what are the consequences of internationally organized violence on the 
relative performance of the Canadian equity market?  
 Figure 9.15 contrasts differential commodity prices and the differential 
performance of the Canadian equity market — the latter measured as a ratio of the TSX 
300 Composite total returns index to the S&P 500 total returns index. The two series are 
tightly intertwined from the 1930s onward. When relative commodity prices increased, 
as they did during the Second World War, during the wars in the Middle East in the 
349 
 
1970s and during the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001, the 
Canadian equity market outperformed global benchmarks like the S&P 500. Outbreaks 
of global peace, by contrast, are associated with the underperformance of Canadian 
equities. Power processes on a global scale appear to shape the relative performance of 
large Canadian corporations. These facts also imply that commodity and producer price 
inflation, like consumer price inflation, has systematically redistributive consequences on 
the relative value of national equity markets.  
 The foregoing discussion is not meant to imply that dominant Canadian 
proprietors helped instigate global conflict. It can safely be assumed that these processes 
unfold independently of the motivation and activities of Canada’s business elite. 
However, the picture presented here casts a rather different light on matters such as 
price formation, business performance and distribution. Instead of speaking of prices 
being the result of ‘demand and supply’, and rather than speaking of stock performance 
and the distribution of income as being determined by ‘productivity’, when we probe the 
deep history of Canada’s political economy we find that organized violence propels 
commodity and producer prices. The consequences of this type of inflation have a direct 
bearing on the profitability and equity value of large Canadian corporations. Power 
processes on a global scale, including internationally coordinated violence, shape 
Canadian business performance.  
 Some questions follow. If Canada’s equity market is closely associated with base 
commodity prices, and if the latter is shaped by global warfare, what does this mean for 
income inequality in Canada? More specifically, if consumer price inflation redistributes 
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income from capital to labour, does commodity and producer price inflation elevate the 
relative income position of the Canadian Establishment? 
 
9.7 Summary 
Veblen argued that ‘a differential advantage inuring to any one class or person commonly 
carries a more than equal disadvantage to some other class or person or to the community 
at large’ (1908b: 361). From the standpoint of institutional and organizational power, and 
in the context of distributive struggle, price formation and inflation, Veblen’s statement 
carries near axiomatic weight. For one organization or group to improve its relative 
position, others must be made relatively worse off. The question arises: is there a 
systematic pattern at play such that we can meaningfully speak about inflation making 
some groups better off and, by implication, others worse off? In Canada, such a pattern 
exists. Let us try to summarize it.  
Canadian inflation tends to appear amidst social conflict. Over the long-haul and 
in the aggregate, the annual inflation rate tends to accelerate with global warfare-fuelled 
social crises. Inflationary episodes in Canada also tend to appear with social conflict of 
another kind, namely worker revolts against business owners. Long waves of labour 
disobedience appear to produce two outcomes: higher wages and a higher rate of 
inflation. The institutional growth of labour organizations in tandem with the extent of 
workplace action shapes the average rate of Canadian labour compensation. The latter, in 
turn, plays a key role in shaping the overall price level. The evidence strongly suggests 
that labour disobedience and worker wage gains are inflationary. When we shift from 
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absolute to differential terms, we find that Canadian inflation tends to redistribute 
income from large to small firms, from large firms to labour groups and from capital to 
labour. The 1970s may be an exception to this trend. In that decade, (stag-)inflation 
tended to redistribute income from labour to capital and to dominant capital.  
Base commodity and producer price inflation tends to increase with outbreaks of 
internationally organized violence. This type of inflation has systematically redistributive 
consequences within the corporate sector, redistributing profit and equity value to 
energy and base materials firms. This type of inflation also tends to redistribute equity 
value between national equity markets, such that the Canadian corporate universe 
outperformed global benchmarks during episodes of regional or global warfare (and 
tended to underperform during outbreaks of peace).  
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that: Canadian inflation 
is nourished on social conflict; Canadian inflation systematically redistributes income 
between different income groups; and lastly, Canadian inflation produces distributive 
winners and losers. These findings have a number of implications for understanding the 
development of large Canadian-based firms and for our understanding broad shifts in 
Canadian public policy. The Canadian middle class was largely built between 1940 and 
1980. This was a period of relatively high and rising inflation, driven partially by worker 
wage struggles. This period also witnessed the relative decline of large firms (as 
registered in the corporate profit share of national income, differential accumulation and 
the profit markup, for example).  
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Beginning in the late 1970s, the Canadian State and the Bank of Canada embraced 
an anti-inflationary monetary policy. If inflation is good for the working and middle 
classes and for smaller firms, and if inflation is harmful to large firms and the top income 
group, then one way of understanding the shift towards anti-inflationary monetary 
policy is to view it as the use of state power (presumably on behalf of large firms and the 
Canadian Establishment) to redistribute income from labour to capital, from small to 
large firms and from the lower to the upper echelons of the personal income hierarchy. 
Far from neoliberalism implying the ‘withdrawal’ or ‘retreat’ of state power, in this 
instance, the broader meaning of neoliberalism is the utilization of state power to 
restrain the wage demands of the working class and to the strengthen the social position 
of dominant capital. Under this interpretation, what is sometimes referred to as ‘sound 
monetary policy’ is, in practice, working and middle class-restraining, business class-
promoting, state policies that have the effect of upwardly redistributing income.   
Given the inflationary backdrop spelled out in this chapter, what are some of the 
long-term drivers of income inequality in Canada? Does the development of large firms 
help explain changes in the level of Canadian income inequality?  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
Some Long-Term Drivers of Inequality in Canada 
 
 
Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there 
must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of 
the many.  
- Adam Smith (1776) 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 8 we mapped the history of personal income inequality in Canada, discussed 
its socio-political significance, reviewed how others have understood the increasing 
income inequality of recent years and explored what an alternative explanatory 
framework might involve. Chapter 9 began to unpack the processes driving distribution 
through an examination of inflation. The present chapter will contrast the evolution of 
some of the major institutions in the Canadian political economy, notably large firms, 
governmental organs and labour unions with a view to understanding what bearing these 
changes have on the distribution of income and wealth. The chapter asks: are there 
patterns and regularities which shape the relative gains made by different income 
groups? If so, are these patterns reducible to shifts in the institutional and organizational 
environment in Canada? 
The core argument to be defended in this chapter is that increasing corporate 
power is associated with the redistribution of factor income from labour to capital and 
from the lower to the upper echelons of the personal income hierarchy. Conversely, the 
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institutional growth of labour unions is historically associated with the redistribution of 
factor income from capital to labour and from the upper to the lower stratums of the 
income hierarchy. The growth of the middle class in Canada unfolded side-by-side 
diminishing (or steady) corporate power and increasing unionization. The de-
unionization of recent decades in tandem with the surge in the relative size of the largest 
firms has meant the erosion of a shared prosperity and growing income inequality.  
 The argument will unfold over six sections. The first section will unpack the 
relationship between unemployment and inequality by exploring the dramatic 
redistribution of personal income during the Second World War. The second section 
establishes points of contact between factor income and personal income before 
explaining how corporate power has shaped both types of income over the postwar 
period. This sets the stage for the third section, which explores the ‘countervailing’ role 
played by unions in distributive outcomes. The fourth section maps the organizational 
structure of the corporate sector with a view to understanding what role (if any) relative 
firm size has played in shaping income inequality.  
In the fifth section we increase the level of resolution by honing in on the top 
income share in Canada to discern if there are stable patters which govern distributive 
gains among Canada’s most affluent inhabitants. Given corporate Canada’s over-
representation in energy and base materials, the focus will be on the role of energy and 
base material price inflation. The sixth section redeploys some of the quantitative history 
around amalgamation and stagflation to discern if long-term trends in these two 
processes have distributive consequences. The seventh section summarizes the findings 
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and provides some closing remarks on the intersection of corporate power and 
democratic citizenship. 
 
10.1 Unemployment and the ‘Natural Right of Investment’ 
A cautionary note is in order before proceeding to an explanation. Given that the 
distribution of income is such a complicated phenomenon and given that the historical 
and socio-institutional environment in Canada has changed so dramatically since 1920 
(when the data begin), we have no good reason to suppose that a single overarching 
principle will be discovered that satisfactorily explains inequality over the entire century. 
At different points in time one or another political-economic factor may prove paramount 
while at another time the explanatory emphasis might be found elsewhere.  
The first half of the twentieth century was characterized by prolonged and severe 
crises, namely two World Wars separated by a Great Depression. And while the income 
inequality data stretch back to the end of the First World War, reliable disaggregate 
equity data are unavailable until 1950, which means that we will have to look elsewhere 
to empirically support our assertions about income inequality in the period prior to 1950. 
Let’s begin with the most dramatic episode in the recorded history of income inequality 
in Canada: why was personal income inequality more than halved between 1939 and 1945 
and did the radical reduction in inequality have anything to do with the reorganization of 
power?  
Figure 10.1 documents the relationship between unemployment and personal 
income inequality. On the left side of the chart, the thick black line captures the 
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unemployment rate and the thin broken line captures the top 0.1 percent income share 
from 1919 to 1950. The inset chart on the bottom right measures the absolute difference of 
each series, smoothed as five year moving averages. The inset chart on the top right plots 
the unemployment rate (thick black line) against the absolute difference of the Gini 
coefficient (thin broken line) from 1970 to 2012 (Gini coefficient data only begins in 
1976). What do the facts tell us? During the three decades after the First World War, 
income inequality was tightly and positively correlated with the unemployment rate.1 
The rate of change of each series is also tightly correlated, as evidenced by the inset figure 
on the bottom right. The period from 1939 to 1945 is especially significant because it 
represents the greatest redistribution of Canadian income on historical record.  
The statistical relationship between the top 0.1 percent income share and the 
unemployment rate breaks down after 1950 for reasons that are not clear. However, it 
seems plausible to assume that the growth of the welfare state through crown 
corporations, government agencies, health care services, post-secondary institutions, etc., 
might have mitigated the power of corporations to enforce unemployment insofar as a 
large and growing portion of the workforce was absorbed by a nascent ‘public sector’. 
Given the data between 1919 and 1950, it appears that sharp increases in unemployment 
redistributed income upward while reductions in the unemployment rate redistribute 
income downward. 
                                                          
1 A correlation coefficient of 0.86. The same two series over the same time span are strongly correlated in 
the United Kingdom (0.77) and weakly correlated in the United States (0.25). 
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Source: top income share from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012) with series updated to 2010 by 
Michael Veall, retrieved online from: http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/; unemployment rate 
from Global Financial Data (1919-1950) and the OECD through Global Insight (1970-2012); Gini coefficient (market 
income) from Cansim Table 202-0705. 
 
Why would unemployment and the distribution of income be positively 
correlated in the interwar years? Recall Veblen’s claims about the ‘natural right of 
investment’: private ownership of industrial equipment grants proprietors the right to 
legally enforce unemployment, and this act of institutionalized exclusion has distributive 
consequences. Consider the reconfigured role of the Canadian State during the Second 
World War. Mainstream economics might speculate that an increase in ‘aggregate 
demand’ caused by the Second World War put people back to work, boosted average 
wages, depressed business earnings with the overall consequence being a narrowing of 
the distribution of personal income. ‘Supply and demand’ provides the ultimate answer, 
say the neoclassicists. This is inadequate. Something much more fundamental than a shift 
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in ‘market forces’ occurred in Canada between 1939 and 1945; the very capitalist nature of 
the Canadian political economy was altered.  
Until 1939 employment (industry) was firmly under the control of private 
proprietors (business). The Second World War partially changed that. As Minister of 
Munitions and Supply, C.D. Howe presided over the shift towards a centrally planned 
political economy. Business considerations, although not totally eliminated, were greatly 
diminished vis-à-vis industrial considerations. Capitalists lost some control over 
(un)employment and pricing. The consequences for them were devastating, as evidenced 
by a collapse in the top income share. In terms of price formation, wage ceilings were 
imposed, producer and consumer prices were frozen, exchange rates were controlled and 
the rate of profit was capped at five percent. In terms of unemployment, restrictions were 
lifted when Howe put Canada on a war-time footing. Ottawa demanded that production 
increase in everything from raw materials to manufactured goods to military hardware. If 
Howe couldn’t find a business to provide the goods he wanted, he created a crown 
corporation (Taylor 2009: 137-9).  
The consequences? Unemployment shrank from 12 percent in 1939 to under 2 
percent in 1945. Gross domestic product grew by more than 15 percent annually, rising 
from $5 billion in 1939 to $12 billion in 1945. Without exception, the 1940s represents the 
most rapid growth decade in Canadian history and the closest Canada ever came to full 
employment. In the process of shifting control of production and prices from business to 
government, the Canadian political economy moved towards full socio-technological 
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potential. The capitalist power manifest in unemployment was severely curtailed and one 
consequence appears to be a radical reduction in the top income share.  
The relationship between unemployment and personal income inequality appears 
to break down after 1950, but appearances can be deceiving.2 The inset chart in the top 
right portion of Figure 10.1 shows a significant relationship between unemployment and 
the absolute difference of income inequality, the latter measured using the Gini 
coefficient. Sharp increases in unemployment (industrial limitation) correspond with 
increases in the absolute difference of income inequality (differential pecuniary gain). The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear. However, the fact that unemployment and 
inequality are positively associated serves to strengthen Veblen’s and N&B’s assertion 
that capitalist power is manifest in the subjugation of industry to business and that the 
exercise of this power has a bearing on the distribution of income.3  
If unemployment shapes the distribution of personal income prior to 1945, let’s 
deepen our analysis by exploring what role broad shifts in the institutional and 
organizational structure of the political economy have on the distribution of income. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The correlation between the unemployment rate and the top 0.1 percent income share is 0.04 between 
1950 and 2010. 
3 Kalecki (1943b: 140-1) hints at a relationship between unemployment and capitalist power. Full 
employment policies, he tells us, will not be embraced by business because ‘“the sack” would cease to play 
its role as a disciplinary measure’ and the ‘social position of the boss would be undermined’. 
Unemployment prevents workers from feeling confident enough to strike for higher wages. If Kalecki’s 
assertion is correct, then the weakened bargaining position of labour resulting from unemployment would 
not only hold the level of wages down, but would also serve to increase income inequality. 
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10.2 Factor Income, Personal Income and Commodified Power 
The Canadian political economy was transformed during the early decades of the 
postwar era just as income inequality began a three decade-long decline. Why did 
personal income inequality decline between 1945 and the late 1970s? Before addressing 
this question, let us review a few conceptual matters. Instead of thinking of income 
formation in atomistic and absolute terms, and instead of assuming that market income 
reflects proportional productive contribution, let us suppose that the political economy 
is partially a terrain of conflict between different socio-economic groups and that the 
distribution of income partly manifests socio-institutional power. Relative, not absolute, 
income gains are what matter using this line of reasoning. The question emerges: is there 
a systematic relationship between personal income inequality and the distributive 
struggle between capital and labour?  
To answer this question let us survey the national accounts and extract three 
metrics: corporate profit, wages and salaries and GDP. Step one is to divide the first two 
measures by the third to arrive at the share of national income going to capital in the 
form of profit and the share of national income going to labour in the form of wages. The 
national wage bill is altered to reflect the class-based distribution of income by 
subtracting the wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income share (thus 
making it an ‘adjusted’ national wage bill). Step two is to divide the first measure by the 
second to arrive at a picture of the distributional struggle between capital and labour 
over profits and wages. When this ratio rises, capital is redistributing income from 
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labour and vice versa. This ratio is plotted in Figure 10.2 against the top percentile 
income share from 1945 to 2010.  
The reasons for adjusting the national wage bill in Canada are analytical. The 
classical political economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries utilized social 
class as an important analytical tool. Indeed, analysis of the distribution of factor income 
between wages, profits and rent/interest — workers, capitalists and landlords/rentiers 
— and the corresponding distribution of personal income makes little sense apart from 
social class. Beginning in the late nineteenth century an emergent ‘neoclassical 
economics’ emptied the political economy of its class content. Instead of social classes 
populating the ‘political economy’, the analysis shifted to the individuals inhabiting the 
‘economy’.  
The removal of class as an analytical category came at the expense of an 
appreciation of the role of institutions in organizing exchange and shaping distribution 
exchange. What was gained in the process, however, was ideologically appealing. By 
failing to distinguish the mass of people who sell their labour power on the market from 
the much smaller number of people who own the major businesses, neoclassical 
economics shifted the discussion away from the apparent conflict between the income 
groups over wages, profits and interest/rent to the much more positive, though partially 
distorted, picture of a socially harmonious society in which the work of individuals is 
rewarded in proportion to productive contribution (or the productivity of the ‘factors’ 
which the individual owns, since it is unclear how mere ownership of physical 
equipment or land is an industrially productive activity). This manoeuvre bypassed some 
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difficult questions about how wealth is generated and what role political-economic 
institutions play in shaping its distribution. 
As Figure 10.2 makes apparent, personal income inequality closely tracked the 
distributive struggle between capital and labour over profits and wages. As workers 
made distributive gains throughout the ‘golden age’ (1945-1980), narrowing the 
distribution of income, capital suffered distributional losses along with the top percentile 
income group. This process went into reverse in the 1980s, with capital redistributing 
income away from labour and the top percentile income share increasing. 
 
Note: the adjusted national wage bill is wages and salaries as a percent of GDP less the 
wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income share. Source: top percentile 
income share (including the wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income 
share)  from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012) with series updated to 
2010 by Michael Veall (http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/); GDP, 
wages and salaries and corporate profit from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F1-13 
and Cansim Table 380-0016; total government expenditure from Historical Statistics of 
Canada, Series F16 (1926-1965); total government outlays (including Canada Pension Plan 
and Quebec Pension Plan but excluding intergovernmental transfers) from Fiscal 
Reference Table 33 (1966-2010). 
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Who is a part of the ‘one percent’, beyond a basic income measure? It is a rather 
large grouping that is bound to include many people who would not be considered 
capitalists. This squares with the observations made by Fortin et. al. (2012), who examine 
the composition of the top percentile based on the 2006 Canadian Census and find that 
most people within it are neither executives nor financiers. A sizeable proportion of the 
top percentile income group are health professionals, for example. We would also expect 
to find accountants, lawyers, athletes and entertainers in this income bracket. Despite 
these caveats, we are safe in presuming that ownership and control of Canada’s corporate 
sector resides somewhere within the top percentile, though it is probably a very small 
fraction that effectively controls the corporate sector. 
The inset chart in Figure 10.2 documents the relationship between government 
spending and the distribution of factor income over the postwar era by presenting two 
series: the thin broken line measures labour-capital redistribution, tabulated as a ratio of 
the adjusted national wage bill to the corporate profit share of GDP and the thick black 
line is total government spending as a percent of GDP (smoothed as five-year moving 
averages).4 The growth of government spending, which could be interpreted as a 
democratization of the political economy, closely mirrors the redistribution of income 
from capital to labour and vice versa.  
Public sector pay scales tend to be more compressed than the private sector — a 
higher floor and a lower ceiling — so as public sector activities form a larger proportion 
                                                          
4 The correlation coefficient over six and a half decades is 0.61. The correlation coefficient for the rate of 
change of each series, also smoothed as five-year moving averages, is 0.46. 
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of GDP, one consequence might be a reduction in income inequality. The redistributive 
aspect of government spending in Canada is mirrored internationally. Examining 64 
countries over a quarter century, Lee (2005) finds a strong interaction between 
democracy and public sector development on the one hand, and intra-country income 
inequality on the other. Increasing public sector size in the context of democratic 
political institutions, he hypothesizes, may serve to redistribute income insofar as 
governmental agencies are more responsive to demands of lower classes and more 
committed to equitable distributive outcomes.5 
Recall: Figure 6.6 establishes a link between aggregate concentration and market 
power; Figure 6.7 shows that corporate concentration is fuelled, in part, by corporate 
amalgamation; and Figure 10.2 uncovers the relationship between the top percentile 
income share and the distributional struggle between capital and labour. What role does 
corporate power play in shaping the distribution of factor income?  
 Kalecki argues that the degree of monopoly is of ‘decisive importance for the 
distribution of income between workers and capitalists’ (1943: 51). Large corporations in 
‘semi-monopolistic’ settings not only tend to have greater pricing discretion, as Means 
(1935) shows, but they tend to have deeper earnings margins. Kalecki posits: 
The long-run changes in the relative share of wages… [are] determined by long-run trends 
in the degree of monopoly… The degree of monopoly has a general tendency to increase in 
the long run and thus to depress the relative share of wages in income… [although] this 
tendency is much stronger in some periods than in others (1938: 65). 
 
                                                          
5 In the context of non-democratic political institutions, the growth of the public sector is positively 
associated with increasing inequality, Lee notes. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, Kalecki’s basic assertion will be restated as a 
question: is it true that the degree of monopoly (measured using the markup among the 
largest firms) has a bearing on the relative share of wages, and in so doing, shapes the 
distribution of income between workers and capitalists?  
 
Note: adjusted national wage bill is wages and salaries as a percent of GDP less the wages 
and salaries portion of the top percentile income share. Source: wages and salaries portion 
of the top percentile income share from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall 
(2012) with series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall; Compustat through WRDS for 
shares outstanding, closing share price, revenue and pre-tax income; Canadian Financial 
Markets Research Centre; Moody's Corporate Manuals through Mergent Webreports; 
Report on Business Top 1000 Companies; GDP, wages and salaries and corporate profit 
from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F1-13 Cansim Table 380-0016. 
 
Figure 10.3 plots the markup of the top 60 firms against capital-labour 
redistribution (smoothed as three-year moving averages to ease the visual assessment). 
The two series are tightly intertwined over six decades. In the Keynesian era, the 
distributive power of the largest firms, registered in their earnings margins, declined. 
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This process went into reverse in the so-called ‘free trade’ era, with the markup soaring 
from the 1990s onward. If the markup is measure of corporate power, and if the 
distributive struggle between capital and labour shapes the distribution of personal 
income, it is highly significant that the former moves in tandem with the latter, because it 
suggests that corporate power shapes the distribution of income in Canada.  
Let’s look at this from a slightly different angle. Does the distributive struggle 
between capital and labour — between the owners of corporate equities and the owners 
of labour power — help explain the level and pattern of top income share? In other 
words, if the top income group owns the corporate sector then does it follow that the 
distributive struggle between this group and the workforce shapes the proportion of 
income accruing to the former? One way of answering this question is to contrast the 
price of corporate equities with the price of labour. Figure 10.4 juxtaposes the top 0.1 
percent income share against a ratio of corporate equity prices to the price of wage 
labour. The latter is measured as a ratio of the inflation-adjusted TSX 300 price index to 
the inflation-adjusted average hourly wage rate.  
Over the long-haul it appears that relative prices of different income groups 
closely resembles the class-based distribution of income. The price of corporate equities 
relative to labour reached a historic high just prior to the Great Depression and again just 
prior to the Second World War. This ratio reached a historic low in the late 1970s before 
surging upward, touching a historic extreme again prior to the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
The share of national income going to the top 0.1 percent followed a similar pattern. 
Historic highs were reached just prior to the Second World War and the Great 
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Recession of 2008-09. A historic low was reached in 1977 — the same year as the ratio of 
equities to wages bottomed out.  
 
Source: top income share from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012) with 
series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall, retrieved online from: http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/; stock price index and consumer price index from 
Global Financial Data; average hourly earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 
E198 (1910-1948) and IMF through Global Insight (1949-2010). 
 
 
If corporate power shapes the distributional struggle between capital and labour 
(Figure 10.3), and if this struggle is manifested in the top income share (Figure 10.2), then 
what are the institutions and processes that mitigate corporate power and lessen income 
inequality? More specifically, do labour unions act as a ‘countervailing power’ to the 
institutional strength of capital and dominant capital?  
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10.3 The Countervailing Power of Organized Labour  
In his study on American capitalism, J.K. Galbraith (1952) utilizes the term 
‘countervailing power’ to denote an institutional setting in which the power of large 
corporations is offset by the power of labour unions and governments. To use familiar 
language, labour unions act as a ‘check’ or ‘balance’ against the power of dominant 
corporations. During the ‘golden age’ of controlled capitalism (1945-1980), labour made 
distributive gains relative to capital and lower income groups made distributive relative 
to the top income group. How can we account for this?  
Unions represent workers at the bargaining table with employers and, because 
they are able to negotiate as a collective unit, their bargaining position is enhanced 
(hypothetically, if not actually) in relation to what it would be if each individual 
bargained in isolation.6 An enhanced bargaining position (often) enables unions to 
increase their compensation and benefits to a greater extent than would otherwise occur. 
Furthermore, by increasing the remuneration of organized workers, unions serve to raise 
the social expectations around the compensation of work in society more broadly. This 
has spillover (or ‘trickle up’) effects in non-unionized workplaces as well (hence the 
increase in average hourly earnings documented in Figure 9.1). 
 Recall from Chapter 9: neoclassical economics argues that that unionized labour 
can only redistribute income within a given national wage bill, not raise it. Is this true? 
Figure 10.5 contrasts union density and the adjusted national wage bill in Canada from 
                                                          
6 In all likelihood, there wouldn’t be any one-on-one bargaining between many workers and their employer 
in the absence of a union. Many low-wage employers (the McDonald’s, Home Depot’s, Tim Horton’s, etc.) 
impose a labour contact on their workers with little or no negotiation. 
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1921 to 2010. The level and pattern of union density was already described in Figure 9.1. 
The adjusted national wage bill is the total wages and salaries divided by GDP less the 
wages and salaries portion of the top percentile income share.7 The two series are tightly 
and positively correlated over the past century. The surge in unionization from 1940 to a 
historic high in 1975 corresponded with an increase in the adjusted national wage bill, 
which peaked in 1977 (shortly after union density peaked). The deunionization of recent 
decades corresponds with a reduced national wage bill, which has fallen to a level not 
seen since the 1940s.    
Figure 10.2 tells us that the distributive struggle between workers and capitalists 
over wages and profits has broad consequences for the top income share and personal 
income inequality. Figure 9.1 and 10.5 indicate that the institutional strength of organized 
labour shapes the level of earnings and the aggregate sum of labour income, which 
implies that unions play a role in redistributing factor income from capital to labour. The 
growth of labour unions also appears to downwardly redistribute personal income, 
lessening the level of personal income inequality.  
How are the facts portrayed in Figure 9.1 and 10.5 related to power? Both figures 
crystallize the successes and failures of one of the largest social movements in Canadian 
history: the labour movement. The process of unionization required large-scale 
                                                          
7 The Saez and Veall top income share is comprised of different categories of income: (1) wages and salaries, 
(2) professional income, (3) business income, (4) dividends, (5) interest income, (6) investment income 
and (7) capital income. The adjusted national wage is total wages and salaries divided by GDP less the wages 
and salaries portion of the top percentile income share. The latter only has data running from 1946 through 
2010, so to estimate the period from 1926-1945 I used the wages and salaries portion of the top percentile 
income share in the United States as a proxy (with rebasing). The wages and salaries portion of the top 
percentile income share in Canada and the United States have a correlation coefficient of 0.74 between 
1946 and 2010, which is sufficiently strong to accurately impute the wages and salaries portion of the top 
percentile income share in Canada.   
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community activism and social mobilization. It was initially a movement of ordinary 
people rising against the power elite who fought to repress it. Throughout the ‘golden 
age’, Canadians were witnesses to increasing union density and a demographic bulge in 
the ranks of the middle class. In the ‘new gilded age’, this process went into reverse. 
Whereas surging unionization over the first three postwar decades appears to have 
redistributed income downward, deunionization since the late 1970s has effectively 
meant an upward redistribution of income. 
 
Note: adjusted national wage bill is wages and salaries as a percent of GDP less the wages 
and salaries portion of the top percentile income share. Source: wages and salaries portion 
of the top percentile income share from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall 
(2012) with series updated to 2010 by Michael Veall; union density from Historical 
Statistics of Canada, Series E176 (1921-1975), Cansim Tables 279-0026 and 282-0078 (1976-
1995) and (1997-2010), respectively; wages and salaries and GDP from Historical Statistics 
of Canada, Series F1-13 and Cansim Table 380-0016. 
 
If Kalecki was correct in asserting that the degree of monopoly shapes the 
national wage bill (Figure 10.3), then how do we account for the level and pattern of the 
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former? Kalecki imagined that the strength of trade unions would be a check on the 
power of large firms insofar as a greater degree of monopoly (high ratio of profits to 
wages) ‘strengthens the bargaining position of trade unions in their demands for wage 
increases since higher wages are then compatible with “reasonable profits” at the existing 
price levels’ (1943a: 51). Is it true that the strength of trade unions restrains or offsets 
corporate power?  
Figure 10.6 documents the historical relationship between the power of large 
firms as manifest in the markup and the institutional strength of organized labour as 
manifest in union density. The thin broken line captures the pre-tax profit markup of the 
top 60 firms and the thick black line measures total union density (the scale of the latter 
is inverted to more easily contrast the relationship between the two series). The two 
series are strongly and negatively correlated over six decades.    
As workers deepened unionization throughout the ‘golden age’, pushing up wages 
and enlarging the ranks of the middle class, it appears that a partial consequence was the 
squeezing of earnings margins. The process culminated in the 1970s and the political-
economic disruption that ensued displaced the Keynesian welfare state as the core way 
to manage the political economy. Distributive outcomes began to move in the opposite 
direction during and after the 1980s. The instituting of the TAIL in the late 1980s appears 
to be a decisive turning point, with organized labour seeing a fall in its membership and 
large firms seeing a corresponding enlargement in the markup.8     
 
                                                          
8 The countervailing power of organized labour in Canada is explored in Brennan (2014). 
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Source: union density from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series E176 (1921-1975), 
Cansim Tables 279-0026 (1976-1995) and 282-0078 (1997-2012), respectively; markup 
from Compustat through WRDS for shares outstanding, closing share price, revenue and 
pre-tax income; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Moody's Corporate 
Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies. 
 
Let’s summarize. On the one hand we have the degree of monopoly — a 
quantitative proxy for the power of large firms — which is shaped (in part) by the 
relative position of the largest firms. The degree of monopoly has a bearing, as Kalecki 
thought, on the distribution of national income between workers and capitalists, which 
in turn, has a bearing on personal income inequality. Kalecki also appears to be correct in 
his hypothesis that corporate power is restrained by the institutional strength of labour 
unions. The institutional growth of unions increase inflation-adjusted wages, enlarge the 
national wage bill and lessen income inequality. The erosion of unions since the late 
1970s has effectively meant wage stagnation and heightened income inequality.  
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Given that the institutional growth of labour unions has shaped the distribution 
of income in Canada, a few questions follow. Has globalization played a role in fuelling 
the growth of large firms? And is there a relationship between the institutional-
organization structure of the corporate sector and the distribution of personal income?  
 
10.4 Institutional-Organizational Structure and Inequality  
Differential capitalization by the top 60 firms is driven, theoretically and historically, by 
differential earnings (Figure 5.5). Does the globalization of Canadian corporate 
ownership play a role in enlarging the earnings of the top 60 firms? Let’s being to answer 
this question by assessing what happens when a Canadian firm invests in a foreign 
country. Because mainstream economists tend to think of capital in material-productive 
terms, i.e., as capital goods or machinery and equipment, the popular mythology is that 
capital ‘moves’ from one jurisdiction to another and that this has some bearing on 
productive capacity and industrial efficiency. N&B argue that this is rarely what happens 
in practice (2009: 350). Liberalized investment has little to do with the movement of 
machinery or equipment. Cross-border investment, they say, is a rearranging of 
ownership claims and nothing more. ‘Capital mobility’ and ‘investment liberalization’ has 
the potential to reconfigure the structure of corporate ownership. And when ownership 
is reconfigured the distribution of income often changes along with it. Why?  
A corporation is a legal and organizational vehicle that grants the owners lawful 
claims on future (and realized) earnings. As firms grow larger by acquiring other firms, 
the legal claims of the resulting owners grows in tandem with the newly enlarged income 
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streams. Recall that the instituting of a TAIL regime acted as an inflection point in many 
of our measures of distribution. The logic of globalization, N&B argue, is such that in 
order for large firms to continue to differentially accumulate, they need a new universe of 
takeover targets (once the existing universe is exhausted). And the political engineering 
of continental integration via the FTA and NAFTA provided such an opening. The TAIL-
era ushered in an explosion of cross-border investment, the result being a more rapid 
restructuring of North American corporate ownership. And when ownership changes 
hands, the associated legal claims on future earnings change hands as well.  
Figure 10.7 contrasts the concentration of pre-tax profit among the top 60 firms 
with the stock of Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA), the latter measured as a 
percent of GDP. The two series are tightly correlated over six decades. Given that 
Canadian merger waves became increasingly globalized over the postwar period and 
given that it tends to be the largest firms that participate in international investment, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the level of international assets held by Canadian-based 
firms synchronizes with the profit share of the top (read: most globalized) firms.  
If the logic of differential accumulation induces large firms to seek new take-over 
targets in foreign jurisdictions (once the existing national universe of desirable take-over 
targets is exhausted), then the profit share of the largest firms will be positively related 
to the magnitude of their foreign holdings, since income represents a ‘return’ on the 
ownership of an asset. And by contrasting the earnings of the top firms with the stock of 
CDIA, we get a picture of the link between ‘globalization’ and the distribution of income 
amongst the top firms.  
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Note the pattern: the stock of CDIA hovers around 6 or 7 percent between 1950 
and 1980 before climbing to a high of 39 percent by 2012. The income share of the top 60 
firms also stays steady for decades, hovering around 30 percent between 1950 and 1990 
before surging to a historic high of 58 percent in 2011. It appears that the concentration of 
income amongst the top 60 firms bears some resemblance to the extent of international 
Canadian corporate ownership. This supports the notion that large firms participate in 
foreign M&A, in part, to boost their (differential) earnings.  
 
Source: Compustat through WRDS for shares outstanding, closing share price and gross 
income; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Moody's Corporate Manuals 
through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business Top 1000 Companies; stocks of 
Canadian direct investment abroad from Cansim Table 376-0037; GDP from Historical 
Statistics of Canada, Series F13 and Cansim Table 380-0016; total pre-tax corporate profit 
from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series F3 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0016 
(1961-2012). 
 
Also note that Canadian firms of all sizes may trade with American-based firms or 
sell their products to American customers. However, cross-border investment is a game 
376 
 
typically played by large firms, so it makes sense that the income share of the top 60 firms 
moves in tandem with international ownership.9 The inset chart in Figure 10.7 portrays 
the stock of CDIA and the equity capitalization of the top 60 firms (both series as a 
percent of GDP and smoothed as five-year moving averages). The two series are even 
more tightly correlated over six decades (0.81), which indicates that the political 
engineering of the TAIL regime and the associated expansion of international asset 
ownership may have contributed (indirectly) to increased relative firm size.  
Let us turn to the relationship between the institutional-organizational structure 
of the corporate sector and income inequality. Recall: Chapter 5 mapped the evolution of 
corporate asset concentration and asked how to account for its level and pattern (Figure 
5.5); and Chapter 6 found a tight correlation between corporate asset concentration and 
corporate amalgamation (Figure 6.7). If concentration has increased in recent years and if 
it is driven by amalgamation, is there a relationship between corporate asset 
concentration and personal income inequality? Figure 10.8 paints a stark picture: the 
concentration of corporate assets among the top 60 firms is stacked up against personal 
income inequality (the latter measured using the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient).10 
The two series are tightly correlated over a half century (0.91). Heightened income 
inequality appears to be driven, in part, by the concentration of corporate power.  
                                                          
9 The claim about international corporate ownership and the performance of large firms is bolstered when 
we compare the equity capitalization of all firms on the TSX less the equity capitalization of the top 60 
firms against CDIA stocks (both as a percent of GDP). The year-over-year correlation between 1950 and 
2011 is -0.55, which strengthens the assertion that large firms benefit from international investment (while 
small firms do not). 
10 Saez and Veall (2007) provide measures for both the Pareto-Lorenz and inverted Pareto-Lorenz 
coefficients. The former measures the concentration of income among the rich. The higher the coefficient, 
the lower the concentration (the opposite holds for the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient). 
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Note: Total corporate assets are tabulated by subtracting the total assets of government 
financial and non-financial business enterprises from the total assets of government and 
business enterprises. Source: Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre and 
Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding, closing share price and 
assets; Moody’s Corporate Manuals through Mergent Webreports; Report on Business 
Top 1000 Companies (various issues from 1985-2010); total corporate assets from Cansim 
Tables 378-0052, 378-0055 and 378-0072; top income share from Saez and Veall (2007), 
Veall (2010) and Veall (2012) (http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). 
 
Why would personal income inequality be related to asset concentration? 
Amalgamation simultaneously increases firm size while shrinking the number of 
corporate units. In principle, this reduces competition and has the potential to eliminate 
markets as a basis for exchange. So as concentration intensifies, coordination through 
markets is replaced by intra-firm transfers, which are subject to hierarchical decree. 
Recall what Adam Smith says about markets and distribution. Smith would have us 
believe that his ‘system of perfect liberty’ would produce distributional outcomes that 
were either perfectly equal or continuously trending towards equality: 
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The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and 
stock must… be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality (1776: 114).   
 
One reason why income inequality might rise, Smith argues, is a restriction of 
competitive pressures. Competition keeps the wages of labour and the profits of stock 
fluctuating around their ‘natural’ level, that is to say, low relative to the social norm. The 
restriction of competition leads to an increase in price, thus undermining the tendency 
towards equality. The public is the loser in this, Smith believes, for they are left with 
higher prices.  
If it seems intuitive that amalgamation increases concentration, reduces 
competition and thickens profit margins, it is still unclear how concentration fuels 
income inequality. It seems reasonable to suppose that the greater profits accruing to the 
largest firms (and the resulting increase in cash flow) has the potential to translate into 
higher executive salaries, whether the executives have an equity stake in the firm they 
manage or not. As has been argued elsewhere (Brennan 2012), there appears to be a 
relationship between surging executive salaries and income inequality, on the one hand, 
and corporate concentration, on the other. Consider Hugh Mackenzie’s (2012) report, 
Canada’s CEO Elite 100, which examines executive compensation in Canada. Of the top 100 
executive salaries, 59 are derived from a firm within the top 60 — our proxy for dominant 
capital. A further 16 of the top 100 executive salaries are derived from firms in positions 61 
through 100 (ranked by equity market capitalization).  
The linkages between corporate concentration and income inequality, then, run 
as follows: increased concentration translates into less competition; less competition 
translates into higher profit margins and higher profits; the resulting increase in cash 
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flow has the potential to translate into higher executive salaries; and it is the very high 
executive salaries — many among Canada’s richest 0.1 percent — that are playing a key 
role in driving income inequality across Canadian society. 
Let’s come at the relationship between corporate power and inequality from a 
slightly different angle. Wilkinson and Pickett emphasize the relativity of poverty. N&B 
emphasize the relativity of business performance. What happens when we combine these 
views? Figure 10.9 stacks the differential capitalization of the top 60 firms up against the 
income share of the top 0.1 percent. The result is a very tight correlation over six decades. 
Both series declined for the three decades to 1980, rose gradually in the 1980s and then 
rose rapidly in the two decades to 2010. Ironically, the Keynesian era witnessed shrinking 
relative firm size while the neoliberal era — the period often advertised as having 
unleashed the ‘forces of competition’ — has seen an massive increase in relative firm size. 
The capitalization of Canada’s largest corporate units appears to shape trends in income 
inequality.  
N&B assert that differential accumulation captures the ‘power drive’ of 
accumulation (2009: 325) and Chapter 5 demonstrated that the corporate sector is 
largely controlled by dominant proprietors who have a significant equity stake in the top 
firms. The fact that the top income share and differential capitalization exhibit a similar 
pattern lends additional weight to the anti-managerial view. Recall: Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that the rise of the modern, joint-stock company initiated a corporate 
revolution by altering the property regime. Increasing concentration of corporate assets 
combined with an increasing diffusion of stock ownership led to a separation of 
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ownership from control, or so the theory went. One implication of this political-
economic development, in theory, is that the increase in power associated with higher 
levels of corporate concentration is offset by the diffusion of stock ownership in that 
dominant proprietors were dislodged from a position of power.  
 
Source: Compustat through WRDS for common shares outstanding and closing share 
price; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Global Financial Data for total 
market capitalization and number of listed stocks; top income share from Saez and Veall 
(2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012), retrieved from: http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. 
 
The research presented here challenges this view of the corporate revolution. 
Concentration and differential accumulation have reached historic extremes in recent 
years, but the diffusion of stock ownership is less pronounced than the managerial thesis 
implies. The Canadian experience indicates that dominant proprietors have not been 
dislodged, which suggests that the relative growth of the largest firms signals an 
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increasing concentration and centralization of corporate equity. The fusion of ownership 
and control might be one reason why increasing relative firm size is mirrored by an 
increasing concentration of personal income. 
Figure 10.9 only captures the personal income aspect of inequality. The 
distribution of wealth is another crucial metric. Obtaining disaggregate time series data 
on wealth is notoriously difficult. However, since 1999 Canadian Business Magazine has 
produced an annual ranking of the 100 richest people in Canada. The October 2011 issue 
reports that 61 of the richest 100 Canadian families are classified as billionaires. This is a 
very high figure given Canada’s population. The United States has nine times the 
population of Canada, but only seven times as many billionaires. The United Kingdom 
and France have nearly double, Germany nearly triple and Japan nearly quadruple 
Canada’s population, and yet, each of these societies has fewer billionaires (32, 14, 52 and 
26, respectively). Only three countries — the United States, China and Russia — have 
more billionaires than Canada (Canadian Business 2011: 46-47). If distribution is rooted 
in the nomos, and if it partly reflects power struggles in society, then the fact that a 
medium-sized country like Canada produces more billionaires in relative and absolute 
terms than many comparable (or even large) jurisdictions suggests an enormous 
concentration of power at the top of the Canadian dominance hierarchy.  
What does the distribution of wealth look like in Canada and does it bear any 
resemblance to the structure of the corporate sector? Figure 10.10 plots the differential 
capitalization of the top 60 firms against the differential net worth of the richest 100 
Canadians from 1995 and 1999, respectively. The latter is computed as a ratio of the 
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average net worth of the 100 richest Canadians (ranked annually by Canadian Business 
Magazine) and the average net worth of all Canadians, measured as the market value of 
net financial assets divided by the adult population. The two series are tightly correlated 
over 13 years. Differential net worth increased more than 50 percent, rising from 13,000 in 
1999 to 20,000 in 2011. Not only does differential accumulation appear to play a role in 
driving income inequality, it also appears to play a role in driving wealth inequality. 
 
Source: net worth of the richest 100 Canadians from Canadian Business Magazine’s ‘Rich 
100’ special issue (for the years 1999-2011); total market value of net financial assets from 
Cansim Table 378-0051; adult population in Canada from Cansim Table 051-0001; 
differential capitalization from Compustat through WRDS for common shares 
outstanding and closing share price; Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre; Global 
Financial Data for total market capitalization and number of listed stocks. 
 
The capital as power framework posits that differential accumulation is the 
central process of the political economy and that, so long as differential capitalization is 
non negative, the process represents the amassment of capitalist power (N&B 2009: 
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325). At first glance this claim is hard to decipher, but given its explanatory power vis-à-
vis the distribution of personal income and wealth in Canada, the claim becomes more 
intelligible and deeply meaningful. Increases in relative firm size are mirrored to a 
remarkable extent by increases in income and wealth inequality.  
Let’s summarize. The differential earnings of the top 60 firms drives differential 
capitalization (Figure 5.7) and differential capitalization deepens the distribution of 
personal income (Figure 10.9) and wealth (Figure 10.10), thereby increasing personal 
income inequality, exacerbating social pathologies (as Wilkinson and Pickett maintain) 
and, potentially at least, threatening the democratic process (Figure 8.2). Given the 
restructuring of power in the Canadian political economy, we may wish to know what 
role dominant capital plays in shaping public policy, especially in the areas pertaining to 
the distribution of income. 
 
10.5 Dominant Capital, Income Inequality and Public Policy 
Sections 10.2 through 10.4 documented broad shifts in the institutional environment by 
mapping the power of large firms and the countervailing power of organized labour. We 
learned that changes in the institutional structure of the political economy have a direct 
impact on the distribution of income. Given that large firms have become more powerful 
and labour organizations less powerful in recent decades how are these changes 
registered in the political process? More specifically, if corporate power has increased in 
recent decades how might this manifest itself in Canadian public policies pertaining to 
income inequality?  
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Recall some of the arguments (recounted) in Section 6.4. Blair (1972) tells us that 
with the advent of larger corporate units, market behaviour changes and ‘communities of 
interest’ form around powerful families and financial institutions, which enable these 
groups to better coordinate their activities, including activities in the policy realm. Olson 
tells us that the logic of collective action provides small groups with the incentive to 
coordinate their behaviour on account of the high benefit-to-cost ratio (whereas large, 
dispersed groups lack these incentives for the opposite reason). As Olson puts it, small 
groups possess disproportionate ‘organizational power’ or ‘cartelistic power per capita’ 
(1982: 41). So as a smaller number of ever larger firms become a more tightly integrated 
group and as their control over the industrial life of the nation increases, it seems 
plausible that their influence over the political process will increase in tandem with their 
‘cartelistic power per capita’.  
Leave aside the fact that the people who staff the largest corporate units often end 
up in high-ranking political positions (and vice versa: many top tier politicians end up 
populating corporate boards) and ignore the fact that governing officials often share a 
world view with dominant proprietors and executives. What influence does dominant 
capital exert on Canadian public policy vis-à-vis income inequality?  There are two broad 
categories within which dominant capital may influence distributive policy matters: (i) 
the pro-business policies which they actively lobby government for and (ii) the policy 
options that they explicitly or implicitly veto. We deal with examples of each in turn. 
 Perhaps the most important example of the first kind of intervention would be 
the move towards a trade and investment liberalization (TAIL) regime in North America, 
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which is recounted for illustrative purposes. Aversion to TAIL among the power elite in 
Canada persisted through much of the twentieth century, but began to change in the 
1970s when liberal governments undertook overtly nationalist policies, including 
rejecting TAIL with the U.S. This prompted dominant capital in Canada to re-evaluate its 
way of doing politics. Up until then it had lobbied political parties, helped them 
financially and supported them behind the scenes. In 1976 the Business Council on 
National Issues was formed (since re-branded the Canadian Council of Chief Executives 
(CCCE)), made up of the CEO’s of the largest corporations operating in Canada. Taking 
their cue from Business Roundtable in the U.S., the explicit objective of the organization 
was to have dominant capital participate directly in the policy-making process.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the CCCE led an ‘attitude adjustment’ within 
Canadian business which had, until then, showed little appetite for a TAIL deal with the 
U.S. But by the early 1980s there was near consensus on the issue of TAIL (McBride 2001: 
70). Indeed, even before a TAIL deal became part of the Mulroney Conservatives’ policy 
platform, the CCCE led a delegation to Washington to try to promote the idea to the 
Business Roundtable and Reagan Administration. In 1983 the CCCE began promoting 
the idea to the Canadian public. Despite this, Brian Mulroney campaigned against TAIL 
during his 1983 Tory leadership race, but after winning the 1984 election the tory cabinet 
was invited by the CCCE to an extensive briefing at a secluded retreat in Quebec. The 
following year at the Shamrock Summit in Quebec City, Mulroney and Reagan formally 
announced the launching of free trade negotiations.  
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As argued elsewhere (Brennan 2013a; 2013b), the TAIL regime (including and 
importantly the investor-state dispute settlement procedures enshrined in NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11) tilted the balance of bargaining power between capital and labour. One effect 
has been a radical redistribution of income from labour to capital and from the lower to 
the upper stratums of the personal income hierarchy. 
 As significant as pro-business policies are in shaping the distribution of income, 
also significant are the range of policy options that are not pursued on account of their 
unpopularity with dominant capital groups. The explicit or implicit vetoing of many 
progressive policies by dominant capital would include: higher corporate income tax 
rates; stronger governmental support of collective bargaining and unionization; public 
ownership of key natural resources, industrial processes and financial institutions; 
managed (as opposed to liberalized) trade and investment; reliance on price controls or 
supply management in key industries; anti-trust measures that prohibit oligopolistic and 
semi-monopolistic market structures; recognition of Aboriginal treaties and land 
agreements, especially where resource development is an issue; strict environmental 
regulation and binding green-house gas reduction targets; and perhaps most 
significantly, a national jobs program that aims at full employment.  
This is a short list of policies that would serve a diverse collection of stakeholders, 
but which would be unpopular among some segments of dominant capital. The argument 
here is obviously not that there is a conspiracy on the part of dominant capital and 
governing officials to block these policies. Many small businesses and other groups 
oppose these kinds of policies despite the fact that they are outside the power elite. 
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However, as corporate power increases it seems likely that the distaste dominant capital 
groups have for these types of policies will find its way into the political program of 
governing parties. Reduction in investment and employment, the shifting of resources to 
foreign jurisdictions and the withdrawal of financial donations are some of the levers 
dominant capital groups can pull to influence the policy direction of political parties.  
On the issue of inequality, higher corporate income tax rates, more generous 
unemployment and welfare benefits, public pensions and other labour market policies 
could reduce pre- and post-tax-and-transfer inequality. The fact that dominant capital 
groups, through the CCCE or through other lobby groups, can directly register their 
disapproval with high ranking government officials, if not with the Prime Minister 
directly, might be one reason why Canada’s two largest brokerage parties have not 
pursued these types of policies in recent decades.  
It is also worth mentioning that the same logic would apply to labour 
organizations. In the decades when labour unions were deepening their presence in the 
Canadian political economy it is unsurprising that pro-labour (and other progressive) 
policies were more readily embraced by brokerage parties. Likewise, as labour unions 
diminish in size and industrial significance, their ability to influence public policy 
priorities decreases. This is a round-about way of saying that size matters in politics (as 
in economics and other domains of life). As dominant capital groups concentrate, and as 
control of the industrial process centralizes into fewer units, it becomes easier for this 
entity to coordinate its activities and influence public policy, including and especially 
policy around income inequality.  
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If the distribution of factor and personal income closely shadows the 
organizational structure of the political economy, both in terms of union density and 
relative firm size, are there broader patterns or regularities which govern the distribution 
of personal income? Do global power processes shape inequality in Canada? 
 
10.6 Surfing the Crimson Wave: The Relativity of Canada’s Rich 
Income and asset inequality are often explained and/or justified by referencing 
‘productivity’ or ‘merit’. Neoclassical orthodoxy presumes that market income reflects 
proportional productive contribution. The foregoing sections argued that factor and 
personal incomes are partially shaped by the power institutions of society: labour unions 
redistribute personal income down the income hierarchy and large firms redistribute 
personal income up the income hierarchy. These findings have the potential to challenge 
to the link between ‘merit’ and inequality. Can we explain the top income share by 
referencing ‘hard work’, ‘education’, ‘intelligence’, ‘personal sacrifice’, ‘scarcity’ and 
‘productivity’, i.e.,  ‘merit’, as is so often said? Perhaps, but there appears to be other 
processes at play that shape the top income share which have little to do with 
productivity and merit.  
Let’s begin to unpack these questions by examining the geographic distribution 
of income in Canada. Figure 10.11 stacks differential top Alberta incomes up against the 
price of oil. The former is a ratio which captures the relativity of Alberta’s rich by 
dividing the top percentile income threshold in Alberta by the top percentile income 
threshold in Canada. The latter is the inflation-adjusted price of oil in U.S. dollars. The 
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relative income gains made by Alberta’s most affluent citizens are tightly correlated with 
the relative price of oil over three decades (a correlation of 0.83).  
In trying to account for this relationship, the temptation might be to reference 
productivity (‘intrinsic worth’). As Chapters 2 and 8 argued, for Veblen the link between 
relative commodity prices (and business income, by implication) and the intrinsic worth 
of commodities are tenuous at best and non-existent at worst. Instead, business controls 
industry with a view to arriving at a price that the yields the most advantageous 
distribution. Veblen states: ‘the broad principle which guides [business] in fixing prices 
is “charging what the traffic will bear”’ (1904: 31). And: ‘the output of production [will] 
be held to such a volume that the resulting price of the limited output will take up the 
entire purchasing power of the underlying population’ (1923: 67). Utilizing ‘productivity’ 
to explain the differential top Albertan incomes is difficult. This difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that there is no known way to accurately measure productivity 
(without resorting to prices, which is untenable because that is the phenomena to be 
explained).     
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Source: top income thresholds for Alberta and Canada from Cansim Table 204-0002; price of oil from British Petroleum 
Statistical Review of World Energy, retrieved online from: http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; consumer price indices for 
Canada and the U.S. from Global Financial Data; producer price index from Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global 
Insight; top income share for Canada from Saez and Veall (2007), Veall (2010) and Veall (2012); updated top income share for 
the U.S. from Piketty and Saez (2007), both retrieved from: http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. 
 
In Section 10.2 it was noted that the top percentile income group in Canada is 
comprised of multiple professions, including lawyers, accountants, physicians, financiers, 
top tier public servants and business owners, to name a few. In Alberta we would expect 
the energy business to be overrepresented relative to other provinces. However, it is 
striking that such a broad income group (the top percentile) would closely track the 
price of a single commodity. If the welfare of Alberta’s most affluent citizens bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the price of oil, how are the fluctuations of the latter explained?  
As Chapter 9 recounted, N&B argue that taking refuge in ‘scarcity’ or ‘supply and 
demand’ to explain the price of oil won’t do, even if it’s the most popular intellectual 
reflex (2002: chapter 5). In its place, they uncover the complicated relationship between 
the price of oil on the one hand, and the ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ and 
Middle East ‘energy conflicts’, on the other. Whereas most economists think of energy 
prices from the standpoint of excess demand, excess supply and technological capacity, 
N&B explore global energy prices from the standpoint of corporate collusion and state 
violence. Since the 1970s, they find that war in the Middle East has shaped the global 
price of energy (2002: 228-32). 
The facts portrayed in Figure 10.11 might be one reason why Stephen Harper (as a 
Canadian Alliance MP and Leader of the Opposition), whose power base is in Alberta 
and whose party is financially backed by Big Energy, was enthusiastic about the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. Harper blasted the Chretien Liberals for not participating in the 
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‘coalition of the willing’. Given the relationship between Middle East ‘energy conflicts’ 
and the price of oil on the one hand, and the differential profitability of Canadian-based 
energy firms and differential top Albertan incomes, on the other, it’s not difficult to 
understand his excitement for Middle Eastern bellicosity. 
In 2010 nearly half of the equity value of the TSX was accounted for by energy and 
base materials firms. And as Chapter 5, Table 5.6, documented, many Canadian-based 
firms have controlling shareholders, contrary to managerial suppositions. If the fortunes 
of the top energy corporations and the top income earners in Alberta are closely bound 
up with the price of oil, are the top income group’s fortunes as a whole bound up with 
base commodity and/or producer prices?  
Figure 10.12 contrasts differential producer prices with differential top Canadian 
incomes from 1920 through 2010. The former is a ratio of the producer price index to the 
consumer price index (U.S. prices).11 The latter is a ratio of the average incomes 
(expressed in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars) of the top 0.01 percentile income group in 
Canada and the United States. These two income groups are as close as we can get, 
statistically speaking, to the power elite or ‘Establishment’ in each country. For Canada 
in 2010, the top 0.01 percent is comprised of the 2,600 individuals whose average income 
                                                          
11 The PPI universe consists of the output of all industries in the goods-producing sectors of the U.S. 
political economy — mining, manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, and forestry — as well as natural gas, 
electricity and construction. If we were to use the Reuters/Jeffries CRB Spot Price Index in place of the 
PPI, the correlation would be nearly as tight (0.45 from 1920-2010, 0.67 from 1945-2010 and 0.88 from 1970-
2010). The assumption here is that use of producer prices in the U.S. is a good proxy for long-term changes 
in global producer prices.  
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was $4.2 million USD. For the United States in 2010, the top 0.01 percent is comprised of 
the 16,000 households whose average income was $16.8 million USD.12  
What do the facts tell us? The relative incomes gains made by the power elite in 
Canada — the dominant proprietors and top executives — are closely bound up with 
fluctuations in global producer (and base commodity) prices. As Chapter 9 documented, 
differential commodity and producer prices tend to rise with outbreaks of internationally 
organized violence and tend to fall in times of global peace. The two series in Figure 10.12 
are tightly correlated over the past century and that the strength of the relationship 
increases over time.  
In terms of broad patterns, the Canadian power elite outperformed their 
American counterparts from 1920 to 1975 and underperformed thereafter. However, 
when we shrink the time-scale we find that global crises appear to be the episodes when 
the Canadian power elite does particularly well: the early years of the Great Depression 
(1929-1934), the years of intense fighting during the Second World War (1941-1945), the 
conflicts in the Middle East (1967-1982) and the most recent round of wars in West Asia 
(2001-2007) are all periods of differential income gains. The power elite in Canada has 
capitalized on the bloodshed — or ‘surfed the crimson wave’ — associated with the 
mechanized warfare of the past century. 
To be clear: the suggestion is not that the Canadian Establishment engineered 
international warfare or helped orchestrate global military conflict. It’s a seemingly safe 
presumption that these processes unfold independent of the motivational state of 
                                                          
12 Note the difference in units: in Canada, top incomes are tabulated on an individual basis and in the U.S. 
top incomes are tabulated on a household basis. 
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Canada’s top income group. However, taking refuge in ‘scarcity’ or ‘supply and demand’ 
to account for the relative income gains made by Canada’s superrich becomes a good deal 
less persuasive under the light of these facts. Whether we examine the geographic 
distribution of top incomes (as in the Alberta example) or the gains made by the 
superrich relative to international benchmarks (as in the top 0.01 percent example), what 
we find is a link between relative gains and the commodity price inflation associated 
with outbreaks of organized violence.  
The facts uncovered in Figure 10.11 and 10.12 cast even more doubt on the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution. International power processes appear to factor 
heavily in the level and pattern of Canadian income inequality.  
 
10.7 Amalgamation, Stagflation and Deep Distribution 
It has long been understood that capitalist societies are susceptible to cyclical behaviour. 
The most common form of cycle — the one deeply ingrained in the popular mind — is 
the business cycle. Varying in length, but often encompassed by a decade, contemporary 
capitalist societies exhibit a continual movement from expansion to contraction, boom to 
bust. This cycle is registered in numerous variables, including production, investment, 
employment and often inventory and prices.13 In Chapter 9 we briefly reviewed some of 
the properties of commodity super cycles, which can be much longer in duration, lasting 
up to seven decades. Chapter 6 probed some of the deep history of mergers and 
acquisitions and presented N&B’s ‘amalgamation index’; a measure which crystallizes 
                                                          
13 As reviewed in Chapter 9, postwar Canadian consumer prices almost never fell, but there were episodes 
when they increased less quickly, i.e., disinflation. 
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their conception of the relationship between internal and external breadth. Chapter 9 
mapped Canadian inflation over the past century and plotted N&B’s ‘stagflation index’, a 
measure of the standardized deviation of stagflation from its historic average. 
In N&B’s framework, amalgamation and stagflation are traceable to the 
constituent elements of earnings and capitalization and their oscillating pattern 
constitutes a new type of cycle (2009: 385). They assert that, since the early twentieth 
century, internal breadth (amalgamation) and external depth (stagflation) in the United 
States have tended to move counter-cyclically to one another. During an amalgamation 
wave, stagflation tended to revert to its historic average (or below it), but when the 
amalgamation wave subsided there tended to be a sharp increase in stagflation, which 
subsided, in turn, when amalgamation resumed. This seemingly new type of cycle grew 
tighter (albeit negative) and more synchronized over the past century, they note.    
 The Canadian experience is similar. Plotting the amalgamation and stagflation 
indices from 1919 to 2012, the correlation is -0.11, which signals virtually no statistical 
relation between the two series over the long-term. However, when the time span is 
compressed to 1973-2012, the correlation grows to -0.77 — negative and strongly 
significant. This pattern appears to be consistent with the story N&B tell about the 
growth of dominant capital and the maturity of differential accumulation as the central 
institution and core process, respectively, of advanced capitalist societies. However, 
evidence in Chapter 9 suggested that inflation and stagflation appear to be driven 
primarily by the strike activity of the working class. What’s more, inflation and 
stagflation tend to redistribute income to labour, not to capital.  
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This interrupts the narrative that inflation and stagflation are driven primarily by 
increases in the earnings margins of large firms (even though there is some evidence to 
support that claim). It also interrupts the notion that stagflation is generative of 
differential accumulation. In Chapter 5 we learned that differential accumulation was 
negative and falling from the early 1950s through the late 1970s — precisely the period 
when stagflation was rising above its historic average. So what is happening here?  
 If it were true that both amalgamation and stagflation were processes that propel 
the relative growth of large firms, then we would expect the distributive outcome of each 
process to improve the relative income position of large firms. Figure 10.13 and 10.14 
explore some of the distributive aspects of amalgamation and stagflation in Canada over 
the past century. In Figure 10.13, N&B’s amalgamation index is plotted against a ratio of 
the distributive struggle between capital and labour. The latter metric is tabulated as a 
ratio of the total returns on the Toronto Stock Exchange’s Composite Index to average 
hourly earnings. The latter index captures the distributive struggle between the owners 
of corporate equities and the owners of labour power.  
The two series are positively correlated over the past century and the strength of 
the statistical relationship steadily increases over time. Both indices display a long, wave-
like pattern. Note the timing of the peaks and troughs: in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the capital-labour redistribution metric reached a high just prior to the Great 
Depression and again prior to the Second World War. Labour redistributed income away 
from capital thereafter, reaching a historic low in 1977. Also note that 1977 is the same 
year that the top 0.1 percent income share reached a historic low (Figure 8.1). In the one-
396 
 
third of a century since 1977, capital redistributed income away from labour and the ‘fit’ 
with the amalgamation index became even tighter.  
 
Note: data on non-residential structures and equipment only dates to 1926. Values for 1914 through 1925 are estimated using 
gross fixed private investment (from Urquhart (1993), Table 1.2, pp. 16-17), with proper rebasing.  Source: See Appendix C for 
data on mergers and acquisitions; business spending on non-residential structures and equipment from Historical Statistics 
of Canada, Series F23+F24 (1926-1960) and Cansim Table 380-0017 (1961-1980) and 384-0038 (1981-2012); stock price index 
and consumer price index from Global Financial Data; average hourly earnings from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 
E198 (1910-1948) and IMF through Global Insight (1949-2012); unemployment rate from Global Financial Data (1919-1975) 
and Cansim Table 282-0086 (1976-2012). 
 
In terms of a broad pattern, we see three long amalgamation waves: the first 
spanned the quarter century between 1914 and 1941; the second spanned the third of a 
century between 1941 and 1975; and the third long wave ran from 1975 to the present, 
though it must be noted that this latter wave may have not yet ended. The capital-labour 
redistribution metric followed a similar pattern. Why would these two metrics be 
related? In Chapter 6 we discovered that amalgamation is a key driver of corporate asset 
concentration, that the level of concentration is closely associated with the level of 
corporate earnings margins, especially the margins of large firms and that the earnings 
margins of large firms appear to shape the distributive struggle between capital and 
labour over profit and wages.  
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Outside the merger wave of the 1920s — in the interwar and Keynesian periods 
— amalgamation was comparatively low. Capital controls in tandem with a boom in 
green-field investment may have served to dilute corporate power, especially after the 
1940s. As a partial consequence, the capital-labour redistribution metric fell by more than 
three quarters between in the half century between 1928 and 1977. Successive 
amalgamation waves in the neoliberal period, however, led to an enormous concentration 
of corporate power, which may be one reason why this period witnessed a radical 
redistribution of factor and personal income. 
If the logic at play with amalgamation and capital-favouring distribution seems 
intuitive, the relationship in Figure 10.14 is more difficult to sort out. In this latter chart, a 
metric capturing the distributive struggle between labour and capital is plotted. Note 
that the two variables in this ratio have been inverted: average hourly earnings are 
divided by total returns on the TSX’s Composite Index, which means that when this 
index rises, labour is redistributing income from capital and vice versa. The stagflation 
series is a simple sum of inflation and unemployment (rather than N&B’s stagflation 
index). The two series are strongly and positively correlated over the past century and 
the strength of the statistical relationship increases over time.  
In terms of a broad pattern, during the six decades between the early 1920s and 
early 1980s, stagflation trended upward, and during the three decades since the early 
1980s stagflation trended downward. Stagflation went from a historic high of 29 in 1920 
to a historic low of -1.5 in 1922.  From there, stagflation reached an interwar peak in 1934 
(registering a value of 19) before trending downward to 1965 (reaching a value of 6), 
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before soaring to a postwar historic high in 1982 (of 22) and declining thereafter, settling 
at a value of 9 in 2012. Over the past century there appears to be two long waves: the first 
full cycle spanned the early 1920s through the early 1950s and the second cycle ran from 
the mid-1960s through to the present.  
The pattern of stagflation is shadowed by the distributive struggle between 
labour and capital, which was described above. Historic lows in the labour-capital 
redistribution index were registered in 1928 and 2007. These dates correspond with the 
tail end of two of the largest merger waves in the past century and just precede two of 
the greatest financial crashes of the past century. A historic high was reached in 1977, just 
as the largest bout of stagflationary behaviour was approaching a postwar high.  
As the sum of inflation and unemployment, stagflation is a curious process. We 
have argued, following Veblen, that one of the core institutional powers of business is the 
ability to control the level of employment. Following Kalecki, we argued that 
unemployment could be understood as a disciplinary measure insofar as it tempers the 
wage demands (and related aspirations) of the working class. Inflation is more 
complicated. Business institutions and labour organizations both appear to have 
inflationary aspects to their activities, but when we examine the distributive winners 
and losers, we find that the weight of the evidence supports the view that labour tends to 
win from inflation.  
Figure 10.14 suggests that even though unemployment and inflation are partially 
driven by opposing sources, labour has been the systematic winner from bouts of 
stagflation. And because amalgamation and stagflation tend to move counter cyclically to 
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each other, it follows that business tends to be the distributive winner from merger 
waves. In terms of discerning the broad meaning of neoliberal globalization, then, the 
facts seem to suggest that (the partnership between) states and business have 
reorganized social life in a manner that makes conditions more favourable to business. 
This includes everything from anti-inflationary monetary policy to anti-union legislation 
and the signing of trade and investment liberalization agreements like the NAFTA. These 
changes are registered on the distribution side, which have witnessed stagnant wages, 
booming profits and an upward redistribution of personal income.  
 
10.8 Summary 
Wilkinson and Pickett would have us believe that higher levels of income inequality 
exacerbate social problems. Given that income inequality has surged in Canada over the 
past three decades, this does not bode well for the health of the Canadian body politic. 
Income inequality might also contribute to the depression of political participation, thus 
contributing to the de-legitimization of the democratic process. In terms of explaining 
the evolution of personal income inequality, unemployment appears to have had 
significant redistributive consequences in the three decades after the First World War. 
In the four decades since 1970, unemployment has also served to upwardly redistribute 
income, though the relationship is weaker over this period. 
 The present chapter tried to uncover the linkages between factor income and 
personal income. The distributive struggle between proprietors and their employees 
appears to shape the level of personal income inequality. It also appears that increases in 
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government spending and in union density redistributes income from capital to labour, 
and in so doing, serve to compress the distribution of personal income (and vice versa). 
The market power registered in the markup also appears to have a significant bearing on 
the distribution of national income. Its enlargement serves to redistribute income from 
labour to capital and from lower income groups to the top income group.  
 The distribution of personal income and assets also bears a striking resemblance 
to the institutional and organizational structure of the corporate sector. The 
concentration of corporate assets in addition to the level and pattern of differential 
accumulation seems to shape personal income inequality over the long haul. And at the 
upper end of the income spectrum, we find the relative gains made by Canada’s power 
elite closely fluctuate with differential commodity and producer prices. The latter, we 
found, are closely associated with international military conflict.  
The analysis presented here strongly suggests that the institutional and 
organizational structure of the political economy — including the relative position of 
labour unions and large firms — has a strong bearing on the distribution of income and 
wealth in Canada. And whereas amalgamation waves tend to concentrate corporate 
assets, leading to a redistribution of income from labour to capital, stagflation waves have 
the opposite effect insofar as they redistribute income from capital to labour. In both 
cases, institutional and organizational power shapes the distribution of income. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
 
Conclusion:  
The Corporation and Institutional Power 
 
 
The scientist must… be concerned to understand the world and to extend the precision 
and scope with which it has been ordered. 
   - Thomas Kuhn (1962)  
 
 
 
 
In his attempt to address problems arising from Popper’s (1963) falsificationism and 
Kuhn’s (1962) skepticism of paradigmatic progress, Imre Lakatos (1978) advances a novel 
vision of what science is and how it can be distinguished from ignorance and 
pseudoscience. Contra Popper, science cannot be demarcated, nor does it advance, 
through a process of conjecture and refutation. Contra Kuhn, we can validly speak of 
scientific progress. Science centres what Lakatos labels ‘research programs’, which are 
comprised of three broad components: (i) a ‘hard core’ of unfalsifiable claims; (ii) a 
flexible ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary, but refutable hypotheses; and (iii) a ‘heuristic’ or 
‘problem-solving machinery’ to assist with irregularities and respond to anomalies. In 
assessing a scientific research program, it is not testability or refutation that serves as the 
ultimate criterion of satisfaction, but the discovery of novel facts. In a ‘degenerative’ 
research program, facts must be forcibly fit into the mould of the old theory. In a 
‘progressive’ research program, old problems are solved in new ways and novel or 
‘undreamt of’ facts are discovered, Lakatos argues (1978: 4-6).  
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 Social scientists must be careful when incorporating ideas from the philosophy of 
science into their domain for (at least) two reasons. First, the stability of the objects 
under investigation are different in the social and natural sciences. The social entities, 
institutions and processes which form a part of human culture change more rapidly than 
do most of the entities studied by natural science. This makes the truth or validity of 
social scientific theories more transitory. Second, human cultures are variable while the 
natural world is (relatively) uniform. This means that social scientific validity cannot be 
made to turn on prediction because theories are, to an extent, bounded by historical 
conditions and cultural circumstances.  
 The preceding ten chapters sketched an image of postwar Canadian capitalism. 
The foreground was occupied by the largest firms and the growth pathways they 
travelled. Residing in the background were some of the broad political-economic 
consequences of increasing corporate power. Of the eclectic collection of heterodox 
approaches relied upon, N&B’s capital as power (CAP) was utilized most extensively. 
Given that this is a relatively new approach to political economy, we may wish to know 
how and where it proved useful and whether key hypotheses emerging from the 
framework are (dis)confirmed by the Canadian evidence. Loose adoption of Lakatos’ 
vision of science can help with this task.  
 The CAP framework stresses the untenability of a strict separation of politics 
from economics. In treating the accumulation of capital as a power process, N&B (seem 
to) argue that politics and economics are integrated aspects of social life. Chapter 3 
reviewed the deep history of Canadian business and argued that a bifurcation of 
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corporate power and political or State power is an analytical impediment. The Canadian 
political economy and business history literatures are nearly unanimous in asserting that 
Canadian commercial power was deeply intertwined with State and imperial power. The 
structure and governance activity of the Hudson’s Bay Company was one example. 
Similarly, Chapter 3 argued that our understanding of key turning points in Canadian 
history, including the Act of Union in 1840-41, Confederation in 1867 and the NAFTA in 
1994 is impaired if we insist on divorcing commodified power from legislative power. In 
place of the politics/economics bifurcation, we ought to return to the conception 
associational reality offered by the classical political economists, who treated the 
accumulation of wealth and of power — market institutions and State institutions — as 
a holistic process. 
 Chapter 5 reviewed and contested the managerial thesis in light of the (newly 
uncovered) Canadian evidence. Instead of professional managers controlling the 
corporate sector, the evidence suggests that proprietors wield ultimate control of the 
Canadian corporate sector on account of their large equity stake. This is significant 
because, as Drucker (1946) argued, the separation thesis implied that the modern 
corporation was run for the benefit of stakeholders as opposed to shareholders. The 
implication of this line of reasoning was that the enormous productive power associated 
with the corporate system was indirectly serving the public good.  
This line of reasoning is incompatible with the CAP framework in multiple ways 
(which need not be recounted). Building on Veblen’s conception that capitalist power is 
most clearly manifest in private ownership — a type of power which grants capitalists 
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the right and ability to exclude others, through unemployment, from accessing the 
industrial-technological-knowledge structure of society — N&B’s power theory of 
capitalism seems to require that capitalists wield ultimate control of the corporate sector 
through ownership and that corporate power be utilized in the service of the capitalist 
class. And because capital is capitalization, an increase in the value of the largest 
corporate units implies an increase in the power of capitalists.  
This study tried to remain agnostic about the identification of capital with power 
for a variety of analytical and normative reasons. However, the research presented in 
Chapter 5 supports the anti-managerial hypothesis, and in so doing, is broadly consistent 
with the CAP framework. The relative growth of the largest corporate units, which is 
understood as a proxy for corporate power, becomes politically significant once we 
recognize that the largest firms have controlling owners. Veblen’s distinction of 
‘business’ from ‘industry’ amplifies the significance of this finding: proprietary control 
(read: power) of the corporation implies that the industrial life of the nation is under the 
command of a cohesive capitalist class. An increase in the relative value of the largest 
corporate units, then, is coterminous with increasing capitalist power.   
 Another set of CAP hypotheses pertain to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
N&B argue that M&A constitute a broad ‘regime of differential accumulation’, meaning 
it is a key growth pathway for large firms. They also claim that, over the long-term, M&A 
(internal breadth) should tend to rise relative to green-field investment (external 
breadth). A third testable claim is that M&A leads to spatial unification and 
globalization on account of large firms breaking through successive ‘envelopes’. The 
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reasoning runs as follows: in order for large firms to grow and for differential 
accumulation to remain positive, large firms must expand outward from their original 
industries into broader sectors through to the national political economy, and finally, the 
global political economy. All three hypotheses are testable in the sense that the historical 
facts will either support or undermine them.  
In plotting the aggregate and disaggregate history of Canadian mergers and 
acquisitions in Chapter 6, we found that N&B’s ‘amalgamation index’ maps on very 
tightly to the concentration of corporate assets (Figure 6.7) and onto the differential 
profit per employee of the largest firms (Figure 6.8), which supports the hypothesis that 
M&A are a key growth pathway for large firms. The second hypothesis, that the growth 
of M&A will tend to outpace green-field spending, is supported by the sharp increase in 
the trend line of the amalgamation index, plotted in Figure 6.4. Third and finally, in 
developing a quantitative proxy for the globalization of Canadian business ownership in 
Chapter 5 (Figure 5.11), we provide the basis for a third test of a crucial CAP hypothesis. 
If N&B’s conception of M&A is correct, then the amalgamation index should be 
positively correlated with the proxy for Canadian corporate ownership abroad. Figure 
6.9 demonstrated a tight and persistent relationship between corporate amalgamation 
and the globalization of Canadian business ownership, which confirms N&B’s third 
hypothesis.     
 Chapter 7 explored the level, pattern and constituents of Canadian GDP growth. 
It showed that the ‘build-to-hoard’ indicator (Figure 7.4), a ratio of business spending on 
fixed assets to cash, maps onto the growth rate of private sector employment very tightly. 
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It also showed that the deepening income share of dominant capital corresponds with 
the hoarding of corporate cash (Figure 7.5). Given that GDP growth is partially fuelled by 
investment in fixed assets (Figure 7.2) and that the heightened M&A activity of recent 
decades has seen under-investment in fixed assets amidst surging concentration, this 
cluster of facts suggests that the relative growth of large firms has a depressing effect on 
growth. Stated differently, GDP stagnation is a partial consequence of heightened 
concentration. The research presented in Chapter 7 is not directly related to N&B’s 
framework, but the ‘spirit’ of the questioning is in line with their broad vision. How? 
Building on Veblen’s conception of ‘sabotage’, N&B argue that capitalist income 
oscillates between two extremes: capitalist income will be low in the case of glut and 
depression, which is obvious; but counterintuitively, capitalist income will also be low in 
the case of rapid growth. The ‘ideal’ or ‘optimal’ distribution for business resides in 
between these extremes, which implies that a moderate degree of stagnation (through 
either (or both) unemployment and capacity under-utilization) is ‘healthy’ for business 
(though not for workers, obviously). Higher levels of unemployment restrain the wage 
demands of the working class and reduced competitive pressure (manifested in heighted 
corporate concentration) elevates the earnings margins of dominant capital. The 
argument developed in Section 10.1 about the relationship between unemployment and 
the top income share during the Second World War lends additional support to this 
conception (recall: full employment and rapid GDP growth led to a halving of the top 
income share between 1939 and 1945). Although this line of reasoning is unorthodox, the 
Canadian facts support it.  
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 Another powerful area of confirmation (or in Lakatosian terms, the discovery of a 
‘novel fact’) is the research pertaining to income inequality. The Great Recession made 
apparent the shortcomings of neoclassical orthodoxy. The Occupy Movement made 
inequality a popular political concern. Thomas Piketty’s, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
and the ‘Piketty mania’ that has ensued are a consequence of this shift. We know that 
Canadian income inequality is high and rising and that this comes amidst middle class 
stagnation. Both pose a problem to the prevailing model of capitalism. But do we know 
what causes heightened inequality?  
Chapter 10 utilized N&B’s differential measures to examine Canadian inequality. 
By plotting the differential capitalization of dominant capital side-by-side the top 0.1 
income share (Figure 10.9) and beside the differential net worth of the 100 richest 
Canadians (Figure 10.10), we were able to assess two broad suppositions: for Veblen, 
business centres on the redistribution of income; and for N&B, their differential 
measures capture the ‘power drive’ of accumulation. The fact that the relative position of 
the top income and wealth group oscillate with the differential performance of dominant 
capital strongly suggests that N&B’s approach to business development is valid. It also 
lends weight to the anti-managerial thesis. If the top income group owns and controls the 
corporate sector and if corporate ownership is not an industrially productive act, but a 
claim on earnings, then it follows that the differential performance of the largest firms 
will tend to exacerbate inequality. This poses a major challenge to Canadian public 
policy, which presumes that what’s called ‘business success’ is ‘good for society’. If 
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Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) arguments about inequality are correct, then differential 
business performance will tend to aggravate, not alleviate, social problems.  
 A significant disconfirmation of the CAP framework came in Chapter 9, which 
examined Canadian inflation and stagflation. N&B argue that inflation (stagflation) is a 
power process which redistributes income from labour to capital and from small to large 
firms. They further argue that stagflation constitutes a broad ‘regime of differential 
accumulation’, meaning it is a growth artery for large firms pass. This set of claims is 
highly unorthodox. Central banks in the OECD have tended to pursue anti-inflationary 
monetary policy in recent decades. If inflation is beneficial to large firms it would be 
puzzling why (big) business would support inflation-restraining policy. In Canada, rapid 
inflation and stagflation have tended to have the opposite effect, redistributing income 
from capital and dominant capital to labour, from large to small firms and from the upper 
to the lower income brackets. Canadian inflation has tended to undermine the 
performance of large firms, not elevate it. This eliminates the puzzle surrounding the 
shift to anti-inflationary monetary policy at the Bank of Canada and it provides an 
important challenge to the validity of a core tenet of the CAP framework.   
 The Preface to this dissertation closed by stating that this study would distance 
itself from the normative and political undertones of the CAP framework. The reader may 
wish to know why. The present chapter will close with a brief assessment of the 
practical ethics of Capital as Power. While there is powerful analytical and empirical in the 
CAP framework, the normative and political vision that is associated with N&B’s ideas is 
unpersuasive and ethically objectionable.  
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The CAP framework grows out of a dual dissatisfaction, one theoretical 
(philosophical) the other practical (political). N&B not only claim that existing 
approaches to capital are deeply flawed, they also claim that the dominant approach — 
neoclassical economics — is inherently ideological. Neoclassical economics is ‘an 
ideology in the service of the powerful’ because the capitalist class uses it to ‘conceal its 
own power’ from plain view. The supposed scientific status of neoclassical economics 
doubles as its social function, for it legitimizes the institutions underpinning capitalism. 
The underlying reality that is veiled from ordinary people is that ‘the capitalist ruling 
class… shapes society’ (2009: 2-3). The political function of Capital as Power is to tear down 
the veil, laying bare relations of power and domination so that people may act to bring 
about ‘a new social reality’. N&B’s professed political goal is to ‘change the capitalist 
world’ (2009: 3).  
 The establishment of linkages between ruling class ideology and the changing of 
social reality (read: revolution) is but one demonstration of the intellectual debts N&B 
owe Marx and Engels. Marx’s often-quoted thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach: ‘philosophers 
have only interpreted the world… the point, however, is to change it’ (1888: 145), seems to 
capture N&B’s vision of the relationship between philosophy and politics. Although 
N&B try to distance themselves from Marx and Marxism, the political program 
submerged in their work, which admittedly needs to be read between the lines, bears 
many of the hallmarks of the Marxist vision.  
Like Marx, N&B critique liberal political economy as a ‘bourgeois’ or pseudo-
science. Like Marx, they seek to penetrate the veil of ruling class ideology with new 
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analytical weapons: for Marx the secret to understanding capitalism lay in ‘surplus 
value’; for N&B, the analytical weapons include dominant capital and differential 
accumulation. Marx generated the materialist conception of history. In its place, N&B 
postulate that history unfolds through a succession of ‘modes of power’.14 Marx’s insights 
were meant to facilitate revolution by arming the exploited and alienated proletariat 
with the (intellectual) hammer they need to break their (economic) chains and so 
(politically) emancipate themselves. But the emancipation of the proletariat would also 
emancipate humanity from its pre-history by solving the problem of human oppression 
manifested in class domination. N&B adopt a similar, though not identical, narrative.  
 Even though N&B would have us investigate ‘the capitalist reality [as a] 
prerequisite for changing it’ (2009: 15), conspicuously absent from their work is any 
sustained argument as to (1) why it should be changed, (2) what it should be changed to 
and (3) how the changed social reality would be an improvement over existing reality. 
Other questions emerge: how should we go about changing capitalism?; do we have good 
reason to suppose that the intended changes would not amount to something worse than 
the current reality?; and why is the improved social condition not possible within the 
broad confines of capitalism, i.e., why do we need radical social change? These questions 
present themselves at the beginning of their book, but upon arrival at the end the reader 
learns that the questions remain unanswered. We will address the three core questions 
listed above in turn.  
                                                          
14 Delivering a graveside speech, Engels (1883) notes that Marx’s two great intellectual accomplishments 
were the discovery of surplus value as the ‘special law of motion’ of capitalism and the materialist 
conception of history.  
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Let’s engage in a thought experiment for a moment. Assume that all of N&B’s core 
contentions are true — capital is a power institution, its accumulation a power process, 
the capitalist mega-machine shapes social development, inflation is a redistributive 
mechanism, etc. Why should we abolish capitalism? There is no sustained argument in 
Capital as Power to support N&B’s political prescription and so incitement to study 
capitalism with a view to bringing about ‘a new social reality’ becomes a non-sequitur. 
Perhaps this shouldn’t surprise us. For all the distance N&B try to place between 
themselves and Marx, on this file their proximity is all too apparent.  
Marx’s prescriptions for political revolution were not based on ethical 
imperatives, moral argumentation or overtures to justice. Marx considered himself a 
scientist, not a moralist. His discussion of ethics and morality tended to range from 
flippant dismissal and ridicule on the one hand, to reductionism on the other. For 
example, in the Critique of the Gotha Program Marx refers to the concept of a ‘fair 
distribution’ of income as ‘ideological nonsense about right’ and ‘obsolete verbal rubbish’ 
(1875: 531). He is equally dismissive of modern concept of liberty. The young Marx’s, On 
the Jewish Question reduces the liberal conception of freedom to the right to private 
property. In his words: ‘the right of man to freedom is not based on the association of 
man with man but rather on the separation of man from man… the right of self-interest’ 
(1843: 229).  
Appeals to fairness, justice and freedom don’t hold much sway with Marx 
because he believed that ‘right can never be higher than the economic structure of society 
and its cultural development conditioned thereby’ (1875: 531). Our notions of justice are 
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part of the ‘superstructure’, which means they emerge from the ‘forces of production’ and 
‘relations of production’, the combination of which Marx refers to as the ‘economic 
structure of society’ (1859: 211). Right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust are the 
products of socio-economic development. The latter is shaped by class struggle, which is 
ultimately reducible to the ‘economic base’ (read: technology). Their truth and 
permanence are equally illusory. 
The difficulty with Marx’s vision comes when we examine the grounds upon 
which Marx himself stands to level his criticism and deliver his philosophy. If morality is 
reducible to the economic base, then how can Marx launch any type of normative 
criticism of capitalism? And if all broad philosophical visions are part of the ideological 
superstructure, and thus change when the economic base changes, what happens to 
Marx’s grand philosophical vision in non-capitalist setting? If the truth of a claim and 
rightness of an action are confined to historical circumstance, how can Marx 
philosophize about history or morally condemn capitalism? These difficulties pose 
insurmountable obstacles for anyone who strives for universal explanations or makes 
transcendental arguments while asserting the relativity of truth and ethics. N&B are 
careful to avoid the analytical difficulties associated with historicism and relativism, but 
they stand with Marx in failing to offer normatively-grounded reasons for social change.  
Moving from the question of ‘why’ to ‘what’, there is no sustained argument about 
what a ‘new social reality’ should look like. Let’s assume for a moment that N&B did in 
fact provide a systematic account of why we need a new, non-capitalistic social reality. 
What value(s) should the new social reality strive to realize? And why are said values 
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impossible to realize under a capitalist regime? N&B make passing references to 
‘autonomy’ and ‘free human creativity’ (2009: 20-21), ‘the democratically articulated good 
life per person’ (2009: 226), ‘democratic creorders’ (2009: 305) and an ‘alternative, 
humane future’ (2009: 400), but nowhere are these concepts elaborated, specified or 
analyzed. What conditions are required for the realization of these values? Even the 
meaning of some of these terms is deeply ambiguous.  
Take the concept of autonomy, which N&B put special emphasis on. Besides 
addressing what autonomy is and why it is incompatible with capitalism, we must ask: 
why should autonomy be elevated above other values? Why does autonomy become an 
overriding normative imperative instead of, say, justice, liberty or equality, not to 
mention efficiency, stability or piety? To assume that one value is the supreme value 
without reason or argumentation is hollow. But N&B appear to presuppose more than 
just that. Instead, their fidelity to the idea of autonomy indicates that they might believe 
there is an ultimate answer to the riddle of social existence. Let us not suppose that N&B 
assume that autonomy will solve all human problems. Instead, let us assume that they 
believe autonomy will create the conditions for human beings to solve their problems 
through free creativity and social cooperation. Perhaps they assume autonomy to be the 
condition of the possibility of the good life. And perhaps they equate autonomy with 
genuine freedom, free creation and the absence of social exclusion. Even if this were an 
accurate rendering of the term ‘autonomy’ and a correct picture of their view, why should 
autonomy be pursued over other values?  
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 N&B’s claims about ‘autonomy’ and a ‘humane future’ bear some resemblance to 
Marx’s thinking about communism and Plato’s about the kallipolis: they presuppose that 
there is one correct answer to all political tensions, one supreme value to which all other 
values must be subordinate and one final expression of human sociality. Although there 
is something deeply attractive about this presupposition, Isaiah Berlin persuasively 
argued that it is unworkable. In his beautiful essay on Machiavelli, Berlin (1972) claims 
that there are equally valid but mutually exclusive value systems. To presuppose the 
existence of a single universal structure of values, graspable by reason, which provide the 
ultimate answer to the riddle of collective human existence is simply not feasible. Berlin’s 
(1988) ‘objective pluralism’ or ‘value pluralism’ is a necessary antidote to the false 
temptations associated with relativism and the hubris of rationalist monism. Autonomy 
is one value among many, it will almost certainly clash with other values and thus we 
ought to be careful about reconfiguring society for the sake of a single value.        
 And finally, on the question of ‘how’ to bring about a new social reality, N&B do 
not offer anything programmatic and this appears to be deliberate. Radical social change 
will emerge from the ‘magma’ or ‘free human creativity’ (2009: 20), so it appears a 
revolutionary change cannot be planned or designed. That said, the implied politics of 
Capital as Power are anti-capitalist, and because N&B fuse capital and the state into a 
‘state of capital’ amalgam, their politics appear as revolutionary anarchism.  
On the subject of revolution there is plenty to say, but Orwell’s insight into the 
consequences of revolution are perhaps the clearest in the twentieth century, not least 
because they proved prophetic. What emerges after a revolution, whether it be left-wing 
415 
 
international socialist or right-wing national socialist, is not liberté, égalité, fraternité, a 
dictatorship of the proletariat, much less ‘the brotherhood of man’, but the dictatorship 
of a vanguard of intellectuals. And the regime that emerges, despite pretences to 
democracy and egalitarianism prior to seizing power, almost invariably becomes a blend 
of authoritarianism and anti-liberalism. Prior to the revolutions China, Korea, Cuba and 
elsewhere, Orwell states:    
The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of 
others… The German Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close to us in their 
methods, but they never had the courage to recognise their own motives… Power is not a 
means, it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; 
one makes the revolution in order to establish a dictatorship (1949: 275-6).  
  
The historical record of revolutions in the twentieth century (and prior) supports 
Orwell’s claim. A revolutionary reconstruction of society, even in the name of democracy, 
is surest path to dictatorship.15   
There is something highly suspicious about the motivation behind a revolutionary 
reconstruction of society, which Orwell rightly pinpointed. The notion that there is 
something wrong with ‘the world’ and that this something is the thoughts, beliefs and 
behaviour of other people should give us pause. If the program is to ‘change social reality’ 
by changing other people, in practice this simply means using violence to make other 
people more like us (or, because hypocrisy and politics are often not far apart, the use of 
force to fit other people into a mould of our choosing). The impulse to ‘improve’ social 
conditions by improving other people, not through force of argument, but through force of 
                                                          
15 This is not true in all instances. The American Revolution, for example, was not predicated on re-
modelling society or a re-fashioning of human nature, but on restoring ancient liberties that were being 
trampled by a tyrannical monarch. This is why Edmund Burke (1790) could bitterly condemn the French 
Revolution while remaining ambiguous about the American. The essentially liberal revolutions in Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s provide a comparable example. 
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revolutionary arms, simultaneously absolves the revolutionary individual of personal 
responsibility and indicts the other.    
After years as a dedicated Marxist, a believer in the Soviet project and a solider in 
the Red Army, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn found himself a prisoner of the Soviet labour 
camp system. The experience transformed his perception of human life and he captured 
this awakening in his three-volume masterpiece, The Gulag Archipelago. On the relationship 
between evil and revolution, Solzhenitsyn states:  
Looking back, I saw that for my whole conscious life I had not understood either myself or 
my strivings. What had seemed for so long beneficial now turned out in actuality to be 
fatal, and I had been striving to go in the opposite direction to that which was truly 
necessary to me. But just as the waves of the sea knock the inexperienced swimmer off his 
feet and keep tossing him back on to the shore, so also was I painfully tossed back on dry 
land by the blows of misfortune. And it was only because of this that I was able to travel 
the path which I had always really wanted to travel.  
 
It was granted me to carry away from my prison years on my bent back, which nearly 
broke beneath its load, this essential experience: how a human being becomes evil and how 
good. In the intoxication of youthful successes I had felt myself to be infallible, and I was 
therefore cruel. In the surfeit of power I was a murderer and an oppressor. In my most evil 
moments I was convinced that I was doing good, and I was well supplied with systematic 
arguments. And it was only when I lay there rotting on prison straw that I sensed within 
myself the first stirrings of good. Gradually it was disclosed to me that the line separating 
good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties 
either - but right through every human heart - and through all human hearts. This line 
shifts. Inside us it oscillates with the years. And even within the hearts overwhelmed with 
evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained. And even in the best of all hearts, there 
remains… an un-uprooted small corner of evil.  
 
Since then I have come to understand the truth of all the religions on the world. They 
struggle with the evil inside a human being (inside every human being). It is impossible to 
expel evil from the world in its entirety, but it is possible to constrict it within each 
person. And since that time I have come to understand the falsehood of all the revolutions 
of history: they destroy only those carriers of evil contemporary with them (and also fail, out 
of haste, to discriminate the carriers of good as well). And they take to themselves as their 
heritage the actual evil itself, magnified still more. 
 
‘Know thyself!’ There is nothing that so aids and assists the awakening of omniscience 
within us as insistent thoughts about one's own transgressions, errors, mistakes. After the 
difficult cycles of such ponderings over many years, whenever I mentioned the 
heartlessness of our highest-ranking bureaucrats, the cruelty of our executioners, I 
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remember myself in my captain’s shoulder boards and the forward march of my battery 
through East Prussia, enshrouded in fire, and I say: ‘So were we any better?’ 
 
And that is why I turn back to the years of my imprisonment and say, sometimes to the 
astonishment of those about me: ‘Bless you, prison!’ (Solzhenitsyn 1975: 615-16) 
 
One view of revolutionary politics, then, is as a substitute for the difficult work of self-
transformation and self-mastery. The truth in revolutionary politics is recognition of 
human suffering, its relationship to evil and the need to confront the latter in order to 
deal with the former. The falsity in revolutionary politics is the projection of all evil onto 
social institutions and/or other people, and therein failing to recognize the evil lurking 
within the self. 
 For those uninterested in anti-capitalist or revolutionary politics, are there valid 
reasons for being concerned with the concentration of corporate power? According to 
Lewis Mumford, the ‘spinal principle’ of democracy is to ‘place what is common to all 
men above that which any organization, institution, or group may claim for itself’ 
(1964:1). Josiah Ober explores the original meaning of term ‘democracy’ and finds that 
instead of signifying ‘majority rule’ or even ‘rule by the people’, the term historically 
denoted the ‘collective capacity of the public to make good things happen in the public 
realm’ (2008: 8). The popular conception of democracy in Canada appears to be 
something rather different. Most Canadians think of democracy in terms of the selection 
and removal of a government, through elections, by the mass of the voters. ‘Democracy’, 
Canadians think, has been realized north of the forty-ninth parallel.  
 But if Mumford and Ober are correct, then democracy should not be thought of as 
a condition that could ever be fully realized. Instead, it should be thought of as an ideal 
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— a collective project — that society strives towards but is bound to fall short of, if only 
because all historical societies have limits on the capacity of the public, either collectively 
or individually, to do ‘good things’ in the public realm. The conception of democracy 
advanced by Mumford and Ober imply that concentrations of corporate power, income 
and wealth pose a threat to democracy. After all, agglomerations of commodified power 
will be more capable of placing their views and interests above those of the public. And 
the amassment of corporate power reduces the capacity of ordinary citizens to 
participate in the public realm if only because it effectively shrinks the public realm and, 
within the remaining space, takes up a larger portion of it. This trespasses on our 
conception of the civic participation and public good and is something that should 
concern every citizen of modern Canada.  
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Appendix A 
Profile of the 100 Largest Canadian-Domiciled Firms  
(Ranked by equity market capitalization in 2012) 
Rank Firm Equity Market Value        Sector 
TSX 
Listing 
Effective 
Founding  
1 Royal Bank of Canada 79,413,660,849 Finance 1918 1864 
2 Toronto-Dominion Bank  75,551,004,599 Finance 1955 1855 
3 Bank of Nova Scotia  64,747,982,349 Finance 1919 1832 
4 Suncor Energy Inc. 43,705,563,575 Oil & Gas 1966 1853 
5 Barrick Gold Corporation 40,612,534,310 Mining 1983 1983 
6 Bank of Montreal 38,109,242,502 Finance 1922 1817 
7 Canadian National Railway  37,042,688,423 Div. Industries 1995 1919 
8 Imperial Oil Limited 35,229,407,572 Oil & Gas 1921 1880 
9 Potash Corporation   35,139,364,144 Mining 1989 1953 
10 BCE Inc. 35,041,761,598 Comm. & Media 1905 1880 
11 Enbridge Inc. 34,567,954,649 Util. & Pipelines 1953 1949 
12 Canadian Natural Resources  32,617,952,263 Oil & Gas 1976 1973 
13 CIBC 31,276,929,965 Finance 1961 1867 
14 TransCanada Corporation 31,083,587,294 Util. & Pipelines 2003 1951 
15 Goldcorp Inc. 30,536,647,580 Mining 1983 1954 
16 Cenovus Energy Inc. 24,566,783,289 Oil & Gas 2009 1883 
17 Brookfield Asset Mgmt.  23,694,368,628 Div. Industries 1979 1899 
18 Thomson Reuters  23,672,029,588 Comm. & Media 1980 1851 
19 Husky Energy Inc. 23,005,931,406 Oil & Gas 2000 1938 
20 Manulife Financial Corp. 22,793,833,764 Finance 1999 1887 
21 Great-West Lifeco Inc. 22,021,296,460 Finance 1986 1891 
22 Power Financial Corporation 20,205,174,104 Finance 1984 1925 
23 TELUS Corporation 19,352,705,799 Comm. & Media 1999 1906 
24 Rogers Communications Inc. 18,649,927,763 Comm. & Media 1971 1960 
25 Teck Resources Limited 18,138,454,698 Mining 1952 1906 
26 Encana Corporation 15,179,064,631 Oil & Gas 2001 1883 
27 Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int. 15,043,176,825 Life Sciences 1987 1960 
28 Sun Life Financial Inc. 15,032,068,320 Finance 2000 1865 
29 Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. 13,004,111,705 Div. Industries 2001 1881 
30 Agrium Inc. 12,780,742,524 Mining 1993 1931 
31 Crescent Point Energy Corp. 12,730,895,820 Oil & Gas 2002 2001 
32 National Bank of Canada 12,710,279,434 Finance 1979 1859 
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Appendix A 
Profile of the 100 Largest Canadian-Domiciled Firms (continued) 
33 Power Corporation  11,730,866,191 Finance 1936 1925 
34 Talisman Energy Inc. 11,438,660,333 Oil & Gas 1971 1953 
35 Yamana Gold Inc. 11,308,993,780 Mining 1995 1994 
36 Brookfield Office Properties  10,742,034,969 Real Estate 1985 1899 
37 IGM Financial Inc. 10,334,785,748 Finance 1986 1894 
38 Magna International Inc. 9,747,211,095 Div. Industries 1962 1957 
39 Canadian Oil Sands Limited 9,734,506,860 Oil & Gas 1995 1978 
40 Kinross Gold Corporation 9,440,331,923 Mining 1983 1983 
41 Silver Wheaton Corp. 9,382,460,597 Mining 2004 2004 
42 Fairfax Financial Holdings  9,300,825,423 Finance 1972 1951 
43 Nexen Inc. 9,240,449,661 Oil & Gas 1971 1969 
44 Canadian Utilities Limited 9,196,269,926 Util. & Pipelines 1946 1927 
45 Loblaw Companies Limited 9,144,409,468 Div. Industries 1956 1919 
46 Intact Financial Corporation 8,913,394,842 Finance 2004 1809 
47 Shoppers Drug Mart  8,658,378,793 Div. Industries 2001 1962 
48 Pembina Pipeline Corp. 8,639,160,401 Util. & Pipelines 1997 1954 
49 First Quantum Minerals Ltd. 8,616,453,001 Mining 2000 1996 
50 Shaw Communications Inc. 8,582,593,366 Comm. & Media 1983 1966 
51 Tim Hortons Inc. 8,580,816,467 Div. Industries 2006 1964 
52 Saputo Inc. 8,527,606,392 Div. Industries 1997 1992 
53 George Weston Limited 8,328,308,766 Div. Industries 1929 1882 
54 Eldorado Gold Corporation 8,166,459,763 Mining 1993 1991 
55 lululemon athletica inc. 8,003,001,013 Div. Industries 2007 1998 
56 Riocan Reit 7,887,881,506 Real Estate 1994 1994 
57 Cameco Corporation 7,849,776,673 Mining 1991 1927 
58 Alimentation Couche-Tard 7,304,651,823 Div. Industries 1999 1980 
59 Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. 7,228,521,193 Mining 1996 1994 
60 Fortis Inc. 7,178,600,947 Util. & Pipelines 1969 1969 
61 Bombardier Inc. 7,065,450,870 Div. Industries 1946 1942 
62 MEG Energy Corp 6,683,499,603 Oil & Gas 2010 1999 
63 Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. 6,618,376,664 Mining 1957 1953 
64 Penn West Petroleum Ltd. 6,539,684,730 Oil & Gas 1980 1979 
65 Franco-Nevada Corporation 6,252,418,625 Mining 2007 1983 
66 CI Financial Corp. 6,211,040,680 Finance 1994 1965 
67 ARC Resources Ltd. 6,010,901,277 Oil & Gas 1996 1996 
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Appendix A 
Profile of the 100 Largest Canadian-Domiciled Firms (continued) 
68 Bell Aliant Inc. 5,998,149,753 Comm. & Media 2006 1885 
69 Viterra Inc. 5,947,652,256 Div. Industries 1996 1920s 
70 SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. 5,760,500,683 Div. Industries 1986 1911 
71 Research in Motion Limited 5,608,510,331 Technology 1997 1984 
72 Canadian Tire Corp. 5,506,424,837 Div. Industries 1945 1922 
73 Baytex Energy Corp. 5,393,105,754 Oil & Gas 1994 1993 
74 CGI Group Inc. 5,387,084,110 Technology 1992 1976 
75 Metro Inc. 5,028,383,490 Div. Industries 1993 1947 
76 Central Fund of Canada 4,956,349,249 Structured Prdts 1965 1961 
77 Inter Pipeline Fund 4,952,376,780 Util. & Pipelines 1997 1997 
78 H&R REIT 4,903,295,744 Real Estate 1996 1996 
79 ONEX Corporation 4,382,734,089 Finance 1987 1983 
80 TransAlta Corporation 4,365,179,908 Util. & Pipelines 1992 1911 
81 New Gold Inc. 4,278,826,403 Mining 2002 1980 
82 Athabasca Oil Corporation 4,270,741,985 Oil & Gas 2010 2006 
83 Vermilion Energy Inc. 4,262,511,668 Oil & Gas 1996 1994 
84 Emera Incorporated 4,234,284,219 Util. & Pipelines 1999 1919 
85 Dollarama Inc. 4,221,053,327 Div., Industries 2009 1992 
86 IAMGold Corporation 4,163,020,510 Mining 1996 1991 
87 Finning International Inc. 4,162,270,941 Div. Industries 1969 1933 
88 Atco Ltd. 4,122,936,042 Util. & Pipelines 1968 1947 
89 Tourmaline Oil Corp. 3,805,432,884 Oil & Gas 2010 2008 
90 First Capital Realty Inc. 3,683,642,552 Real Estate 1994 1993 
91 Brookfield Renewable Energy  3,628,758,790 Clean Tech. 1999 1999 
92 Domtar Corporation 3,477,597,511 Forest Products 2007 1903 
93 TMX Group Inc. 3,439,531,602 Finance 2002 1861 
94 Calloway REIT 3,306,025,194 Real Estate 2002 1945 
95 Dundee REIT 3,295,953,485 Real Estate 1997 1984 
96 Keyera Corp. 3,258,481,683 Util. & Pipelines 2003 1998 
97 AltaGas Ltd. 3,199,200,309 Div. Industries 2000 1993 
98 Cominar REIT 3,047,295,976 Real Estate 1998 1997 
99 Progress Energy Resources 3,027,065,332 Oil & Gas 2004 2001 
100 Inmet Mining Corporation 3,010,473,463 Mining 1987 1987 
Note: Ranking based on data from 31 May 2012. A few firms that are not headquartered in Canada (General Motors, for example) 
were removed from the list in order to maintain consistency.  Source: TMX Group’s Equity Financing Statistics; effective founding 
date from Forbes Global 2000, Yahoo Finance and company annual reports. 
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Appendix B 
Some Great Canadian Fortunes and some Large Canadian-Domiciled Firms 
Rich 100 
Rank Name 
Net Worth 
$Billions of CAD (TSX Rank)  Corporation 
1 David Thomson and family 20.10 (18) Thomson Reuters Corp. 
2 Galen Weston 8.20 
(45) Loblaw Companies Ltd. 
(53) George Weston Ltd. 
4 Edwards Rogers and family 6.41 (24) Rogers Communications Inc. 
7 Paul Desmarais Sr. 4.40 
(21) Great-West Lifeco Inc. 
(22) Power Financial Corporation 
(33) Power Corporation of Canada 
(37) IGM Financial 
8 Lino Saputo and family 4.23 (52) Saputo Inc. 
10 Chip Wilson 3.51 (55) lululemon athletica inc.  
17 Clay Riddell 2.87 
(125) Paramount Resources Ltd. 
(135) Trilogy Energy Corp. 
(449) Perpetual Energy Inc. 
18 Wallace McCain 2.84 (160) Maple Leaf Foods Inc. 
20 Frank Stronach 2.72 (38) Magna International Inc. 
22 Sobey family 2.35 (159) Empire Co Ltd. 
23 Murray Edwards 2.35 
(12) Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. 
(150) Ensign Energy Services Inc. 
25 Mitchell Goldhar 2.10 (101) Calloway REIT 
33 
Joseph-Armand Bombardier 
and family 1.89 (63)  Bombardier Inc. 
35 Jean Coutu 1.83 (173) Jean Coutu Group 
39 
Gerald Schwartz and Heather 
Reisman 1.69 
(83) Onex Corp. 
(537) Indigo Books & Music Inc. 
40 Ronald Southern 1.67 
(45) Canadian Utilities Ltd. 
(93) Atco Ltd. 
45 JR Shaw 1.50 
(51) Shaw Communications Inc. 
(154) Corus Entertainment Inc. 
47 Stephen Jarislowsky 1.48 * Jarislowsky Fraser Ltd. 
48 Seymour Schulich 1.42 
(40) Canadian Oil Sands Trust 
(511) Newmont Mining Corp of Canada 
54 Larry Rossy 1.25 (90) Dollarama Inc. 
55 Eric Sprott 1.22 (268) Sprott Inc. 
56 Ronald (Ron) Joyce 1.19 (52) Tim Hortons Inc. 
62 Robert Friedlan  1.08 
(61) Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. 
(454) Ivanhoe Energy Inc. 
63 Hal Jackman 1.07 (152) E-L Financial Corp. Ltd. 
66 Alain Bouchard 1.04 (60) Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. 
74 Sam & Van Kolias 0.975 (114) Boardwalk REIT 
 
 
75 Eugene Melnyk 0.973 
(28) Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. 
(Biovail Corp.) 
82 K. (Rai) Sahi 0.881 
(213) Morguard Corporation 
(228) Morguard REIT 
(624) ClubLink Enterprises Ltd. 
(828) Morguard North American Residential REIT 
83 Serge Godin 0.871 (78) CGI Group Inc. 
424 
 
Appendix B 
Some Great Canadian Fortunes and some Large Canadian-Domiciled Firms (cont.) 
84 Michael Lazaridis 0.870 (74) RIM 
88 Rob McEwen 0.790 
(15) Goldcorp Inc. 
(272) Rubicon Minerals Corp. 
(397) McEwen Mining Inc. 
(1,055) Lexam VG Gold Inc. 
91 Leon family 0.721 (283) Leon’s Furniture Ltd. 
96 Jodrey family 0.689 (472) High Liner Foods Incorporated 
97 Pierre Karl and Erik Peladeau 0.673 (131) Quebecor Inc. 
99 Jack Cockwell 0.667 (17) Brookfield Asset Management Inc. 
35 of 100   
20 of the top 60 
38 of the top 200 
* A dominant (privately held) investment management firm with stakes in many of the top firms.  
Note: Net worth rankings are as of 22 November 2012. Corporation rankings are as of 31 May 2012. Source: Canadian Business 
Magazine’s 2012 list of the 100 Richest Canadians (10 December 2012); TMX Group’s Equity Financing Statistics. 
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Appendix C 
Data on Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, a continuous data series on mergers and 
acquisitions does not exist for Canada. The data used in this study are drawn from 
numerous sources. The total number of M&A (Figure 6.3) comes from Marchildon 
(1996), Table A.1, p. 55 for the years 1885-1899. In this data set, the number of mergers is 
the sum of acquisitions and consolidations. The years 1900-1948 come from Weldon 
(1966), Table 1, p. 233. The data represents the number of enterprises absorbed through 
merger. The data hereafter are for the total number of M&A announcements. The years 
1949-1974 are drawn from Globerman (1977), Table 1, p. 55. The years 1975-1987 come 
from Brander (1988), Table 1, p. 117. The years 1988-1989 come from Khemani (1991), 
Table 1, p. 4. There is a gap in the data from 1990-1993. These values were estimated using 
data from UNCTAD on the number of Canadian cross-border M&A as a proxy, with 
proper rebasing (the correlation between the total number of M&A and Canadian cross-
border M&A is 0.78, or very high). The years 1994-2012 come from Financial Post Crosbie 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Canada.  
The dollar value of all announced M&A comes from Financial Post Crosbie 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Canada for 1994-2012 (not all announced M&A are 
completed, but that is the data that are available). The estimated dollar value of mergers 
and acquisitions for prior years comes in a series of steps. The first step was to create a 
unified TSX Composite Price Index by fusing two separate indices, one from the OECD 
through Global Insight for the years 1960-2012 and the second from Global Financial 
Data for the years 1914-1959 (with the year 2005 set to 100). The second step was to 
multiply the total number of M&A by the unified stock price index. The third step was 
the creation of a rebasing number so that the total number of M&A could be multiplied 
by the proxy value. In step four, the resulting number (the number of M&A multiplied by 
the stock price index) was multiplied by the rebasing number. The product is an 
estimate of the dollar value of M&A going backwards in time. The final step was to 
reproduce for Canada Nitzan and Bichler’s buy-to-build indicator (Figure 6.4), which 
divides the dollar value of M&A by business spending on non-residential structures, 
machinery and equipment.  
The types of mergers (inset within Figure 6.3) come from Lecraw and Thompson 
(1977), Table 1, p. 64. The number of foreign acquisitions (as a percent of total, inset in 
Figure 6.4) comes from Globerman (1977) for the years 1945-1974, Brander (1988) for the 
years 1975-1987, Khemani (1991) for the years 1988-1989 and UNCTAD Cross-Border 
M&A Database, Web Tables 11 and 12 for the years 1990-2011.  
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